Emirates B777 gear collapse @ DXB?
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@atpcliff
I don't know if Boeing ever said that, or if they ever recommended flying visual circuits/approaches in FLCH mode, which is some stupid idea!
Which brings me to the comment of Mr. Mouse
Spot on. Basically there's no further comment to add.
XAAs take note or be oblivious!
Asiana had the Autothrottles ON. Boeing told everyone, that with autothrottles ON, you would be speed protected...the plane wouldn't overspeed, and it wouldn't stall. Turns out Boeing's information to us was incorrect.
My airline is now changing their groundschool and training because of this. Our checkairman were VERY surprised to find out that they could stall with the autothrottles ON. Hopefully this accident will prevent some more serious ones in the future...
My airline is now changing their groundschool and training because of this. Our checkairman were VERY surprised to find out that they could stall with the autothrottles ON. Hopefully this accident will prevent some more serious ones in the future...
Which brings me to the comment of Mr. Mouse
They are fine aeroplanes. Unfortunately, they cannot ever be designed to be foolproof in the hands of the poorly trained or marginally proficient.
XAAs take note or be oblivious!
They are fine aeroplanes.
Any modern aeroplane that has TOGA buttons that won't work at any point (within reason) is not "fine".
They're just like cars and software. Each has good points and bad points but the humans that design them are too pig-headed to incorporate the best bits into one design because "we know better".
Can anyone comment on how long it would take the engines to begin to develop enough thrust to accelerate the aircraft in the conditions that were present that day?
Bloggs, so you're comfortable with the idea that if the pilot accidently bumps the TOGA switch while reaching for the reverse levers after touchdown, you should get full forward thrust?
A fellow you may have heard of by the name of Wernher Von Braun put it quite well:
"There is no such thing as a foolproof system, because fools are too ingenious"
Part of my standard certification flight test profile is to do a 'simulated' go-around, so I've witnessed dozens. The PF always leaves his hand on the throttles until go-around thrust is obtained. Of course, flight test pilots are competent. Apparently not all pilots the SLF trust their lives to have that advantage...
Bloggs, so you're comfortable with the idea that if the pilot accidently bumps the TOGA switch while reaching for the reverse levers, you should get full forward thrust?
Of course, flight test pilots are competent. Apparently not all pilots the SLF trust their lives to have that advantage...
My point precisely, TDracer. Why are the TOGA buttons anywhere near the reverser levers? On other aeroplanes, the GA buttons are on the back of the throttles; no chance of bumping them when pulling Reverse. 
Given that the Boeing TOGA buttons have been in the same place for over 50 years, moving them could easily cause more problems than it solves
Those guys did not go flying that day to not bother to check TOGA when they needed it (if indeed that is what happened). Don't slip into the group of "they stuffed it up, no more to see, move along please".
Let's face it, most of us would love to be more "engaged" but we're not allowed to be. That is the cold hard fact. We're expected to perform with imperfect equipment when we are not allowed-to or given the opportunity to get-to/stay at a level where we can perform.
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B777 Auto throttle has come in for some criticism by FAA after SFO accident. Off course you don't fly an approach without looking at your speed but In throttle hold it is supposed to wake up when speed drops but it didn't . Aeroplane may be fine but some systems may not be that ingeniously designed .
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If I remember correctly the 757/767 have the GA switches on the rear of the thrust levers, easier to use and more logical.
B732 if I remember had palm switches for GA?????
B732 if I remember had palm switches for GA?????
Interestingly, the 757/767 GA switches are still there on the 744, but are instead used to disconnect the A/T. On conversion from the 767 to the 744, the instructors repeatedly warned us about this difference. They also said it will not be if, but when, we will incorrectly push the A/T disconnect switch when we mean to GA. (High workload, cognitive overload, revert to 'muscle memory' etc.) I did it once in an early sim session.
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It's much easier...
GA is a normal maneuver.
It's just like a takeoff.
Power , pull, gear up.
The problem I see is that tons of pilots, instructors pilots, check airmen, see it as a an " emergency procedure" to escape of the unknown or near disaster.
This triggers the normal response of the trainee( during training fase or recurrent) that all has to be done in a rush , expediuos and impressive way.
Then ATC with their stupid habit to give new instructions,ask the reason of the GA,combined with the stupid habit of responding to stupid questions right away by PF...
Think about the take off.
Step by step in a calm manner , no rush,no to much taking, no ATC intervention...PF, PM FOUCUSED ON THE MANOUVER. GA IS JUST LIKE A TAKEOFF AND SHOULD BE PERFORMED THE SAME WAY AND PHILOSOPHY !
Aviate Navigate Comunicate.
And of course pilots need to learn to fly( newies) and old ones practice and recover their lost skills.
Thousand of procedures and automation can change , but with the basic fundamentals not in place, another accident is waiting to happen again, unfortunately.
It's just like a takeoff.
Power , pull, gear up.
The problem I see is that tons of pilots, instructors pilots, check airmen, see it as a an " emergency procedure" to escape of the unknown or near disaster.
This triggers the normal response of the trainee( during training fase or recurrent) that all has to be done in a rush , expediuos and impressive way.
Then ATC with their stupid habit to give new instructions,ask the reason of the GA,combined with the stupid habit of responding to stupid questions right away by PF...
Think about the take off.
Step by step in a calm manner , no rush,no to much taking, no ATC intervention...PF, PM FOUCUSED ON THE MANOUVER. GA IS JUST LIKE A TAKEOFF AND SHOULD BE PERFORMED THE SAME WAY AND PHILOSOPHY !
Aviate Navigate Comunicate.
And of course pilots need to learn to fly( newies) and old ones practice and recover their lost skills.
Thousand of procedures and automation can change , but with the basic fundamentals not in place, another accident is waiting to happen again, unfortunately.
Last edited by VONKLUFFEN; 13th Aug 2016 at 11:48.
Controversial, moi?
Off course you don't fly an approach without looking at your speed but In throttle hold it is supposed to wake up when speed drops but it didn't
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Hamish McBush
Many years ago, a Britannia Airways 737-200 carried out an approach in poor visibility into Leeds Bradford. The crew consisted of a very junior and inexperienced Second Officer, with a highly experienced Captain, ex RAF and a reputation for abruptness and high autocracy on 'his' flight deck. The Captain went below minimums and the Second Officer called G/A twice. The Captain then initiated a G/A and called for gear up. He then saw the lights and proceeded to dive for the runway after initiating a pull up and even after calling for the retraction of the undercarriage. The aircraft landed hard, very hard, and many panels opened within the cabin including masks and luggage bins. What saved them, was under the huge stress of the event, the S/O had selected OFF instead of UP and the gear had remained down.
Never, ever try to predict human behaviour in unplanned and stressful situations. The only thing that's certain is uncertainty.
Harry
Many years ago, a Britannia Airways 737-200 carried out an approach in poor visibility into Leeds Bradford. The crew consisted of a very junior and inexperienced Second Officer, with a highly experienced Captain, ex RAF and a reputation for abruptness and high autocracy on 'his' flight deck. The Captain went below minimums and the Second Officer called G/A twice. The Captain then initiated a G/A and called for gear up. He then saw the lights and proceeded to dive for the runway after initiating a pull up and even after calling for the retraction of the undercarriage. The aircraft landed hard, very hard, and many panels opened within the cabin including masks and luggage bins. What saved them, was under the huge stress of the event, the S/O had selected OFF instead of UP and the gear had remained down.
Never, ever try to predict human behaviour in unplanned and stressful situations. The only thing that's certain is uncertainty.
Harry
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M.Mouse
I am not 777 guy but in the SFO case pilots stated something similar to what I said and later FAA asked Boeing to have a look at the auto throttle design. I am interested to know why is that? What does it exactly mean?
I am not 777 guy but in the SFO case pilots stated something similar to what I said and later FAA asked Boeing to have a look at the auto throttle design. I am interested to know why is that? What does it exactly mean?
Hamish McBush
Many years ago, a Britannia Airways 737-200 carried out an approach in poor visibility into Leeds Bradford. The crew consisted of a very junior and inexperienced Second Officer, with a highly experienced Captain, ex RAF and a reputation for abruptness and high autocracy on 'his' flight deck. The Captain went below minimums and the Second Officer called G/A twice. The Captain then initiated a G/A and called for gear up. He then saw the lights and proceeded to dive for the runway after initiating a pull up and even after calling for the retraction of the undercarriage. The aircraft landed hard, very hard, and many panels opened within the cabin including masks and luggage bins. What saved them, was under the huge stress of the event, the S/O had selected OFF instead of UP and the gear had remained down.
Never, ever try to predict human behaviour in unplanned and stressful situations. The only thing that's certain is uncertainty.
Harry
Many years ago, a Britannia Airways 737-200 carried out an approach in poor visibility into Leeds Bradford. The crew consisted of a very junior and inexperienced Second Officer, with a highly experienced Captain, ex RAF and a reputation for abruptness and high autocracy on 'his' flight deck. The Captain went below minimums and the Second Officer called G/A twice. The Captain then initiated a G/A and called for gear up. He then saw the lights and proceeded to dive for the runway after initiating a pull up and even after calling for the retraction of the undercarriage. The aircraft landed hard, very hard, and many panels opened within the cabin including masks and luggage bins. What saved them, was under the huge stress of the event, the S/O had selected OFF instead of UP and the gear had remained down.
Never, ever try to predict human behaviour in unplanned and stressful situations. The only thing that's certain is uncertainty.
Harry
I won't speculate on the cause of this accident but a number of issues I have read on this thread really worry me:
The suggestion that the climb performance of the 777 was poor at MLW on TWO engines, is nonsense. After all, all twins can produce a climb on ONE engine at RTOW. On two engines at MLW climb performance is excellent even at plus 50 c, at least on all the twins I have flown. Can't imagine the tripler is any worse.
Any competent pilot should monitor that, even if AT is engaged and TOGA or any other mode is active at a critical phase of flight, that the thrust levers are moving to give the required thrust ! Hand on thrust levers and if you need a lot of thrust in a hurry, firewall the levers, the ECUs will handle the acceleration and the engines can take it !Even the old hydro mechanical AFRCUs would always control engine acceleration, and as QFI I have seen a lot of that after slams !
Still can't understand the hostility towards hand flying when the environment and workload allows to maintain handling skills and instrument scan.
My company SOP was "centre to command " at 1000 feet. Sometimes in a quiet ATC environment I would hand fly to/from say, 20,000 ft or so. I was sometimes asked why. My answer to this was that one day, I might, just might, have to fly a manual, single engine, non precision approach to minimums at 3 am in the morning after significant systems and,/or engine failure. I was not going to be unable to cope, and hand flying kept up my flying skills, just like my manual flying days on Canberras. ( no ap or at). Autopilots don't get out of practice, human pilots certainly do !
I make these comments, long since retired, but after almost 40 years of flying on 3 four jets and 5 twin jets so shoot me down if you wish !
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Originally Posted by VONKLUFFEN
GA is a normal maneuver.
It's just like a takeoff.
Power , pull, gear up.
The problem I see is that tons of pilots, instructors pilots, check airmen, see it as a an " emergency procedure" to escape of the unknown or near disaster.
This triggers the normal response of the trainee( during training fase or recurrent) that all has to be done in a rush , expediuos and impressive way.
Then ATC with their stupid habit to give new instructions,ask the reason of the GA,combined with the stupid habit of responding to stupid questions right away by PF...
Think about the take off.
Step by step in a calm manner , no rush,no to much taking, no ATC intervention...PF, PM FOUCUSED ON THE MANOUVER. GA IS JUST LIKE A TAKEOFF AND SHOULD BE PERFORMED THE SAME WAY AND PHILOSOPHY !
Aviate Navigate Comunicate.
And of course pilots need to learn to fly( newies) and old ones practice and recover their lost skills.
Thousand of procedures and automation can change , but with the basic fundamentals not in place, another accident is waiting to happen again, unfortunately.
It's just like a takeoff.
Power , pull, gear up.
The problem I see is that tons of pilots, instructors pilots, check airmen, see it as a an " emergency procedure" to escape of the unknown or near disaster.
This triggers the normal response of the trainee( during training fase or recurrent) that all has to be done in a rush , expediuos and impressive way.
Then ATC with their stupid habit to give new instructions,ask the reason of the GA,combined with the stupid habit of responding to stupid questions right away by PF...
Think about the take off.
Step by step in a calm manner , no rush,no to much taking, no ATC intervention...PF, PM FOUCUSED ON THE MANOUVER. GA IS JUST LIKE A TAKEOFF AND SHOULD BE PERFORMED THE SAME WAY AND PHILOSOPHY !
Aviate Navigate Comunicate.
And of course pilots need to learn to fly( newies) and old ones practice and recover their lost skills.
Thousand of procedures and automation can change , but with the basic fundamentals not in place, another accident is waiting to happen again, unfortunately.
And not knowing what you fly VONKLUFFEN but a take-off on my current type may be 180 tonnes heavier than a go around at max landing weight; The performance differences exacerbated by generally taking off with reduced thrust and going around with full attainable thrust! Makes the machine a TOTALLY different beast!
The Go Around also may come at the end of a tiring ULR 15 hour sector. Just another wee difference...
Harry the Cod, post #900
"The crew consisted of a very junior and inexperienced Second Officer, with a highly experienced Captain, ex RAF and a reputation for abruptness and high autocracy on 'his' flight deck."
Ex RN, in fact
"The crew consisted of a very junior and inexperienced Second Officer, with a highly experienced Captain, ex RAF and a reputation for abruptness and high autocracy on 'his' flight deck."
Ex RN, in fact