Swiss Control Human Factors
By their own chronology of events, Skyguide reports that both aircraft were on the same Swiss Control frequency for between five and six minutes prior to impact. A mid air collision in European controlled airspace has occurred, the first since Zagreb, with disastrous consequences.
Having visited the Zürich AACC (Area and Approach control centre) several things strike me as incongruous within their rather surprisingly rapid efforts to deflect blame upon dead aircrew.
Controllers routinely occupy their sectors whilst maintaining a 'speaker watch'. No headsets are used, and local distractions are therefore amplified. Was the controller actually at his/her seated sector position from 2325-2336, or merely there long enough to answer the initial contact calls of first DHL at 2325 and then the Tu154 at 2330?
Why weren't either aircraft assigned a separation vector at any time from 2325, why was it left so late to descend the Tupolev? That it was left so late in attempting to separate aircraft at the same level, that a delayed response from the Tupolev is even as issue, is an indictment of the Sector Controller responsible.
I regularly operate in Swiss controlled airspace, to and from Zürich Airport, and within Zürich's area of responsibility, and find their usual standard of controlling to be among the finest in Europe. However, as seems likely from the chronology of this disaster, lack of attention by the Zürich controller was, at the very least, the triggering causal factor of this accident. Personally, rather than reduce ZRH AACC capacity by 20% as has been the Skyguide response, I for one would like to see compulsory headsets insisted upon for all European Air Traffic Controllers.
It is perilously easy to become distracted by local conversations (how many European pilots haven’t heard other conversations/laughter taking place in the background of ATC comms?) during even optimum periods of stress. The potential for disaster is, in my opinion, orders of magnitude greater late at night with vastly reduced alertness levels.
If the ongoing investigation does reveal, as I strongly suspect it will, lack of ATC attention from 2325 until impact at 2336, I find the haste in deflecting blame onto the TU154 crew, and failing to accept full responsibility, to be an appalling reflection on the management of Skyguide (Swiss Control).
We need to learn from this. Ducking lawsuits and seeking a redirection of responsibility is no way to further flight safety.
Last edited by Hold at Saffa; 7th Jul 2002 at 13:30.