PIA A320 Crash Karachi
Originally Posted by Aeromech3
Why offer "pilot discretion proceed direct MAKLI" if this would entail a follow on LH hold pattern (over a populated areas), what advantage?
As the Capn implies, short cuts and “straight-ins” are not uncommon but it’s up to both pilots to agree about their aircraft’s potential and kinetic energy. If the crew is unhappy with the offer, possibly because tiredness, either a polite refusal or a request for more track miles is the correct response and is always respected.
So a very quick mental calculation and discussion for those who are well trained, well rested and well fed.
So a very quick mental calculation and discussion for those who are well trained, well rested and well fed.
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At least crying Inshallah sounds better than Alahu Akbar in their final CVR during their final minutes and shows they had not lost their nerve completely.
I looked into this accident today.
I'm really shocked to find out that most likely all of the deadly mistakes that day were committed by the F/O.
Of course you could say that the captain stubborness to land at all costs was the cause of this accident. But the F/O really didn't help.
He was most likely the one to retract the landing gear before landing. Had he not done that, the aircraft would have probably been able to stop on the runway with the gear down.
He's the one who called for a go around, with engines scraping the runway. Had he not done that, they would just have made a runway excursion, with possibly 100% survivors depending on how much the airplane would have slowed before encountering the first obstacle.
He was the one calling for right engine idle after the "go around". Had he not done that, the airplane would have had more altitude when the engines would give up (after having lost all of their oil)
He was most likely the one to get the landing gear out again after the ATC called them about it. Had he not done that, the airplane most probably could have flown the 1300 meters that it was missing from the runway. And it's likely everybody would have survived, if the gear had been extended at the right time (30s before touchdown).
To sum up, the captain would have transformed a normal standard flight, into a very unstandard flight but certainly without any scratch to the passengers or airplane. The captain could have crashed the airplane, but some other day.
On the other hand, the first officer transformed the very unstandard flight without any damage, to a fatal crash, then and there.
And he committed at least 4 actions that all converged to do so. Abstaining from just one of them could have saved most of the lives involved and even the airplane serviceability (first one).
It's surprising that his role is not emphasized more.
Of course I'm not advocating for 7° slope approaches over stabilized approaches, but I will advocate for messy landings that don't kill anybody over crashes, all day long, all year round.
I'm really shocked to find out that most likely all of the deadly mistakes that day were committed by the F/O.
Of course you could say that the captain stubborness to land at all costs was the cause of this accident. But the F/O really didn't help.
He was most likely the one to retract the landing gear before landing. Had he not done that, the aircraft would have probably been able to stop on the runway with the gear down.
He's the one who called for a go around, with engines scraping the runway. Had he not done that, they would just have made a runway excursion, with possibly 100% survivors depending on how much the airplane would have slowed before encountering the first obstacle.
He was the one calling for right engine idle after the "go around". Had he not done that, the airplane would have had more altitude when the engines would give up (after having lost all of their oil)
He was most likely the one to get the landing gear out again after the ATC called them about it. Had he not done that, the airplane most probably could have flown the 1300 meters that it was missing from the runway. And it's likely everybody would have survived, if the gear had been extended at the right time (30s before touchdown).
To sum up, the captain would have transformed a normal standard flight, into a very unstandard flight but certainly without any scratch to the passengers or airplane. The captain could have crashed the airplane, but some other day.
On the other hand, the first officer transformed the very unstandard flight without any damage, to a fatal crash, then and there.
And he committed at least 4 actions that all converged to do so. Abstaining from just one of them could have saved most of the lives involved and even the airplane serviceability (first one).
It's surprising that his role is not emphasized more.
Of course I'm not advocating for 7° slope approaches over stabilized approaches, but I will advocate for messy landings that don't kill anybody over crashes, all day long, all year round.
I'm really shocked to find out that most likely all of the deadly mistakes that day were committed by the F/O.
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Mentor pilot has done a very good debrief of this accident on his Youtube channel
It makes for sombre watching.
To counter CV's post above regarding the FO and the landing gear before the crash. The tower controller asks the crew about the landing gear which is than acted upon by the crew. Who moved the lever is unknown. If the controller had not mentioned this it would have moved one of the proverbial holes in the swiss cheese and the landing gear may have been kept stowed for longer.
Also mentioned is the order of warnings that the Airbus logic issues. The 'too low, gear' warning was not given on the first attempt. Can anyone eleberate on why, in my opinion a critical warning like this wouldnt be given a higher priority?
To counter CV's post above regarding the FO and the landing gear before the crash. The tower controller asks the crew about the landing gear which is than acted upon by the crew. Who moved the lever is unknown. If the controller had not mentioned this it would have moved one of the proverbial holes in the swiss cheese and the landing gear may have been kept stowed for longer.
Also mentioned is the order of warnings that the Airbus logic issues. The 'too low, gear' warning was not given on the first attempt. Can anyone eleberate on why, in my opinion a critical warning like this wouldnt be given a higher priority?
That doesn't let the Captain off the hook. At no point during a flight does the Captain relinquish command even more so when he is also the PF. Both pilots were making deadly errors that day but it is the Captain who was ultimately responsible for their consequence. He could have told the F/O to leave the gear down and he did not have to execute a go-around just because the F/O called for it. Some days the F/O's performance is not very good and some days the Captain's performance is not very good. On this day neither pilot was operating to even a minimum standard with unfortunate results.
Not going around after a go around call is cause for failure in any sim examination (even if you call go around yourself then change your mind)
Also, maybe he didn't notice the F/O put the gear up. The fault lies with the F/O who didn't ask nor communicate it.
Not really. I don't know for Pakistan airlines but in my airline for example it's mandatory to go around if any pilot calls for it.
Not going around after a go around call is cause for failure in any sim examination (even if you call go around yourself then change your mind).
Not going around after a go around call is cause for failure in any sim examination (even if you call go around yourself then change your mind).
In that state of mind, he was easily convinced by what sounded like an order. "Take off sir, take off !" That's an order.
I would just have liked the report to point out that based on performance calculations, had the gear been kept down throughout the approach, the airplane would have been able to land at the beginning of the runway, on the correct profile, maybe with some excess speed.
The 3400m dry runway then would have been ample room to land even at a ludicrous speed.
Even without the deceleration provided by the gear, had they landed on their wheels, 1500m down the runway, at 200 knots, the airplane at its mass would have been able to stop within the remaining runway length. Worst case they would have made a low speed runway excursion.
If you are unable to maintain situational awareness for the time period of your flight that encompasses "short-final-to-the-flare-to-touchdown" (there was a 777 at SFO a few years ago with a similar problem, being 35+ knots BELOW approach speed, rather the opposite of this case) then there are some serious problems between the ears. It's on the Captain to make sure it is done properly using the crew resources that he has available. That comes with the stripes, the title, and the prestige of being Captain.
I would just have liked the report to point out that based on performance calculations, had the gear been kept down throughout the approach, the airplane would have been able to land at the beginning of the runway, on the correct profile, maybe with some excess speed.
Not going around after a go around call is cause for failure in any sim examination (even if you call go around yourself then change your mind)
I think this flight was operated so badly in almost every respect that there is very little to learn from it. They started with a perfectly serviceable aircraft and managed through complete buffoonery to destroy it and kill all but one person on board and several on the ground, not least by ignoring every good aviation practice and all of the warnings given by the aeroplane.
Non-existent CRM blended with total disregard of SOPs and ATC is a very potent cocktail. There were many, many points during the approach where they could have broken off, set up for another one and none of the rest would have happened. About the only positive in this accident is that it triggered a far-reaching investigation which may have saved more lives in the long run.
Non-existent CRM blended with total disregard of SOPs and ATC is a very potent cocktail. There were many, many points during the approach where they could have broken off, set up for another one and none of the rest would have happened. About the only positive in this accident is that it triggered a far-reaching investigation which may have saved more lives in the long run.
I think this flight was operated so badly in almost every respect that there is very little to learn from it. They started with a perfectly serviceable aircraft and managed through complete buffoonery to destroy it and kill all but one person on board and several on the ground, not least by ignoring every good aviation practice and all of the warnings given by the aeroplane.
Non-existent CRM blended with total disregard of SOPs and ATC is a very potent cocktail. There were many, many points during the approach where they could have broken off, set up for another one and none of the rest would have happened. About the only positive in this accident is that it triggered a far-reaching investigation which may have saved more lives in the long run.
Non-existent CRM blended with total disregard of SOPs and ATC is a very potent cocktail. There were many, many points during the approach where they could have broken off, set up for another one and none of the rest would have happened. About the only positive in this accident is that it triggered a far-reaching investigation which may have saved more lives in the long run.
There are some posters on this forum that strenuously object whenever an accident is attributed to "crew error" - pointing out that things like crew training and chronic fatigue due to rostering are the real culprits. While there may be some truth to that for many 'crew error' accidents, I'd counter that this accident is not one - this was simply a case of a couple of trained pilots who were simply incapable of flying a perfectly good aircraft on that particular day.
tdracer and FullWngs, you are both absolutely right.
I think it's far too kind to the captain to point to the critical errors made by the FO from short finals on the first approach as somehow absolving the captain of primary responsibility. The way the captain directed the aircraft to be operated was so far outside the FO's training and experience that it seems to have overwhelmed him. Another "old school" captain in the right hand seat, or a test pilot, or even just someone versed in single pilot ops might have been able to draw upon instinctive prioritisation and survival skills - SOP be damned - but a child of the magenta line is not equipped to operate like that. That's not his/their fault. The captain pushed the aircraft beyond its limits, and he pushed the FO beyond his limits from the point at which he overrode the FO's final suggestion of an orbit.
"I think this flight was operated so badly in almost every respect that there is very little to learn from it."
Almost correct - a brilliant summary TBH - but what we learn is that there are still ways for complete idiots to finish up in the cabin of a commercial airliner. and due to holes in the cheese its possible for TWO of them to be on the same flight.............
Almost correct - a brilliant summary TBH - but what we learn is that there are still ways for complete idiots to finish up in the cabin of a commercial airliner. and due to holes in the cheese its possible for TWO of them to be on the same flight.............
The accident one hundred percent would not have happened if the Captain had flown a stabilized approach before attempting to land. Period. End of story.
What the Captain did opened myriad holes in the swiss cheese through which the other mistakes were allowed to pass, creating the deadly condition. If the FO wasn't keeping up, that's because the Captain had created a set of conditions beyond the FO's skill set, particularly when they were fasting for Ramadan. I mean -- 7500fpm descent rate 10 miles from the threshold? That's a clue it's time to go around.
Last edited by wjcandee; 20th Apr 2024 at 13:37.
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I am not a pilot but just someone very interested in aviation. I watched the Mentour Pilot video this morning and a few things come to mind. First, from his record it appears to me that the Captain himself had many times preferred messy landings to the point where he didn't or couldn't distinguish them from dangerous ones. To lay blame on an FO when early in the approach the captain said "They'll be surprised we've done this' seemingly indicating that even before things began to go very badly wrong the captain himself knew they were close to the edge seems totally unjust. And unfortunately it also seems to me that if by some miracle i.e. gear being down so stopping just in time, they had made it, with this captain's attitude it would just have happened somewhere else at a different time.
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I think this accident will be used one day by the people pushing for full automation . So many warnings and ECAMs messages were disregarded in that flight . it is close to caricatural . ...