NTSB update on Asiana 214
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That's just my opinion.
I don't expect others "to concede the point," not on the basis of one post of my own!
I formed an opinion about whether someone who has had an accident might be useful for teaching others how not to have an accident, and I formed that opinion from direct experience, not from a guess. It was a disappointment to discover how stuck in one frame of mind that accident pilot was, how he persisted in dysfunctional, downright dangerous, self-delusional behavior. I thought to myself, "I can teach anyone to fly better than that!" but I failed. Failed doubly, in fact, since he was, for political reasons, allowed to carry on for quite a while longer until he was finally got rid of; my own "down-check" of him was disregarded at the time it was given, since it was embarrassing.
That said, I am sure that my own "incidents" (dents and scratches on various aircraft) have taught me things that have made me a better, because much more humble, teacher of others.
It's just that the fact of having made a real mess of things, as this Asiana crew certainly have done, is not something that automatically denotes value as a teacher. Maybe, maybe not, when my best guess is "probably not." Others may well have a different opinion, particularly since I have had no contact with Koreans in aviation. Koreans, yes, but not in aviation.
I formed an opinion about whether someone who has had an accident might be useful for teaching others how not to have an accident, and I formed that opinion from direct experience, not from a guess. It was a disappointment to discover how stuck in one frame of mind that accident pilot was, how he persisted in dysfunctional, downright dangerous, self-delusional behavior. I thought to myself, "I can teach anyone to fly better than that!" but I failed. Failed doubly, in fact, since he was, for political reasons, allowed to carry on for quite a while longer until he was finally got rid of; my own "down-check" of him was disregarded at the time it was given, since it was embarrassing.
That said, I am sure that my own "incidents" (dents and scratches on various aircraft) have taught me things that have made me a better, because much more humble, teacher of others.
It's just that the fact of having made a real mess of things, as this Asiana crew certainly have done, is not something that automatically denotes value as a teacher. Maybe, maybe not, when my best guess is "probably not." Others may well have a different opinion, particularly since I have had no contact with Koreans in aviation. Koreans, yes, but not in aviation.
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I think completing a career with no bumps or scratches means you learned from other people's mistakes, not your own. It is not necessary to at 18 wreck your car to learn how to drive safely, even thou most do. Learn how to drive and fly safely looking at what went wrong with others and learn from it.
The Asiana pilots are probably now paranoid of another crash but they aren't better pilots because of it.
The Asiana pilots are probably now paranoid of another crash but they aren't better pilots because of it.
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Originally Posted by Island-Flyer
I have personally and I have seen other check airmen and instructors do the same at various 121 carriers here in the US. They all have heard the same answer:
"Train to the training program minimum hours, it's what we're budgeted for. If the FAA thought we'd need more to be safe they would require that we increase the hours in the training program."
The FAA when asked about it says:
"We only hold the minimum standard, it's up to the operator to go beyond that."
"Train to the training program minimum hours, it's what we're budgeted for. If the FAA thought we'd need more to be safe they would require that we increase the hours in the training program."
The FAA when asked about it says:
"We only hold the minimum standard, it's up to the operator to go beyond that."
Originally Posted by aterpster
I was on the ALPA Safety/Technical Committee when we went to the Vice-President of Training to attempt to get a second recurrent training sim session.
His response, "Negotiate that in your next collecting bargaining agreement. Otherwise it has a snowballs chance in Hell."
His response, "Negotiate that in your next collecting bargaining agreement. Otherwise it has a snowballs chance in Hell."
Last edited by AirRabbit; 2nd Jan 2014 at 22:23.
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Thank you for that lesson of safe thinking.
The war against pilots unions, and generally unions, is an old political story, lost by pilots whith A320 beginning. Engineers took the power, and refuse today to listen pilots' questions, are these questions about letal stalls or management, aso. Recent PPRuNe's threads show many exemples of that. If you risk to be fired, you accept not only these blackmails, most accept to risk their life... and passengers' life ! Korean pilots of Asiana 214 behaviour and no-communication with heads, in and out of the cockpit, is now worldwide. My thought . But I don't agree to call that "culture", isn't it ?
The war against pilots unions, and generally unions, is an old political story, lost by pilots whith A320 beginning. Engineers took the power, and refuse today to listen pilots' questions, are these questions about letal stalls or management, aso. Recent PPRuNe's threads show many exemples of that. If you risk to be fired, you accept not only these blackmails, most accept to risk their life... and passengers' life ! Korean pilots of Asiana 214 behaviour and no-communication with heads, in and out of the cockpit, is now worldwide. My thought . But I don't agree to call that "culture", isn't it ?
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Aside from the fact that both B and A brand FBW development had pilots involved at all stages, engineers - of all stripes - and pilots are effectively on the same side and always have been.
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Any airline pilot should know how to do a visual approach with no glideslope.
I have never seen one that couldn't. How did they do that on a clear day? I hope we can do away with these push button pilots so we can go back to where we were.
I have never seen one that couldn't. How did they do that on a clear day? I hope we can do away with these push button pilots so we can go back to where we were.
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That I can't answer. But based on the material released, it seems that Asiana's long-haul network doesn't usually fly to airports without ILS, and moreover, the simulator training doesn't include visual approaches other than their home base.
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Originally Posted by DozyWanabee
engineers - of all stripes - and pilots are effectively on the same side and always have been.
in their armchairs.
The attitude to safety and CRM is exemplified by one Company I flew with who introduced some sweeping changes to SOPs which were based more on potential commercial liability rather than flight safety.
At no stage were the experienced pilots in said Company (many of whom who were far more qualified and experienced than those at the top who were changing the rules) consulted and/or asked their opinion about the changes.
The Companies preach the CRM mantra to flight crew and then take an authoritarian approach to instituting changes.
And then we wonder why flight safety is affected?
bubbers44, quite the most succinct summary of the (sad) situation I have ever read.
At no stage were the experienced pilots in said Company (many of whom who were far more qualified and experienced than those at the top who were changing the rules) consulted and/or asked their opinion about the changes.
The Companies preach the CRM mantra to flight crew and then take an authoritarian approach to instituting changes.
And then we wonder why flight safety is affected?
Any airline pilot should know how to do a visual approach with no glideslope.
I have never seen one that couldn't. How did they do that on a clear day? I hope we can do away with these push button pilots so we can go back to where we were.
I have never seen one that couldn't. How did they do that on a clear day? I hope we can do away with these push button pilots so we can go back to where we were.
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Once again, it is apparently necessary to point out that in today’s world, there is an ever increasing philosophy directed toward commercial ventures – which holds that such ventures are launched with only one goal in mind … and then maintained strictly through the satisfaction of one, and usually only one, principle. That goal is to generate “income” while committing to an absolute minimum of “expenditures” … and that principle is to manipulate all impressions of the conduct of the business practices such that when applying anything less than extreme scrutiny, each venture is recognized as being conducted in accordance with all rules, regulations, and agreements, while, at the same time, presenting the business managers in a light of having satisfied the most professional and ethical standards of conduct and being fully committed to the successes of the specific venture, and if pressed, to be able to defend their interest in the advancement and welfare of their employees.
While, of course, it isn’t necessarily true across the board, it is certainly known that in a good many circumstances that have generated sufficiently “good cause” to analyze the business practices of some airlines with something that does, in fact, exceed the typical “less-than-extreme” scrutiny, when someone determined the necessity or logic in doing so, it has been found at least some cases, that the business practices fell far short of what might be considered necessary and appropriate … but such an after-the-fact recognition does little to comfort those involved in the circumstance that generated the scrutiny in the first place.
There are some here who will undoubtedly think that my recommendations are “off the mark” or are a result of “old-timer-thinking.” Well, each is more than welcome to his/her own thought process. I have no particular warm spot in my heart for “labor unions:” despite the fact that I’ve been a member of several and even started one – that, although somewhat changed, is still in existence today – but I also have no animosity toward them either. I have no animosity toward airline owners and managers – as I fully recognize the supreme difficulties that exist in making such ventures profitable in a free flowing, capitalistic world – even those which are ostensibly an “arm” of a specific national government. And, as I’ve said many times on these pages … training one’s own crew members does not result in direct income … it only costs. And the delicacy of the mission of the managers is usually found at the “how-much-is-good-enough” level – and that is applicable to at least the amount of training provided in any specific course; the numbers of repetitions of that training conducted in any given time frame; the cost of the equipment used in such training; the costs of instructors, facilities, transportation, per diem, lodging; AND the loss in revenue due to the individuals not performing the jobs for which they were hired to perform … in the case of flight crew members … flying airplanes in revenue service. Of course, insurance companies have a significant impact on what kinds of, the amounts of, and the recurring amounts of, any training deemed necessary.
This is NOT an indictment of “automatic systems” – but it IS a caution that pilots MUST be educated, trained, and found to be proficient on how each automatic system performs and how pilots MUST monitor that performance in order to realize the true benefits of such systems. There is ONLY ONE pilot flying at any given time. Engaging the automatics does NOT relievel the pilot flying from those responsibilities – but I’m not at all sure that all training in those areas are anywhere near where they need to be in respect to who is still in control of the airplane.
Additonally, as I’ve repeatedly said, perhaps the single area that is often overlooked – is that of the originally established regulatory minimums. It has been my experience that, despite what some here believe to be true, i.e., that regulators are not guilty of “being ignorant of, or lack an understanding of, airplane systems … while merely sitting in their armchairs.” Each individual regulator I’ve ever known is responsible to his/her superior – and at some point, while moving “up” the chain … there comes an individual that has to answer to someone’s concern about having to defend a requirement for congressional constituents being required to increase a costly function merely to satisfy some “safety concerns” that those constituents believe to be either irrelevant or ineffectual or superfluous. More often than not a reduction in the amount, the quality, or the required frequency or duration originally drafted in a typically developed set of regulatory requirements (which are often developed in concert with a specifically invited representation of airline owners/managers, pilots, pilot unions, training organizations, and other similarly interested parties) results from someone either within the hierarchy of the regulator or the government office responsible for such actions and wind up “caving” because of political pressure from “above” or from someone in the elected representation of the government. I’m not sure if that will ever change … and I have no logical recommendation as to how that might be achieved … but I DO know that the professional development of appropriate minimum standards, minimum content, minimum performance, minimum understanding, minimum equipment capabilities, etc., etc., simply cannot be compromised, and must not allow any compromise, to such professionally developed standards. This is one, but only one, of the reasons that I’ve recommended, on repeated occasions, that those here become involved in any (all, if possible) of the internationally developed efforts currently underway, and others being considered, that focus specifically on the requirements that should be considered minimum – without having to endure some other “bureaucrat” submission to political expediency. I know it won’t happen if we all sit on our hands. It won’t happen if we each wait for the “other” guy to get involved. It won’t happen if we don’t want to be the “squeaky wheel.” The old adage IS, in fact, true … it is the squeaky wheel that gets the most grease, and gets it first. Where are you?
While, of course, it isn’t necessarily true across the board, it is certainly known that in a good many circumstances that have generated sufficiently “good cause” to analyze the business practices of some airlines with something that does, in fact, exceed the typical “less-than-extreme” scrutiny, when someone determined the necessity or logic in doing so, it has been found at least some cases, that the business practices fell far short of what might be considered necessary and appropriate … but such an after-the-fact recognition does little to comfort those involved in the circumstance that generated the scrutiny in the first place.
There are some here who will undoubtedly think that my recommendations are “off the mark” or are a result of “old-timer-thinking.” Well, each is more than welcome to his/her own thought process. I have no particular warm spot in my heart for “labor unions:” despite the fact that I’ve been a member of several and even started one – that, although somewhat changed, is still in existence today – but I also have no animosity toward them either. I have no animosity toward airline owners and managers – as I fully recognize the supreme difficulties that exist in making such ventures profitable in a free flowing, capitalistic world – even those which are ostensibly an “arm” of a specific national government. And, as I’ve said many times on these pages … training one’s own crew members does not result in direct income … it only costs. And the delicacy of the mission of the managers is usually found at the “how-much-is-good-enough” level – and that is applicable to at least the amount of training provided in any specific course; the numbers of repetitions of that training conducted in any given time frame; the cost of the equipment used in such training; the costs of instructors, facilities, transportation, per diem, lodging; AND the loss in revenue due to the individuals not performing the jobs for which they were hired to perform … in the case of flight crew members … flying airplanes in revenue service. Of course, insurance companies have a significant impact on what kinds of, the amounts of, and the recurring amounts of, any training deemed necessary.
This is NOT an indictment of “automatic systems” – but it IS a caution that pilots MUST be educated, trained, and found to be proficient on how each automatic system performs and how pilots MUST monitor that performance in order to realize the true benefits of such systems. There is ONLY ONE pilot flying at any given time. Engaging the automatics does NOT relievel the pilot flying from those responsibilities – but I’m not at all sure that all training in those areas are anywhere near where they need to be in respect to who is still in control of the airplane.
Additonally, as I’ve repeatedly said, perhaps the single area that is often overlooked – is that of the originally established regulatory minimums. It has been my experience that, despite what some here believe to be true, i.e., that regulators are not guilty of “being ignorant of, or lack an understanding of, airplane systems … while merely sitting in their armchairs.” Each individual regulator I’ve ever known is responsible to his/her superior – and at some point, while moving “up” the chain … there comes an individual that has to answer to someone’s concern about having to defend a requirement for congressional constituents being required to increase a costly function merely to satisfy some “safety concerns” that those constituents believe to be either irrelevant or ineffectual or superfluous. More often than not a reduction in the amount, the quality, or the required frequency or duration originally drafted in a typically developed set of regulatory requirements (which are often developed in concert with a specifically invited representation of airline owners/managers, pilots, pilot unions, training organizations, and other similarly interested parties) results from someone either within the hierarchy of the regulator or the government office responsible for such actions and wind up “caving” because of political pressure from “above” or from someone in the elected representation of the government. I’m not sure if that will ever change … and I have no logical recommendation as to how that might be achieved … but I DO know that the professional development of appropriate minimum standards, minimum content, minimum performance, minimum understanding, minimum equipment capabilities, etc., etc., simply cannot be compromised, and must not allow any compromise, to such professionally developed standards. This is one, but only one, of the reasons that I’ve recommended, on repeated occasions, that those here become involved in any (all, if possible) of the internationally developed efforts currently underway, and others being considered, that focus specifically on the requirements that should be considered minimum – without having to endure some other “bureaucrat” submission to political expediency. I know it won’t happen if we all sit on our hands. It won’t happen if we each wait for the “other” guy to get involved. It won’t happen if we don’t want to be the “squeaky wheel.” The old adage IS, in fact, true … it is the squeaky wheel that gets the most grease, and gets it first. Where are you?
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At the risk of grossly oversimplifying a complicated situation, it would seem we need to get away from the current "train to fly the instruments" and get back to "train to fly the aircraft"
Automation is without doubt our friend, but apparently only to a point.
We must perform a risk assessment, do the benefits of automation outweigh the risks? I think that answer is a clear yes - the balance of positives far outweighs the few negative results as here.
Normally a rational risk assessment would say Asiana 214 is an anomaly, certainly necessary to review and consider, but one incident should not outweigh years of safe ops.
But the Asiana failure was so massive and complete - the complete failure to simply fly the aircraft in CAVU conditions and with a full flight deck of allegedly experienced pilots - that the level of the failure was so basic it shocks our belief. And escalates the importance in any risk assessment exponentially.
It seems a conundrum.
Do we require more hand flying, without automatic aids, which may slightly reduce safety in the short term, but likely increase safety in the long term. Do we require a bunch of hand flying time in the sims to try and train out the automation reliance? Do we take away some of the automation altogether - reduce the complexity - in the interests of safety?
Do we FURTHER automate, attempt to "tech" away the problem? Do we require "certification" to fly into major and/or "difficult" airports? Do we require all pilots be trained and certified in a unrelated stand alone program outside the company? Do we require one pilot to wear a hat that says "I'm in charge" so there is no uncertainty?
Some of these are obviously silly. But they reflect the complexity and importance of the issue.
The failure was at the most basic simple level. The solution seems anything but.
It seems to me there absolutely IS a cultural issue. Crew hierarchy and the tendency to train (and/or learn) by rote repetition and memorization. And this must be addressed.
But the automation "trap" seems to transcend that - we are beginning to see indications this fault could affect all of the system. And that would seem to be the bigger elephant in the room.
To me a couple short term changes might be a help in at least identifying weak competency at hand flying, and removing company/culture bias.
What if certification was required to be completed by independent authorized arms length organizations? And what if every certification required a hand flown, no instrument/automation, approach and landing, preferably in the aircraft?
Automation is without doubt our friend, but apparently only to a point.
We must perform a risk assessment, do the benefits of automation outweigh the risks? I think that answer is a clear yes - the balance of positives far outweighs the few negative results as here.
Normally a rational risk assessment would say Asiana 214 is an anomaly, certainly necessary to review and consider, but one incident should not outweigh years of safe ops.
But the Asiana failure was so massive and complete - the complete failure to simply fly the aircraft in CAVU conditions and with a full flight deck of allegedly experienced pilots - that the level of the failure was so basic it shocks our belief. And escalates the importance in any risk assessment exponentially.
It seems a conundrum.
Do we require more hand flying, without automatic aids, which may slightly reduce safety in the short term, but likely increase safety in the long term. Do we require a bunch of hand flying time in the sims to try and train out the automation reliance? Do we take away some of the automation altogether - reduce the complexity - in the interests of safety?
Do we FURTHER automate, attempt to "tech" away the problem? Do we require "certification" to fly into major and/or "difficult" airports? Do we require all pilots be trained and certified in a unrelated stand alone program outside the company? Do we require one pilot to wear a hat that says "I'm in charge" so there is no uncertainty?
Some of these are obviously silly. But they reflect the complexity and importance of the issue.
The failure was at the most basic simple level. The solution seems anything but.
It seems to me there absolutely IS a cultural issue. Crew hierarchy and the tendency to train (and/or learn) by rote repetition and memorization. And this must be addressed.
But the automation "trap" seems to transcend that - we are beginning to see indications this fault could affect all of the system. And that would seem to be the bigger elephant in the room.
To me a couple short term changes might be a help in at least identifying weak competency at hand flying, and removing company/culture bias.
What if certification was required to be completed by independent authorized arms length organizations? And what if every certification required a hand flown, no instrument/automation, approach and landing, preferably in the aircraft?
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What good is adding a new certification?
These people already have ATPLs and type ratings. Something is broken, but documentation/examination/sign-off is not it.
In my unprofessional opinion, the man-machine interface has failed in this instance. That is something more valuable to look into.
These people already have ATPLs and type ratings. Something is broken, but documentation/examination/sign-off is not it.
In my unprofessional opinion, the man-machine interface has failed in this instance. That is something more valuable to look into.
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At the risk of grossly oversimplifying a complicated situation, it would seem we need to get away from the current "train to fly the instruments" and get back to "train to fly the aircraft"
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I hope we can do away with these push button pilots so we can go back to where we were.
In the hope that the XAA's and the training departments take the initiative in this matter, before more smoking holes, we could be seeing "Back to the Future 3." Let's hope so.
In the hope that the XAA's and the training departments take the initiative in this matter, before more smoking holes, we could be seeing "Back to the Future 3." Let's hope so.
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bubbers44
True. BUT the airline is probably a better airline because of it.
It is oft been said that an airline is at it's safest immediately following a prang. Every other member of staff - in all capacities - is watching out more closely than before.
The Asiana pilots are probably now paranoid of another crash but they aren't better pilots because of it.
It is oft been said that an airline is at it's safest immediately following a prang. Every other member of staff - in all capacities - is watching out more closely than before.