With all of the usual caveats about not jumping to premature conclusions, it would appear that the central hypothesis identified on the thread some time ago regarding how the airctaft came to be too low and too slow, is being supported by the facts which have emerged so far. No doubt there is much more to emerge regarding autothrottle protocols and settings, crew experience, and CRM generally, all of which will be important.
However, given that the overarching objective of everyone in the industry is to prevent accidents, the impact of the inoperative runway navigation aids needs to be given a much greater significance and scrutiny.
Does anyone think this accident would have happenned if they had been operational?
The central tenet of aviation safety is surely to remove the possibility for failure, whether it be human or mechanical. Turning off the navigation aids created the possibilty for the failure which seems to have occurred here, and surely cannot be justified other than on cost grounds.