Emirates B777 gear collapse @ DXB?
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Text of Hi Tech's image is as follows:
Date of Occurrence: Aug-16
AC Type: B773
From: TRV
To: DBX
Source: SiD
Event Title: Crash Landing
Event Summary:
During flare updraft caused the A/C to float till after the end of the touch downd (sic) zone. We decided to G/A. Normal G/A initiated after that we had positive climb so the gear was retracted. Speed dropped rapidly below the top of amber band due to W/S. W/S proc was done however the A/C crash landed on the RW and skidded off it to come to a complete stop off the RW with fire and fumes covering the whole A/C. Mayday declared and evacuation initiated. All pax and crew survived without serious injuries.
AC Type: B773
From: TRV
To: DBX
Source: SiD
Event Title: Crash Landing
Event Summary:
During flare updraft caused the A/C to float till after the end of the touch downd (sic) zone. We decided to G/A. Normal G/A initiated after that we had positive climb so the gear was retracted. Speed dropped rapidly below the top of amber band due to W/S. W/S proc was done however the A/C crash landed on the RW and skidded off it to come to a complete stop off the RW with fire and fumes covering the whole A/C. Mayday declared and evacuation initiated. All pax and crew survived without serious injuries.
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Originally Posted by Captplaystation
I had a former colleague in a well known loco, knew the manuals back to front, became one of the companies youngest Capts/LTC/TRI etc, he was one of the "select few" to get DEC with [.] Couldn't fly a simple visual to save himself
Regarding the sort of abbreviated reported two posts before, have you noted it's as always :
"updraft caused the A/C to float "
"speed dropped rapidly "
"however the A/C crash landed "
More and more do we see that sort of formulations in many ASR, with sentences like "the aircraft did climb, the aircraft went left, the aircraft went right, the aircraft did sink" - never any mention of any pilot action which might have been the cause of the phenomenon, or which might have been endeavored to correct it ... Pilots just watching the aircraft behaving by itself.
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"WS proc was done"
Given that a GA was already initiated (let's assume TOGA thrust, flaps 20 and gear up), I wonder what they mean by the statement "windshear proc was done" after they noticed the WS event?
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Pilots just watching the aircraft behaving by itself
Couldn't fly a simple visual to save himself (Capt/TRI/TRE)
"We decided to G/A. Normal G/A initiated after that we had positive climb so the gear was retracted."
"Speed dropped rapidly below the top of amber band due to W/S. W/S proc was done however the A/C crash landed"
Now irrespective of an eventual bad execution of the GA or a real presence of a W/S, i come back to what i have suggested in earlier threads: Wouldn't it make sense in such floating situations (low speed and close to ground) to go for this more aggressive solution (W/S or Pull-Up, manual with AP/AT off) right from the beginning?
As i had suggested earlier: Go for "moves" first: levers forward, yoke back, no conf change, pitch up to whatever seems reasonable. When you feel comfortable, then revert to the normal GA proc.
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Skill training, skill retention and skill fade have not been a contributing factor to any of the recent accidents on either the Boeing or the Airbus. Recent Scientific Research points to the contrary.
Lack of understanding of Automation and how it behaves in a non normal situation is what has caused the recent accidents including the 777 accident in Dubai.
Lack of understanding of Automation and how it behaves in a non normal situation is what has caused the recent accidents including the 777 accident in Dubai.
Not because I agree 100%, but because it 100% highlights an issue, to which there is no easy answer, but which is essential to understand avialion safety and the interaction between men and machine.
While "skill" is typically understood as "human automatics", as the ability to cope with situations you have learned to cope with, without having to think your way through, the issue indeed is more with situations where you need to think, where you need to understand what the problem is that you need your skills for.
One element of the problem for sure is, that you need to be so skilled, that you have some percent of spare brain power available in any situation. You should be so well trained and up to date to "fly the aircraft" that you have some resources left to deal with an issue. This is why the minimum skills we should expect from a pilot must always be more than the minimum it needs to safely fly an aircraft. We must require a standard above the absolute minimum, to keep a certain margin for the unexpected.
The other element is that you need to have enough understanding of all the details of your aircraft systems, that even if it surprises you by some action or reaction, you are able to understand what it is doing, why it is doing, and what you can do about it.
This includes to accept, that there is nothing like a perfect system. There is nothing bad about having a non-perfect system, as long as all the imperfections are well documented, published and told to the pilots.
There were times, when the pilots had the skills, and the FI had the detailed knowledge about the systems. Now the systems have replaced the FI, but who has the knowledge about the systems now? And do the systems relief the pilots enough, to give them that extra capacity to additionally know about all of the even much more complicated systems? According to the statistics, the answer seems to be yes. According to many recent accidents, the answer may seem to be more complicated
Normal G/A initiated
Last edited by Less Hair; 11th Aug 2016 at 08:50.
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As to the Airbus fans, don't gloat too much about its design.
The Airbus fixed position lever has the advantage in that you simply click-up to TOGA position with the lever and the mode engages. This is easier than shoving up the T7 levers and at the same time pushing the awkwardly placed TOGA switch. I certainly appreciated that when i flew Airbus!
However, the non-moving lever in Airbus has a certain ambiguity as to the thrust deployment. At least Asseline (Habsheim) got trapped when going for that mode he didn't feel anything, thus distrusted the system, pulled the lever back to quickly re-engage GA, to make sure. By this the spool-up was interrupted and re-initiated and the process took too long.
On a Boeing, a keen pilot could realise the non-engagement of TOGA by the levers not moving up to full thrust. I appreciate that now on the Boeing.
So both systems can trap you, because knowledge is king, certainly, but quite often the stunning effect reigns!
What i would strongly suggest to Boeing, is to install the firewall switch from the MD11 (they own all patents). By shoving the thrust levers through this spring loaded firewall position, it would apply full available thrust, the FD command wings level, max pitch, AT off, AP off at any time with no mode reversal until the pilot decides to alter anything.
The Airbus fixed position lever has the advantage in that you simply click-up to TOGA position with the lever and the mode engages. This is easier than shoving up the T7 levers and at the same time pushing the awkwardly placed TOGA switch. I certainly appreciated that when i flew Airbus!
However, the non-moving lever in Airbus has a certain ambiguity as to the thrust deployment. At least Asseline (Habsheim) got trapped when going for that mode he didn't feel anything, thus distrusted the system, pulled the lever back to quickly re-engage GA, to make sure. By this the spool-up was interrupted and re-initiated and the process took too long.
On a Boeing, a keen pilot could realise the non-engagement of TOGA by the levers not moving up to full thrust. I appreciate that now on the Boeing.
So both systems can trap you, because knowledge is king, certainly, but quite often the stunning effect reigns!
What i would strongly suggest to Boeing, is to install the firewall switch from the MD11 (they own all patents). By shoving the thrust levers through this spring loaded firewall position, it would apply full available thrust, the FD command wings level, max pitch, AT off, AP off at any time with no mode reversal until the pilot decides to alter anything.
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Because you have windshear and you have windshear.
Not every windshear is a microburst, which is what we practise in the simulator.
No microburst in the EK accident.
If I divert every time the wind shifts/varies by 10-15 kts, I would not be doing much else.
Not every windshear is a microburst, which is what we practise in the simulator.
No microburst in the EK accident.
If I divert every time the wind shifts/varies by 10-15 kts, I would not be doing much else.
The initial symptoms will be the same for a convergence as a mature microburst, i.e. gain of airspeed, tendency to go high, unusual thrust lever position, etc. so people who have been trained that windshear = microburst will initiate a WS GA. As the approach may be unstable by then, it’s not a bad response and errs on the side of safety.
I have to say I am somewhat skeptical as to the reports that say the aircraft sank back onto the runway due windshear alone. It would have needed to be pretty extreme to do that to a 777 below MLW with firewall power on both engines, even given the high OAT. Consider that at that weight and temperature it should be able to climb with reduced thrust on one engine after the other one failed at V1. A shortfall in thrust for part or all of the manoeuvre is a simpler explanation, although the atmosphere can throw some right curve balls at you on occasions...
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AO83 Many of the bounces I have seen, admittedly on crosswind horror shows on youtube, involve one leg arriving first. Followed sometimes by the other or G/A off the one leg. What happens to the toga switch inhibition on the leg that doesnt touch down?
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Volume: an interesting attempt at addressing the issue. I came from very basic GA, entered airlines a B732 level where the visual approach was not only the norm, but very often in the low tech environment of the Greek islands, the only option. Thus we knew how to fly the a/c. It's automatics were very basic and didn't take a lot of mastering. The important thing was the grounding we had in how to make the a/c do what we wanted it to do, either via manual or automatics. I then progressed to the wizz-bang bells & whistles of B767, but same philosophy: learn how to make the a/c do what I wanted via manual control; how it felt and what parameters made it work. The environment was still the same and the Greek islands, Gatwick/Luton/EMA were treated the same. We also learnt how to use the automatics to make the a/c do what we wanted and what was the optimum method of different phases & profiles, but the SOP's were not rigid straight jackets. There was a preferred method, but if an alternative suited the situation better we were knowledgeable and capable and allowed to use it. We also had a fair understanding of the traps. Ultimately we could throw the whole lot away and fly the a/c. By knowing what we wanted the a/c to do, and how it should be doing it we could detect, quickly, if something was amiss and know what to do about it.
In subsequent airlines I trained for this philosophy has disappeared. It is minimal manual flying in the sim, minimal manual flying on the line. The sim is focused on rigid use of automatics (SOP's) to achieve profiles in only one manner. Procedures, procedures. The failures are the basic QRH systems failures. Nothing subtle, just the MC warning system, an amber light followed by QRH. In the now shortened time to command there will be not much more and very little multiple failures exposure, and very little manual flying save a raw data ILS.
IMHO many incidents are caused by subtle mis-behaviours of systems, malfunctioning of automatics and other items where the crew did not notice there was a creeping problem nor understand fully what was happening, and then didn't know what to do about it. Often misguided intervention made the matter worse and the descending spiral of confusion led from a solvable incident into an accident.
If I understand correctly Airbus, in their A350 program, have realised this problem and begun to address it with more manual/basic flying in the beginning of the course. I know of one major airline who are doing this, certainly on B777. Learn to fly the basic a/c with no guidance, then add the AFDS, the add the full automatics, then introduce failures. Building blocks.
Sadly not all airlines, in their rush to get cadets into line training, are adopting this training regime. Indeed some have made retrograde steps. They have the philosophy that rigid SOP adherence and full use of automatics is the safest method of operation. Sad days.
But to address the point about humans and monitoring: considering my back ground and apprenticeship I had no problem converting to the full automatic modern EFIS cockpit. All the detailed information made the job of manual approaches and CDA"s easier, more accurate and thus more pleasing. A full understanding of the systems and what the a/c was doing made the job easier and more relaxing, but never causing complacency; just easier to manage and keep an overview, than with needles & dials. I wonder if it's the lack of that apprenticeship that is missing today and causing this over dependancy on automatics. The cadet pilot knows nothing else after the type rating. Then the quick command captain knows nothing else because for 3-4 years they been on the same rigid SOP automatics only treadmill.
It's not just about manual flying or the odd weekend trip in a glider. That won't solve the basic problem of ignorance about the a/c, both in aerodynamic & performance terms and in systems & automatics terms. The whole training philosophy needs a complete overhaul and then the attitude of airlines in enhancing and maintaining piloting skills on line needs an overhaul. There is no single silver bullet to solve the underlying problems.
In the 70's there was huge FTL problem and in UK the Bader report brought about industry changes. That was an outside independent report and accepted and adopted. I wonder if a solution is for another respected aviator to do the same thing with pilot training. A complete review of the problems, a review of the current training & testing syllabi, and review of the different philosophies on the line and how it affects piloting skills, and then comprehensive recommendations for discussion across the industry including the pilot representatives who are not management lackeys, but 'steeped in aviation' dedicated trainers.
Volunteers please step forward.
I realise this is an old chestnut that has been debated on here numerous times, but once again it might be that in Dubai it has raised it's ugly head and so re-opened the discussion.
In subsequent airlines I trained for this philosophy has disappeared. It is minimal manual flying in the sim, minimal manual flying on the line. The sim is focused on rigid use of automatics (SOP's) to achieve profiles in only one manner. Procedures, procedures. The failures are the basic QRH systems failures. Nothing subtle, just the MC warning system, an amber light followed by QRH. In the now shortened time to command there will be not much more and very little multiple failures exposure, and very little manual flying save a raw data ILS.
IMHO many incidents are caused by subtle mis-behaviours of systems, malfunctioning of automatics and other items where the crew did not notice there was a creeping problem nor understand fully what was happening, and then didn't know what to do about it. Often misguided intervention made the matter worse and the descending spiral of confusion led from a solvable incident into an accident.
If I understand correctly Airbus, in their A350 program, have realised this problem and begun to address it with more manual/basic flying in the beginning of the course. I know of one major airline who are doing this, certainly on B777. Learn to fly the basic a/c with no guidance, then add the AFDS, the add the full automatics, then introduce failures. Building blocks.
Sadly not all airlines, in their rush to get cadets into line training, are adopting this training regime. Indeed some have made retrograde steps. They have the philosophy that rigid SOP adherence and full use of automatics is the safest method of operation. Sad days.
But to address the point about humans and monitoring: considering my back ground and apprenticeship I had no problem converting to the full automatic modern EFIS cockpit. All the detailed information made the job of manual approaches and CDA"s easier, more accurate and thus more pleasing. A full understanding of the systems and what the a/c was doing made the job easier and more relaxing, but never causing complacency; just easier to manage and keep an overview, than with needles & dials. I wonder if it's the lack of that apprenticeship that is missing today and causing this over dependancy on automatics. The cadet pilot knows nothing else after the type rating. Then the quick command captain knows nothing else because for 3-4 years they been on the same rigid SOP automatics only treadmill.
It's not just about manual flying or the odd weekend trip in a glider. That won't solve the basic problem of ignorance about the a/c, both in aerodynamic & performance terms and in systems & automatics terms. The whole training philosophy needs a complete overhaul and then the attitude of airlines in enhancing and maintaining piloting skills on line needs an overhaul. There is no single silver bullet to solve the underlying problems.
In the 70's there was huge FTL problem and in UK the Bader report brought about industry changes. That was an outside independent report and accepted and adopted. I wonder if a solution is for another respected aviator to do the same thing with pilot training. A complete review of the problems, a review of the current training & testing syllabi, and review of the different philosophies on the line and how it affects piloting skills, and then comprehensive recommendations for discussion across the industry including the pilot representatives who are not management lackeys, but 'steeped in aviation' dedicated trainers.
Volunteers please step forward.
I realise this is an old chestnut that has been debated on here numerous times, but once again it might be that in Dubai it has raised it's ugly head and so re-opened the discussion.
A great post, Rat 5. I suspect I had the first jet job at the same place as you - a LTN based charter company with a lady on the tail - happy days. The emphasis then was indeed on 'flying the aeroplane' with minimum over analysis of the limited automatics. We even seemed to find the Canaries using VOR's! It is not the fault of the magenta line generation that successive decades of training 'managers' with limited understanding of complex automation have deemed it virtually mandatory to use automation modes to the fullest extent.
The only point I would take up with you is the promoting of Airbus as a convert to the 'use less automation - it's just an aeroplane' brigade. Having had a foot in both 'camps' I can say that I did a manufacturers course on the A340 in 1994 and the first thing was a 'dollar ride' where you flew the sim without automation and the point was made that with a sidestick and throttle it was indeed 'just an aeroplane'. The various talking heads from Airbus that promote this novel approach to post - modern training are just cynically attempting to sell more aeroplanes ad reinforcing back to basics.
This accident has possibly highlighted another gap in the system: how often are baulked landings trained in the simulator? Almost never I would say similar to all engine go arounds, also traditionally mishandled due startle effect or lack of training / misunderstanding. I have experienced bounced landings for real as a base trainer and zft trainer of cadets- some of these landings have ended up as go arounds near the ground - I am just happy that the gear didn't come up too early which could have ended with the same result as this accident.
It would be good to think that lessons can be learnt: swiss cheese is always present and it will not be lack of technique solely responsible. I hope that EK take a pro - active, non punitive overview of the circumstances. Finally, RIP to the fireman.
The only point I would take up with you is the promoting of Airbus as a convert to the 'use less automation - it's just an aeroplane' brigade. Having had a foot in both 'camps' I can say that I did a manufacturers course on the A340 in 1994 and the first thing was a 'dollar ride' where you flew the sim without automation and the point was made that with a sidestick and throttle it was indeed 'just an aeroplane'. The various talking heads from Airbus that promote this novel approach to post - modern training are just cynically attempting to sell more aeroplanes ad reinforcing back to basics.
This accident has possibly highlighted another gap in the system: how often are baulked landings trained in the simulator? Almost never I would say similar to all engine go arounds, also traditionally mishandled due startle effect or lack of training / misunderstanding. I have experienced bounced landings for real as a base trainer and zft trainer of cadets- some of these landings have ended up as go arounds near the ground - I am just happy that the gear didn't come up too early which could have ended with the same result as this accident.
It would be good to think that lessons can be learnt: swiss cheese is always present and it will not be lack of technique solely responsible. I hope that EK take a pro - active, non punitive overview of the circumstances. Finally, RIP to the fireman.
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http://www.hobeco.net/sites/default/...vimet_awos.pdf
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Rat5 & Olster, two, simply, superb posts. I recall being discouraged from manual flying by a CP who stated that having paid huge amounts for sophisticated, high tech automation, they had a right to expect us all to use that facility at all times. I asked why the sim procedures (in those days) required manual flying skills. His response was that they made allowance for that. In other words, lowered manual flying ability was catered for.
My short experience in the ME was that the locals always tried for a soft landing. Eating up useful concrete in holding off for the soft touch-done was a common fault. I got very strange looks when I pointed out that one should always be able to achieve a good landing at the touchdown-point rather than halfway down, albeit, a long runway.
I seem to recall DBX having a slight downward slope. Guaranteed to result in a soft touchdown anyway. If it is true that a hold-off in this incident resulted in a 12 second float, no wonder useful concrete disappeared rapidly into history. Just take a look at your watch sweep for 12 seconds. Imagine floating for all that.
Don't buy the w/s causing an upfloat for 12 seconds.
Do buy the degraded standards, lack of training and high focus on going for the soft landing.
My short experience in the ME was that the locals always tried for a soft landing. Eating up useful concrete in holding off for the soft touch-done was a common fault. I got very strange looks when I pointed out that one should always be able to achieve a good landing at the touchdown-point rather than halfway down, albeit, a long runway.
I seem to recall DBX having a slight downward slope. Guaranteed to result in a soft touchdown anyway. If it is true that a hold-off in this incident resulted in a 12 second float, no wonder useful concrete disappeared rapidly into history. Just take a look at your watch sweep for 12 seconds. Imagine floating for all that.
Don't buy the w/s causing an upfloat for 12 seconds.
Do buy the degraded standards, lack of training and high focus on going for the soft landing.
Anyone care to comment on "MAYDAY DECLARED" in the Incident Report. There was no mayday on the ATC tape.
If increasing reliance on automation and procedures is a fundamentally flawed concept why is commercial aviation safer now than it has ever been?
Could it be that increasing reliance on automation and procedures over manual flying skills has had a positive impact on flight safety?
Could it be that increasing reliance on automation and procedures over manual flying skills has had a positive impact on flight safety?
Paxing All Over The World
to SLF3, I'd say commercial aviation is safer now due to sheer weight of numbers. Since the automatics do save the day for many, the amount of commercial sectors operated every day are going to turn out well.
I recall reading in PPRuNe several years ago (following one prang or another) that we were on the verge of the statistics going the wrong way. The reasons stated were all the same as in this thread.
I recall reading in PPRuNe several years ago (following one prang or another) that we were on the verge of the statistics going the wrong way. The reasons stated were all the same as in this thread.
- Loss of basic skills
- Inability to make the a/c do what you want it to do
- Knowing what you NEED it to do to get out of the bad situation
- Management who grew up in university and business school, rather than on the apron
- The Stock Market demanding ever better returns,rather than long term steady growth and a safe investment
- Accountants responding to that demand by the only tools they understand.
- + many more.
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SLF3: there is some merit to that argument. However, as pax travelling in blind faith with total trust in those up front, I, and I'm sure many others perhaps including you, would also like to have faith that when the automatics decide to have a bad hair day, and when the desk jockey written procedures are not suitable for the moment, the guys & gals up front will be able to sort it out and ensure a happy outcome. That does not always seem the case. And, don't forget, there are some places where the cognitive skills of hand eye coordination and manual control of the a/c are the only options. Witness St. Marten in the Caribbean. Spend all your life in a B747 into nice big airfields with radar vectors to an ILS all via 'George & his friend Amy-Tricia' then rostering decide to throw you a curve ball and you end up at the end of 12 hours skimming the beach & fence to a relatively short piece of tarmac carved into an island. You need to be able to do it on a regular basis.
I think you'll find it's not the increasing reliance on automation that has had the impact on safety rather the increase in capability of that automation and the huge improvement in reliability of the a/c as a whole; that plus the huge improvement in the overall environment including ATC, radar, ILS, GPS, RNP approaches etc. The days of scratching around on manually flown NDB's in thunderstorms has 99% passed for the large jet boys; thank any god you like.
What this discussion is focusing on is that when basic flying skills are required they are too often found missing. Add to that the notion that some people don't even realise when they are required and still try to solve problems via the automatics and start playing the piano causing very out of tune music. It's not a simple black/white one is better than the other. It is a collective matter. A good pilot needs both skills. Our argument is the balance is not correct.
I think you'll find it's not the increasing reliance on automation that has had the impact on safety rather the increase in capability of that automation and the huge improvement in reliability of the a/c as a whole; that plus the huge improvement in the overall environment including ATC, radar, ILS, GPS, RNP approaches etc. The days of scratching around on manually flown NDB's in thunderstorms has 99% passed for the large jet boys; thank any god you like.
What this discussion is focusing on is that when basic flying skills are required they are too often found missing. Add to that the notion that some people don't even realise when they are required and still try to solve problems via the automatics and start playing the piano causing very out of tune music. It's not a simple black/white one is better than the other. It is a collective matter. A good pilot needs both skills. Our argument is the balance is not correct.
RAT 5 and olster: Good analysis and very well said. Let us hope that someone can get your message across to the XAAs and airlines.
I sometimes feel that I am going backwards in ability. In the SIM, there is always the latest thing from the Tech. department to go through which has to be flown and the ECAM worked through - eating up literally hours of SIM time - and leaving very little time for actual flying.
On the rare occasions when we do finish early in the SIM, I ask if I can do a couple of go-arounds or whatever, but the response from the TRE and the other guy is always "no way mate, I want to go home".
I sometimes feel that I am going backwards in ability. In the SIM, there is always the latest thing from the Tech. department to go through which has to be flown and the ECAM worked through - eating up literally hours of SIM time - and leaving very little time for actual flying.
On the rare occasions when we do finish early in the SIM, I ask if I can do a couple of go-arounds or whatever, but the response from the TRE and the other guy is always "no way mate, I want to go home".
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One should know their energy state, its trend, and how to control it. It is a testament to the man hours and effort spent that commercial aviation has become so incident and accident free. Of the occurrences that do happen, improper management of the energy state is a significant problem.