Mid-Air Collision over Southern Germany (merged)
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RatherBe Flying
100% agree with you. Skyguide management is to be held responsible for a huge part of this accident. They not just let happen that there is only one single controller in front of the radar, they demand that because of lack of personel. It's the same management that stopped ab initio training some years ago. So they are to blame that there are not enough controller to work in two man ops. And those working are doing it with minimum freedays (8 days/month)!! The more tired you are the more mistake you make!
100% agree with you. Skyguide management is to be held responsible for a huge part of this accident. They not just let happen that there is only one single controller in front of the radar, they demand that because of lack of personel. It's the same management that stopped ab initio training some years ago. So they are to blame that there are not enough controller to work in two man ops. And those working are doing it with minimum freedays (8 days/month)!! The more tired you are the more mistake you make!
Props are for boats!
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What Goes Up ,I suppose I was really only explaining what happens at a radar head and not taking process time into consideration. Seems awfull slow though, especially when multi radars are aquiring the target. What happened was tragic, and should be learnt from what ever the case. To me this shows you cant totally be complacent with technology, and if you have certain features switched off or ( in this case a collision alerting system at the ATC site ) You think that something so important should have redundancy, I bet most other parts of their system are.
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Rather be Flying, I'd stick to computers if I were you. The DHL may not have been aware that the controller was vectoring to avoid them, it is not the first priority to tell ATC that you are responding to a TCAS but to get on with it.
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Multi Radar Processing
Sheep Guts - I agree with you 12 seconds for an update on a Multi Radar system is a long time,unless of course there is a very slow rotating radar head contributing to the picture.
The Multi Picture should be updated at the same rate as the slowest rotating radar that is capable of feeding into the system. This allows that Multi Processing to have at least one set of track and plot information from each radar for each aircraft.
Don't let processing delay confuse you. If a radar rotates at every 6 seconds (or 10 rpm) and it takes 1 second to process the data (radar head, data transmission system, radar processing at ACC, display update) then the display with still update every 6 seconds, its just the data will be 1 second old.
The Multi Picture should be updated at the same rate as the slowest rotating radar that is capable of feeding into the system. This allows that Multi Processing to have at least one set of track and plot information from each radar for each aircraft.
Don't let processing delay confuse you. If a radar rotates at every 6 seconds (or 10 rpm) and it takes 1 second to process the data (radar head, data transmission system, radar processing at ACC, display update) then the display with still update every 6 seconds, its just the data will be 1 second old.
Seriph, I have no quarrel with your last two assertions (see updated profile for first).
That said, letting ATC know reasonably soon which way you are deviating from your clearance because of an RA looks like a good second priority.
That said, letting ATC know reasonably soon which way you are deviating from your clearance because of an RA looks like a good second priority.
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ATC is usually pretty good in the western world (sometime I’m not really sure about the borderline). However, to deal with ATC shortcomings they have invented TCAS. This is the last safety net to avoid a midair collision.
If the Russian guy had been trained properly, he would have followed his RA, no matter what ATC says, no matter what your visual reference tells you. Let’s face it, if his training would have been adequate, the accident wouldn’t have happen and we would never heard about the ATC **** up.
I guess we all know the rules about collision avoidance in former UDSSR airspace: Traffic visual on the right, you climb, traffic visual on the left, you descend.
Flying there worries me sometime, because you are not suppose to do what you are trained to do; follow your RA (unless ground contact is possible). Is your conflicting traffic a western aircraft who is following RA or a russian Aircraft? Does he have visual contact? Does he understand English? These questions go through my mind when I see a target at the same altitude on my NAV display.
If the Russian guy had been trained properly, he would have followed his RA, no matter what ATC says, no matter what your visual reference tells you. Let’s face it, if his training would have been adequate, the accident wouldn’t have happen and we would never heard about the ATC **** up.
I guess we all know the rules about collision avoidance in former UDSSR airspace: Traffic visual on the right, you climb, traffic visual on the left, you descend.
Flying there worries me sometime, because you are not suppose to do what you are trained to do; follow your RA (unless ground contact is possible). Is your conflicting traffic a western aircraft who is following RA or a russian Aircraft? Does he have visual contact? Does he understand English? These questions go through my mind when I see a target at the same altitude on my NAV display.
About a dozen of our pilots worked two years for a major European airline, following a very creative agreement, as "Cruise pilots", when they and many others were laid off here in the early 90's.
One of the pilots who worked there was on our jumpseat in the early or mid-90's to ABQ, a western US city. He described firsthand a flight over Russia long after midnight while he was in the 744 Captain's seat. Straight ahead he saw the lights of another plane, and it was at the same altitude! I seem to remember that "Kreijde" (his nickname) was beginning to level off at a higher altitude, and so he smoothly but quickly pushed the nose over and missed the other plane by less than three or four hundred feet or so. After he asked ATC about other aircraft, no others were said to be in the area at that altitude.
I can't remember if the airline already had TCAS onboard.
One of the pilots who worked there was on our jumpseat in the early or mid-90's to ABQ, a western US city. He described firsthand a flight over Russia long after midnight while he was in the 744 Captain's seat. Straight ahead he saw the lights of another plane, and it was at the same altitude! I seem to remember that "Kreijde" (his nickname) was beginning to level off at a higher altitude, and so he smoothly but quickly pushed the nose over and missed the other plane by less than three or four hundred feet or so. After he asked ATC about other aircraft, no others were said to be in the area at that altitude.
I can't remember if the airline already had TCAS onboard.
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From the New York Times:
Midair Crash Opens Debate on Air Safety Over Europe
By MARK LANDLER
FRANKFURT, July 20 — Europeans can drive from Stockholm to Seville without stopping at a border post or showing a passport. But if they fly across the Continent, their pilot must deal with a long succession of national air traffic authorities, some calling on different radio frequencies, as the plane streaks across the borders that divide the skies of one country from the next.
Aviation experts have complained for years that this fragmentation of airspace contributes to the chronic delays in European flights, since pilots take longer plotting their routes.
Now, in the wake of the recent midair crash of a Russian passenger jet and a Boeing 757 cargo plane over southern Germany, some say Europe's patchwork of air traffic control systems is also a safety threat.
"Many of these countries are way, way too small to have their own air traffic control centers," said Jim Eckes, the managing director of Indoswiss Aviation, an airline consulting company. "The Swiss airspace should be merged into the German zone. If the Germans were running it, this accident probably wouldn't have happened."
Such assertions are predictably controversial in Europe, where sovereignty and pride often clash with growing economic and political integration.
But officials here acknowledge that among the baffling chain of missteps that led to the midair collision on July 1 was a breakdown in communication between controllers in Karlsruhe, Germany, who had been tracking the planes, and the controller on duty in Zurich, who picked up the planes as they flew close to Lake Constance, in southern Germany near the Swiss border.
Investigators say the German controller tried desperately to call his counterpart in Zurich, after noticing that the planes were on a collision course two minutes before the crash. But the line was busy.
"Normally a controller should have a hot line to call his colleague," said George Paulson, the director of safety, airspace and airports at the European Organization for the Safety of Air Navigation, which provides technical advice on air traffic control issues to 31 European countries.
Mr. Paulson said his organization, known as Eurocontrol, had set up a high-level committee after the crash to draft new safety recommendations. It expects to issue the guidelines in November.
Among the possible recommendations, he said, could be emergency phone lines, or a computer link, between air traffic control centers in different countries. It may also suggest ways to improve communication between pilots and controllers.
On the fateful night of July 1, the Swiss controller ordered the pilot of the Russian Tupolev Tu-154, to descend to avoid the Boeing, operated by the overnight courier service DHL Worldwide Express. Later, the collision warning system on the Russian plane instructed the pilot to climb. He obeyed the Swiss controller, with tragic results.
"It's an accident that never should have happened," Mr. Paulson said.
Despite that, he said Europe's safety record compared favorably to that of the United States, which has a unified air traffic control system. Midair crashes are rare on both sides of the Atlantic.
The difference is that American controllers handle double the volume of traffic, on average, of their European counterparts. As traffic in Europe becomes more congested, experts worry that its fragmented system — which uses 73 control centers, compared with 22 in the United States — will not be able to cope.
Defenders of the European system point out that in most countries the private companies that provide air traffic control services use newer, more advanced technology than that used in the United States.
Still, Europe's airlines are pushing for a uniform airspace, which would be regulated by the European Commission. Their motivation is mainly economic: eliminating national boundaries would allow Europe to consolidate its 73 centers into a few megacenters.
Not surprisingly, the chief opponents of the idea are the controllers themselves. They fear that streamlining Europe's air traffic system will lead to a loss of jobs. And they argue that the commercial pressure will increase, not reduce, the likelihood of future crashes.
"There's nothing wrong with harmonizing the system," said Marc Baumgartner, a controller in Geneva who is president of the International Federation of Air Traffic Controllers. "But the way the E.C. is doing it is through economic incentives, and that has a direct impact on training." He acknowledged, however, that the crash had thrown many long-held assumptions into question.
"It took away a bit of our religion," he said. "We had all the safety nets in place to prevent this, and still it happened."
Midair Crash Opens Debate on Air Safety Over Europe
By MARK LANDLER
FRANKFURT, July 20 — Europeans can drive from Stockholm to Seville without stopping at a border post or showing a passport. But if they fly across the Continent, their pilot must deal with a long succession of national air traffic authorities, some calling on different radio frequencies, as the plane streaks across the borders that divide the skies of one country from the next.
Aviation experts have complained for years that this fragmentation of airspace contributes to the chronic delays in European flights, since pilots take longer plotting their routes.
Now, in the wake of the recent midair crash of a Russian passenger jet and a Boeing 757 cargo plane over southern Germany, some say Europe's patchwork of air traffic control systems is also a safety threat.
"Many of these countries are way, way too small to have their own air traffic control centers," said Jim Eckes, the managing director of Indoswiss Aviation, an airline consulting company. "The Swiss airspace should be merged into the German zone. If the Germans were running it, this accident probably wouldn't have happened."
Such assertions are predictably controversial in Europe, where sovereignty and pride often clash with growing economic and political integration.
But officials here acknowledge that among the baffling chain of missteps that led to the midair collision on July 1 was a breakdown in communication between controllers in Karlsruhe, Germany, who had been tracking the planes, and the controller on duty in Zurich, who picked up the planes as they flew close to Lake Constance, in southern Germany near the Swiss border.
Investigators say the German controller tried desperately to call his counterpart in Zurich, after noticing that the planes were on a collision course two minutes before the crash. But the line was busy.
"Normally a controller should have a hot line to call his colleague," said George Paulson, the director of safety, airspace and airports at the European Organization for the Safety of Air Navigation, which provides technical advice on air traffic control issues to 31 European countries.
Mr. Paulson said his organization, known as Eurocontrol, had set up a high-level committee after the crash to draft new safety recommendations. It expects to issue the guidelines in November.
Among the possible recommendations, he said, could be emergency phone lines, or a computer link, between air traffic control centers in different countries. It may also suggest ways to improve communication between pilots and controllers.
On the fateful night of July 1, the Swiss controller ordered the pilot of the Russian Tupolev Tu-154, to descend to avoid the Boeing, operated by the overnight courier service DHL Worldwide Express. Later, the collision warning system on the Russian plane instructed the pilot to climb. He obeyed the Swiss controller, with tragic results.
"It's an accident that never should have happened," Mr. Paulson said.
Despite that, he said Europe's safety record compared favorably to that of the United States, which has a unified air traffic control system. Midair crashes are rare on both sides of the Atlantic.
The difference is that American controllers handle double the volume of traffic, on average, of their European counterparts. As traffic in Europe becomes more congested, experts worry that its fragmented system — which uses 73 control centers, compared with 22 in the United States — will not be able to cope.
Defenders of the European system point out that in most countries the private companies that provide air traffic control services use newer, more advanced technology than that used in the United States.
Still, Europe's airlines are pushing for a uniform airspace, which would be regulated by the European Commission. Their motivation is mainly economic: eliminating national boundaries would allow Europe to consolidate its 73 centers into a few megacenters.
Not surprisingly, the chief opponents of the idea are the controllers themselves. They fear that streamlining Europe's air traffic system will lead to a loss of jobs. And they argue that the commercial pressure will increase, not reduce, the likelihood of future crashes.
"There's nothing wrong with harmonizing the system," said Marc Baumgartner, a controller in Geneva who is president of the International Federation of Air Traffic Controllers. "But the way the E.C. is doing it is through economic incentives, and that has a direct impact on training." He acknowledged, however, that the crash had thrown many long-held assumptions into question.
"It took away a bit of our religion," he said. "We had all the safety nets in place to prevent this, and still it happened."
on your FM dial
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A fair assessment by the New York Times.
European ATC has been kept in the dark ages for decades by protectionist employment policies and ego-political nationalistic squabbling.
The United States of Europe - the way forward.
European ATC has been kept in the dark ages for decades by protectionist employment policies and ego-political nationalistic squabbling.
The United States of Europe - the way forward.
ex-Tanker
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CVR data (verbatim not released in Europe - only the sense) shows that in the last seconds both crews tried further avoiding action - possibly visual based. Gallant guys all but it was not to be.
Source NZZ newspaper.
Source NZZ newspaper.
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Hemispherical Cruising Altitude Regulations Maximize Midair Collisions
The major world-wide aviation safety technical error called the hemispherical cruising altitude rule caused the German midair collision, and was similarly responsible for the Namibian collision September 13, 1998. This rule is a technical error because it is impossible to follow it and improve flight safety. I proved this with my paper published April 1997 in Risk Analysis: An International Journal (http://www.geocities.com/rpatlovany/...Manuscript.htm). My findings were corroborated by a NASA Ames Research Center programmer Russ Paielli in Air Traffic Control Quarterly in the Fall of 2000 in his paper: "A Linear Altitude Rule for Safer and More Efficient Enroute Air Traffic," (http://russp.org/publist.htm). My non-technical description of the proof was published in Aviation Safety December 1998, which resulted in almost two pages of published comments (http://us.share.geocities.com/rpatlo...cleLetters.pdf). The world wide aviation community has known, or should have known, of this error since Feb. 1968 with the publication in Air Facts of "Automatic Altitude & Heading Separation," by Leighton Collins (http://www.geocities.com/rpatlovany).
In summary, aircraft mean free path to collision (that is, safety) is reduced in direct proportion to the accuracy of compliance in obeying the hemispherical cruising altitude rule, as proven by two independent computer simulations and the mean free path formula itself. It is physically impossible to improve safety by using the hemispherical cruising altitude rule. In fact, it is so impossible to improve safety using this rule that random altitude pilots have at least six times more safety than rigorously and professionally obedient pilots obeying the rule. The German and Namibian collisions prove that given the great frequency of even single human errors in cockpits and air traffic control centers, once such errors have occurred, it is far safer to be at random altitudes than to be in a thin slice of airspace with unnaturally and unnecessarily high concentrations of other aircraft.
The easy, almost zero-cost solution (for aircraft owners and pilots) is the Altimeter-Compass Cruising Altitude Rule (ACCAR), which I modeled as RP-1000 in my Risk Analysis paper. Here's how this 70-year-old cruising altitude rule works. Mentally superimpose a compass rose on your altimeter scale (or cheat with a translucent printing of the compass rose adhering to the altimeter gauge glass). Fly the desired cruising heading on the magnetic compass. Then at cruising altitude, climb or descend until the superimposed mental "heading" of the 100-ft hand of the altimeter match the measured heading of the compass.
If everybody does this, then everybody at every altitude is flying on parallel paths with maximum mean free path to midair collision and a minimum possible closing velocity. Obeying ACCAR the DHL 757 would have missed the Russian Tu-154 by over 200 ft, and the Namibian C141 would have missed the German Tu-154 by over 450 ft. So far 135 people have unnecessarily died and about $500 million in aircraft have been lost due to the failure of the USA Federal Aviation Administration to seriously consider my request for a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (28996) back in 1997 to fix the problem (http://www.geocities.com/rpatlovany/...leMidairs.html).
This may seem tough to think about at first. However, my sensitivity study (risk vs. compliance accuracy, Figures 1 and 2 in the Risk Analysis paper) shows that when you are depending on the pilots eyes and the hemispherical cruising altitude rule in any way for safety, random altitudes are safer than the hemispherical cruising altitude rule; and ANY level of accuracy in following ACCAR is far better than random altitudes with about twice the visible time to collision due to halved average closing speeds.
Before you tell me how hard ACCAR is to use, go up and try it sometimes where it is legal to fly random altitudes (for example, under 3000 ft above ground level in the USA). It took me three minutes to get fully stabilized on ACCAR the first time I tried it.
In summary, aircraft mean free path to collision (that is, safety) is reduced in direct proportion to the accuracy of compliance in obeying the hemispherical cruising altitude rule, as proven by two independent computer simulations and the mean free path formula itself. It is physically impossible to improve safety by using the hemispherical cruising altitude rule. In fact, it is so impossible to improve safety using this rule that random altitude pilots have at least six times more safety than rigorously and professionally obedient pilots obeying the rule. The German and Namibian collisions prove that given the great frequency of even single human errors in cockpits and air traffic control centers, once such errors have occurred, it is far safer to be at random altitudes than to be in a thin slice of airspace with unnaturally and unnecessarily high concentrations of other aircraft.
The easy, almost zero-cost solution (for aircraft owners and pilots) is the Altimeter-Compass Cruising Altitude Rule (ACCAR), which I modeled as RP-1000 in my Risk Analysis paper. Here's how this 70-year-old cruising altitude rule works. Mentally superimpose a compass rose on your altimeter scale (or cheat with a translucent printing of the compass rose adhering to the altimeter gauge glass). Fly the desired cruising heading on the magnetic compass. Then at cruising altitude, climb or descend until the superimposed mental "heading" of the 100-ft hand of the altimeter match the measured heading of the compass.
If everybody does this, then everybody at every altitude is flying on parallel paths with maximum mean free path to midair collision and a minimum possible closing velocity. Obeying ACCAR the DHL 757 would have missed the Russian Tu-154 by over 200 ft, and the Namibian C141 would have missed the German Tu-154 by over 450 ft. So far 135 people have unnecessarily died and about $500 million in aircraft have been lost due to the failure of the USA Federal Aviation Administration to seriously consider my request for a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (28996) back in 1997 to fix the problem (http://www.geocities.com/rpatlovany/...leMidairs.html).
This may seem tough to think about at first. However, my sensitivity study (risk vs. compliance accuracy, Figures 1 and 2 in the Risk Analysis paper) shows that when you are depending on the pilots eyes and the hemispherical cruising altitude rule in any way for safety, random altitudes are safer than the hemispherical cruising altitude rule; and ANY level of accuracy in following ACCAR is far better than random altitudes with about twice the visible time to collision due to halved average closing speeds.
Before you tell me how hard ACCAR is to use, go up and try it sometimes where it is legal to fly random altitudes (for example, under 3000 ft above ground level in the USA). It took me three minutes to get fully stabilized on ACCAR the first time I tried it.
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Whilst this may throw standard separation out of the window, it seems to make sense !!
The question is: Are pilots prepared to let their aircraft get closer to each other (less than 1000') in order to make sure they don't hit ?
rpatlovany
Unfortunately, none of your links (except one) are valid, but I was able to understand the theory all the same.
The question is: Are pilots prepared to let their aircraft get closer to each other (less than 1000') in order to make sure they don't hit ?
rpatlovany
Unfortunately, none of your links (except one) are valid, but I was able to understand the theory all the same.
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SkyGuide
Edited to reflect the sensitivities of the issues involved.
Contrary to the speculation of Proceed and Guy D'age, I am not an insider at Skyguide and have no axe to grind with either it or its employees, most of whom, I am sure are consientious and upstanding.
However, my several direct links into the Skyguide management make it clear that things are far from acceptable
Contrary to the speculation of Proceed and Guy D'age, I am not an insider at Skyguide and have no axe to grind with either it or its employees, most of whom, I am sure are consientious and upstanding.
However, my several direct links into the Skyguide management make it clear that things are far from acceptable
Last edited by Wist L Blower; 23rd Jul 2002 at 07:38.
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Whist L Blower,
Your allegations are pretty strong stuff, to say the least.
If I was you, I'd be rather careful what to "reveal", even on this anonymous forum.
You appear to be an insider, who, for some reason, has a few "open bills" with skyguide or some individuals or non-expats.
I hereby would like to challenge some of your allegations, apparently based on a "pay back" attitude. Especially 2) and 3).
In plain language: utter bollocks.
There has been lots of speculation and assumption within this thread so far, but what you are suggesting is just beyond belief.
And in this case it's not only about what I believe (or not), but also about what I know...
Your allegations are pretty strong stuff, to say the least.
If I was you, I'd be rather careful what to "reveal", even on this anonymous forum.
You appear to be an insider, who, for some reason, has a few "open bills" with skyguide or some individuals or non-expats.
I hereby would like to challenge some of your allegations, apparently based on a "pay back" attitude. Especially 2) and 3).
In plain language: utter bollocks.
There has been lots of speculation and assumption within this thread so far, but what you are suggesting is just beyond belief.
And in this case it's not only about what I believe (or not), but also about what I know...
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Whist L Blower,
I have to side with Proceed as cleared on this one. As good as your intentions may be, I really don't think that this is the right time and place to be making such statements. Skyguide certainly has at least it's share of internal problems right now, many of which will be exposed in coming months through accident investigation and/or the press but there is no need to stick the dirty laundry on the flagpole!
Secondly, Skyguide has a relatively small ratio of expat controllers to swiss ones. If, as you suggest, you are (or are well connected with) one of us, I would be very careful about a) making yourself too obvious and b) instigating a backlash against all of us.
Although some of what you say may touch a few raw nerves, I suspect a certain amount of embellishment, perhaps intended to attract the interest of some of the less popular readers of these forums...... ie, the parasites... oops, journos.
I have to side with Proceed as cleared on this one. As good as your intentions may be, I really don't think that this is the right time and place to be making such statements. Skyguide certainly has at least it's share of internal problems right now, many of which will be exposed in coming months through accident investigation and/or the press but there is no need to stick the dirty laundry on the flagpole!
Secondly, Skyguide has a relatively small ratio of expat controllers to swiss ones. If, as you suggest, you are (or are well connected with) one of us, I would be very careful about a) making yourself too obvious and b) instigating a backlash against all of us.
Although some of what you say may touch a few raw nerves, I suspect a certain amount of embellishment, perhaps intended to attract the interest of some of the less popular readers of these forums...... ie, the parasites... oops, journos.
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The Swiss transport minister has announced that an external review of air safety will be carried out using an expert from either Germany or France.
This seems to be a welcome step in an otherwise sad story.
This seems to be a welcome step in an otherwise sad story.
Last edited by bluskis; 23rd Jul 2002 at 18:29.
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Whist L Blower,
Your 180 is far from convincing...
However, "things"..."far from acceptable" within skyguide is not necessarily the issue.
In the aftermath, everything seems to be bad within the organisation (at least according to the non-expert view of too many journos who don't have a clue).
But consider this:
It could have happened (almost) anywhere, anytime.
Close calls (in fact very close calls) have occurred recently.
And if there is only little truth behind the allegation that there is no advisory, valid for every country and operator, concerning following an RA, then ICAO will have to be held accountable to some extent as well.
Can it be, that it is up to pilot's discretion to follow an RA or an ATC clearance, considering that ATC doesn't get any information about RAs and considering that TCAS' are "corresponding" to coordinate an appropriate avoiding action between acft??
Your 180 is far from convincing...
However, "things"..."far from acceptable" within skyguide is not necessarily the issue.
In the aftermath, everything seems to be bad within the organisation (at least according to the non-expert view of too many journos who don't have a clue).
But consider this:
It could have happened (almost) anywhere, anytime.
Close calls (in fact very close calls) have occurred recently.
And if there is only little truth behind the allegation that there is no advisory, valid for every country and operator, concerning following an RA, then ICAO will have to be held accountable to some extent as well.
Can it be, that it is up to pilot's discretion to follow an RA or an ATC clearance, considering that ATC doesn't get any information about RAs and considering that TCAS' are "corresponding" to coordinate an appropriate avoiding action between acft??
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Proceed as cleared
As in my previous thread the JAA requirement is that pilots should follow TCAS
The definition is:
Should means that the application of the procedure or provision is recommended.
Will means that the application of the rule procedure or provision is mandatory.
It seems to me that the JAA needs to revisit its TCAS recommendations. I suspect that one of the changes is from Should to Will in JAA's.
The lawyers are going to have a profitable time on this one.
As in my previous thread the JAA requirement is that pilots should follow TCAS
The definition is:
Should means that the application of the procedure or provision is recommended.
Will means that the application of the rule procedure or provision is mandatory.
It seems to me that the JAA needs to revisit its TCAS recommendations. I suspect that one of the changes is from Should to Will in JAA's.
The lawyers are going to have a profitable time on this one.