Asiana flight crash at San Francisco
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Total Disconnect
Kaokao,
From the information released by the NTSB and confirmed by Asiana CEO, the aircraft was working normally. From the data released, the aircraft was below normal speed for 30 seconds or more and the low airspeed warning and stick shaker activated appropriately. During the final seconds a go round was called and initiated and the aircraft responded normally with the engines spooling up as the impact occurred.
The pilots' account as reported in Korea bears little semblance to the facts as recorded by the FDR and CVR. This is exactly the cultural problem that western pilots who have worked in Korea and some other asian countries complain about. There is a cultural tendency to create an alternate reality rather than admit a shortcoming and learn from it or prevent it from recurring.
A critical part of the investigation will be to determine if any of the three pilots in the cockpit actually understood the state of the aircraft. Did they totally miss the indications and warnings they were getting? That is hard to believe. If they observed the approach becoming unstable and the speed decaying, why did they not act (PF) or say something (pilots not flying). It seems at this point that there was very little communication happening in the flight deck, and a go round was not considered.
The fact that it took so long after the crash to initiate evacuation is also indicative of the pilots state of mind.
The NTSB has a good history of sound conclusions, and in this accident there is a lot of data available. I agree that we should wait for the final report, but I also think that report will not praise these pilots.
From the information released by the NTSB and confirmed by Asiana CEO, the aircraft was working normally. From the data released, the aircraft was below normal speed for 30 seconds or more and the low airspeed warning and stick shaker activated appropriately. During the final seconds a go round was called and initiated and the aircraft responded normally with the engines spooling up as the impact occurred.
The pilots' account as reported in Korea bears little semblance to the facts as recorded by the FDR and CVR. This is exactly the cultural problem that western pilots who have worked in Korea and some other asian countries complain about. There is a cultural tendency to create an alternate reality rather than admit a shortcoming and learn from it or prevent it from recurring.
A critical part of the investigation will be to determine if any of the three pilots in the cockpit actually understood the state of the aircraft. Did they totally miss the indications and warnings they were getting? That is hard to believe. If they observed the approach becoming unstable and the speed decaying, why did they not act (PF) or say something (pilots not flying). It seems at this point that there was very little communication happening in the flight deck, and a go round was not considered.
The fact that it took so long after the crash to initiate evacuation is also indicative of the pilots state of mind.
The NTSB has a good history of sound conclusions, and in this accident there is a lot of data available. I agree that we should wait for the final report, but I also think that report will not praise these pilots.
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Given the recent posts from Korean sources, is anyone here still questioning the "too much information, released too soon" stance taken by the NTSB?
What are the options, after all? Should they hold all the info that's immediately verified, and let a thousand ugly rumors and wrong assumptions bloom on the Internet for a few months? Or release what they have that's verified information, and won't change in later reports?
I don't have any personal agenda here (other than hoping that the next flight my daughter-in-law takes from Seattle to Japan is a safe one). But I commend the NTSB for understanding the current media climate, which now means much more than the "official" media and extends through every corner of the Web.
What are the options, after all? Should they hold all the info that's immediately verified, and let a thousand ugly rumors and wrong assumptions bloom on the Internet for a few months? Or release what they have that's verified information, and won't change in later reports?
I don't have any personal agenda here (other than hoping that the next flight my daughter-in-law takes from Seattle to Japan is a safe one). But I commend the NTSB for understanding the current media climate, which now means much more than the "official" media and extends through every corner of the Web.
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Photonic
One result of the faster media cycle is the implications for corporate bottom lines. In the old days, everyone could say we have to wait for the offical report in 18 months' or so time. By then the story had vanished from media attention and possibly a majority of prospective pax would not even learn about the final report when it came out. The airline concerned received a commercial advantage or "breather" from this buffer.
However, the situation now seems different. Perhaps this is the first time in a heavy crash that the responsibilities seem so clearly attributed, so early on. This must be very worrying for Asiana, and hence their imploring NTSB to be more discreet with releases, and calling for everyone to wait until the final report is out. NTSB will need to weigh the hurt to airline bottom lines from the fast news cycle from just one bad flight, versus the advantages of the faster and freer media such as in forcing airlines to quickly undertake necessary (and perhaps other, cosmetic) system reforms in order to retain the confidence of the flying public.
One result of the faster media cycle is the implications for corporate bottom lines. In the old days, everyone could say we have to wait for the offical report in 18 months' or so time. By then the story had vanished from media attention and possibly a majority of prospective pax would not even learn about the final report when it came out. The airline concerned received a commercial advantage or "breather" from this buffer.
However, the situation now seems different. Perhaps this is the first time in a heavy crash that the responsibilities seem so clearly attributed, so early on. This must be very worrying for Asiana, and hence their imploring NTSB to be more discreet with releases, and calling for everyone to wait until the final report is out. NTSB will need to weigh the hurt to airline bottom lines from the fast news cycle from just one bad flight, versus the advantages of the faster and freer media such as in forcing airlines to quickly undertake necessary (and perhaps other, cosmetic) system reforms in order to retain the confidence of the flying public.
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Asiana pilots did right
Maybe I better make it short.
When they, cp especially, watched PAPI 3 reds and 1 white, he already knew the flight too low, which was at 500 feet, 34 secs before collision.
(Do I need to explain what PAPI is and what 3R1W means?)
He engaged the autothrottle ON and put the throttle lever back fully in order to gain the thrust. Then NO power increase at engine.
After GA engaged, the engine power revived, which was about 3 secs before collision.
We have to notice that what pilots say - they tried to regain engine power for 20 secs.
What missing from NTSB report is that the pilots were dumb for 20 seconds. However I could see that engine were dumb for 20 secs.
This is quite similiar case with crash at Heathrow airport 2008.
Similarities
- After engage autothrottle for the landing, engine went idle.
- throttle lever didnt help to gain thrust
- Crash just before runaway
Differences
- BA pilot called Mayday
- Asiana pilots tried to gain speed and altitude but no call
- Engine makers
When BA038 accident took place, initially the autothrottle function was suspected but concluded engine fuelling issue.
When they, cp especially, watched PAPI 3 reds and 1 white, he already knew the flight too low, which was at 500 feet, 34 secs before collision.
(Do I need to explain what PAPI is and what 3R1W means?)
He engaged the autothrottle ON and put the throttle lever back fully in order to gain the thrust. Then NO power increase at engine.
After GA engaged, the engine power revived, which was about 3 secs before collision.
We have to notice that what pilots say - they tried to regain engine power for 20 secs.
What missing from NTSB report is that the pilots were dumb for 20 seconds. However I could see that engine were dumb for 20 secs.
This is quite similiar case with crash at Heathrow airport 2008.
Similarities
- After engage autothrottle for the landing, engine went idle.
- throttle lever didnt help to gain thrust
- Crash just before runaway
Differences
- BA pilot called Mayday
- Asiana pilots tried to gain speed and altitude but no call
- Engine makers
When BA038 accident took place, initially the autothrottle function was suspected but concluded engine fuelling issue.
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Kaokao ;
You mean to tell us that he pushed the throttle forward and got no response? But on the CVR he said absolutely nothing?? Then when the CVR has them calling for a GoAround, miraculously the Engines recover!
Oh it must be Boeings fault then, and also ATC for not telling them they were too low. Couldn't possibly be the Asiana crew
You mean to tell us that he pushed the throttle forward and got no response? But on the CVR he said absolutely nothing?? Then when the CVR has them calling for a GoAround, miraculously the Engines recover!
Oh it must be Boeings fault then, and also ATC for not telling them they were too low. Couldn't possibly be the Asiana crew
Kaokao---we can understand how you want to defend your fellow Koreans BUT please stick to topics you understand. Obviously flying ( in particular large transport catagory Jets ) isn't your area of expertise....
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Man he's all over the place.
You need to give it up - your pilots screwed the pooch on this one and they did it badly.
Any airline pilot looking at this on what's be presented alone can see it was pilot error.
The CVR and FDs will more than put this to bed.
You need to give it up - your pilots screwed the pooch on this one and they did it badly.
Any airline pilot looking at this on what's be presented alone can see it was pilot error.
The CVR and FDs will more than put this to bed.
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Flying or Riding?
""Its important for a pilot to be a few seconds ahead of the aircraft at all times. Being proactive instead of reactive is the key. Once you get behind the aircraft, you're pretty much screwed.""
I think you got it about right. Those fellows from Asaina were Riding, not Flying their airplane.
I think you got it about right. Those fellows from Asaina were Riding, not Flying their airplane.
Last edited by No Fly Zone; 15th Jul 2013 at 04:08.
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Honeywell RAAS
Mr. Metro Man,
Honeywell has developed a system called RAAS which is a "Runway Awareness and Advisory System". This would have told they were doing something wrong and they maybe would of reacted a bit quicker. I am not sure if A or B have it certified yet (or if they will), but there are STC's out there for the system on some aircraft types.
Honeywell has developed a system called RAAS which is a "Runway Awareness and Advisory System". This would have told they were doing something wrong and they maybe would of reacted a bit quicker. I am not sure if A or B have it certified yet (or if they will), but there are STC's out there for the system on some aircraft types.
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Dirty Sanchez
ASSUMING the translation stands up, it seems there is very little point investigating as the airline and wider Korean society will not be interested in the finding. Such denial and propaganda are reminiscent of ridiculous regimes over the last few decades...
The fact that the airline are trying to detract from the issue by threatening law suits over an ill conceived gag, is frankly appalling. If they took a closer look at why their "pilots" drove a perfectly serviceable jet into a sea-wall, killing 3 kids in the process, they might learn something.
Disgraceful.
ASSUMING the translation stands up, it seems there is very little point investigating as the airline and wider Korean society will not be interested in the finding. Such denial and propaganda are reminiscent of ridiculous regimes over the last few decades...
The fact that the airline are trying to detract from the issue by threatening law suits over an ill conceived gag, is frankly appalling. If they took a closer look at why their "pilots" drove a perfectly serviceable jet into a sea-wall, killing 3 kids in the process, they might learn something.
Disgraceful.
S Korea has 50 million people. That's a lot of people to put into 1 category.
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The relief crew
Augmented crew operations.
Volumes have already been written on the two front seat guys, but what of the relief Capt & F/O?
Based on media reports this flight had an augmented crew (4 pilots). So, in respect to the other 2 pilots, who was where & who did what?
The relief Capt.
The media reported that the relief Capt was seated in the cabin for the approach & landing. This has been almost been glossed-over as being inconsequential.
Whenever I am operating as a member of an augmented crew we split into 2 ('A' and 'B') teams for the cruise, however all, repeat ALL crew members are required to be on the deck for take-off AND landing.
Why was the relief capt not on the deck? It could be that Asiana SOP's have provision for this and happy to be set straight if this is the case.
But assuming he was required to be on the deck for landing, it could be argued that he is at very least negligent or in worst case culpable in that another pair of 'trained' eyes may have prevented this accident.
The relief F/O.
How could a former 'nuck' quietly sit there and watch this happen without saying anything? Yet another example of Asian culture trumping CRM culture and sadly why this had no place in airline operations.
I hope when the investigators are done with the 2 drivers that they turn their blowtorch on the relief crew.
Volumes have already been written on the two front seat guys, but what of the relief Capt & F/O?
Based on media reports this flight had an augmented crew (4 pilots). So, in respect to the other 2 pilots, who was where & who did what?
The relief Capt.
The media reported that the relief Capt was seated in the cabin for the approach & landing. This has been almost been glossed-over as being inconsequential.
Whenever I am operating as a member of an augmented crew we split into 2 ('A' and 'B') teams for the cruise, however all, repeat ALL crew members are required to be on the deck for take-off AND landing.
Why was the relief capt not on the deck? It could be that Asiana SOP's have provision for this and happy to be set straight if this is the case.
But assuming he was required to be on the deck for landing, it could be argued that he is at very least negligent or in worst case culpable in that another pair of 'trained' eyes may have prevented this accident.
The relief F/O.
How could a former 'nuck' quietly sit there and watch this happen without saying anything? Yet another example of Asian culture trumping CRM culture and sadly why this had no place in airline operations.
I hope when the investigators are done with the 2 drivers that they turn their blowtorch on the relief crew.
If I understand kaokao correctly, the pilots did something to the AT to get more thrust.
KK, when you're thousands of feet up, you have the altitude to sort out any MCP confusions as long as you don't bust your clearance.
But when you are only a few hundred feet up with a serious descent rate, it's time to move the TLs yourself.
KK, when you're thousands of feet up, you have the altitude to sort out any MCP confusions as long as you don't bust your clearance.
But when you are only a few hundred feet up with a serious descent rate, it's time to move the TLs yourself.
The Reverend
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Full throttle did not work. why?
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Originally Posted by kaokao
He engaged the autothrottle ON and put the throttle lever back fully in order to gain the thrust. Then NO power increase at engine.
I know English is not your first language, however, the sentence you have provided, if true, would explain the cause of the accident.
In English, "back" can also mean aft or toward the tail of the aircraft. This is the go-slow (idle thrust) throttle position.
The FDR data includes throttle position data. It should not be a long wait before you can actually see what happened with the throttles in a preliminary NTSB report.
I do not believe that these pilots had a reversed throttle reflex.
But do not expect these pilots to come out heroes.
No airspeed and No altitude = MORE power needed.
How simple is it. 
No airspeed and No altitude = MORE power needed. Take control of any automation and put your hand on the throttles and apply max power. Sorry to sound harsh but I am really tired of this automation culture. I know many airlines mandate the sue of automation as it potentially saves costs but this is basic abinitio training stuff
No airspeed and No altitude = MORE power needed. Take control of any automation and put your hand on the throttles and apply max power. Sorry to sound harsh but I am really tired of this automation culture. I know many airlines mandate the sue of automation as it potentially saves costs but this is basic abinitio training stuff
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4. Also - unless there was some other flammable material in the top of the fuselage amidships - where the fire flared up considerably about 5 minutes into the 2nd video - it would appear that composite fuselages flammability might be a concern.
Not sure what you mean but I'm pretty sure that the trip-7 does not have a composite fuse. Composites are said to be used in the tails (h/v) and the floor beams.
Boeing: The Boeing 777 Family: Preferred by Passengers and Airlines Around the World
Even the upcoming 777X is going to have a metal fuselage:
Boeing Defends 777X Aluminum Hull as Plastic A350 Flies - Bloomberg
Ut Sementem Feeceris
Did the NTSB not state in one of their briefs that the engines responded normally to all inputs by the pilots? This info can only have come from the FDR.
So, how about levers in IDLE as they capture from above, as they descend through the profile the levers are moved forward (as claimed by the crew) but even though they're at (approach) idle the response time is still relatively slow. The crew think (erroneously) they're not responding and close the levers to "try again". Repeat several times with the thrust barely going above idle and the perception is that the system has "failed" - only when they TOGA does the system "work".
What's the spool time from idle on 777 compared to the A320? Does the 777 have "approach idle"?
I offer this purely as a theory as to why the crew believed the thrust was not available.
So, how about levers in IDLE as they capture from above, as they descend through the profile the levers are moved forward (as claimed by the crew) but even though they're at (approach) idle the response time is still relatively slow. The crew think (erroneously) they're not responding and close the levers to "try again". Repeat several times with the thrust barely going above idle and the perception is that the system has "failed" - only when they TOGA does the system "work".
What's the spool time from idle on 777 compared to the A320? Does the 777 have "approach idle"?
I offer this purely as a theory as to why the crew believed the thrust was not available.
Last edited by A4; 15th Jul 2013 at 07:37.
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Let the NTSB do its work.
Stator Vane.
Thanks for your excellent post that every PPruner should digest.
1, SFO is a challenging approach environment where recovery from ATC imposed high and fast positioning on finals to visual approaches is common.
2, Reducing speed and descending from above the glideslope in a 777 requires assertive handing. That's what they were trying to do but failed.
3, Blend into the complex mix the inexperienced Training Captain and ex Airbus trainee, and the recipe has been disastrous.
Those self-aware and honest pilots among us will remember times when they've been in close shave scenarios where they needed all the skills available among their crew to avoid a catastrophe. Let us humbly acknowledge that "There but for the grace of God go many of us".
It is now the time to wait for the preliminary NTSB report with keen anticipation.
Thanks for your excellent post that every PPruner should digest.
1, SFO is a challenging approach environment where recovery from ATC imposed high and fast positioning on finals to visual approaches is common.
2, Reducing speed and descending from above the glideslope in a 777 requires assertive handing. That's what they were trying to do but failed.
3, Blend into the complex mix the inexperienced Training Captain and ex Airbus trainee, and the recipe has been disastrous.
Those self-aware and honest pilots among us will remember times when they've been in close shave scenarios where they needed all the skills available among their crew to avoid a catastrophe. Let us humbly acknowledge that "There but for the grace of God go many of us".
It is now the time to wait for the preliminary NTSB report with keen anticipation.
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Asiana pilots
Well, I already told not a pilot nor at flight industry.
However I have been working with complicating systems runnig with automatic control containing embedded sw for decades years.
When I heard what happened during Asiana 777 crash, I instinctly started survey the relevant information such as technical documents and incident cases showing what autothrottle was and whether similiar event ever happened.
Actually it is quite shocking that many people have strong beliefs on sw. Most of people started put their blames on pilots but almost none paid attention to the possible sw/hw defect.
80~90% of detects/incidents what we have encountered was software plus hardware problem, which might be a algorithm fault, coding mistakes and CPU system down.
I can just guess why many people expect is - boeing 777 has such a renown record of safety during a decade's her flights.
However in my professional perspective, it does not mean system is perfect. If conditions put together, the system will collapse.
I do not put blame on boeing yet nor pilots.
Just I am trying to collect information as many as possible to understand what problem have happened.
So far one thing is clear.
NTSB reports do not contain all information enough to judge whether it is system defect or pilots mistakes. However most people believe they are responsible for accident.
As NTSB claimed, whatever the flight has problems, it is pilots' responsibility to maintain speed and altitude.
But I would like to say
whoever manuver the flight at the cockpit, none can save thier lives if engine is not working as intended.
However I have been working with complicating systems runnig with automatic control containing embedded sw for decades years.
When I heard what happened during Asiana 777 crash, I instinctly started survey the relevant information such as technical documents and incident cases showing what autothrottle was and whether similiar event ever happened.
Actually it is quite shocking that many people have strong beliefs on sw. Most of people started put their blames on pilots but almost none paid attention to the possible sw/hw defect.
80~90% of detects/incidents what we have encountered was software plus hardware problem, which might be a algorithm fault, coding mistakes and CPU system down.
I can just guess why many people expect is - boeing 777 has such a renown record of safety during a decade's her flights.
However in my professional perspective, it does not mean system is perfect. If conditions put together, the system will collapse.
I do not put blame on boeing yet nor pilots.
Just I am trying to collect information as many as possible to understand what problem have happened.
So far one thing is clear.
NTSB reports do not contain all information enough to judge whether it is system defect or pilots mistakes. However most people believe they are responsible for accident.
As NTSB claimed, whatever the flight has problems, it is pilots' responsibility to maintain speed and altitude.
But I would like to say
whoever manuver the flight at the cockpit, none can save thier lives if engine is not working as intended.