PIA A320 Crash Karachi
Also in the report, a nod to the captain's apparently gung-ho approach to flying: "After the accident, flights of Captain for last 12 months were analysed which indicated, numerous triggers during Approach related to High Speed, Path High, High Rate of Descent, Long Flare Distance and GPWS Warnings. There was no Go-Around initiated and several Unstabilized Approaches were continued." Again, there are no such comments against the FO.
It's not dangerous to perform a maneuver that's under control. What's dangerous is to be in an unexpected, unwanted position, unintentionally. In this case it shows that the pilot does not control the flight path.
Unstable approaches are forbidden, so when they happen, it's a sign that the pilot is behind the aircraft, or that he voluntarily disregards the rule.
The latter case is not necessarily dangerous. At least, in my opinion, less than the first case. Again, do you think airbus test pilots fly stabilized approaches ? They disregard this safety rule, yet they're not dangerous.
To claim the captain was incompetent, it would require to prove that all these violations of usual rules were unintentional. You proved that he was either incompetent, or disregarding voluntarily the rules.
In my opinion it's not clear which is true, however the F/O really didn't help him in this case. There is a clear disregard for the rule, but the fact that the CPT could say "they're gonna be amazed we did it" when indeed his flight path was consistent with a landing (assuming the gear was let down...) pleads, in this case, for the second part.
Constant disregard of the rule giving him some proficiency in this kind of situations (high energy approaches). Not enough obviously...
Do you think airbus test pilots fly stabilized approaches ? What do you think about aerobatics, spins, barrels.. ?
It's not dangerous to perform a maneuver that's under control.
....
To claim the captain was incompetent, it would require to prove that all these violations of usual rules were unintentionnal.
It's not dangerous to perform a maneuver that's under control.
....
To claim the captain was incompetent, it would require to prove that all these violations of usual rules were unintentionnal.
1) Aerobatics (in particular, barrel rolls), spins and test flying are hazardous activities where risk is controlled through application of mitigations in respect of pilot qualifications, experience, supervision, geographic location, etc - and perhaps most importantly in this context, numbers of commercial passengers: ie none.
2) Any captain of a commercial passenger flight who intentionally violates rules in the absence of extenuating circumstances is, by any reasonable definition, incompetent in their role. So I don't think any consideration of intent is necessary.
Yes I am sure they do, whenever they land after a test flight if the landing is not part of the evaluation. I am also sure that they perform all sorts of non-nominal approaches - if those are part of their test plan - with full ground backup and cleared airspace if necessary.
I think those manoeuvres - along with Airbus test pilots - constitute whataboutery and are irrelevant to the PIA incident which was not a test flight and which went south because of an abject failure to operate the aircraft properly... on the part of both pilots (I do agree with you there!)
I think those manoeuvres - along with Airbus test pilots - constitute whataboutery and are irrelevant to the PIA incident which was not a test flight and which went south because of an abject failure to operate the aircraft properly... on the part of both pilots (I do agree with you there!)
Unstable approaches are forbidden, so when they happen, it's a sign that the pilot is behind the aircraft, or that he voluntarily disregards the rule. The latter case is not necessarily dangerous. At least, in my opinion, less than the first case. Again, do you think airbus test pilots fly stabilized approaches ? They disregard this safety rule, yet they're not dangerous.
I would think that test pilots fly stabilised approaches, just like everyone else, unless they are doing something that has been pre-briefed as non-standard and a safety case made for it. Airbus lost a jet and four test pilots in one go at Toulouse, due to an unplanned/unbriefed engine shut down on a perfectly serviceable aeroplane, when one of them decided to show how good the automatics were in this scenario but hadn’t thought it through fully, or involved the other crew members in the decision. I would expect that test pilots are in reality pretty cautious as a group (certainly the ones I know, the older, less bold ones), as I would be if operating much closer to the edge of the flight envelope than in normal ops.
It has been well established that the captain on the PIA flight was more akin to a crash test dummy than a test pilot, and would be a perfect example of the Dunning-Kruger Effect. He was disregarding the rules in some part because he was incompetent; it seems he got away with it up until then because PIAs FOQA was almost non-existent and/or serious issues were flagged but nothing done about them, breeding Normalization of Deviance.
There is a clear disregard for the rule, but the fact that the CPT could say "they're gonna be amazed we did it" when indeed his flight path was consistent with a landing (assuming the gear was let down...) pleads, in this case, for the second part.
Also in the report, a nod to the captain's apparently gung-ho approach to flying: "After the accident, flights of Captain for last 12 months were analysed which indicated, numerous triggers during Approach related to High Speed, Path High, High Rate of Descent, Long Flare Distance and GPWS Warnings. There was no Go-Around initiated and several Unstabilized Approaches were continued." Again, there are no such comments against the FO.
Your claim is way too broad.
You should restrict it to rules which have a direct impact on safety.
Furthermore, the approach is to be stabilized by 500ft (VMC).
Hence, it's perfectly by the book to fly a high energy approach where you descend at an angle of negative 10° of flight path angle, then join the glide path and configure for landing and lift your thrust levers at 540ft AGL and reach VAPP+13kt (my airline allows +15) with some thrust by 500ft AGL. Sometimes it's even part of recurrent training to do this sort of thing.
The PIA8303 was, give or take, close to this sort of profile.
The moment where landing became less likely was when the F/O pulled the gear up.
Had he not done that, the landing would have been nominal. I can't guarantee the approach would have been stabilized (Vapp+15 could have been reached below 500ft, so unstable), but it's 99% sure the captain would have landed and stopped without any passenger noticing anything wrong. Like he did all the time before.
It's easy to notice and compensate for one's own mistakes. It's much more difficult when someone like this guy does completely unexpected things.
Yes I am sure they do, whenever they land after a test flight if the landing is not part of the evaluation.
I didn't have to look for very long to find a sidestep performed below 500ft and finished at 300ft AGL, on flightradar.
For example when they need to gather data about braking or flaring, they will make very short circuits.
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Do you respect the entirety of your tens of thousands of pages of OM A-B-C-.. ? I doubt it. Or, your manuals are much smaller than they could be.
Your claim is way too broad.
You should restrict it to rules which have a direct impact on safety.
Furthermore, the approach is to be stabilized by 500ft (VMC).
Hence, it's perfectly by the book to fly a high energy approach where you descend at an angle of negative 10° of flight path angle, then join the glide path and configure for landing and lift your thrust levers at 540ft AGL and reach VAPP+13kt (my airline allows +15) with some thrust by 500ft AGL. Sometimes it's even part of recurrent training to do this sort of thing.
The PIA8303 was, give or take, close to this sort of profile.
The moment where landing became less likely was when the F/O pulled the gear up.
Had he not done that, the landing would have been nominal. I can't guarantee the approach would have been stabilized (Vapp+15 could have been reached below 500ft, so unstable), but it's 99% sure the captain would have landed and stopped without any passenger noticing anything wrong. Like he did all the time before.
It's easy to notice and compensate for one's own mistakes. It's much more difficult when someone like this guy does completely unexpected things.
If you lived in Toulouse, you would regularly see, during weekdays, white and blue jetliners turning to final lower than 500ft AGL.
I didn't have to look for very long to find a sidestep performed below 500ft and finished at 300ft AGL, on flightradar.
For example when they need to gather data about braking or flaring, they will make very short circuits.
Your claim is way too broad.
You should restrict it to rules which have a direct impact on safety.
Furthermore, the approach is to be stabilized by 500ft (VMC).
Hence, it's perfectly by the book to fly a high energy approach where you descend at an angle of negative 10° of flight path angle, then join the glide path and configure for landing and lift your thrust levers at 540ft AGL and reach VAPP+13kt (my airline allows +15) with some thrust by 500ft AGL. Sometimes it's even part of recurrent training to do this sort of thing.
The PIA8303 was, give or take, close to this sort of profile.
The moment where landing became less likely was when the F/O pulled the gear up.
Had he not done that, the landing would have been nominal. I can't guarantee the approach would have been stabilized (Vapp+15 could have been reached below 500ft, so unstable), but it's 99% sure the captain would have landed and stopped without any passenger noticing anything wrong. Like he did all the time before.
It's easy to notice and compensate for one's own mistakes. It's much more difficult when someone like this guy does completely unexpected things.
If you lived in Toulouse, you would regularly see, during weekdays, white and blue jetliners turning to final lower than 500ft AGL.
I didn't have to look for very long to find a sidestep performed below 500ft and finished at 300ft AGL, on flightradar.
For example when they need to gather data about braking or flaring, they will make very short circuits.
I don’t know why You are mentioning Airbus test pilots but anyway those guys have a very specific job to do and they are also highly trained for that, their margins are different from a standard line flight crew, regardless of the crew experience, for many different reasons already mentioned above.
Here is a possible scenario:
The Captain - who we have learned was generally difficult and autocratic and did not fly by the book - is for some reason, (maybe hunger), in a particularly bad and unapproachable mood that day. Due to his impatience, he decides to accept an approach that is too close, too high and too fast, instead of simply asking for more track miles or even a 360°
He barks orders to his F/O who is either brand new or timid or both. This shouting and the extreme approach puts the F/O behind the aircraft trying to keep up with the orders and checklists and seating the cabin crew and radio calls, so he has no time to think except to do what the Captain is ordering. Captain barks "Gear down" 30 nm out and the F/O complies, his mind paralysed. As they get to short finals the Captain - who has forgotten the gear is already down - barks "Gear Down" and the F/O moves the lever, but because the gear was already down he actually raises the gear. As they flare; the F/O realises what has happened and miserably, finally manages to speak up and calls go-around to avoid a crash landing.
The Captain at last realises that he has severely f****d up and hasn't got away with it this time, so he obeys the go-around call, hoping he can rescue the situation and be able to explain the disastrous approach away somehow. But then the engine accessory gearboxes and oil pumps are badly damaged and the subsequent fatal accident is inevitable.
This is the sort of thing that F/Os need to be able to deal with, (and all Captains need to be aware of), but in years of CRM courses, I have never seen it properly addressed. Cabin crew are given specific training and role playing about how to deal with angry or unreasonable passengers but I have never seen F/Os trained to deal with angry or unreasonable Captains.
The Captain - who we have learned was generally difficult and autocratic and did not fly by the book - is for some reason, (maybe hunger), in a particularly bad and unapproachable mood that day. Due to his impatience, he decides to accept an approach that is too close, too high and too fast, instead of simply asking for more track miles or even a 360°
He barks orders to his F/O who is either brand new or timid or both. This shouting and the extreme approach puts the F/O behind the aircraft trying to keep up with the orders and checklists and seating the cabin crew and radio calls, so he has no time to think except to do what the Captain is ordering. Captain barks "Gear down" 30 nm out and the F/O complies, his mind paralysed. As they get to short finals the Captain - who has forgotten the gear is already down - barks "Gear Down" and the F/O moves the lever, but because the gear was already down he actually raises the gear. As they flare; the F/O realises what has happened and miserably, finally manages to speak up and calls go-around to avoid a crash landing.
The Captain at last realises that he has severely f****d up and hasn't got away with it this time, so he obeys the go-around call, hoping he can rescue the situation and be able to explain the disastrous approach away somehow. But then the engine accessory gearboxes and oil pumps are badly damaged and the subsequent fatal accident is inevitable.
This is the sort of thing that F/Os need to be able to deal with, (and all Captains need to be aware of), but in years of CRM courses, I have never seen it properly addressed. Cabin crew are given specific training and role playing about how to deal with angry or unreasonable passengers but I have never seen F/Os trained to deal with angry or unreasonable Captains.
That's more like it tho my own take is that the whole cockpit environment was a bit more insidious and places a little bit more blame on the FO but maybe helps explain why the FO acted as he did. As follows:-
Autocratic but laid-back Capt sets the scene of "lets wing this flight as usual" right from the Departure Gate and the FO sort of goes along with it as the Capts reputation of bawling out FOs is well known - maybe these 2 have flown on previous occasions - and so "non-standard" is the accepted norm. Indeed, the Capt appears quite amicable on the day as they are reported to be chatting about this and that - but his reputation is there as someone who can "turn"........
The FO, while seemingly playing along with the "lets wing this flight as usual" gets more and more concerned during the approach and finally starts to suggest the hold is the solution to get back on profile - but here the Capt gets annoyed and rejects the hold suggestion from both the FO and ATC and then just takes over.
The FO, by now, is very unhappy and increasingly stressed both at the lack of a hold to sort things out - something he's wanting to do and hence the gear coming up - but, wait, now he's just had control whipped from him....... The Capt has consistently rejected buying time and seems intent on seeing "Plan A" through to it's conclusion and has now made that abundantly clear. After all, he's even said that he'll show ATC what he can do as a skilled aviator!!!! But, because of the way the whole flight has been conducted so far, the Capts not really on top of the aircraft anymore .... hence the gear......
At that point the FO seems to simply enter into a sort of "sod it" mode and what rational thinking he was doing now seems to leave him (certainly WRT remembering the status of the gear). The rest is as we see until the Capt finally realises that it's all gone South as you say.
WRT to the comment that this is the sort of situation FOs need to be able to deal with, I was on a Training Course with several guys from Pakistan - all really nice guys. But, when it came to working scenarios (moving aircraft about on the ground) when we all role-played, there was in their group a "No 1". The guys would consistently turn to this guy for direction even if he was playing a "minion". Whenever the guy who was managing the move issued an instruction - Brit or one of their team - they would immediately look to this guy for his approval. It drove the Instructor nuts as they refused to do otherwise - their No 1 had the final say on everything - end of! That was "the way" and, had I not seen it myself, I'd never have believed it. CRM would have a tough time in breaking down such thinking. But, as I said, a nicer bunch of guys you couldn't find!
Anyway, a thought...... FWIW!
Autocratic but laid-back Capt sets the scene of "lets wing this flight as usual" right from the Departure Gate and the FO sort of goes along with it as the Capts reputation of bawling out FOs is well known - maybe these 2 have flown on previous occasions - and so "non-standard" is the accepted norm. Indeed, the Capt appears quite amicable on the day as they are reported to be chatting about this and that - but his reputation is there as someone who can "turn"........
The FO, while seemingly playing along with the "lets wing this flight as usual" gets more and more concerned during the approach and finally starts to suggest the hold is the solution to get back on profile - but here the Capt gets annoyed and rejects the hold suggestion from both the FO and ATC and then just takes over.
The FO, by now, is very unhappy and increasingly stressed both at the lack of a hold to sort things out - something he's wanting to do and hence the gear coming up - but, wait, now he's just had control whipped from him....... The Capt has consistently rejected buying time and seems intent on seeing "Plan A" through to it's conclusion and has now made that abundantly clear. After all, he's even said that he'll show ATC what he can do as a skilled aviator!!!! But, because of the way the whole flight has been conducted so far, the Capts not really on top of the aircraft anymore .... hence the gear......
At that point the FO seems to simply enter into a sort of "sod it" mode and what rational thinking he was doing now seems to leave him (certainly WRT remembering the status of the gear). The rest is as we see until the Capt finally realises that it's all gone South as you say.
WRT to the comment that this is the sort of situation FOs need to be able to deal with, I was on a Training Course with several guys from Pakistan - all really nice guys. But, when it came to working scenarios (moving aircraft about on the ground) when we all role-played, there was in their group a "No 1". The guys would consistently turn to this guy for direction even if he was playing a "minion". Whenever the guy who was managing the move issued an instruction - Brit or one of their team - they would immediately look to this guy for his approval. It drove the Instructor nuts as they refused to do otherwise - their No 1 had the final say on everything - end of! That was "the way" and, had I not seen it myself, I'd never have believed it. CRM would have a tough time in breaking down such thinking. But, as I said, a nicer bunch of guys you couldn't find!
Anyway, a thought...... FWIW!
Last edited by Hot 'n' High; 25th Apr 2024 at 11:22.
This is the sort of thing that F/Os need to be able to deal with, (and all Captains need to be aware of), but in years of CRM courses, I have never seen it properly addressed. Cabin crew are given specific training and role playing about how to deal with angry or unreasonable passengers but I have never seen F/Os trained to deal with angry or unreasonable Captains.
However your last point is more than valid.
At my airline we received some guidance to help us deal with overwhelmed captains. And some advice about what to do with this type of behavior. Not a huge training but definitely some guidance.
It does not resemble in any way or form to manipulating important controls in the back of the captain and trying to take decisions in his back. On the contrary, in the end you have to work as a team until the airplane is landed. Then, once safely at the gate, not one minute before that, you will make as many reports as you need and call management to explain why you don't want to fly with the guy anymore.
I know first hand accounts from friends, of pilots using this type of method in very exceptional cases.
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Furthermore, the approach is to be stabilized by 500ft (VMC).
I don't buy your scenario, the F/O voluntarily retracted the gear because he wanted to go around, but didn't anything about either going around nor retracting the gear.
3.1.3.22 After AP disconnection, “OVERSPEED” VFE triggered Master Warning along with CRC Aural Alert. Flight crew selected FLAPS without monitoring speed
and did not verbalize acknowledgement of the Master Warning.
3.1.3.23 Two Sequence of GPWS Alerts were triggered before the R/W contact. During 04 GPWS Warnings of “PULL UP”, flight crew did not perform an immediate Terrain Avoidance / Escape Manoeuvre. On 02 “SINK RATE” and 10 “TOO LOW TERRAIN” Amber Cautions, flight crew did not call out GPWS Caution.
3.1.3.24 At 1,600 ft baro altitude, 5 NM from R/W 25L, Landing Gears were selected UP, and Speed Brakes were retracted. Retraction of Landing Gears and Speed
Brakes were not verbalized. 3.1.3.25 At 1,100 ft baro altitude and CAS 227 kts, FO was heard saying “Should we do the Orbit?” (in Urdu) to which Captain replied “No-No”, followed by “Leave it” (both in Urdu). This communication indicates FO has intention for an Orbit. Most probably Landing Gear and Speed Brakes were retracted by FO.
3.1.3.26 Captain took over controls and change of controls was not verbalized by either of the flight crew.
and did not verbalize acknowledgement of the Master Warning.
3.1.3.23 Two Sequence of GPWS Alerts were triggered before the R/W contact. During 04 GPWS Warnings of “PULL UP”, flight crew did not perform an immediate Terrain Avoidance / Escape Manoeuvre. On 02 “SINK RATE” and 10 “TOO LOW TERRAIN” Amber Cautions, flight crew did not call out GPWS Caution.
3.1.3.24 At 1,600 ft baro altitude, 5 NM from R/W 25L, Landing Gears were selected UP, and Speed Brakes were retracted. Retraction of Landing Gears and Speed
Brakes were not verbalized. 3.1.3.25 At 1,100 ft baro altitude and CAS 227 kts, FO was heard saying “Should we do the Orbit?” (in Urdu) to which Captain replied “No-No”, followed by “Leave it” (both in Urdu). This communication indicates FO has intention for an Orbit. Most probably Landing Gear and Speed Brakes were retracted by FO.
3.1.3.26 Captain took over controls and change of controls was not verbalized by either of the flight crew.
This was a maximally dysfunctional team. Either one by themselves would likely have landed safely, but the failures of basic communication became overwhelming and the Captain, who was monitoring, didn't seem to monitor in spite of warnings from the plane and from the ATC.
I am unsure if the Captain at any time was aware of just how badly this approach was going. I am unsure if fasting can carry the full blame as the report indicates the Captain had a number of unstabilized approaches that he continued with, but fasting could certainly have made realizing how bad the situation was unlikely.
The entire thing leaves me sad.
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This is the sort of thing that F/Os need to be able to deal with, (and all Captains need to be aware of), but in years of CRM courses, I have never seen it properly addressed. Cabin crew are given specific training and role playing about how to deal with angry or unreasonable passengers but I have never seen F/Os trained to deal with angry or unreasonable Captains.
Over this last part I would like to emphasize the fact that when operating within the boundaries of proper Aviation Safety Agencies and proper NAA, there should be no place for any Operator to have highly unsuitable crew members at the controls.
Generally speaking we do not expect pilots to reach those kind of extreme behaviors (even though I remember some time ago a couple of pilots from a National Airline fighting in the cockpit but luckily that was on the ground…). Problematic Captains should be stopped by Flt Ops at the very first signs that something is going out of the loop.
A general word For all the FOs, especially the youngest ones: remember that the Captain is there also for YOUR safety. If you don’t feel safe with someone go ahead and fill up reports. Always be factual, never give Your opinions, so that will work even if some guys “have connections”.
Remember that the Legal implications of seating up front, especially in the LHS, are HUGE. Always do Your best to keep everyone safe.
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