ASL/DHL overrun LIME/BGY Italy
His dude, Full Wings, et al,
We, individually and the industry, tend to focus on 'last chance' defences; primarily because we are close to these operational scenarios, but also because of human - hindsight bias.
Greater safety benefits could be identified by working backwards along the timeline to consider other contributing factors and safety opportunities.
Overruns rarely have origins in a single factor; the much flaunted 'unstable approach' does not cause and accident, nor the failure to decide to go around; e.g. contributors; unstable approaches, tailwind (long landing), braking action, situation surprise, performance knowledge.
Many of these factors can be identified in advance - in the pre landing briefing, where weak or lacking information can be considered (braking action, wind speed), or safety boundaries tightened (last point of touchdown - first third on a long runway reduced to less than 1500ft on a short runway).
The objective is to reduce the burden of tactical decision-making in situations which could limit human performance, to the periods of strategic decision-making, before commencing the approach; briefing, thinking ahead, (weather CBs in the area, wet/ flooded runway, change of wind direction). Thus the decision-making process becomes 'should I be starting the approach', and for a continuing approach with the continuous comparison of the perceived situation with that in the plan (briefing).
"A briefing is a flight-plan for the mind"
His dude #81, freighters, fatalities, failure to act; regrettably I agree.
Again the industry needs to consider alternative views of safety - reducing the risk of harm in future operations. Every overrun has the potential for fatalities, many non fatal hull loss overrun accidents have been very close to a catastrophic outcome, e.g. A340 Toronto, 777 SFO, 777 DUB, 737 Jamaica.
Airbus provides a refreshing, alternative view, of safety statistics.
We need to change the way in which we think about safety, using statistics, training, operational guidance, and risk assessment.
We, individually and the industry, tend to focus on 'last chance' defences; primarily because we are close to these operational scenarios, but also because of human - hindsight bias.
Greater safety benefits could be identified by working backwards along the timeline to consider other contributing factors and safety opportunities.
Overruns rarely have origins in a single factor; the much flaunted 'unstable approach' does not cause and accident, nor the failure to decide to go around; e.g. contributors; unstable approaches, tailwind (long landing), braking action, situation surprise, performance knowledge.
Many of these factors can be identified in advance - in the pre landing briefing, where weak or lacking information can be considered (braking action, wind speed), or safety boundaries tightened (last point of touchdown - first third on a long runway reduced to less than 1500ft on a short runway).
The objective is to reduce the burden of tactical decision-making in situations which could limit human performance, to the periods of strategic decision-making, before commencing the approach; briefing, thinking ahead, (weather CBs in the area, wet/ flooded runway, change of wind direction). Thus the decision-making process becomes 'should I be starting the approach', and for a continuing approach with the continuous comparison of the perceived situation with that in the plan (briefing).
"A briefing is a flight-plan for the mind"
His dude #81, freighters, fatalities, failure to act; regrettably I agree.
Again the industry needs to consider alternative views of safety - reducing the risk of harm in future operations. Every overrun has the potential for fatalities, many non fatal hull loss overrun accidents have been very close to a catastrophic outcome, e.g. A340 Toronto, 777 SFO, 777 DUB, 737 Jamaica.
Airbus provides a refreshing, alternative view, of safety statistics.
We need to change the way in which we think about safety, using statistics, training, operational guidance, and risk assessment.
Overruns rarely have origins in a single factor; the much flaunted 'unstable approach' does not cause and accident, nor the failure to decide to go around; e.g. contributors; unstable approaches, tailwind (long landing), braking action, situation surprise, performance knowledge.
Many of these factors can be identified in advance - in the pre landing briefing, where weak or lacking information can be considered (braking action, wind speed), or safety boundaries tightened (last point of touchdown - first third on a long runway reduced to less than 1500ft on a short runway).
Many of these factors can be identified in advance - in the pre landing briefing, where weak or lacking information can be considered (braking action, wind speed), or safety boundaries tightened (last point of touchdown - first third on a long runway reduced to less than 1500ft on a short runway).
It might be something to with briefing and mental rehearsal: they are really useful techniques and I use them all the time in professional and sporting aviation but they are incomplete insofar as the physical and mental environment is hard to emulate internally. What seems perfectly clear at briefing time can be confusing when it comes to actual execution. Which is another good reason for sim practice, of course.
We, individually and the industry, tend to focus on 'last chance' defences; primarily because we are close to these operational scenarios, but also because of human - hindsight bias.
FullWings, 
'It’s a credit to the vast majority of airline crews ... etc, Oh so, so true.
However, if we expect pilots to work closer to the edge then the industry should consider making the edge conditions more visible, but in dynamic, high risk operations the edge is rarely stable even if visible. Thus everyone has to embrace the uncertainty of operations, minimise the risks, reduce the unknowns, buffer the safety margins (e.g. Airbus landing perf FOLD); a new way of thinking about safety.
Lemay - Review of Weick and Sutcliffe (2001) Managing the Unexpected | Raymond Lemay - Academia.edu
Or
http://www.mindtherisk.com/literatur...sutcliffe-2001
'It’s a credit to the vast majority of airline crews ... etc, Oh so, so true.
However, if we expect pilots to work closer to the edge then the industry should consider making the edge conditions more visible, but in dynamic, high risk operations the edge is rarely stable even if visible. Thus everyone has to embrace the uncertainty of operations, minimise the risks, reduce the unknowns, buffer the safety margins (e.g. Airbus landing perf FOLD); a new way of thinking about safety.
Lemay - Review of Weick and Sutcliffe (2001) Managing the Unexpected | Raymond Lemay - Academia.edu
Or
http://www.mindtherisk.com/literatur...sutcliffe-2001
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RAAS: Maybe we need a flashing runway overrun light in the windscreen or a buzzer in the seat or something...
Hairs on the back of my neck have worked fine for a whole career, and still do in my paraglider flying; also in my car, and certainly when contemplating disagreeing with my wife.
Hairs on the back of my neck have worked fine for a whole career, and still do in my paraglider flying; also in my car, and certainly when contemplating disagreeing with my wife.
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"and certainly when contemplating disagreeing with my wife."
No-one has invented a warning system robust enough to provide effective protection for that scenario . . . . .
However, in most other cases, the old "hairs on the back of the neck" work just fine, but, I guess we are all prone to becoming goal fixated (the "goal " normally being to arrive . . . I.E. land at destination )
In these circumstances, a competent trustworthy colleague, who may be marginally less goal orientated , and, being younger hopefully has less "inhibitions" against speaking up, can be worth his weight in gold, but, he has to have the experience to realise too that it is all going South, and the industry "norm" is to increasingly fill the vacant seat on the right with low experience guys . . . . .
No-one has invented a warning system robust enough to provide effective protection for that scenario . . . . .
However, in most other cases, the old "hairs on the back of the neck" work just fine, but, I guess we are all prone to becoming goal fixated (the "goal " normally being to arrive . . . I.E. land at destination )
In these circumstances, a competent trustworthy colleague, who may be marginally less goal orientated , and, being younger hopefully has less "inhibitions" against speaking up, can be worth his weight in gold, but, he has to have the experience to realise too that it is all going South, and the industry "norm" is to increasingly fill the vacant seat on the right with low experience guys . . . . .
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You cannot solve all problems in aviation with yet another electronic device. There is just too much variables.
And if its starts generating false or superfluous warnings, it won't take long before nobody reacts anymore. See how long it took before "terrain, terrain, pull up". was accepted and people acted accordingly. Sadly, a few times it was the last audible part on the CVR...
One time we were saddled up with a (probably expensive) gadget in the DC10, a landing prediction display where more or less the touchdown was "predicted". I have seldom witnessed such a useless thinghy.
After a few Years a fresh technical pilot had them all yanked out.
And if its starts generating false or superfluous warnings, it won't take long before nobody reacts anymore. See how long it took before "terrain, terrain, pull up". was accepted and people acted accordingly. Sadly, a few times it was the last audible part on the CVR...
One time we were saddled up with a (probably expensive) gadget in the DC10, a landing prediction display where more or less the touchdown was "predicted". I have seldom witnessed such a useless thinghy.
After a few Years a fresh technical pilot had them all yanked out.
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And if its starts generating false or superfluous warnings, it won't take long before nobody reacts anymore.
How many have you had ?
Not saying every problem can be cured - BUT it gives you a clue in very rapidly developing scenario, in which humans "often" do have an issue.
Can it overcome the "desire to land" instead of "boltering" into a TS ? Not in every case, but provide with a FACT (e.g."3000ft remaining, Speed 130 KIAS, insufficient") might influence the decision making in a good way, I think.
I have not 'required' the input yet - luckily - and the type I fly lives on short fields.
Still I like having it. Would I fly a runway eatin' machine, I´d like it even more...
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Hd, nope, never had the opportunity to see the system in operation. I'm out of airline business for close to 10 Years. And flew mostly long haul with heavy jets on long RWY's. 2500m was a shorty for us.
If You feel it enhances Yr operation, fine and it is an addition.
I just wanted to state that not all decisions can be made by a computer, especially when ground comes into play.
As far as I know, complex military drones are fully controlled during flight, by far away operators, but shortly after landing a local controller takes it over manually.
Just too many things that can go wrong on the ground, as we all know.
That's why I am not charmed with the experiments with self driving cars in the current road structure. Even more than in aviation, weird situations can develop that go past the programming of the "auto"pilot. It recently cost the life of a driver that trusted the system too much.
If You feel it enhances Yr operation, fine and it is an addition.
I just wanted to state that not all decisions can be made by a computer, especially when ground comes into play.
As far as I know, complex military drones are fully controlled during flight, by far away operators, but shortly after landing a local controller takes it over manually.
Just too many things that can go wrong on the ground, as we all know.
That's why I am not charmed with the experiments with self driving cars in the current road structure. Even more than in aviation, weird situations can develop that go past the programming of the "auto"pilot. It recently cost the life of a driver that trusted the system too much.
