Asiana flight crash at San Francisco

[LeadSled]

Throttles are for recip engines.

Junebug172,
Now I know what the problem was, with B747-200/300 I flew for about 5000h, and fitted with autothrottles --- Boeing fitted the wrong engines.

In another case of "anyone can make a mistake", I note that Asiana is suing NTSB and KTVU Channel 2 in Oakland for confirming incorrect names for the four flight crew.
Look up the cause of action for the incorrect names, as reported on the AFP wire service.
Tootle pip!!

[777boeings]

Stator Vane,
Your post is all very 'touch feely' and politically correct. Unfortunately though your post fails to address the primary issue here.
Flying a modern airliner is a grown up job. The flight deck is no place for people who can't perform at least to the basic standard required.
Technical knowledge, adherence to SOP, situational awareness, the list goes on....are an essential set of skills in an airline pilot. Preliminary facts show that the crew lacked any of these. Whether one knew them or not is neither here nor there.
Yes it is speculation at this point but that's what this forum is all about.

[ross_M]

Whenever I am operating as a member of an augmented crew we split into 2 ('A' and 'B') teams for the cruise, however all, repeat ALL crew members are required to be on the deck for take-off AND landing.
Why was the relief capt not on the deck? .

I hope when the investigators are done with the 2 drivers that they turn their blowtorch on the relief crew.

Is there a mandatory requirement to that effect (relief crews on flight deck for landings)? I am curious.

How many airlines' internal SOP's mandate it?

[Running_In]

Stator Vane, thank you for your post. I couldn't agree more.

I have personally made plenty of mistakes, I have tried to learn from each one and hopefully it has made me a better & safer pilot.

777Boeing

You say the crew had non of the below..

''Technical knowledge, adherence to SOP, situational awareness''

Do you really mean that? Or do you mean the crew had all of these to a degree but on this occasion maybe a reduced level of one of them led to an accident.

The RAF has red and white checkered caravans at the end of all of it's airfields that operate fighter or training aircraft - the idea is for them to act as an extra level of safety, checking for aircraft approaching with the gear up. So, it is accepted that even the best of the best will every so often make a mistake and try to put one on the deck with no wheels.

By your logic anyone who tried that and has to go around because of a red flare from the caravan has no situation awareness and has no place in a cockpit, despite the potential to have thousands of hours of flying experience. They have just been found out for the frauds they are and are simply not up to the job.

By Stator Vanes logic they are people who are put in a demanding environment and every so often, because only the pope is infallible, they fail to get everything right. That is part of the job and they hopefully live to tell the tail and learn to go on to be better aviators.

Now the RAF went for Stator Vanes logic - I guess they are just a bunch of PC touchy feely mummy's boys!

[clayne]

Originally Posted by stator vane

speculation is one thing. statements that imply that the writer of various responses could never make a similar mistake is not.

All the previous examples you listed were situations of adverse conditions. Can we get some examples of perfect sunny day visual approaches gone wrong at the list minute due to pilot error?

[koreafan]

Finally been drawn into this because it's getting silly and had to comment.

@ KaoKao

"We have to notice that what pilots say - they tried to regain engine power for 20 secs."

Sorry, I don't buy this at all. At this stage I personally believe what the NTSB have briefed on when TOGA was requested...which was not 20 odd seconds before impact.

[Momoe]

'Inexperienced training captain'??????

WTF is that then other than an oxymoron?

I'll wait for the NTSB report which I don't believe will have many technical issues.

[aviatorhi]

BBK, not a "large", but "mediums" count too right? I do about 75% of my sim training into that airport as well and feel familiar enough with the approaches to comment, and if a 5 mile straight in to an 11,000+ foot runway, which is 200 feet wide is considered difficult I'm just going to laugh.

[The Blu Riband]

75% of your training is at SFO?

What about the rest of the world? In any single month I go to asia, india, us, africa etc

I have 22, 000 hours (8,000 on 777s) and have landed at SFO abour 20 time over the last 15 years but have never practised approaches at SFO in the sim.

I am told many us pilots fly limited routes which makes them extremely familiar , but then perhaps atc expect too much of other, less familiar, operators.

Obviously I'm not excusing incompetence, but visiting an airfield twice a year is not the same as flying in and out daily.

[HazelNuts39]

Originally Posted by A4

What's the spool time from idle on 777 compared to the A320? Does the 777 have "approach idle"?

The regulation is the same for all Transport Category airplanes. FAR 25.119 Landing Climb: all-engines-operating specifies "The engines at the power or thrust that is available 8 seconds after initiation of movement of he power or thrust controls from the minimum flight idle to the go-around power or thrust setting", The airplane manufacturer selects the flight idle setting so that it meets that requirement.

Typically on high bypass-ratio engines during the first 3 or 4 seconds the acceleration is mostly in the high-pressure part of the engine with little increase in thrust.

[BBK]

Aviatorhi

Aviatorhi

Fair enough, but aren't you and the others who make the "guilty" call just a little bit curious about why this accident happened? Doesn't it seem odd that you have an experienced crew with about 27,000 hours between the three of them and no one noticed they were way below Vref?

In a way I envy people who can be so certain of their views when, in reality, they have no more data than the rest of us who have a natural curiousity and reticence to call the facts when they are not yet established.

For example, early on in this thread folks of your persuasion said well they're Korean so it must have been a meek FO too scared to stand up to the Captain....except it soon became clear it was a Captain, new to type, on his conversion course. Instantly their theory starts to unravel but don't let a few facts spoil your speculation frenzy. Anyway, if I have any sense I'll stop trying to preach my view. It's clear some people will drink from the fountain of knowledge and others just like to gargle.

[Tomescu]

ATHR

It was mentioned numerous time here about the ATHR being on hold mode and that's something that I am curious to find out from the DFDR. Unfortunately, no matter how good is your training, human error take its toll sometimes.

[Vasco dePilot]

Momoe
'oxymoron'? Perhaps I should expand: inexperienced as a training captain on the 777 because this was his first flight as a trainer on this type.

[BuzzBox]

I do about 75% of my sim training into that airport as well and feel familiar enough with the approaches to comment

Yes, but how many times have you operated an unfamiliar 'heavy' widebody into an unfamiliar airport after a 12 hour ULH flight, at the back of your body-clock, without an ILS? A visual approach into SFO on a CAVOK day should be a non-event for a pilot who routinely makes such approaches, but I would suggest it's a very different story for the average ULH pilot who is new on the aircraft, tired and not particularly current. It's very easy to sit back and s***-can the guys involved in this accident - try putting yourself in their shoes.

[FERetd]

Two crew operation?

caneworm, Quote:- "Whenever I am operating as a member of an augmented crew we split into 2 ('A' and 'B') teams for the cruise, however all, repeat ALL crew members are required to be on the deck for take-off AND landing.
Why was the relief capt not on the deck?"

Probably because the B777 is certificated for a two crew operation - unless your Company is suggesting that it should't be.

If your Company accepts that this SOP enhances safety, does it accept a lower level of safety for short or medium haul operations? If so, why?

An extra pair of eyes when in the terminal area can't be a bad thing, but they need to be looking. An extra pair of hands when things are going wrong is also useful. However, sometimes the flight deck can become too crowded - you've probably experienced a 747 Classic with all the flight deck seats occupied.

When an augmented crew is operating in a normal crew environment, reponsibilities need to be clearly defined lest too many cooks.....

[aviatorhi]

75% of your training is at SFO?

What about the rest of the world?

It's a simulator from the 1980s, you can only put so much in. In any month I bounce around the Pacific as well. Now I'm not saying they need to blaze in at full speed like I do into the airports I go into and pick up all the landmarks I have memorized, but they need to (at the very least) not say that a long wide runway with a 5 mile final is a "challenge".

Fair enough, but aren't you and the others who make the "guilty" call just a little bit curious about why this accident happened? Doesn't it seem odd that you have an experienced crew with about 27,000 hours between the three of them and no one noticed they were way below Vref?

Tells me they were counting on the A/T to hold speed for them, and apparently it wasn't. The other option is that the ASI isn't part of their scan in the first place since they've become so dependent on the A/T to do the work for them. You would imagine the AF stall into the ocean wouldn't have happened either since there were enough hours of experience in the cockpit to keep from stalling an aircraft. Now, if we look at the most recent aviation accidents involving major passenger airlines in the western world we have:

Asiana B777
Air France A340
Colgan Q400

At the base level, all a result of not adding power when it was needed. I know that we should wait for the report on Asiana, but the one paramount FACT which the NTSB did put out was that the aircraft systems were functioning normally during the approach, all the way to impact. Which leaves only operator error, the report we are in fact waiting for is only a descriptor of the operator error and what the NTSB will recommend to prevent future occurrences (to my dismay this will probably be more automation).

Now, you can go back and look at my remarks on the subject and I've never suggested it was an Asian cultural issue, etc. I think this issue is applicable to all airlines which preach, and all pilots who accept, the mandatory use of automatics for as many phases of flight as possible.

...try putting yourself in their shoes.

They're probably better rested than I am after a 14 hour duty day with no relief pilots.

[220mph]

BBK - aren't you ... just a little bit curious about why this accident happened? Doesn't it seem odd that you have an experienced crew with about 27,000 hours between the three of them and no one noticed they were way below Vref?

BBK - that is my question exactly. I've tried to understand how this could occur ... how absent mechanical failure, which does not so far seem likely from the data provided, these experienced pilots could get into the position they did.

It is seemingly beyond comprehension this could occur in today's world with all the resources (and here experience) available.

It shouldn't be about guilt or necessarily blame - but moreso learning and understanding why and how this could have occurred - in order to help prevent from happening again.

[A4]

Typically on high bypass-ratio engines during the first 3 or 4 seconds the acceleration is mostly in the high-pressure part of the engine with little increase in thrust.

Thanks HazelNuts.....so that lends some credibility to pushing the levers, thinking nothing is happening, closing them to "try" again etc etc

Could be BS (particularly with the experience level in the flight deck) but I see no other way how the crew could try several times with no response....but TOGA worked, albeit too late.

[glofish]

Yes, but how many times have you operated an unfamiliar 'heavy' widebody into an unfamiliar airport after a 12 hour ULH flight, at the back of your body-clock, without an ILS? A visual approach into SFO on a CAVOK day should be a non-event for a pilot who routinely makes such approaches, but I would suggest it's a very different story for the average ULH pilot who is new on the aircraft, tired and not particularly current. It's very easy to sit back and s***-can the guys involved in this accident - try putting yourself in their shoes.

The only thing i can concur that might be a tiny little help to excuse the inexcusable, is the first, namely operating an unfamiliar heavy. But that is exactly the point where the trainer steps in and by that i mean a trainer with experience on it. What Asiana did here, and many other inconsiderate airlines do, is pairing two pilots unfamiliar with their seat. That is almost a set-up for a problem.
I truly hope that the NTSB will point that out very clearly and some regulators will implement correction in that respect.

Everything else you pointed out is bullocks, sorry.

There is a reason we are still in the cockpit and a cavok day visual approach should in almost any case be a no-event with even a AT malfunction into SFO.

Otherwise please hand in your wings and enjoy airline flying as a passenger.

I respect the trying to keep up some camaraderie as to not convict these pilots too early, but there is a limit to that, please.

[BuzzBox]

There is a reason we are still in the cockpit and a cavok day visual approach should in almost any case be a no-event with even a AT malfunction into SFO.

With the greatest respect, I disagree. The typical 'slam-dunk' approach into SFO can be a challenge at the end of an ULH flight, even with a functioning ILS. Take away the ILS, put an 'inexperienced' crew in the seat and it's not hard to see how a break down in situational awareness could occur. Throw in some cultural factors on top of that and the rest is history.