Asiana flight crash at San Francisco
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I've tried to read back through the whole thread and had brain ache; please forgive if these comments have been made.
I train lots of whizz-kid cadets on a lesser VNAV/LNAV Boeing. In FBS they treat it like a play station with fingers dancing over the buttons of MCP & CDU like Liberace. Sometimes they get it right, sometimes not, and then the piano playing starts again. What I then have to beat out of them is not to sit as a passneger in the cockpit and watch the A/P take them for a ride, but to engage with the a/c and cover the controls, monitor what it is doing and confirm it is what you want. If not take over with hands & feet. I wonder if PF had their hands on the thrust levers, or was sitting back unattached expecting it to handle it. If connected to the a/c surely it is a natural thing to do to shove up the power it A/T is not doing it.Never been to SFO, but people talk of ATC imposed 'slam dunk' visual approaches. Really? Who is responsible for and in charge of the a/c. How can ATC paint a commander into a corner on a visual approach. What happened to " no can do," or "we'll turn when ready," or "need a couple of more miles."??[LIST]People have said crews after 11 hrs flight should not be subject to pure visual approaches when tired. Does 777 not have VNAV PTH approach technology? I see from the chart that there is an approach profile with alt v distance. I assume this is in the FMC data base. You select this, plug in A/P to it and when all nice a stable about 1000' - 500' you disconnect, do a little fine tuning and land. The lack of visual guidance and trying to use a long defunct Mk.1 eyeball is not the only way. If using VNAV PTH it is possible to attack it from above, but not comfortable. You have the vertical deviation info and act accordingly well in advance. The automatics can stay in all the time. Not only do modern jet jockeys not know how to fly basically, they often do not know how to use the automatics to extricate themselves from a hole.
Please will someone put me right about VNAVPTH approaches on 777 if I'm off base with this one. I am a basic Mk.1 eyeball plot at heart, but I also know when & how to use the automatics when appropriate and necessary.
I train lots of whizz-kid cadets on a lesser VNAV/LNAV Boeing. In FBS they treat it like a play station with fingers dancing over the buttons of MCP & CDU like Liberace. Sometimes they get it right, sometimes not, and then the piano playing starts again. What I then have to beat out of them is not to sit as a passneger in the cockpit and watch the A/P take them for a ride, but to engage with the a/c and cover the controls, monitor what it is doing and confirm it is what you want. If not take over with hands & feet. I wonder if PF had their hands on the thrust levers, or was sitting back unattached expecting it to handle it. If connected to the a/c surely it is a natural thing to do to shove up the power it A/T is not doing it.Never been to SFO, but people talk of ATC imposed 'slam dunk' visual approaches. Really? Who is responsible for and in charge of the a/c. How can ATC paint a commander into a corner on a visual approach. What happened to " no can do," or "we'll turn when ready," or "need a couple of more miles."??[LIST]People have said crews after 11 hrs flight should not be subject to pure visual approaches when tired. Does 777 not have VNAV PTH approach technology? I see from the chart that there is an approach profile with alt v distance. I assume this is in the FMC data base. You select this, plug in A/P to it and when all nice a stable about 1000' - 500' you disconnect, do a little fine tuning and land. The lack of visual guidance and trying to use a long defunct Mk.1 eyeball is not the only way. If using VNAV PTH it is possible to attack it from above, but not comfortable. You have the vertical deviation info and act accordingly well in advance. The automatics can stay in all the time. Not only do modern jet jockeys not know how to fly basically, they often do not know how to use the automatics to extricate themselves from a hole.
Please will someone put me right about VNAVPTH approaches on 777 if I'm off base with this one. I am a basic Mk.1 eyeball plot at heart, but I also know when & how to use the automatics when appropriate and necessary.
BOAC,
You are right - normal position in a 320 is a forward position. However, the absolute position is more difficult to judge (as I find as I have gone back and forth between A and B) because the 320 levers are tiny, low down and have a small travel (cf Boeing with long levers, large travel, different position).
Still would like to emphasise, not looking to remove culpability, just to understand how an experienced pilot could find themselves in this position. Only by understanding can we start to rectify. Plenty of people on here just thinking "not monitoring - their fault - carry on".
You are right - normal position in a 320 is a forward position. However, the absolute position is more difficult to judge (as I find as I have gone back and forth between A and B) because the 320 levers are tiny, low down and have a small travel (cf Boeing with long levers, large travel, different position).
Still would like to emphasise, not looking to remove culpability, just to understand how an experienced pilot could find themselves in this position. Only by understanding can we start to rectify. Plenty of people on here just thinking "not monitoring - their fault - carry on".
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I did think Deborah handled the presentation well, but I agree with it being a little 'premature' since it is based only on statements and 'observations' before both CVR and FDR have been analysed (unless, of course, a 'sneak' view has been had). We must treat the 'information' released as preliminary and not jump to conclusions.
I also wonder if there's extra sensitivity because it's a Korean carrier, albeit South Korean? Tensions between the US and North Korea probably don't need the weight of an extra feather.
Sources in the country's transport ministry confirmed Bong Dong Won - who was in the cockpit jump seat - repeatedly yelled "sink rate" in the final minute before the crash, it was reported.
If the sink rate - the rate of decrease in altitude - was checked when Mr Bong raised the alarm, it may have prevented the plane from hitting the seawall as it landed at San Francisco Airport, reports said.
But the two pilots at the controls - Lee Kang Kuk and his instructor Lee Jung Min - apparently did not respond to Mr Bong's shouted warnings, the respected Joongang Daily newspaper said.
If the sink rate - the rate of decrease in altitude - was checked when Mr Bong raised the alarm, it may have prevented the plane from hitting the seawall as it landed at San Francisco Airport, reports said.
But the two pilots at the controls - Lee Kang Kuk and his instructor Lee Jung Min - apparently did not respond to Mr Bong's shouted warnings, the respected Joongang Daily newspaper said.
It's all coming out in the wash.
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With all due respect to the Airline Pilots Association, the NTSB are acting as required these days - with information and speculation spilling out all over the Interthingy, not least right here on pprune, the best thing to do is to release as much information as you reasonably can, as fast as you reasonably can.
If the NTSB were to hold back, as in the "good" old days, the media and the public would turn to other, less reputable, sources.
People may not be aware just how much the timescale for information release has become compressed, thanks to "social media" - where, twenty years ago, one had a week, one now has an hour - sometimes thirty minutes.
The journo's phrase for it is "The most important Editor in any newsroom is Phil Space"...
If the NTSB were to hold back, as in the "good" old days, the media and the public would turn to other, less reputable, sources.
People may not be aware just how much the timescale for information release has become compressed, thanks to "social media" - where, twenty years ago, one had a week, one now has an hour - sometimes thirty minutes.
The journo's phrase for it is "The most important Editor in any newsroom is Phil Space"...
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I can't take it anymore!
First post here, after years of lurking. Mainly because I can't take it anymore. I'll start off with a rant on data analysis:
<rant>
Why is everyone plotting the Asiana flight data using time on the X axis? For example, there's post 1210 - the NYT sure set a poor example. Then there's this guy on Twitter, whose plots are also ragged and misleading because the FlightAware data he used had time truncated to 1 minute resolution.
Not pilots, presumably, because when was the last time any of us said "hmm, I'm a little high for being 2 minutes from touchdown"?? If you haven't seen it yet, this article by @FlyingProfs is one of the best data analysis pieces I've seen so far.
</rant>
Ok, so the real reason for my post is to share the result of some data wrangling of my own. @FlyingProfs showed some interesting comparisons of the speed/altitude/energy of the accident flight vs. another arrival shortly before. Their article only compares against UAL 852 which landed on the same runway about 10 minutes prior. I got curious and plotted out AAR 214 and UAL 852 arrivals from the previous several days, as well as an ANA 8 arrival just a few minutes before the incident airplane. AAR and UAL were 777-200's; ANA 8 was a 777-300. I think the results reinforce the idea that the accident flight was "out of family" compared with the other approaches.
In the charts below, the accident flight is the redline. Other AAR flights in blue, except Jul 4 in orange; UAL and ANA in green. Vertical bars are "gates" representing the San Mateo Bridge and runway threshold. The grey horizontal in the speed chart is the target Vref = 137 kts for the accident flight.
On the Quiet Bridge Visual procedure, recommended altitude at the bridge (5 mile final) is 1900', which just about everybody hits - except AAR 214 on Jul 4 and 6. The difference between the July 4 and 6 flights is in speed - with the July 6 flight being significantly over-speed at 3-6 miles out relative to all the other flights. (Since the plots are groundspeed, some variation can be expected given differing wind conditions encountered by the different flights) It seems but for some better speed control, the Jul 4 flight could potentially have met a similar fate.
Bottom line, the arrival profile of the accident flight inside 5 miles stands out (even aside from the fact it's highlighted in red).
This got me wondering just how unusual the accident flight profile was. The following altitude and speed scatter plots show data from the accident flight vs. 103 other B-777 flights landing at the SFO runway 28 complex over the last two weeks. I removed go-arounds as they tended to gum up the works in my quick and dirty plot setup. Note again that the speed plot shows groundspeed, so some variability would be expected for differing wind conditions over the two week period. Along similar lines, there's no guarantee that all plotted arrivals were on a visual approach vs. RNAV, LOC, etc. The glideslope shown is 3 degrees to a touchdown point 1000' beyond the threshold.
Again, it's pretty clear that Asiana 214's flight profile on July 6 was pretty unusual relative to the bulk of other flights.
Many others have commented on how this flight profile might have arisen. I have no experience or qualifications to address that aspect, so I'll stop here and hope everyone enjoys contemplating the charts
(Note: All plots were sourced from FlightAware data)
Edited to fix glideslope in 3rd chart.
<rant>
Why is everyone plotting the Asiana flight data using time on the X axis? For example, there's post 1210 - the NYT sure set a poor example. Then there's this guy on Twitter, whose plots are also ragged and misleading because the FlightAware data he used had time truncated to 1 minute resolution.
Not pilots, presumably, because when was the last time any of us said "hmm, I'm a little high for being 2 minutes from touchdown"?? If you haven't seen it yet, this article by @FlyingProfs is one of the best data analysis pieces I've seen so far. </rant>
Ok, so the real reason for my post is to share the result of some data wrangling of my own. @FlyingProfs showed some interesting comparisons of the speed/altitude/energy of the accident flight vs. another arrival shortly before. Their article only compares against UAL 852 which landed on the same runway about 10 minutes prior. I got curious and plotted out AAR 214 and UAL 852 arrivals from the previous several days, as well as an ANA 8 arrival just a few minutes before the incident airplane. AAR and UAL were 777-200's; ANA 8 was a 777-300. I think the results reinforce the idea that the accident flight was "out of family" compared with the other approaches.
In the charts below, the accident flight is the redline. Other AAR flights in blue, except Jul 4 in orange; UAL and ANA in green. Vertical bars are "gates" representing the San Mateo Bridge and runway threshold. The grey horizontal in the speed chart is the target Vref = 137 kts for the accident flight.
On the Quiet Bridge Visual procedure, recommended altitude at the bridge (5 mile final) is 1900', which just about everybody hits - except AAR 214 on Jul 4 and 6. The difference between the July 4 and 6 flights is in speed - with the July 6 flight being significantly over-speed at 3-6 miles out relative to all the other flights. (Since the plots are groundspeed, some variation can be expected given differing wind conditions encountered by the different flights) It seems but for some better speed control, the Jul 4 flight could potentially have met a similar fate.
Bottom line, the arrival profile of the accident flight inside 5 miles stands out (even aside from the fact it's highlighted in red).
This got me wondering just how unusual the accident flight profile was. The following altitude and speed scatter plots show data from the accident flight vs. 103 other B-777 flights landing at the SFO runway 28 complex over the last two weeks. I removed go-arounds as they tended to gum up the works in my quick and dirty plot setup. Note again that the speed plot shows groundspeed, so some variability would be expected for differing wind conditions over the two week period. Along similar lines, there's no guarantee that all plotted arrivals were on a visual approach vs. RNAV, LOC, etc. The glideslope shown is 3 degrees to a touchdown point 1000' beyond the threshold.
Again, it's pretty clear that Asiana 214's flight profile on July 6 was pretty unusual relative to the bulk of other flights.
Many others have commented on how this flight profile might have arisen. I have no experience or qualifications to address that aspect, so I'll stop here and hope everyone enjoys contemplating the charts
(Note: All plots were sourced from FlightAware data)
Edited to fix glideslope in 3rd chart.
Last edited by aa5bpilot; 10th Jul 2013 at 17:19. Reason: Edit to fix glideslope in 3rd chart
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"Plenty of FO's around the world have sat there and said nothing while the Captain proceeded to kill them.
This should not happen in 2013 in a modern jet operated by a major carrier BUT IT DOES."
Sorry, couldn't find the quote button for the above...
Anyway, in today's PC world and we all know it, and nothing's done about it...some cultures let face saving, social standing, seniority and rank interfere with training and proper CRM in their flight decks to the extent where pilots will let a situation develope and let it go to it's disasterous conclusion because they're too afraid to speak up.
Unless these cultures can prove otherwise, their airlines are not safe and should be banned from the air space of responsible air transport participating nations.
This should not happen in 2013 in a modern jet operated by a major carrier BUT IT DOES."
Sorry, couldn't find the quote button for the above...
Anyway, in today's PC world and we all know it, and nothing's done about it...some cultures let face saving, social standing, seniority and rank interfere with training and proper CRM in their flight decks to the extent where pilots will let a situation develope and let it go to it's disasterous conclusion because they're too afraid to speak up.
Unless these cultures can prove otherwise, their airlines are not safe and should be banned from the air space of responsible air transport participating nations.
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Originally Posted by phil gollin
Does anyone know what the amount of lateral deviation was and any possible explanation for it ?
Does anyone know what the amount of lateral deviation was and any possible explanation for it ?
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SalNichols…..When we are overloaded the brain cannot do anymore it is overloaded so it starts to filter. One of the first seances it filters is the sense of hearing. It can be seen in the simulator when everything is going to hell and the alarms are not cancelled even though they are blaring away in the background, the other pilot will give you an instruction and you may not even register it. It was taught to me in Human Factors during my ATPLs way back when and also demonstrated in CRM classes. I don't know the reference but Im sure someone here will….I'm not making it up…and I am far from a great pilot.
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Your statement scares me Lonewolf_50
Attitude for aim point
Power for speed
The bolded part is what I don't "get."
I was taught that you use power to stay on (or addjust to) glide slope, pitch to stay on (or adkust for) airspeed when making an approach to land. (Of course, the two work together to give you the performance you are trying to achieve. )
I was taught that you use power to stay on (or addjust to) glide slope, pitch to stay on (or adkust for) airspeed when making an approach to land. (Of course, the two work together to give you the performance you are trying to achieve. )
Power for speed
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... which appears to have failed in this scenario because someone/something didn't link attitude with power to equal performance. Treat the two in isolation and things will go wrong. 
Last edited by Cows getting bigger; 10th Jul 2013 at 10:46.
With all of the usual caveats about not jumping to premature conclusions, it would appear that the central hypothesis identified on the thread some time ago regarding how the airctaft came to be too low and too slow, is being supported by the facts which have emerged so far. No doubt there is much more to emerge regarding autothrottle protocols and settings, crew experience, and CRM generally, all of which will be important.
However, given that the overarching objective of everyone in the industry is to prevent accidents, the impact of the inoperative runway navigation aids needs to be given a much greater significance and scrutiny.
Does anyone think this accident would have happenned if they had been operational?
The central tenet of aviation safety is surely to remove the possibility for failure, whether it be human or mechanical. Turning off the navigation aids created the possibilty for the failure which seems to have occurred here, and surely cannot be justified other than on cost grounds.
However, given that the overarching objective of everyone in the industry is to prevent accidents, the impact of the inoperative runway navigation aids needs to be given a much greater significance and scrutiny.
Does anyone think this accident would have happenned if they had been operational?
The central tenet of aviation safety is surely to remove the possibility for failure, whether it be human or mechanical. Turning off the navigation aids created the possibilty for the failure which seems to have occurred here, and surely cannot be justified other than on cost grounds.
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It is interesting just how much dissention there seems to be, even among 777 pilots, about the "FLCH trap" and its ramifications.
One has to wonder just how much the vast number of complex inter-relationships between automatic systems can ever be comprehensively understood by the average pilot, and whether these relationships produced by clever automatics are simply becoming too numerous for (some) mere humans to instinctively keep track of?
One has to wonder just how much the vast number of complex inter-relationships between automatic systems can ever be comprehensively understood by the average pilot, and whether these relationships produced by clever automatics are simply becoming too numerous for (some) mere humans to instinctively keep track of?
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A lot of posters commenting disgusted about the speculations and comments about cultural differences etc etc.
This is not an investigation thread, it's an open discussion forum and posters are entitled to an opinion. It is allowed to have an opinion on what might have caused the crash or what differences there might be between certain operators and certain others, and whether or not it's got to do with their cultural environment.
A good debate is made of contrasting opinions. To come here and say this thread is pointless, doesn't really make it more useful does it?
This is not an investigation thread, it's an open discussion forum and posters are entitled to an opinion. It is allowed to have an opinion on what might have caused the crash or what differences there might be between certain operators and certain others, and whether or not it's got to do with their cultural environment.
A good debate is made of contrasting opinions. To come here and say this thread is pointless, doesn't really make it more useful does it?
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In response to Patrick Smiths blog I also have been an Airline Pilot since 1990, with several thousand hours flying 777's. I also have flown in Korea.
I heartily disagree with his summation of Korean safety standards and Pilot training. The cultural issue is still a Major factor in 2013. The difference between the 80's and 90's to now is not a huge improvement of training and cultural change, but incredibly good equipment supplied by Boeing and Airbus. Period.
I say this from personal experience, and really hope something changes.
I heartily disagree with his summation of Korean safety standards and Pilot training. The cultural issue is still a Major factor in 2013. The difference between the 80's and 90's to now is not a huge improvement of training and cultural change, but incredibly good equipment supplied by Boeing and Airbus. Period.
I say this from personal experience, and really hope something changes.
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whether these relationships produced by clever automatics are simply becoming too numerous for (some) mere humans to instinctively keep track of?
I would suspect that is indeed probable, which is why stable approaches are important, to avoid high workload situations at critical moments, which is apparently what happened to these poor chaps...
I would suspect that is indeed probable, which is why stable approaches are important, to avoid high workload situations at critical moments, which is apparently what happened to these poor chaps...