EgyptAir 804 disappears from radar Paris-Cairo
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Flightaware's log shows
Thu 03:29:31 33.6768 28.7912 137° Southeast 534 615 37,000 FlightAware ADS-B (GZP / LTFG)
that is actual ADSB from one or more LTFG receivers
so it seems ADSB quit at that time at FL370. 9 seconds later disappeared from radar. strange huh
00:26Z 3044 ANTI ICE R WINDOW
00:26Z 561200 R SLIDING WINDOW SENSOR
00:26Z 2600 SMOKE LAVATORY SMOKE
00:27Z 2600 AVIONICS SMOKE
00:28Z 561100 R FIXED WINDOW SENSOR
00:29Z 2200 AUTO FLT FCU 2 FAULT
00:29Z 2700 F/CTL SEC 3 FAULT
so ACARS first, followed by ADSB failure followed by the radar. I wonder if there is any truth in that 'witness' report about seeing a fireball...
Flightaware's log shows
Thu 03:29:31 33.6768 28.7912 137° Southeast 534 615 37,000 FlightAware ADS-B (GZP / LTFG)
that is actual ADSB from one or more LTFG receivers
so it seems ADSB quit at that time at FL370. 9 seconds later disappeared from radar. strange huh
00:26Z 3044 ANTI ICE R WINDOW
00:26Z 561200 R SLIDING WINDOW SENSOR
00:26Z 2600 SMOKE LAVATORY SMOKE
00:27Z 2600 AVIONICS SMOKE
00:28Z 561100 R FIXED WINDOW SENSOR
00:29Z 2200 AUTO FLT FCU 2 FAULT
00:29Z 2700 F/CTL SEC 3 FAULT
so ACARS first, followed by ADSB failure followed by the radar. I wonder if there is any truth in that 'witness' report about seeing a fireball...
Last edited by vmandr; 21st May 2016 at 21:38.
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Uhhh IF a rapid decompression caused by whatever means- then due to later recording of ACARS- a cabin altitude or similar differential pressure sensor alarm would be expected to appear in the next few 2 or 3 minutes. Since there is no such- the decompression scenario seems to be near zero probibility !!
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The first engineering CFDS messages that were transmitted were:
00:26Z 3044 ANTI ICE R WINDOW
00:26Z 561200 R SLIDING WINDOW SENSOR
00:26Z 2600 SMOKE LAVATORY SMOKE
The first 2 are associated with a failure of WHC 2 in the avionics bay but only generate one ECAM warning between them which is:
ANTI ICE R WINDSHIELD. That's the first clue that all is not well as WHC2 fails in the avionics bay below the FO's feet.
The front part of the aircraft is not entirely segmented so smoke/fumes will not be confined to the avionics bay..... so the next bit of bad news is:
SMOKE LAVATORY SMOKE (presumably toilet A). Remember the toilet smoke detectors are not only sensitive (to gentleman's hair spray amongst other stuff) but they are also single channel, unlike:-
SMOKE AVIONICS SMOKE which goes straight to the top of the ECAM warning list in red, but remember.... it requires both of the 2 detectors to be triggered before the warning latches on so it is slower that a toilet warning. All the Airbus professionals here know where this warning is leading, especially if you already have evidence that something is going wrong in the avionics bay. So in no time at all the Smoke checklist takes you into Emergency Electrical Configuration (EEC) and the workload goes through the roof.
It is difficult enough hand flying a big jet at high altitude with everything working normally but the Captain is now flying at high altitude, with only his basic instrumentation with the aircraft in Alternate Law. As the crew of Air Asia 8501 found out.... flying at altitude in Alternate Law is VERY demanding on a pilot, trying to do that in an environment of increasing smoke, maybe already on oxygen may have been too much for them.
I would have also made a turn to the left, towards Paphos, in order to land ASAP. I believe control was lost shortly thereafter.
00:26Z 3044 ANTI ICE R WINDOW
00:26Z 561200 R SLIDING WINDOW SENSOR
00:26Z 2600 SMOKE LAVATORY SMOKE
The first 2 are associated with a failure of WHC 2 in the avionics bay but only generate one ECAM warning between them which is:
ANTI ICE R WINDSHIELD. That's the first clue that all is not well as WHC2 fails in the avionics bay below the FO's feet.
The front part of the aircraft is not entirely segmented so smoke/fumes will not be confined to the avionics bay..... so the next bit of bad news is:
SMOKE LAVATORY SMOKE (presumably toilet A). Remember the toilet smoke detectors are not only sensitive (to gentleman's hair spray amongst other stuff) but they are also single channel, unlike:-
SMOKE AVIONICS SMOKE which goes straight to the top of the ECAM warning list in red, but remember.... it requires both of the 2 detectors to be triggered before the warning latches on so it is slower that a toilet warning. All the Airbus professionals here know where this warning is leading, especially if you already have evidence that something is going wrong in the avionics bay. So in no time at all the Smoke checklist takes you into Emergency Electrical Configuration (EEC) and the workload goes through the roof.
It is difficult enough hand flying a big jet at high altitude with everything working normally but the Captain is now flying at high altitude, with only his basic instrumentation with the aircraft in Alternate Law. As the crew of Air Asia 8501 found out.... flying at altitude in Alternate Law is VERY demanding on a pilot, trying to do that in an environment of increasing smoke, maybe already on oxygen may have been too much for them.
I would have also made a turn to the left, towards Paphos, in order to land ASAP. I believe control was lost shortly thereafter.
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Excellent checkpoint on facts vs supposition 
The cause speculators often stretch their suppositions into factual support.
This is the main reason why we should wait for time stamped and correlated black box data and not rely on maintenance oriented signals as factual time stamps.
For many accidents even black box data is not sufficient to conclude the causes without corresponding examination of hardware.
We have a long way to go on this one
Forgive my ignorance, but I see only "hours and minutes" recorded in the times of these events. Are seconds within minutes not displayed?
Given the above - can we know if these events occur simultaneously and simply appear in the order they do so in this list by some accident of software logic - oris their order on the list absolutely defined by the order in which they occurred?
Also....without "seconds" how can we know the events of minute 26 and minute 27 did not actually occur within seconds of one another....?
Would this information be available to aircrew handling a sequence of errors and therefore allow them to perhaps make a causal link between errors?
I am not involved in the air industry at all, but I do handle systems where error reporting allows me to trace a causal event through real time error reporting.
Given the above - can we know if these events occur simultaneously and simply appear in the order they do so in this list by some accident of software logic - oris their order on the list absolutely defined by the order in which they occurred?
Also....without "seconds" how can we know the events of minute 26 and minute 27 did not actually occur within seconds of one another....?
Would this information be available to aircrew handling a sequence of errors and therefore allow them to perhaps make a causal link between errors?
I am not involved in the air industry at all, but I do handle systems where error reporting allows me to trace a causal event through real time error reporting.
The cause speculators often stretch their suppositions into factual support.
This is the main reason why we should wait for time stamped and correlated black box data and not rely on maintenance oriented signals as factual time stamps.
For many accidents even black box data is not sufficient to conclude the causes without corresponding examination of hardware.
We have a long way to go on this one
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so ACARS first, followed by ADSB failure followed by the radar. I wonder if there is any truth in that 'witness' report about seeing a fireball...
LA Times: EgyptAir Flight 804: No explosion detected by satellites - LA Times
"U.S. reconnaissance satellites did not detect evidence of a large flash or explosion aboard the EgyptAir A320 jetliner, U.S. officials said."
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Having just done the scenario set out by Maplug above, this is a realistic outcome from a smoke incident which is not quickly curtailed. Frankly, it is unpleasant to do in the safety of the sim.
Having flown Airbus for years, I have always been a little puzzled by the lack of fire suppression in the avionics bay.
Having flown Airbus for years, I have always been a little puzzled by the lack of fire suppression in the avionics bay.
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Could anyone comment on the ability of a single member of SLF to take out an aircraft using nothing other than items allowed onboard.
I know AC 797 was a discarded butt (ie not intentional), but if your intention was malice and you had a litre of duty free vodka + reams of available paper in the toilet + a single ignition source?
Night flight, would anyone be looking at who took what into the toilet?
I know AC 797 was a discarded butt (ie not intentional), but if your intention was malice and you had a litre of duty free vodka + reams of available paper in the toilet + a single ignition source?
Night flight, would anyone be looking at who took what into the toilet?
In a actual aircraft explosive decompression if the aircraft is more then a few years old you will often get a lot of dust flying which will set off a particulate style detector.
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I sincerely hope that if anyone could comment with authority born of expertise on this subject, that they would have the wit not to do so on a publicly available forum.
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Could anyone comment on the ability of a single member of SLF to take out an aircraft using nothing other than items allowed onboard.
I know AC 797 was a discarded butt (ie not intentional), but if your intention was malice and you had a litre of duty free vodka + reams of available paper in the toilet + a single ignition source?
Night flight, would anyone be looking at who took what into the toilet?
I know AC 797 was a discarded butt (ie not intentional), but if your intention was malice and you had a litre of duty free vodka + reams of available paper in the toilet + a single ignition source?
Night flight, would anyone be looking at who took what into the toilet?
We forbid all kinds of items through security.
Then once they're airside we let the pax buy bottles of high-proof rum in duty-free. Stick a napkin in the neck and you have a moderately effective improvised Molotov cocktail. Break the bottle over the seat in front of you and you have an improvised weapon no less deadly than a boxcutter. A coordinated attack along those lines by multiple individuals is possible and it might even be effective - but damn few people seem to be willing to even consider the possible vulnerabilities there.
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Could anyone comment on the ability of a single member of SLF to take out an aircraft using nothing other than items allowed onboard.
I know AC 797 was a discarded butt (ie not intentional), but if your intention was malice and you had a litre of duty free vodka + reams of available paper in the toilet + a single ignition source?
Night flight, would anyone be looking at who took what into the toilet?
I know AC 797 was a discarded butt (ie not intentional), but if your intention was malice and you had a litre of duty free vodka + reams of available paper in the toilet + a single ignition source?
Night flight, would anyone be looking at who took what into the toilet?
PROBABLE CAUSE: "A fire of undetermined origin
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Rear bulkhead failure repair 4 years previous is likely linked.
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Again, the NTSB report does not say electrical fire. It says "undetermined origin".
http://libraryonline.erau.edu/online...s/AAR86-02.pdf
http://libraryonline.erau.edu/online...s/AAR86-02.pdf
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Though the fuselage was nearly destroyed by the intensity of the fire, the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) and flight data recorder (FDR) for flight 797 were still in good condition and produced vital data for the NTSB investigation.[3] On the CVR, NTSB investigators heard eight sounds of electrical arcing—likely inaudible to the crew—beginning at 18:48 CDT. Three minutes later, at 18:51, the popping sounds that Cameron and Ouimet would later identify as the left toilet circuit breaker tripping are audible on the CVR; Cameron attempts to reset the circuits twice over the next 60 seconds, but the CVR records the breakers immediately popping again after each reset attempt.[4] Cameron would attempt once more to reset the breakers at 18:59, but the CVR records arcing sounds followed by the popping sound of the breakers continuing to trip again after each reset over the next 60 seconds.[4] At 19:02, the CVR records flight attendant Judi Davidson entering the cockpit to deliver the first report of a possible fire in the lavatory.[4] Though a number of wires in the lavatory section were later found with insulation stripped away, NTSB investigators were unable to determine whether this insulation damage was the cause of the fire or was caused by the fire.
This from the NTSB report. Cause "undetermined" ? More like can't tell which wire bundle went first. And continual resetting of the tripped circuit breaker was not unrelated, either.
This from the NTSB report. Cause "undetermined" ? More like can't tell which wire bundle went first. And continual resetting of the tripped circuit breaker was not unrelated, either.
Reading through the posts of last night, I see everyone is still chewing on the same old gum. There is one item in particular which seems to be completely misunderstood, and that is one of the few FACTUAL information we know:
The lost radar contact referred to is SECONDARY RADAR, ATC does not use primary radar any more. The timing almost perfectly matches the loss of data from FR24, etc. indicating that the loss of contact happened while the aircraft was still cruising at FL370. From the statement it is clear that Greek AF primary AD radar did not track the flight, so any subsequent statements made by the minister of defence were likely the result of analysis of stored recordings.
We have zero information on the time it took to FL100, and the taken course itself has not been verified, it is just based on a politician's press statement, and we all know what that's worth. As the last ACARS messages were received very close to this time, it is fair to assume that all communications systems lost power at this point.
As for the ACARS messages, keep in mind that they could:
A) indicate valid faults, the system functioning as designed
B) be generated in error, due to some components of the ECAM system being compromised
In absence of FDR/CVR data, it will take a very lengthy and complicated fault path analysis to establish whether the messages reflect scenario A) or B), until this is known it is meaningless to draw any conclusions based on assumption A).
From known/published FACTS, this is what we know till now:
- Flight progressed on course at FL370 till moment of loss of contact. Last voice communication happened 42 minutes earlier when all appeared normal.
- Flight at LKP was in cruise phase, TOD would have been another 10-15 minutes, approaching the Egyptian coastline.
- ACARS data indicate a series of faults commencing at 3-4 minutes prior to loss of contact. Some of the transmitted ECAM messages suggest smoke in FWD lavatory/avionics bay, however it is yet to be established whether these are valid warnings or have been generated in error.
- Simultaneous loss of ADS-B and ACARS data suggests loss of power to both systems.
- Three minutes prior to loss of contact, crew did not respond to Greek ATC calls, however the area is known to be a blind spot confirmed by several knowledgeable posters, so this by itself would not indicate any problems.
- SUPPOSEDLY some time after loss of contact aircraft entered into a steep descent with some lateral maneuvres (based on analysis of Greek primary AD radar returns), however this is based on Greek MoD press statement made very soon after the accident, may not be verified and needs to be treated with caution.
- Aircraft crashed into the Mediterranean with high energy very close to LKP. This suggests aircraft was still structurally intact at time of impact with the sea (compare wreckage of Metrojet to the very mangled and fragmented pieces recovered so far - the seat-back piece is particularly telling - with Metroject whore rows survived the free-fall practically intact)
Originally Posted by HCAA press statement
At 03:29:40 am local time the flight signal was lost from radar, almost 7 NM south/southeast from KUMBI point (boundary point, between ATHINAI and CAIRO FIRs), within Cairo FIR. Immediate assistance of the Hellenic Air Force radars was requested for possible target tracking, with no avail. (full press statement here: Hellenic Civil Aviation Authority - News)
We have zero information on the time it took to FL100, and the taken course itself has not been verified, it is just based on a politician's press statement, and we all know what that's worth. As the last ACARS messages were received very close to this time, it is fair to assume that all communications systems lost power at this point.
As for the ACARS messages, keep in mind that they could:
A) indicate valid faults, the system functioning as designed
B) be generated in error, due to some components of the ECAM system being compromised
In absence of FDR/CVR data, it will take a very lengthy and complicated fault path analysis to establish whether the messages reflect scenario A) or B), until this is known it is meaningless to draw any conclusions based on assumption A).
From known/published FACTS, this is what we know till now:
- Flight progressed on course at FL370 till moment of loss of contact. Last voice communication happened 42 minutes earlier when all appeared normal.
- Flight at LKP was in cruise phase, TOD would have been another 10-15 minutes, approaching the Egyptian coastline.
- ACARS data indicate a series of faults commencing at 3-4 minutes prior to loss of contact. Some of the transmitted ECAM messages suggest smoke in FWD lavatory/avionics bay, however it is yet to be established whether these are valid warnings or have been generated in error.
- Simultaneous loss of ADS-B and ACARS data suggests loss of power to both systems.
- Three minutes prior to loss of contact, crew did not respond to Greek ATC calls, however the area is known to be a blind spot confirmed by several knowledgeable posters, so this by itself would not indicate any problems.
- SUPPOSEDLY some time after loss of contact aircraft entered into a steep descent with some lateral maneuvres (based on analysis of Greek primary AD radar returns), however this is based on Greek MoD press statement made very soon after the accident, may not be verified and needs to be treated with caution.
- Aircraft crashed into the Mediterranean with high energy very close to LKP. This suggests aircraft was still structurally intact at time of impact with the sea (compare wreckage of Metrojet to the very mangled and fragmented pieces recovered so far - the seat-back piece is particularly telling - with Metroject whore rows survived the free-fall practically intact)
Last edited by andrasz; 22nd May 2016 at 11:55.
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ANDRAZ, you have made the best statement so far..
There are a lot of speculations about what happened, based on very very few information, some of them not even reliable...
To make an investigation, for crime or accident, the process has to be followed carefully, following a protocol, step by step, and by PROFESSIONALS..
First is to gather information, then built different scenario and confront them to probability of happening... I know it is a forum, and everyone can express
but I do think that there a lot to much speculations here..
I do work for many years in aviation, as engineer, and I do fly, and one thing I learned is not to go to fast in diagnostic...
So I do not have an idea of what happened, and if someone ask me he or she will be very disappointed to hear me saying "better to wait for the Cvr and DFDR to get an idea"
There are a lot of speculations about what happened, based on very very few information, some of them not even reliable...
To make an investigation, for crime or accident, the process has to be followed carefully, following a protocol, step by step, and by PROFESSIONALS..
First is to gather information, then built different scenario and confront them to probability of happening... I know it is a forum, and everyone can express
but I do think that there a lot to much speculations here..
I do work for many years in aviation, as engineer, and I do fly, and one thing I learned is not to go to fast in diagnostic...
So I do not have an idea of what happened, and if someone ask me he or she will be very disappointed to hear me saying "better to wait for the Cvr and DFDR to get an idea"
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I have a couple questions regarding the possibility of fire given the ACARS messages.
1. Are there measures in place to mitigate a fire taking out redundant electronic components?
2. Are there any cases of a fly-by-wire airliner (or even a military jet) having a fire in the cargo hold or electronics bay at cruise which maintained control long enough to land? I ask about fly-by-wire particularly because I suspect that the implications of an electrical fire on an electronics-controlled aircraft are somewhat different than on an aircraft with conventional hydrolics (not saying better or worse but wondering about close analogues).
3. What sorts of higher amperage circuits are connected to either the electronics bay or lavatory besides heating elements? Not interested in voltage, but amperage.
I am aware that smoke detectors, particularly ionization ones, can be set off by many things other than smoke (humidity, condensation, even overpressurization), but naturally the first question when one gets messages like this seem to my mind to be "was there a fire?"
I don't see how this can be looked at without finding close analogues. I looked and I could not find any quickly.
1. Are there measures in place to mitigate a fire taking out redundant electronic components?
2. Are there any cases of a fly-by-wire airliner (or even a military jet) having a fire in the cargo hold or electronics bay at cruise which maintained control long enough to land? I ask about fly-by-wire particularly because I suspect that the implications of an electrical fire on an electronics-controlled aircraft are somewhat different than on an aircraft with conventional hydrolics (not saying better or worse but wondering about close analogues).
3. What sorts of higher amperage circuits are connected to either the electronics bay or lavatory besides heating elements? Not interested in voltage, but amperage.
I am aware that smoke detectors, particularly ionization ones, can be set off by many things other than smoke (humidity, condensation, even overpressurization), but naturally the first question when one gets messages like this seem to my mind to be "was there a fire?"
I don't see how this can be looked at without finding close analogues. I looked and I could not find any quickly.