"Yes, of course, though the simple fact that the FO of crew #2 didn't apply the <10s repeated trim input"
He did. He just didn't correct the trim forces he could clearly feel. You need to read the FDR graphs to see what everyone did.
The "cacophony" was from the stall warning. If pilots are blacking out from a stall warning then something is seriously wrong with the training. In this case it was a false alarm. I'm not sure why that is a factor, issuing false alarms, crying wolf, demanding focus on something that isn't a problem, is pushed off as not of primary importance. It's exactly what brought down AF447, another plane that was fully controllable by the crew. As suggested before, there are plenty of ways to detect the AoA system is either incorrect or has failed completely without using best 2 out of 3 (which failed on at least one Airbus, which also shoved the nose down and required power to be pulled from 2 of 3 flight computers). Using that detection to invalidate that side SMYD and ADIRU would have meant that MCAS would not function. Stop the first domino rather than expect the last domino not to get knocked down after, by my count, 4 have already failed.