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Emirates B777 gear collapse @ DXB?

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Emirates B777 gear collapse @ DXB?

Old 9th Aug 2016, 07:01
  #661 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by Hi_Tech View Post
This is a bit scary. There are some very good posts here by pilots of B777. What is scary for a non-pilot is, there appears to be a variation in their understanding of the system. There is also apparently a variation in standards of training and write ups in FCTM between airlines.
Another difference that is very evident. We have Byron Bailey type of pilots (A few pilots left), who rose from earlier moderately automatic aircraft, and those who have flown only the modern jets. I have seen in ME airlines cadet pilots who start on the modern jet like 777 and are now sitting on left seat. I think it will be this lot who are most vulnerable when automatic system misbehaves (or used wrongly), and you have seconds to understand and react. And when you have some one to retract the gear after a bounce, .... I need not say more. As one experience pilot once told me, "we are paid these days for the first 5 min and the last 10 min of a flight". That was on a A310 when FMS was introduced. We have gone several steps ahead with automation after that. The challenge is how to train and remember all the logic behind automation at critical times. It is a bigger challenge when one switches from Airbus to Boeing or vice versa as Asiana pilot in SFO incident testified. The discussion on this thread has become very interesting and revealing at the same time.
Well said and since you have mentioned A310, not an easy plane to handle in GA, how many of us here discussing did base training on an a/c and not in FFS. Touch and go's with basic rules, no reverse, flaps 1 notch up and trim for T/O and TOGA and I can tell feels much different and that is exactly what new gen pilots need, get out of the box and use your common sense....
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Old 9th Aug 2016, 07:21
  #662 (permalink)  

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The last time those contributing to this thread encountered bounces on landing, some more frequency than others, was probably during their first 20+ hours of basic flying training.

Bounce, decaying airspeed, select the appropriate attitude and apply power (and a touch of right rudder) ~ escape from danger, and climb away. Remember?

Automation in recent accidents has a lot to answer for, as it appears to wipe clean the memory of what you were taught (the basics) in the first place.

And as Cygnet46 (as was at PIK) would say of aircraft "it is just an aeroplane"

Swiss cheese..............

Cygnet66 (PIK)

Last edited by parkfell; 9th Aug 2016 at 10:29. Reason: PIK
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Old 9th Aug 2016, 07:22
  #663 (permalink)  
 
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This is a bit scary. There are some very good posts here by pilots of B777. What is scary for a non-pilot is, there appears to be a variation in their understanding of the system. There is also apparently a variation in standards of training
Don't forget that there is also a variation in ticket prices. As a pilot it frustrates me when I see ticket prices that will barely cover the cost of the fuel for that sector. The effectiveness and size of the training department, the quality of candidates attracted by salaries, the number of tasks completed on Engineering checks, the number of pilots per airframe etc are all elements that affect the bottom line.
If Airline A has ten people in their training department, pays pilots the minimum they can get away with considering the market, runs the bare minimum tasks per Engineering check that the manufacturer allows and has pilots flying the maximum number of hours per month/ year that is considered legal, and offers cheap tickets, then Airline B who has a bigger more expensive training department ( ie better trained staff) , runs an extra 200 tasks for the same Engineering check, and has more pilots per airframe allowing well rested crews to operate at their best is stuffed. They have to compete on the price of the ticket, but their overheads are greater.
The "lean operators" drag the other operators down to their level. The only way to combat this is to have sensible minimum standards legislated. Unfortunately, the regulators don't often meet with pilot/ engineering groups ( those who understand the realities of safety) , they meet with the lawyers and accountants who run the Airlines and come up with rules like the recently introduced duty and flight time limitations that can see people who are not fit to operate a lawn mower in charge of a jet with 400 people on it.
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Old 9th Aug 2016, 07:35
  #664 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by NSEU View Post
If the TOGA switch/es were pushed during the (suspected) bounce (i.e. in the air), would the A/T and A/P produce the desired result?
EK pilots don't use A/P on for LDG's unless it is autoland LDG required to keep recency and knowing the wx conditions at the time of arr that was the case.
Personally I would also disengage A/T at the same time...anytime not happy with outcome of LDG phase go for GA and announce it so the PM knows your intentions, it looks like in case of B777 you need to press TOGA switches twice, first time for FD guidance and second time for your thrust in order to climb out


in case of 521, maybe PF accidentally disengaged A/T instead of selecting GA and here we go....no FD bars no thrust and bad decision of PM raising gear up on positive climb (induced by bounce)
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Old 9th Aug 2016, 07:44
  #665 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by BuzzBox View Post
HPSOV L:

The Rejected Landing procedure in our 777 FCOM states the following:
The problem with a bounced landing recovery is that the TOGA switches do not become active again until a short time (2 seconds??) after the aircraft blessing.
what are the conditions for TOGA to be active again after 2sec??
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Old 9th Aug 2016, 08:02
  #666 (permalink)  
 
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what are the conditions for TOGA to be active again after 2sec??
There is a thread running in Tech Log called B777 logic - balked landing/GA after touch down
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Old 9th Aug 2016, 08:14
  #667 (permalink)  
 
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framer: "I see ticket prices that will barely cover the cost of the fuel"

You are right to be concerned about the quality of training, but I wouldn't focus too much on the lowest ticket prices. An airline like BA may well decide to compete with EZY on price, but only offer a handful of cheap seats. A lot of airlines will have ten different fare classes. O'Leary once said that his highest paying pax were those going to a funeral. I believe him.
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Old 9th Aug 2016, 08:22
  #668 (permalink)  
 
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This is a bit scary. There are some very good posts here by pilots of B777. What is scary for a non-pilot is, there appears to be a variation in their understanding of the system. There is also apparently a variation in standards of training and write ups in FCTM between airlines.
I noticed this kind of comment appearing in the Fly Dubai Accident thread. Non pilots cannot believe how pilots don't understand x/y/z.

Well for the non pilots out there the reason for this is that Aircraft Manuals are written to tell you the absolute legal minimum to understand how to fly the aircraft. Sometimes this is useful, (ie knowing to much can hurt you) or it can lead to an accident when you get a weird failure or unusual circumstance.

That is why there are adverts for all these 'extra' manuals and technical APPs you can purchase. Bascially the real manual don't tell you enough. This compounded by some Check Airman who are frustrated Aeronautical Engineers.

Maybe it's time the manufacturers change their approach to manual writing?
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Old 9th Aug 2016, 08:26
  #669 (permalink)  
 
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I come back to an earlier posting (#495) where i suggested, that a "Pull-Up" procedure might save the day.

We have a rejected landing with a technique, a bounced landing with a technique, we might have a low level wind-shear with a technique and a threatening rapid loss of altitude at low level with a technique.

What do they have in common, what is their greatest threat?
- > Yes, an impending heavy ground contact/crash.
What would you do if a ground impact is looming?
- > Yes, a "Pull-Up" escape manoeuvre would probably be appropriate.

The perfidious thing here is, that a warning that would lead to such a manoeuvre is inhibited at this stage!

As we can read on these pages, there is much debate about when is what inhibited or when can what be engaged......
Simply imagine the average John Doe, with the average actual training and the average thin booklets we are given, and paint your own picture of how fast and accurately he can assess which of the above hazards he has actually encountered and which manoeuvre he should apply. All this during his initial stunning moments when rapid action is crucial.

I guess all Monday morning quarterbacks, especially the ones who have themselves never touched a -300) would pretend that this is easy, just know your aircraft and blah, blah ...

I come back to my suggestion:
For such situations, so close to ground, with that much drag and at a certain stage with very low power, I strongly suggest that recommending ONE simple manoeuvre, that might not be the most elegant, but the one with the best chances to get out of impending trouble, could be the "Pull-Up" procedure, even without GPWS warning. At least it would leave no doubt and take you out of automation doubt.

Once out of trouble, have your PM switch on the AT, engage TOGA and then continue as per normal GA procedure.

(let me speculate on this accident, you might shoot me down: I guess the pilots went the other way around: First a normal GA with gear up, then when it turned ugly, went for a W/S escape procedure. It didn't work. Maybe the other way around, with pull-up first and GA after, it might have.)
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Old 9th Aug 2016, 08:36
  #670 (permalink)  
 
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Boeing don't publish a balked landing procedure. It's left up to certain operators and regulators to train their own procedures. However it is basic airmanship to ensure full thrust is applied. A pull up manoeuvre is a bad idea as you would need to pull the nose up to 20 degrees whereas a rejected landing requires maintaining the current attitude until climbing safely away when a normal go around can be followed (TOGA, retracting flaps to go-around setting, then gear).
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Old 9th Aug 2016, 08:52
  #671 (permalink)  
 
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From these valuable contributions by 777 pilots you get the sense we are getting close to the explanation for this crash. There were similar discussions around the Rostov accident. ( note, effectively same operator as 521). And there have been others. Presumably the majors, Boeing and Airbus get to read or hear about these discussions in an ad hoc way. Perhaps if a pilots body (IFALPA?) pulled the most relevant ones into a combined document and sent it to them, some weight would be added to the discussions which are presumably going on in the marbled halls. Meanwhile although the explanation must already be known by some in the know, we have to be patient. The clock is ticking to 3rd September when UAE GCAA are required to issue first report.
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Old 9th Aug 2016, 09:35
  #672 (permalink)  

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....it looks like in case of B777 you need to press TOGA switches twice, first time for FD guidance and second time for your thrust in order to climb out
That is not how the sytem works.
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Old 9th Aug 2016, 09:46
  #673 (permalink)  
 
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In our baulked landing procedure we are told never to trust that the TOGA switches will function (inhibited if the ground air switches have functioned and the spoilers deployed) after a bounce or deep landing but instead to believe they haven't and advance max manual full thrust. (as someone stated earlier on the thread full arms length push!)

After take off, hit the TOGA switches, but keep the throttles forward in the case that the thrust levers will attempt to motor backwards. Once TOGA is engaged and the FMA's have been confirmed by the NHP (SOP FMA call out after take off) then you can relax on the throttles and monitor them.

The initial report will, hopefully, contain some actual facts for discussion.
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Old 9th Aug 2016, 09:48
  #674 (permalink)  
 
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There are several aspects in this thread, all of which might contribute to an accident, but perhaps none in isolation.
Speculation about accidents requires a wider view; not just a question of if pilots know how the guidance system works or not, or know and forget, or misjudge the situation, or just follow SOPs. Or if the system design, operation, or training are inconsistent, or overly complex in rare or unexpected circumstances.

There are assumptions behind all of these aspects; why the system was designed so, the expectations for use, consideration of human performance and limitations, likelihood of encountering situations.
As an example, there are sound arguments for using automation during the approach (AT, FD) and for standardising operations, but it is unlikely that these can accommodate every scenario in increasingly complex and high tempo operations. Thus if training focuses on always following SOPs, and the SOP is to select TOGA, then the policy must account for, or accept situations where the required actions will deviate from the standard. This implies that the policies, training programs, documents and practical training must similarly involve a common understanding of the system and operation.

There can be many viewpoints for solutions and conflict resolution, some may involve a specific scenarios, or training, or policy, but none (I venture) will be without assumption and compromise. Safety improvements will require that several aspects be addressed simultaneously; I.e. reconsider the design, the content or policy of SOPs. Undertake wider investigations of an apparent increase in bounced landings, hazards of tailwind operation, human-automation interaction, and changing norms and expectations of modern society re training and knowledge.
Don't expect to find answers in one accident, one view, one idea, or in one solution; look at all operations for vulnerabilities, assumptions, and the consequences of not knowing, forgetting, or by just following SOPs.
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Old 9th Aug 2016, 10:03
  #675 (permalink)  
 
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You are right to be concerned about the quality of training, but I wouldn't focus too much on the lowest ticket prices
I hear what you are saying oldchina but the lowest ticket price wouldn't be quite so low if the regulators had sensible bottom lines when it comes to things like training and pilot flight/duty times. The Rostov accident mentioned above by Portmanteau is a case in point. The Captain had resigned siting fatigue, it was 4am, he was half way through an eleven hour duty, truck drivers in civilised countries are not allowed to do the kind of duty hours that crew were doing and are required to have more rest breaks out of the vehicle. Yet it was legal.
The Airlines will always compete to get their overheads as low as possible, it is the applied law that determines how low they go. The ticket prices are a reflection of this problem and that is why I focussed on them.
I'm not in any way suggesting fatigue was a factor in the 521 crash, just using the above example as a way of highlighting that the regs are the bottom line whether it be maintenance, training,or flight/duty limits and they need to be sensible.
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Old 9th Aug 2016, 10:11
  #676 (permalink)  
 
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A pull up manoeuvre is a bad idea as you would need to pull the nose up to 20 degrees
No, only up to stick shaker, which might be very much lower initially and which incidentally gives the actual best performance getting away from what is the greatest threat: The ground.

Isn't that the foremost objective when you're hanging in the air, close to ground?

It might sound strange, but such bounced/balked landings, if due to pilot error or ambient conditions, were what brought the three MD11 down and now a -300. All of them seemingly tried the procedure with holding actual attitude and then trying to go around .....

I can see the reluctance to propagate such a drastic manoeuvre, but it seems to me, that drastic situations sometimes require drastic measures.

.... and it's just a suggestion ....
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Old 9th Aug 2016, 10:32
  #677 (permalink)  
 
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The experience, training and procedures are all there and, in many airlines throughout the world, are in practice.

It's just getting the airline management to stop seeing training purely as a cost to be trimmed to it's absolute legal minimums and see it as a forward projecting benefit to the company. Apply the experience, procedures and training that we already possess!
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Old 9th Aug 2016, 10:50
  #678 (permalink)  
 
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up to stick shaker, which might be very much lower initially and which incidentally gives the actual best performance
The stick shaker gives you a predfined margin to stall, but that only accidentially would mean it is the speed of steepest climb. You may already fly slower than the best climb performance speed if you pull up to the stick shaker.
However, If you do not have time to figure out the best speed, pulling up to the stick shaker is not totally off.
The speed of steepest climb is related to engine power, the stall speed is not. So that difference varies with OAT and wind. A clever modern PFD should be able to display it accurately...
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Old 9th Aug 2016, 11:08
  #679 (permalink)  
 
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Pulling up to the PFI's is the EGPWS pull up go-around manoeuvre and whilst it will give you the most rapid of climbs it also can activate the stick shaker which is a huge distraction to both crew members especially when so close to the ground!

Call the Go-Around, PNF selects F20, a smooth application of pitch at 2-3 degrees per second towards 15-20 degrees at landing weights with simultaneous application of full manual thrust, both engines functioning whilst monitoring the airspeed and vsi will take you between 5-7 seconds, hit the TOGA switches and follow the FD's.

Throw a stick shaker in there and your workload has gone through the roof. This is not a tricky manoeuvre from a flight position you are unsure of (unlike EGPWS!)

IMHO of course! :[
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Old 9th Aug 2016, 11:12
  #680 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by M.Mouse View Post
That is not how the sytem works.
You are right, my mistake it should say:
pushing the TOGA switches leads to selection of go-around thrust guaranteeing a vertical speed of at least 2,000 ft/ min, automatic disengagement of all of the previously selected AFDS modes, and automatic engagement of the go-around roll and pitch modes. Pressing a second time leads to selection of maximum thrust.
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