I don't buy your scenario, the F/O voluntarily retracted the gear because he wanted to go around, but didn't anything about either going around nor retracting the gear.
Per the report analysis, before the FO could start the go-around the Captain took controls from the FO.
3.1.3.22 After AP disconnection, “OVERSPEED” VFE triggered Master Warning along with CRC Aural Alert. Flight crew selected FLAPS without monitoring speed
and did not verbalize acknowledgement of the Master Warning.
3.1.3.23 Two Sequence of GPWS Alerts were triggered before the R/W contact. During 04 GPWS Warnings of “PULL UP”, flight crew did not perform an immediate Terrain Avoidance / Escape Manoeuvre. On 02 “SINK RATE” and 10 “TOO LOW TERRAIN” Amber Cautions, flight crew did not call out GPWS Caution.
3.1.3.24 At 1,600 ft baro altitude, 5 NM from R/W 25L, Landing Gears were selected UP, and Speed Brakes were retracted. Retraction of Landing Gears and Speed
Brakes were not verbalized. 3.1.3.25 At 1,100 ft baro altitude and CAS 227 kts, FO was heard saying “Should we do the Orbit?” (in Urdu) to which Captain replied “No-No”, followed by “Leave it” (both in Urdu). This communication indicates FO has intention for an Orbit. Most probably Landing Gear and Speed Brakes were retracted by FO.
3.1.3.26 Captain took over controls and change of controls was not verbalized by either of the flight crew.
I haven't backed up enough to see how coming in too high and too fast originated, but the FO was generally in charge of the controls until the Captain decided to grab them. Had the Captain not done so, the FO had clearly prepped to go around, having retracted the gear, the speed brakes, and seemed to be prepping to follow through on the PULL UP, SINK RATE, and TOO LOW TERRAIN warnings.
This was a maximally dysfunctional team. Either one by themselves would likely have landed safely, but the failures of basic communication became overwhelming and the Captain, who was monitoring, didn't seem to monitor in spite of warnings from the plane and from the ATC.
I am unsure if the Captain at any time was aware of just how badly this approach was going. I am unsure if fasting can carry the full blame as the report indicates the Captain had a number of unstabilized approaches that he continued with, but fasting could certainly have made realizing how bad the situation was unlikely.
The entire thing leaves me sad.