Bergerie1
I agree with your view of the inability to generate appropriate surprise in simulation: situational surprise vs fundamental surprise.
Startle normally relates to the physical output response.
Simulation can create some surprise - “I did not expect that”, but the situation is plausible with a known or knowable response; training. In very rare simulated situations - the instructor makes it up - the unknowable aspects can be dismissed as only being a simulation, I wont die; lets have fun, I’m not really surprised.
The more extreme, fundamental surprise is unimaginable, not plausible, fearful of an unknown (temporarily unmanageable) outcome; reality in flying, not a simulation.
The question is what type of surprise are pilots expected to manage (encounter):
Situational surprise in normal operations. Reactions should be self evident, education, knowledge, behaviour, training; if not, then the industry has a safety issue.
Fundamental surprise, rare, unforeseeable, cannot have a procedural response. It requires a calm reframing of awareness, to making sense of what is being experienced. To seek understanding, which at best can be turned into situational surprise, but with continuing inherent fear of the unknown - we overreact.
Consider if there is some similar situation, what can be done. Whether that reaction is correct or not depends on questioning understandings, being prepared to change viewpoint and adapt; there is no SOP.
Regarding this thread; Boeing faced fundamental surprise, not that the events were unknowable, but were mentally dismissed as non existent, not a problem. Belatedly they accepted situational surprise, but chose an inappropriate reaction - money before safety, no change of viewpoint (use the money SOP).
The issues in the development simulator could similarly be dismissed - the aircraft was still being developed, the simulator spec or coding incorrect; thus the underlying system problems were not fully appreciated, - there was no threat of death and the much need imagination was put on hold.
‘Flight testers don't like to break things. They like to dispel the illusion that things work’
Prosecuting individuals is akin to error, blame (after the fact); an easy solution for senior management. The industry could minimise this by refocussing safety on the system opposed to the individual.
* never say never; fundamental surprise in simulators. The day the simulator cab fell off the motion jacks - “I don't believe it”, unimaginable at the time, only plausible when outside - ever used the escape ropes for real, are there any escape ropes in the sim.
Last edited by safetypee; 31st Mar 2022 at 06:14.