ASL/DHL overrun LIME/BGY Italy
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Regarding wet runways, there is an FAA SAFO number 15009 from the end of last year arising from several overrun incidents in rain. It says that: "The data indicates that applying a 15% safety margin to wet runway time-of-arrival advisory data .... may be inadequate in certain wet runway conditions...The root cause of the wet runway stopping performance shortfall is not fully understood at this time; however issues that appear to be contributors are runway conditions such as texture (polished or rubber contaminated surfaces), drainage, puddling in wheel tracks and active precipitation. Analysis of this data indicates that 30 to 40 percent of additional stopping distance may be required in certain cases where the runway is very wet, but not flooded."
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"Landing long and THEN deciding NOT to GA would be two mistakes in a row."
Last edited by Reverserbucket; 10th Aug 2016 at 11:24.
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In terms of attempting a two-engine go-around from a floater/long landing?Different environment yes, but a contaminated runway and variable w/v vs high temp and variable w/v are both limiting.
Last edited by Reverserbucket; 10th Aug 2016 at 11:18.
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Show me stats of runway overruns vs failed baulked landing manoeuvres. EK521 may be one, but we don't know that yet.
If you don't have enough runway remaining to go-around after touchdown, you sure as hell don't have enough runway to stop.
If you don't have enough runway remaining to go-around after touchdown, you sure as hell don't have enough runway to stop.
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Quite, Derfred, I agree. Just observing that a go-around from a long landing (i.e. in principal, making the right decision) could result in a similar outcome - as you suggest, little evidence supports that however. And yes, we don't know about 521 - I'll delete my comment, although I was inferring a late go-around following floating beyond the FDM's; if the SOP's state touchdown within the blocks, it's a G/A regardless of LDA.
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An Italian colleague has told me that a go-around from the touchdown was attempted but that the spoilers didn't retract automatically (as they should do with application of thrust ) nor were they retracted manually. Capt apparently has serious back injuries. All 3rd hand, but it is what I was told.
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Sucks, that is a bad one.
I failed to manually pop out the SBs after TD a few times in a sim session when I was PNF and the instructor failed the auto pop up.
A nasty one especially if the PF had difficulty to stay on the centreline due to N-1 and or Xwind and You as PNF needed monitoring/assisting the PF.
In this incident most likely the adverse WX conditions like tail/crosswind added a load to the PNF's workload, so that he missed the SBs.
BTW, another one I tended to do was after a GA to keep holding the throttles during a GA, after the initial push. I just wanted to feel the ATS take over and feel the throttles "firewall".
Not all the instructors would mark that as a S- however, some didn't really care. Others followed the book and made a negative remark about it.
Personally I did not like it at all to release them.
It stems from my other flying in GA aircraft which I kept on doing (about 5.500 hrs) besides my airline career.
Most of the Cessnas and the likes had a bad habit of throttles creeping back if the "friction nut" wasn't tightened enough.
I taught my students never to release it, even while a C172 has a dangerous pitch UP effect when adding full power with full flaps (in trimmed condition), let's say after a simulated force landing.
It needs quite some pitch down input, but that diminishes quickly after the flaps are retracted in stages.
There is now some discussion about this matter in the Emirates Gear collapse thread. When it will be established that the throttles did not or were not advanced (sufficiently), we might have to review worldwide how to handle the throttles during a GA.
After having seen the pics and videos from the path the 737 followed during its overrun, I was wondering there was initially no report about the condition of the crew. There must have been some serious vertical loads on their spine.
I hope all the best for the capt, more and more I think it is one of those crashes where I was glad not to have been there at that moment.
I ended after a scratch free career, I do contribute this however also to a load of luck, even the best crew cannot fight bad luck.
Richard
I failed to manually pop out the SBs after TD a few times in a sim session when I was PNF and the instructor failed the auto pop up.
A nasty one especially if the PF had difficulty to stay on the centreline due to N-1 and or Xwind and You as PNF needed monitoring/assisting the PF.
In this incident most likely the adverse WX conditions like tail/crosswind added a load to the PNF's workload, so that he missed the SBs.
BTW, another one I tended to do was after a GA to keep holding the throttles during a GA, after the initial push. I just wanted to feel the ATS take over and feel the throttles "firewall".
Not all the instructors would mark that as a S- however, some didn't really care. Others followed the book and made a negative remark about it.
Personally I did not like it at all to release them.
It stems from my other flying in GA aircraft which I kept on doing (about 5.500 hrs) besides my airline career.
Most of the Cessnas and the likes had a bad habit of throttles creeping back if the "friction nut" wasn't tightened enough.
I taught my students never to release it, even while a C172 has a dangerous pitch UP effect when adding full power with full flaps (in trimmed condition), let's say after a simulated force landing.
It needs quite some pitch down input, but that diminishes quickly after the flaps are retracted in stages.
There is now some discussion about this matter in the Emirates Gear collapse thread. When it will be established that the throttles did not or were not advanced (sufficiently), we might have to review worldwide how to handle the throttles during a GA.
After having seen the pics and videos from the path the 737 followed during its overrun, I was wondering there was initially no report about the condition of the crew. There must have been some serious vertical loads on their spine.
I hope all the best for the capt, more and more I think it is one of those crashes where I was glad not to have been there at that moment.
I ended after a scratch free career, I do contribute this however also to a load of luck, even the best crew cannot fight bad luck.
Richard
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Paxed into BGY late that afternoon. Although no suggestion of bad weather then the thunderstorms I saw a few hours later from the mountains surrounding were intense, spectacular and continued all night. Amazed any traffic was moving through any of Milan's airports.
I’ve had recurrent training for baulked landings for some time. The thing that strikes me is that once you’ve made the (admittedly difficult) decision to throw it away close to or after touchdown, there is then no real rush.
As you are near to or at flying speed, there isn’t much acceleration required before you can get back into the air. The aircraft generally has performance in hand as you’re below MLW and as long as you rotate before you get into the reds it should work out. OK, if you’re touching down 2,500m into a 3,000m runway, then you need to be a bit snappier but if you haven’t chucked it away long before that point then you’ve got it coming, I’m afraid.
As you are near to or at flying speed, there isn’t much acceleration required before you can get back into the air. The aircraft generally has performance in hand as you’re below MLW and as long as you rotate before you get into the reds it should work out. OK, if you’re touching down 2,500m into a 3,000m runway, then you need to be a bit snappier but if you haven’t chucked it away long before that point then you’ve got it coming, I’m afraid.
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As you are near to or at flying speed, there isn’t much acceleration required before you can get back into the air.
On a B737 Vref landing = V2 GA flap. If the decision is made PDQ then the distance required to get airborne again is minimal. One would hope that the curly hairs on the back of the safety sensor have been twitching since 200'. Will we, won't we?? Then in the flare there should be lots of "Oops" and a OMG this is not good. Even after the wheels touch your mind could be halfway towards a GA and so it's not a suddens surprise, if you have been forewarned and if you have experienced, even just once in the sim, this decision making process and executed it.
What is required is some imaginative thinking to create this scenario in the sim. You don't want to allow the crew to enter the braking phase for more than 1 sec. It's similar to the decision at (just before) V1 and the delay to act with a Stop; in this case a Go. I'm sure that once experienced never forgotten.
It's like I drummed into my cadets: a takeoff is a stop until V1; an approach is a GA until TR's are selected. Hence my dislike of flaring with hands on TR's.
On a B737 Vref landing = V2 GA flap. If the decision is made PDQ then the distance required to get airborne again is minimal. One would hope that the curly hairs on the back of the safety sensor have been twitching since 200'. Will we, won't we?? Then in the flare there should be lots of "Oops" and a OMG this is not good. Even after the wheels touch your mind could be halfway towards a GA and so it's not a suddens surprise, if you have been forewarned and if you have experienced, even just once in the sim, this decision making process and executed it.
What is required is some imaginative thinking to create this scenario in the sim. You don't want to allow the crew to enter the braking phase for more than 1 sec. It's similar to the decision at (just before) V1 and the delay to act with a Stop; in this case a Go. I'm sure that once experienced never forgotten.
It's like I drummed into my cadets: a takeoff is a stop until V1; an approach is a GA until TR's are selected. Hence my dislike of flaring with hands on TR's.
The sim details I’ve done have been pre-briefed and more for getting people happy with the mechanics of a baulked landing and the lack of need for panic as opposed to throwing an unexpected scenario in there. I think it would be hard to manufacture something that wouldn’t get a competent crew to go-around before the event, or if the timing was out, lead to a “accident” in the sim, which is of dubious training value.
Overall, I think it’s better to get pilots familiar with a rejected landing so it holds no fear. Then it becomes just another tool in the box to be used when necessary.
Overall, I think it’s better to get pilots familiar with a rejected landing so it holds no fear. Then it becomes just another tool in the box to be used when necessary.
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The sim details I’ve done have been pre-briefed and more for getting people happy with the mechanics of a baulked landing and the lack of need for panic as opposed to throwing an unexpected scenario in there.
Fullwings: totally agree. It is pure training exercise and not done under surprise. It should be an eye-opener to show that is no stigma with it and how possible it is.
Fullwings: totally agree. It is pure training exercise and not done under surprise. It should be an eye-opener to show that is no stigma with it and how possible it is.
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RAT5
Indeed, the creeping hands towards the Rev levers during the flare (when the throttles were closed but no TD yet) was something a few people developed and it was sometimes difficult to retrain that "reflex". Totally agree that was unacceptable.
(me wonders how navy carrier pilots cope with the reflex tot slam the throttle(s) wide open upon touchdown when NOT making a carrier landing...)
OK, we are drifting away from the thread...
Indeed, the creeping hands towards the Rev levers during the flare (when the throttles were closed but no TD yet) was something a few people developed and it was sometimes difficult to retrain that "reflex". Totally agree that was unacceptable.
(me wonders how navy carrier pilots cope with the reflex tot slam the throttle(s) wide open upon touchdown when NOT making a carrier landing...)
OK, we are drifting away from the thread...
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I just saw an Air Crash Investigation of B737 Garuda flight 200. It landed very fast at F5 and bounced twice and then tried to bury the nose gear. It was a sequence of errors, culminating the F/O PM calling GA x2 before touchdown and captain ignored the calls. It would appear there was still time for the F/O to have taken control, or the captain, and make a GA off the 1st bounce.
I’m reliably informed that you could indeed use reverse in the air on the HS121 in normal operations, which combined with the other drag devices made it fall out of the sky like a stone. The actual rates of descent have probably been exaggerated in telling over the years but I think they were substantial. I suppose the passengers got used to simulated re-entry manoeuvres when commuting on the Edinburgh shuttle...
http://www.pprune.org/aviation-histo...ow-1971-a.html
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Anybody in the airlineworld heard of RAAS ? If 'my' RAAS tells me 3000ft (remaining runway) and I´m still not really landed, let alone decelerating, I know what to do.
https://aerospace.honeywell.com/en/p...dvisory-system
Fitted to all airliners and crews trained, problem solved (mostly)
https://aerospace.honeywell.com/en/p...dvisory-system
Fitted to all airliners and crews trained, problem solved (mostly)
RAAS is good, in fact excellent. Unfortunately, basic human factors tells us that the hearing sense is the first to suffer exclusion in times of high workload and/or stress.
IMHO RAAS probably isn’t strident enough to attract the attention of someone completely fixated on landing the aeroplane (which is probably a major causal factor in overruns) and “xxxx remaining” needs a bit of mental processing before the import is known, although it might work for the PM. In contrast, there’s a “whoop whoop” on the GPWS and it virtually shouts to get attention, windshear comes up big and red on the instruments and fire warnings are unmistakeable both audibly and visually.
Maybe we need a flashing runway overrun light in the windscreen or a buzzer in the seat or something...
IMHO RAAS probably isn’t strident enough to attract the attention of someone completely fixated on landing the aeroplane (which is probably a major causal factor in overruns) and “xxxx remaining” needs a bit of mental processing before the import is known, although it might work for the PM. In contrast, there’s a “whoop whoop” on the GPWS and it virtually shouts to get attention, windshear comes up big and red on the instruments and fire warnings are unmistakeable both audibly and visually.
Maybe we need a flashing runway overrun light in the windscreen or a buzzer in the seat or something...
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Well, first of all the crew could commit to a certain amount of runway remaining after which there needs to be a G/A if not landed and secondly this "gate" could be easily programmable and given out with a synthetic command "G/A".
This would be no issue at all with todays computers. Even as a standalone machine if the avionic suite of older models wouldn´t be able to accommodate the required mods.
But then of course, this was a freighter and with no fatalities in "sufficient quantities" we can´t expect authorities to act. They rather let us fill in risk assessments, which for Bergamo surely finds nothing out of the ordinary....
This would be no issue at all with todays computers. Even as a standalone machine if the avionic suite of older models wouldn´t be able to accommodate the required mods.
But then of course, this was a freighter and with no fatalities in "sufficient quantities" we can´t expect authorities to act. They rather let us fill in risk assessments, which for Bergamo surely finds nothing out of the ordinary....