AF 447 report out
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[quote-SSD]Why the hell did they ignore the extreme nose-high attitude indication?[/quote] - at the risk of frightening the Oozlum bird out of the tree yet again, I find the suggestion that they thought they had an 'overspeed' problem at 38000ft with 16 degrees nose up
a) non-sensical
b) if true, extremely frightening
a) non-sensical
b) if true, extremely frightening
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the human brain can malfunction in strange ways; and probably it's close impossible to understand how for someone who wasn't there. I am in no way blaming the crew, AF 447 is imho a training failure, possibly not limited to AF, but systemic.
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If the pilot's brain "malfunctioned" , the cause of the crash is pilot error.
It is an x-o calculation.
If he was fed misinformation, by systems, and relied on this, in the absence of common sense as decided by his peers, he was responsible for the loss.
If the misinformation due to systemic error was overwhelming and utterly confounding, for a pilot in his situation, as judged by his peers, he is innocent.
It is an x-o calculation.
If he was fed misinformation, by systems, and relied on this, in the absence of common sense as decided by his peers, he was responsible for the loss.
If the misinformation due to systemic error was overwhelming and utterly confounding, for a pilot in his situation, as judged by his peers, he is innocent.
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If the pilot's brain "malfunctioned" , the cause of the crash is pilot error.
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Pilots should know what they are doing flying an airliner, neither of these guys had a clue. What will holding full up on the sidestick accomplish? Have any of you guys tried it? Maybe once.
.
But we pay subservient homage to all these new-fangled gadgets instead of paying attention to the job of flying the beast, so why should we ever question their demands - like obeying ones' wife !!
If the gadget says you are in a stall, react accordingly and when finally convinced that the idiot was wrong, then kick its ass - but not at the first call. Never heard of High Speed Stall ?
I once got an audible, electronic, "Terrain" warning when correctly established on a Cat III ILS approaching a mountain shrouded airport in low visibility at night. I immediately went into basic drill - i.e. When In Doubt Lash Out, and called for go around power and got the hell out of it. My co-pilot was unimpressed, why ? we were established on the ILS ? Yeah! Right! never heard of a false glide slope, buddy ?
Won't bore you with the rest of it, but my point is why shouldn't the AF crew have assumed that the 'Stall' warning was correct, at least initially?
Remember the crew practising stalls at altitude with the gear remaining retracted, and cancelling the gear unsafe horn every time they closed the throttles. When they eventually prepared to land, and out of the habit of the last hour or so, didn't lower the gear, and when the warning horn sounded yet again the Captain silenced it with the phrase -"shut up, Gringo" then proceeded to land gear up.
If you've paid for a warning device, then obey it, initially at least. If it says Stall, assume that you are in a stall.
.........it is very, very easy.........to assume that the stall warning in that case is invalid as well.
If the gadget says you are in a stall, react accordingly and when finally convinced that the idiot was wrong, then kick its ass - but not at the first call. Never heard of High Speed Stall ?
I once got an audible, electronic, "Terrain" warning when correctly established on a Cat III ILS approaching a mountain shrouded airport in low visibility at night. I immediately went into basic drill - i.e. When In Doubt Lash Out, and called for go around power and got the hell out of it. My co-pilot was unimpressed, why ? we were established on the ILS ? Yeah! Right! never heard of a false glide slope, buddy ?
Won't bore you with the rest of it, but my point is why shouldn't the AF crew have assumed that the 'Stall' warning was correct, at least initially?
Remember the crew practising stalls at altitude with the gear remaining retracted, and cancelling the gear unsafe horn every time they closed the throttles. When they eventually prepared to land, and out of the habit of the last hour or so, didn't lower the gear, and when the warning horn sounded yet again the Captain silenced it with the phrase -"shut up, Gringo" then proceeded to land gear up.
If you've paid for a warning device, then obey it, initially at least. If it says Stall, assume that you are in a stall.
Last edited by ExSp33db1rd; 24th May 2013 at 22:16.
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All You Want To Know About AF447 Is Here
In the Tech Log, there is a common thread titled "AF447". It contains 17,657 posts contained in 11 sub-threads. The first post in each sub-thread gives links to the BEA Reports on AF447 as well as other informative links. Nearly everything anyone can think of, speculate about, imagine, or theorize is contained in the sub-threads. There are many informative graphs, charts, technical explanations, photos, drawings and A330-300 flight controls and emergency procedures. There are great explanatory posts by experienced pilots that flew A330's for years and experienced military pilots who were among the first to fly FBW aircraft.
For those who have not browsed this wealth of information, I would recommend you do so. One of the things you will discover is that more than 30 crews experienced UAS at high speeds and altitudes and all managed to survive their experiences, the exception to this being the crew of AF447. The crew of AF447 received the same training as many other AF crews and perhaps other airline crews. However that night, starting with the briefing in Rio, they managed to not apply the training they had recently received prior to this flight, did not apply SOPs or even mention key procedures to be followed upon experiencing UAS or utilize good cockpit resource management. It is all there in the reports and postings, check it out.
For those who have not browsed this wealth of information, I would recommend you do so. One of the things you will discover is that more than 30 crews experienced UAS at high speeds and altitudes and all managed to survive their experiences, the exception to this being the crew of AF447. The crew of AF447 received the same training as many other AF crews and perhaps other airline crews. However that night, starting with the briefing in Rio, they managed to not apply the training they had recently received prior to this flight, did not apply SOPs or even mention key procedures to be followed upon experiencing UAS or utilize good cockpit resource management. It is all there in the reports and postings, check it out.
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I would beg to differ. Your examples of cognitive bias should be cognisant to a professional pilot, particularly two, to avoid a disaster such as this.
It appears to me as a layman that it was pilot error.
I'm a citizen. In a stall nose down. It ain't rocket science.
If the inputs were wrong then there may be a case to argue extenuating circumstances.
For a flight over such a large distance, to end up in the ocean, with modern meteorology defies understanding.
It appears to me as a layman that it was pilot error.
I'm a citizen. In a stall nose down. It ain't rocket science.
If the inputs were wrong then there may be a case to argue extenuating circumstances.
For a flight over such a large distance, to end up in the ocean, with modern meteorology defies understanding.
Originally Posted by garpal gumnut
It appears to me as a layman that it was pilot error.
I'm a citizen. In a stall nose down. It ain't rocket science.
I'm a citizen. In a stall nose down. It ain't rocket science.
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FOOD FOR THOUGHT.
Reading the accounts of the flight deck confusion, does anyone see a similarity between this accident and G-ARPI at Staines, LHR in 1972? Just thought I'd wave that to those who weren't even born when that occurred. 40 odd years later and we're back discussing stall confusion!
Even further back to Bonobo chimp days the RAF lost a Shackleton in a suspected stalling accident. Subsequently, the Tombstone Imperative kicked in and this direct descendant of the Lancaster was fitted with a wonderful big ANALOGUE AoA INDICATOR on the coaming where it was impossible to miss or ignore.
I understand that our modern hi-tech people pods are fitted with the wiring and obviously the AoA probes for such an instrument, but does anyone know of a civil air transport fitted with such a display? And are the crews trained and understanding of its message?
My fear is that the beancounter mentality has intervened when the spec for the airframe was signed, (by a knowledgeable line/training pilot-ah methinks probably not!), as the option would cost a few thousand more. I like to think that such a device would be more immune to icing confusion than the primitive bit of forwards facing central heating pipe which we've had since shortly after Wilbur and Orville, Bleriot and the rest!
Most of the pointy military hardware in recent times has had such a wonderful device available to the chimp pulling on the stick, to help him/her stay outa trouble and I bet theirs cost a packet especially on a taxpayer funded budget!
I'm presuming that someone who KNOWS ABOUT AIRCRAFT was probably involved in the spec and purchasing process for these, so I stand to be corrected by those who actually decide what we civil airframe managers need in the long term.
With ice crystal icing the latest hot topic, about which we know very little, maybe it's time to re-evaluate the AoA indicator as a possible accident prevention device? To those who have not had such a device in their line of sight in everyday ops may I request you exercise caution in any replies and perhaps state your experience of such an aid in your professional flying career? Ex military AoA probe drivers may like to educate the rest of us and share their opinions and anecdotes of this PRIMARY FLIGHT INSTRUMENT!!
Also are the AoA probes less likely to be rendered useless by the inevitable multiple birdstrike, maybe neatly slicing the offending poultry ready for the caterers to recover whilst enabling the now UAS aircraft to climb away and get sorted if the engines continue to function??
Even further back to Bonobo chimp days the RAF lost a Shackleton in a suspected stalling accident. Subsequently, the Tombstone Imperative kicked in and this direct descendant of the Lancaster was fitted with a wonderful big ANALOGUE AoA INDICATOR on the coaming where it was impossible to miss or ignore.
I understand that our modern hi-tech people pods are fitted with the wiring and obviously the AoA probes for such an instrument, but does anyone know of a civil air transport fitted with such a display? And are the crews trained and understanding of its message?
My fear is that the beancounter mentality has intervened when the spec for the airframe was signed, (by a knowledgeable line/training pilot-ah methinks probably not!), as the option would cost a few thousand more. I like to think that such a device would be more immune to icing confusion than the primitive bit of forwards facing central heating pipe which we've had since shortly after Wilbur and Orville, Bleriot and the rest!
Most of the pointy military hardware in recent times has had such a wonderful device available to the chimp pulling on the stick, to help him/her stay outa trouble and I bet theirs cost a packet especially on a taxpayer funded budget!
I'm presuming that someone who KNOWS ABOUT AIRCRAFT was probably involved in the spec and purchasing process for these, so I stand to be corrected by those who actually decide what we civil airframe managers need in the long term.
With ice crystal icing the latest hot topic, about which we know very little, maybe it's time to re-evaluate the AoA indicator as a possible accident prevention device? To those who have not had such a device in their line of sight in everyday ops may I request you exercise caution in any replies and perhaps state your experience of such an aid in your professional flying career? Ex military AoA probe drivers may like to educate the rest of us and share their opinions and anecdotes of this PRIMARY FLIGHT INSTRUMENT!!
Also are the AoA probes less likely to be rendered useless by the inevitable multiple birdstrike, maybe neatly slicing the offending poultry ready for the caterers to recover whilst enabling the now UAS aircraft to climb away and get sorted if the engines continue to function??
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Reading the accounts of the flight deck confusion, does anyone see a similarity between this accident and G-ARPI at Staines, LHR in 1972?
In the case of AF 447 the two 'pilots' clearly missed very obvious clues as to what was going on for quite a long time and didn't apply basic techniques in flying the aeroplane.
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BARKINGMAD: from the AF447 final report
Angle of Attack Measurement
The crew never formally identified the stall situation. Information on angle of
attack is not directly accessible to pilots. The angle of attack in cruise is close to the
stall warning trigger angle of attack in a law other than normal law. Under these
conditions, manual handling can bring the aeroplane to high angles of attack such
as those encountered during the event. It is essential in order to ensure flight safety
to reduce the angle of attack when a stall is imminent. Only a direct readout of the
angle of attack could enable crews to rapidly identify the aerodynamic situation of
the aeroplane and take the actions that may be required.
Consequently, the BEA recommends:
that EASA and the FAA evaluate the relevance of requiring the presence
of an angle of attack indicator directly accessible to pilots on board
aeroplanes.
The crew never formally identified the stall situation. Information on angle of
attack is not directly accessible to pilots. The angle of attack in cruise is close to the
stall warning trigger angle of attack in a law other than normal law. Under these
conditions, manual handling can bring the aeroplane to high angles of attack such
as those encountered during the event. It is essential in order to ensure flight safety
to reduce the angle of attack when a stall is imminent. Only a direct readout of the
angle of attack could enable crews to rapidly identify the aerodynamic situation of
the aeroplane and take the actions that may be required.
Consequently, the BEA recommends:
that EASA and the FAA evaluate the relevance of requiring the presence
of an angle of attack indicator directly accessible to pilots on board
aeroplanes.
Sadly I remember Staines only too well, having been working for BEA at the time.
While I agree that the circumstances and sequence of events were completely different from AFR447, I suppose you could argue that what they had in common was an experienced captain who (for differing reasons) was temporarily out of the loop, two other less experienced pilots (considerably less in PI's case) and, overall, a crew who didn't understand until too late why their aircraft was behaving the way it was.
But that's about as far as you can reasonably stretch the analogy.
One other link, of course, is that the reason we know about the confusion on AFR447's flight deck stems directly from the Staines crash (and others) which led to the introduction of the CVR.
While I agree that the circumstances and sequence of events were completely different from AFR447, I suppose you could argue that what they had in common was an experienced captain who (for differing reasons) was temporarily out of the loop, two other less experienced pilots (considerably less in PI's case) and, overall, a crew who didn't understand until too late why their aircraft was behaving the way it was.
But that's about as far as you can reasonably stretch the analogy.
One other link, of course, is that the reason we know about the confusion on AFR447's flight deck stems directly from the Staines crash (and others) which led to the introduction of the CVR.
Last edited by DaveReidUK; 25th May 2013 at 15:55.
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STAINES TRIDENT AND TODAY.
I thought that the control column was held/pulled fully back by PF, the captain in the G-ARPI accident. The inexperienced and not line trained P2 and P3 were inadequately placed and trained to intervene.
Yes, there was no CVR available but that accident allegedly speeded up their introduction and the speculation at the time was of a SA breakdown.
Granted at max ceiling the AoA is critical and there may be not a lot of displacement in the angle displayed between an undesirable and a normal condition, but maybe our test pilot comrades could comment on their accuracy/usefulness in heavy icing? It seems the probes have a symmetrical section, so possibly less likely to give erroneous readings as do the pitots.
I still seek opinion on their reliability, and therefore AoA readings, following ice accretion or an argument with our feathered friends.
The accidents due to static ports being taped up or otherwise obstructed may have been prevented by the presence of and competence in using AoA direct reading info.
My only current easily accessable info on this display is a page in Bulfer's "Noddys'" Guide to the 737NG and it appears to be a brilliantly useful option which has almost universally been ignored by the 'frame buyers/leasers.
Thank you for the BEA report quote, I haven't dared try to read it yet in case I retire to the darkened room and stay there in total despair..........................
Yes, there was no CVR available but that accident allegedly speeded up their introduction and the speculation at the time was of a SA breakdown.
Granted at max ceiling the AoA is critical and there may be not a lot of displacement in the angle displayed between an undesirable and a normal condition, but maybe our test pilot comrades could comment on their accuracy/usefulness in heavy icing? It seems the probes have a symmetrical section, so possibly less likely to give erroneous readings as do the pitots.
I still seek opinion on their reliability, and therefore AoA readings, following ice accretion or an argument with our feathered friends.
The accidents due to static ports being taped up or otherwise obstructed may have been prevented by the presence of and competence in using AoA direct reading info.
My only current easily accessable info on this display is a page in Bulfer's "Noddys'" Guide to the 737NG and it appears to be a brilliantly useful option which has almost universally been ignored by the 'frame buyers/leasers.
Thank you for the BEA report quote, I haven't dared try to read it yet in case I retire to the darkened room and stay there in total despair..........................
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SIGN HERE PLEASE.
Thanks Dozy, I should have made clear I was referring to civil airframes-all makes-versus poiny military things.
Can we all assume that the purchase/lease signatories acting on behalf of Drivers, Airframe, Civilian, are fully aware of what they are specifying and have as much requisite knowledge and background as the average high-time line dog.........?
If AF was offered the option of AoA indicators and rejected them for whatever reason, doubtless the lawyers will add that to their ammunition belt.
Just a shame the pilots in 447 were not up to speed, pardon the pun, on UAS handling as seems to be the conclusion.
Can we all assume that the purchase/lease signatories acting on behalf of Drivers, Airframe, Civilian, are fully aware of what they are specifying and have as much requisite knowledge and background as the average high-time line dog.........?
If AF was offered the option of AoA indicators and rejected them for whatever reason, doubtless the lawyers will add that to their ammunition belt.
Just a shame the pilots in 447 were not up to speed, pardon the pun, on UAS handling as seems to be the conclusion.
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While I'd be the first to agree that EVERY aeroplane should have an AoA indicator (AoA is what wings and therfore flight is all about!) I doubt it would have made any difference in the case of AF447. They had ample cockpit information to fly the aeroplane, particularly attitude information, and they didn't use it.
Concorde did have AoA indicators I guess because AoA is particularly critical on a thin, narrow delta at the high end of the range.
Does / did any other airliner?
Concorde did have AoA indicators I guess because AoA is particularly critical on a thin, narrow delta at the high end of the range.
Does / did any other airliner?