US Air PHL

[Airbubba]

More on this dissent:

Party Submission - Allied Pilots Association

Thanks for sharing this. Since the 'RETARD' annunciation was not at the time listed as a reason for a 'recommended' high speed RTO, I can now see where it indeed may have contributed to the subsequent confusion.

[mach2.6]

HAL

Seems that the various dissenters feel that the unexpected "retard" call by Hal played a large part in the mishap. Although I never flew a bus, I likewise would not have expected this call at this point (takeoff roll) in the operation of the flight, simply because it is illogical.

One could speculate as to what other unexpected calls Hal could have in his repertoire, if he was feeling unwell the day after his colonoscopy.
CVR:
FO: "checklist complete"
Capt (to ATC): "rolling"
Hal: "oui, allons"
Capt: "Hal, I've asked you not to speak French, as I don't understand it."
Hal: "retard..., retard....., retard...."
Capt: "abort"
FO: "abort"
Hal: "sacre bleu!"
A320: "scrunch, snap, grind, scrape"
Capt: "&%@$#!"
FO: "&%@$#!"
Hal: "retard.....retard....retard"
(end of tape)

[JammedStab]

Is there not an FMC message such as "Takeoff Speeds Deleted" or something similar when there is a runway change.. This is what you see on Boeing(or at least some of them).

[Check Airman]

Is there not an FMC message such as "Takeoff Speeds Deleted" or something similar when there is a runway change.. This is what you see on Boeing(or at least some of them).

Fifi does indeed warn you. You get an amber scratchpad message saying something along the lines of "CHECK PERF DATA".

In fairness, for a last minute change of data like this, I suppose the message was inadvertently cancelled. Our company SOP is for the PF to be on the PERF page (with the V speeds displayed) for takeoff. When a runway change occurs, the old V speeds are shown in small font beside the now empty boxes which require entry.

I can't imagine why the CA opted to bring the levers back to climb instead of pushing them forward to the TOGA detent when he was first made aware of the problem though.

[Machinbird]

I can't imagine why the CA opted to bring the levers back to climb instead of pushing them forward to the TOGA detent when he was first made aware of the problem though.

The takeoff roll and right after lift off is a really bad time to be thrown into an unfamiliar emergency situation. Here are some horrible examples:
Kenya Airways Flight 431
ASN Aircraft accident Airbus A310-304 5Y-BEN Abidjan-Felix Houphouet Boigny Airport (ABJ)

TWA Flight 843
ASN Aircraft accident Lockheed L-1011 TriStar 1 N11002 New York-John F. Kennedy International Airport, NY (JFK)

AA Flight 191
ASN Aircraft accident McDonnell Douglas DC-10-10 N110AA Chicago-O'Hare International Airport, IL (ORD)

Logically the reason the Captain elected to pull the throttles back is because the aircraft had been hinting at that.
Due to attention tunneling/plan continuation bias, it is very difficult to change a plan once it has been set in motion in your mind.

[Check Airman]

Please don't get me wrong, I'm not throwing stones. Assuming he processed the message that the thrust was not set, why cycle the levers back to FLEX, instead of just selecting TOGA?

Out of curiosity, what power output would you get on the ground with no FLEX temp, and the levers in the FLEX detent?

[EGPFlyer]

Originally Posted by Check Airman

Please don't get me wrong, I'm not throwing stones. Assuming he processed the message that the thrust was not set, why cycle the levers back to FLEX, instead of just selecting TOGA?

Out of curiosity, what power output would you get on the ground with no FLEX temp, and the levers in the FLEX detent?

You get Max Continuous Thrust which may be up to around 2% less N1 at ISA conditions, depending on the engine variant

[RatherBeFlying]

This retired software developer is not impressed. Instead of RETARD, the voice prompt needs to be GO TO TOGA. This may require some sorting out of the flight mode determination logic.

Demanding a useful response from the pilot would reduce confusion and reduce the odds of making things worse where little time is available for analysis.

There's similarities with AF447 where the later stall warnings only came on when nose down was commanded. Here we have a landing annunciation come on during takeoff

Cockpits are the worst possible places for diagnosing software errors - or should we say poor specifications.

[JammedStab]

Sorry, but initiating an RTO when the nosewheel is in the air already is really, really dangerous. If there has been no indication giving that the aircraft cannot fly, it is really stupid.

You could easily end up like this guy.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xX_yB3mKdUg

[Capn Bloggs]

It looks like his mistake was he tried to fly when it wouldn't (after some sort of major smoking failure), finally he stopped.

US Captain said it was definitely unflyable. A poor assessment, perhaps, but the result didn't turn out too bad for the "not-flyable" scenario.

[BFSGrad]

Previous posts (80, 96, 126-136) discussed Captain’s use of midazolam and fentanyl a few days prior to the accident. Speculation was that use was associated with a stress test.

Page 4 of the Human Performance report clarifies that the Captain underwent stress echocardiography on March 7, 2014 with new abnormalities noted. On March 11, 2014, the Captain underwent cardiac catheterization, which demonstrated significant coronary artery disease. This latter procedure was the source of the midazolam and fentanyl.

Some other background on the Captain’s medical status:

Captain underwent coronary bypass surgery and cardiac catheterization in 2011.
Medically certified under special issuance in 2012 and continuously thereafter.

[RatherBeFlying]

Cardiac catheterization recovery time

First of all the drugs were administered by medical staff during the procedure for sedation. It's a stretch to say he "used" the drugs.

The day after it is recommended to plant oneself in an armchair and do nothing.

As for driving, one clinic advises not to drive for 24 hours; another for two days.

It should also be kept in mind that this was not likely his first cardiac catheterization and that two days later he felt ready to fly.

The human factors report says nothing about how much time should be required before flying again.

Recovery time for pilots after a procedure with sedation would be a worthwhile avenue of inquiry. Would another day or 2,3,4... off have made a difference? There's no data offered here.

[Check Airman]

Originally Posted by RatherBeFlying

This retired software developer is not impressed. Instead of RETARD, the voice prompt needs to be GO TO TOGA. This may require some sorting out of the flight mode determination logic.

Demanding a useful response from the pilot would reduce confusion and reduce the odds of making things worse where little time is available for analysis.

There's similarities with AF447 where the later stall warnings only came on when nose down was commanded. Here we have a landing annunciation come on during takeoff

Cockpits are the worst possible places for diagnosing software errors - or should we say poor specifications.

You make a good point about diagnosing errors, but remember, Airbus can't conceive of every possible failure. I don't think it's a matter of the plane being programmed to call RETARD in that situation (as good as that advice may be), as Airbus was simply able to explain WHY the call was generated at that time.

It's a bit over-engineered, and when things don't go exactly as planned, you can get some unusual results, as was the case with the RETARD callout on takeoff.

[Ozlander1]

I'll bet the flight crew took their chart cases when they went down the slide....