Asiana flight crash at San Francisco

[Aerolex]

Indeed Toruk....

One of the first things said to me when I entered the aviation industry was "It's better to ask a stupid question than it is to explain a stupid mistake". Of course if you are dead, you wouldn't have any explaining to do...

[320busdriver]

CAT 1 I can`t agree with you more on the great points you brought up all the holier than thou attitudes and the astronaut quality people we have on pprune, Bottom line is human beings make mistakes but how many times have they saved the day, I for one will never step foot on a commercial airliner if there were no human beings up front - period

[JamesGV]

I think it is "slightly" unfair to claim that there are NOT "cultural issues" in play in many "operations".

Europe also has it "fair share" of those.

"IF" there were "cultural issues" at play here, ("junior" trainer new to post, "senior" trainee" and the third guy outranked and "unwilling" to comment) I'm sure the "facts" will be easily established ONCE they are reported....and not before !

Alas, "if" that is the case, then factoring "that" issue out of the cockpit hasn't worked.

And whilst it may end up that "The Koreans" are to blame, the finger thus pointed, many will not look at their own "CRM" and take heed.

[James7]

NP

Of course no excuse. However given the rate of descent earlier in the approach and the residual thrust of the engines at idle, thrust was not needed till 500'.

No one noticed the AT mode. Everyone just expected the thrust to come on. In AT hold this was never going to happen. At least on the 777 the levers move so the PF should have realised the power was not going to come up. On the Bus the levers do not move.

Stabilised approach also includes a reasonable thrust amount at a given height usually 1000' and at the latest 500'.

This aircraft crashed because it was effectively a glider and glided into the sea wall.

[nitpicker330]

That's why all Airlines have stabilized approach criteria AND competent crews follow it.

[tilnextime]

The problem with this is that the accident flight was also a training flight designed to assess the PIC's performance into SFO on a new type.

If he had declared that he didn't feel he or his crew could 'complete the mission' with the ILS U/S, he is either sent back to the sim for further training or the TC says 'What better way to learn than fly the approach for real. After all, I am there to catch any balls you may drop'

Was the PIC the one undergoing training, or was the pilot with 47 hours in the 777? Regardless of paygrade and "rank" there is only one PIC in the cockpit, and he calls the shots. How can a "PIC" be the trainee? Are you suggesting that the trainee has ultimate authority over the operation of the aircraft?

While I was not addressing this flight in particular, I think you have the cockpit roles of the crew on this flight confused.

[misd-agin]

Numpty question - does the 777 have an AOA gauge and if so, what does it present to the pilot?

AA does on the 777 and 737NG.

DL does on one, or both, of the 777 and 737NG's.


Guys don't use them for normal ops. Airspeed tape, with Vapp bug, amber foot, red/black stall tape and flap limit speed, has more information.

[stuminisprite]

firstly i am not a pilot, so please dont attack me, i do have a lot of respect for you as i know it is a very difficult job.

I am an aircraft engineer with experience in the military and civil aviation sector. One point i would like to make is i have noticed a lot of people are trying to pin blame or wanting someone held accountable. i agree that the authorities should explore all avenues to find out what actually happened, but, im sure the pilot feels quite bad enough and after reading FACTS that are coming out of all this i dont feel it can be pinned just on the pilot flying. as the old saying goes, all the holes in the swiss cheese lined up and an accident happened.

The best thing to come out of this is to try to find a way to make it extremely difficult for it to happen again. accidents will always happen and even the best pilots in the world will of had a close call at somepoint. it just happened theirs was saturday.

i wonder if a HUD setup can be incorporated into aircraft to give vital info to the flight deck windscreens in times of concentration. ie take off, landing, or emergency situations, just to aid the flight crew.

i may be way off the mark, but thought i would have my say.

[bklooste]

re the pilots.

I thought that at first especially since the company already said there was no problem with the plane and are likely not to be kind to the pilots despite the fact they are products of the companies training program ( and even included an instructor) .

On the other hand there is the parents of the girls who died .....

[Ivanbogus]

Skynews reports that according to Asiana CEO, the trainee has flown 29 times to SFO in A320?? Now, that's a little odd....

[diginagain]

Originally Posted by stuminisprite

i wonder if a HUD setup can be incorporated into aircraft to give vital info to the flight deck windscreens in times of concentration.

If the crew couldn't see that their touchdown point was climbing up the sight-picture, I'm not certain what assistance a HUD might offer.

[757_Driver]

As per usual a load of PPrune drivel from armachair FSx'ers and grissled old ace's who think that everyone should have 20 million fast jet hours before being allowed near a passenger aircraft. BUT this accident raises 2 very very interesting questions in the phsycological area which interest me. I'm assuming these guys didn't deliberatly crash the aicraft, and all comments aside about what they should have done or should have been able to do, I want to know WHY they did what they did.

the guy flying had 10,000 hours, possibly all airbus (not verified, but that seems to be the general info floating around) so he had a huge amount of experience in an aircraft that kept speed with AT WITHOUT MOVING THE THRUST levers. We all suffer from habit reversion from time to time - I certainly do - I sometimes find myself holding hands with my oppo on the thrust reversers even 2 years after moving from an airline where the PF did the reversers to one where the PM does them. I KNOW the SOP in my airline, but that muscle memory seems to be hard wired - no harm no foul in this case, but why does the human brain do this and how can we combat it?

the TC in the other seat let someone fly a perfectly serviceable aircraft into the ground. This is a biggy - why? This question is often raised in training scenarios, who is really in 'charge' of the aircraft, especieally in environments, societies where seniority, social standing etc is important. This isn't the first time that 2 captains flying together have screwed up so it should be something that we can all learn from. And from a training point of view it's often the case that sitruations are allowed to progress beyond what would be normally comfortable to see what the trainee does. (i'm not a flight trainer, but I do teach / train in other areas) but this 'creeping' over the line makes it harder to draw bottom lines and react accordingly.

[falcon900]

Having been an avid follower of pprune for many years, and having followed this thread from the outset, I feel compelled to break my duck, and log in to post a comment.
Whilst I am in agreement with the general thrust of the "consensus" which seems to be emerging in relation to this incident, I am struck by the apparent willingness to overlook the implications of the runway navigation aids being inoperative. In an industry which has such an impressive safety record, and where it is the general practice to duplicate or triplicate critical systems where practicable, is it really acceptable to say "sorry, we are remodelling, hope it doesn't inconvenience customers too much?"
Whilst acknowledging the issue presented by pilots becoming over dependent on computers, there seems to be a tacit acceptance that this flight would have landed without incident had the navigation aids been operational. Given that the issue of overdependence on computers is ongoing and real, does it not follow that turning off the runway navigation aids could only result in significantly higher risk? Factor in long haul heavy traffic approaching over water at the end of a long flight, is it not a risk too far? This is not a minor airport in some third world country...
I am not seeking to excuse any inability to land manually in clear conditions, but the stone which started the ripple in the pond looks like being the decision to continue to operate the runway without its full suite of navigation aids.

[tilnextime]

as the old saying goes, all the holes in the swiss cheese lined up and an accident happened.

Contrary to common misconception, if there is one thing that mishap investigations have proven, mishaps do not just "happen". A mishap is caused. The swiss cheese does not randomly line itself up, the slices are selected and put in place with a given edge facing up. The job of the mishap investigator is to identify "causal factors" so that the next aircrew can learn from this and not put a stack of swiss cheese slices together in the same manner. A technical mishap investigation (which is what the NTSB does) is not looking to affix "blame" on any particular individual, but to identify the factors (to include individual and crew behaviors, qualifications, equipment function etc) that contributed to causing the mishap. If the mishap is the result of a given crew member not flying the aircraft properly, then the question is why, for if the why is not known, future occurrences cannot be avoided.

Eliminate undesirable causal factors, and you eliminate deleterious results.

[The Globetrotter]

i wonder if a HUD setup can be incorporated into aircraft to give vital info to the flight deck windscreens in times of concentration. ie take off, landing, or emergency situations, just to aid the flight crew.

The Embraer 170/190 series have a HUD fit option so I would assume other manufacturers can offer this?

[misd-agin]

Numpty question - does the 777 have an AOA gauge and if so, what does it present to the pilot?

AOA has marks every 5 units.

Stall margin indicator(stall)

Green arc for 'on speed'. Only visible, and accurate, with landing flaps(777 - 25/30, 737-15/30/40). So on the 737 it appears at flaps 15(landing flap setting), disappears for flaps 20/25(not AA approved landing flap setting), and reappears for flaps 30 and flaps 40.

Green arc is at the 5 unit location with landing flaps selected(3 o'clock position) (+/-). Approx. 4-6 units is the upper and lower limits of the green arc.

Upper right corner of PFD. Supposedly where BA has their radar altimeter readout.

Upper right corner of 737 HUD.

About the size of a 1 EU coin or slightly smaller than a U.S. quarter.

[overthewing]

Dumb, non-pilot question about converting to 777...

There's confusion about which type the PF had been flying up till now, but a few reports suggest 747. Assuming this was within the same airline, is conversion from 747 to 777, assuming it's not because of fleet changes, an upward career path?

[stuckgear]

This was an American made aircraft with American conceived automatics flying into an American airport following an American designed stepped procedure. The approach was being flown the American way (visually) under the direction of an American air traffic controller. Most likely the crew were trained by an American FTO to SOPs and an AFM influenced by American carriers.

Of course (as some posts would have) the only factor to be considered in this crash is Asian deference culture

To which point, in what way was a failure evident of:

the aircraft,
the systems,
the approach procedure,
ATC

?

Oh it was an Asian crew*... So your rhetoric is called as B/S.


as per Callsign Kilo's post :

The airline has informed the media that the LTC in the right hand seat was new to the position; it was his first flight as a LTC. The guy in the left had 43 hours on type.

and to emphasise the point about various cultures by another poster (cultural variations do exist, there's been quite few studies on the subject matter):

I hope the guy in the right was not sitting hoping they would make it without having to say something to his senior but junior cpt

*Note: no blame apportioned here, *that* will be subject to the *results* of the investigation.

[Back at NH]

All flights must be stabilised by 1000 feet above airport elevation in IMC and 500 feet above airport elevation in VMC.

An approach is stabilised when all of the following criteria are met:

• The aircraft is on the correct flight path;

• Only small changes in heading/pitch are necessary to maintain the correct flight path;

• The airspeed is not more than VREF + 20kts indicated speed and not less than VREF;

• The aircraft is in the correct landing configuration;

• Sink rate is no greater than 1000 feet/minute; if an approach requires a sink rate greater than 1000 feet/minute a special briefing should be conducted;

• Power setting is appropriate for the aircraft configuration and is not below the minimum power for the approach as defined by the operating manual;

• All briefings and checklists have been conducted;

• Specific types of approach are stabilized if they also fulfil the following:
  • ILS approaches must be flown within one dot of the glide-slope and localizer;
  • a Category II or III approach must be flown within the expanded localizer band;
  • during a circling approach wings should be level on final when the aircraft reaches 300 feet above airport elevation; and,

• Unique approach conditions or abnormal conditions requiring a deviation from the above elements of a stabilized approach require a special briefing.

An approach that becomes unstabilised below 1000 feet above airport elevation in IMC or 500 feet above airport elevation in VMC requires an immediate go-around.


So why was this approach not thrown away as not stabilised by the 500' VMC mark? Why was an unstabilised approach continued to a point when the mandatory go-around for unstable approach was flown from a height where recovery was impossible?

[garpal gumnut]

I'll probably get caned for this post, not being a pilot, and being Australian. I find that the culture of deference to "authority" in Asian countries leads to groupthink. The PIC in this case was a consensus not a person, between four people, none of whom could take responsibility for landing the plane. Nobody was in charge. An amalgam of experience and rank all sitting like muppets having to land the plane with their own anxious inputs at certain points, leading to disaster. It wasn't a difficult day, airport or plane. Just four pilots, none of whom was willing to take command early enough. The Cabin staff probably would have done a better job, or a sixteen year old on a computer.