Volume: an interesting attempt at addressing the issue. I came from very basic GA, entered airlines a B732 level where the visual approach was not only the norm, but very often in the low tech environment of the Greek islands, the only option. Thus we knew how to fly the a/c. It's automatics were very basic and didn't take a lot of mastering. The important thing was the grounding we had in how to make the a/c do what we wanted it to do, either via manual or automatics. I then progressed to the wizz-bang bells & whistles of B767, but same philosophy: learn how to make the a/c do what I wanted via manual control; how it felt and what parameters made it work. The environment was still the same and the Greek islands, Gatwick/Luton/EMA were treated the same. We also learnt how to use the automatics to make the a/c do what we wanted and what was the optimum method of different phases & profiles, but the SOP's were not rigid straight jackets. There was a preferred method, but if an alternative suited the situation better we were knowledgeable and capable and allowed to use it. We also had a fair understanding of the traps. Ultimately we could throw the whole lot away and fly the a/c. By knowing what we wanted the a/c to do, and how it should be doing it we could detect, quickly, if something was amiss and know what to do about it.
In subsequent airlines I trained for this philosophy has disappeared. It is minimal manual flying in the sim, minimal manual flying on the line. The sim is focused on rigid use of automatics (SOP's) to achieve profiles in only one manner. Procedures, procedures. The failures are the basic QRH systems failures. Nothing subtle, just the MC warning system, an amber light followed by QRH. In the now shortened time to command there will be not much more and very little multiple failures exposure, and very little manual flying save a raw data ILS.
IMHO many incidents are caused by subtle mis-behaviours of systems, malfunctioning of automatics and other items where the crew did not notice there was a creeping problem nor understand fully what was happening, and then didn't know what to do about it. Often misguided intervention made the matter worse and the descending spiral of confusion led from a solvable incident into an accident.
If I understand correctly Airbus, in their A350 program, have realised this problem and begun to address it with more manual/basic flying in the beginning of the course. I know of one major airline who are doing this, certainly on B777. Learn to fly the basic a/c with no guidance, then add the AFDS, the add the full automatics, then introduce failures. Building blocks.
Sadly not all airlines, in their rush to get cadets into line training, are adopting this training regime. Indeed some have made retrograde steps. They have the philosophy that rigid SOP adherence and full use of automatics is the safest method of operation. Sad days.
But to address the point about humans and monitoring: considering my back ground and apprenticeship I had no problem converting to the full automatic modern EFIS cockpit. All the detailed information made the job of manual approaches and CDA"s easier, more accurate and thus more pleasing. A full understanding of the systems and what the a/c was doing made the job easier and more relaxing, but never causing complacency; just easier to manage and keep an overview, than with needles & dials. I wonder if it's the lack of that apprenticeship that is missing today and causing this over dependancy on automatics. The cadet pilot knows nothing else after the type rating. Then the quick command captain knows nothing else because for 3-4 years they been on the same rigid SOP automatics only treadmill.
It's not just about manual flying or the odd weekend trip in a glider. That won't solve the basic problem of ignorance about the a/c, both in aerodynamic & performance terms and in systems & automatics terms. The whole training philosophy needs a complete overhaul and then the attitude of airlines in enhancing and maintaining piloting skills on line needs an overhaul. There is no single silver bullet to solve the underlying problems.
In the 70's there was huge FTL problem and in UK the Bader report brought about industry changes. That was an outside independent report and accepted and adopted. I wonder if a solution is for another respected aviator to do the same thing with pilot training. A complete review of the problems, a review of the current training & testing syllabi, and review of the different philosophies on the line and how it affects piloting skills, and then comprehensive recommendations for discussion across the industry including the pilot representatives who are not management lackeys, but 'steeped in aviation' dedicated trainers.
Volunteers please step forward.
I realise this is an old chestnut that has been debated on here numerous times, but once again it might be that in Dubai it has raised it's ugly head and so re-opened the discussion.