AF 447 report out
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LW - my main point was
. Re The s/by ASI, I should have said
"There were no 'standby' ASIs fitted that were of any use". My mistake.
There was no need for 'Standby Instruments' for attitude.-
"There were no 'standby' ASIs fitted that were of any use". My mistake.
Last edited by BOAC; 30th Jul 2012 at 14:19.
OK. With scan breakdown, a whole host of instruments, unused, can't help a crew.
jc: I understand your point on delay in pitot tube recall.
jc: I understand your point on delay in pitot tube recall.
Last edited by Lonewolf_50; 30th Jul 2012 at 14:40.
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In all fairness he's conflating problems during different periods. The problems found by Airbus in 1995 were in Rosemount model pitot tubes, and in 1996 Airbus mandated that these models be replaced with Goodrich models. But the DGAC did not make that mandate a legal requirement until 2001. The BFU's recommendation was likely in response to this issue, as it reported the issues in 1998.
The saga of the Thales pitot tubes was a separate issue which raised its head in the mid-2000s. Thales pitot tubes were always an optional fit, with Goodrich being the default.
Clandestino was pointing out that while the A300 is a widebody, it is of a different generation to the A330 - no FBW, no sidesticks and the systems implementation is totally different.
With all due respect, this is getting very tiresome.
The saga of the Thales pitot tubes was a separate issue which raised its head in the mid-2000s. Thales pitot tubes were always an optional fit, with Goodrich being the default.
Clandestino was pointing out that while the A300 is a widebody, it is of a different generation to the A330 - no FBW, no sidesticks and the systems implementation is totally different.
With all due respect, this is getting very tiresome.
Last edited by DozyWannabe; 30th Jul 2012 at 21:09.
Dozy, I appreciate what jc is doing. What I see jc presenting is the kind of argumentation that a lawyer will use on an ignorant jury to get a large settlement.
I expect that AF's defense will be a reasonable one, as their counsel will show that they had begun to replace the Thales probes, and that this hull wasn't one of the ones YET refitted.
How the jury is played will influence how harshly the jury will perceive AF's schedule and intention to comply with the formal directive ...
I expect that AF's defense will be a reasonable one, as their counsel will show that they had begun to replace the Thales probes, and that this hull wasn't one of the ones YET refitted.
How the jury is played will influence how harshly the jury will perceive AF's schedule and intention to comply with the formal directive ...
Last edited by Lonewolf_50; 30th Jul 2012 at 22:11.
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Quote:
Originally Posted by Lyman
Read the report.
Clandestino was pointing out that while the A300 is a widebody, it is of a different generation to the A330 - no FBW, no sidesticks and the systems implementation is totally different.
With all due respect, this is getting very tiresome.
Originally Posted by Lyman
Read the report.
Clandestino was pointing out that while the A300 is a widebody, it is of a different generation to the A330 - no FBW, no sidesticks and the systems implementation is totally different.
With all due respect, this is getting very tiresome.
The problem is not A300 or A332.
The subject was Kapton (R) insulated wires.
Actually, this insulating product is nowaday not used. But since how many time?
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I didn't see a reference to Kapton in the linked report - are you sure?
I'm aware there was convern over the use of Kapton over a decade ago, but to my mind the only civil incident where it was an issue was Swissair 111. Even then the cause of this was improper installation of the IFE equipment, causing high-voltage electricity to travel where it was never supposed to go. If installed properly, Kapton shouldn't be an issue.
I'm aware there was convern over the use of Kapton over a decade ago, but to my mind the only civil incident where it was an issue was Swissair 111. Even then the cause of this was improper installation of the IFE equipment, causing high-voltage electricity to travel where it was never supposed to go. If installed properly, Kapton shouldn't be an issue.
...the kind of argumentation that a lawyer will use on an ignorant jury...
Would one present something different to an intelligent jury?
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Ignorance does not mean lack of intelligence - it refers simply to informedness. Most members of the public are not well-informed in aviation matters.
I like to think I'm not amazingly dumb, but on the subject of - say - the ins-and-outs of accountancy, I am certainly woefully ignorant!
I like to think I'm not amazingly dumb, but on the subject of - say - the ins-and-outs of accountancy, I am certainly woefully ignorant!
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Would one present something different to an informed jury, if one knew they were informed?
The judgment of the case is not in a criminal court (court d'assises) so .. it will be no jury
If at the end of the trial .. the judge (s) determines that an individual or individuals are personally directly responsible for the deaths of others ( a premeditated or voluntary murder ) .. he will request immediate arrest and they can be trialed by a criminal court (with idiots and intelligent people in the jury
)IMHO ...
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I've been following the discussion. When reading the interim reports, I had a great deal of difficulty in understanding what was going on in the pilots' minds. After reading the final report, I would classify the accident as initiated by spatial disorientation and exacerbated by mode confusion. The ultimate factor was a stall with a botched recovery.
This wasn't just an Airbus problem or a sidestick problem. Look at the Northwest B-727 in December 1974. When I read the report on that one, all I could think was "how dumb could he be?" A few months later, I found out just how dumb I could be. The only difference was I flew out of the cloud before losing the airplane.
In all three cases, there were multiple indications caused by a single common cause. The problem is that human pilots are not very good at working back from multiple indications to a common cause. If you had asked all three pilots what the effect would be of iced pitot tubes, I'm sure that they could have told you. I think that given multiple indications, first on A/S, then a second, then autopilot disconnect, then ... and so on, it would be much more difficult.
There have been a number of studies of multiple failures in transports and in light aircraft. Look at Gideon Singer's doctoral dissertation for example. We should all remember that we've had thirty seven months to study the cause. The crew had a couple of minutes.
This wasn't just an Airbus problem or a sidestick problem. Look at the Northwest B-727 in December 1974. When I read the report on that one, all I could think was "how dumb could he be?" A few months later, I found out just how dumb I could be. The only difference was I flew out of the cloud before losing the airplane.
In all three cases, there were multiple indications caused by a single common cause. The problem is that human pilots are not very good at working back from multiple indications to a common cause. If you had asked all three pilots what the effect would be of iced pitot tubes, I'm sure that they could have told you. I think that given multiple indications, first on A/S, then a second, then autopilot disconnect, then ... and so on, it would be much more difficult.
There have been a number of studies of multiple failures in transports and in light aircraft. Look at Gideon Singer's doctoral dissertation for example. We should all remember that we've had thirty seven months to study the cause. The crew had a couple of minutes.
I was pointing out that absolutely no faults were recorded during the flight of AF447 that were not either the consequence of 1. losing the actual total pressure in pitot installation 2. loss of control. Aeroplane was perfectly sound until the moment she hit the water. Oblique hints that AF447 could have been afflicted with loss of control due to electrical failure as there were similar cases, on closer inspection turned out to be complete fabrication put together from details of other completely unrelated incidents.
Now, falsification needs not to be deliberate, as people quite often do misunderstand or misremember some details, but PPRuNe is full of "thank you for correcting me", which is very normal when one is interested in facts. When our esteemed colleague was warned his story was quite fairytalish, his reaction was curt "Read the report" without further explanation why would it be beneficial or reference to what needs to be corrected. Therefore I am unable to give him the benefit of doubt that he invented the story unintentionally and without some purpose incompatible with open and honest discussion.
Now, falsification needs not to be deliberate, as people quite often do misunderstand or misremember some details, but PPRuNe is full of "thank you for correcting me", which is very normal when one is interested in facts. When our esteemed colleague was warned his story was quite fairytalish, his reaction was curt "Read the report" without further explanation why would it be beneficial or reference to what needs to be corrected. Therefore I am unable to give him the benefit of doubt that he invented the story unintentionally and without some purpose incompatible with open and honest discussion.
Goldfish85
While "mode confusion" may be a sound analysis, I will point out to you that, based on available evidence, there was no attempt at stall recovery, therefore one cannot have been botched. Why do I conclude that? There was, based on available evidence, not recognition of stall from which to recover, even though one was in progress.
There was a botched response to a malfunction, that led to a stall.
After that, I think you can argue that mode confusion was the modus operandi until impact with the ocean.
The ultimate factor was a stall with a botched recovery.
There was a botched response to a malfunction, that led to a stall.
After that, I think you can argue that mode confusion was the modus operandi until impact with the ocean.
Last edited by Lonewolf_50; 31st Jul 2012 at 12:31.
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Smart Cows and sitcks
Smart cows eat the grass and spit out the sticks. I have been grazing the AF447 thread long term, read the reports in detail and many of the references. I am a computer test lab rat not a pilot, This is likely sticks.
There is no human ability to mentally muti-task.
The mind must move from one problem to the next, and if returning
to a previous step in a long problem, must recover the previous point in progress and then advance.
My particular sicky spot is that as the airspeed data returned to a computer valid number the stall warning was activated. And that happend three times if memory serves me.
I start to correct my nose up input. I get stall warning....
and it happens three times.
Has the timing and the sequence convinced me that nose down is an error no matter what else the computer is telling me?
Facing a tremendous display of data and alarms.
We know the plane was not flying. It seems they never grasped that
crucial single element. Their view was 'flying with problems'. What does it take to mentally unlock from 'its flying' to 'its not flying'?
Some years in the future we may see a human factors disection of the FDR and CVR data coupled to pilot grade scan and process the information speeds. (much above average street smarts)
As a member of the computer programmming clan, how was it that 'its not flying' was not made obvious? And for you who sit in the seats, do you now know how to glean 'its not flying' from the data they faced?
There is no human ability to mentally muti-task.
The mind must move from one problem to the next, and if returning
to a previous step in a long problem, must recover the previous point in progress and then advance.
My particular sicky spot is that as the airspeed data returned to a computer valid number the stall warning was activated. And that happend three times if memory serves me.
I start to correct my nose up input. I get stall warning....
and it happens three times.
Has the timing and the sequence convinced me that nose down is an error no matter what else the computer is telling me?
Facing a tremendous display of data and alarms.
We know the plane was not flying. It seems they never grasped that
crucial single element. Their view was 'flying with problems'. What does it take to mentally unlock from 'its flying' to 'its not flying'?
Some years in the future we may see a human factors disection of the FDR and CVR data coupled to pilot grade scan and process the information speeds. (much above average street smarts)
As a member of the computer programmming clan, how was it that 'its not flying' was not made obvious? And for you who sit in the seats, do you now know how to glean 'its not flying' from the data they faced?
gleaf, I do not totally agree with your analysis, though I appreciate your thought process since you have to model the behaviors in serial. (Or so it appears).
Tasks and skills unique to instrument flying are suceptible to clumping and grouping, typically in most easily clumped or grouped aggregates of 3 to 5. Once you get over five, you can typically clump or group the greater number in to 2 heirarchies of three, and so on. I'll suggest to you that it is indeed multitasking when you are actually flying. When you are watching the plane fly, maybe not so much.
That disagreement aside, you are on to something in terms of serial prioritization, which we list as the holy triumvirate in aviation:
Aviate
Navigate
Communicate
Inside "aviate" are a lot of sub tasks, some of which you do in parallel when flying, some in series. You can talk and fly at the same time, that need not be done in serial, and you can also navigate and fly at the same time: many of us have done so. The reason we fall back to that holy triumvirate is to make sure that as we encounter changing conditions or changing requirements, we take care of first priority when task loading increases. Malfunctions and emergencies are typically a period of increased task loading. Responses are typically organized around the prioritization logic of the holy triumvirate.
Things get a bit more complex when dealing with change while operating under instrument conditions. (It's easier to do when VFR, since you peripheral senses help you with flying references ...)
As far as multi tasking, breaking down an instrument scan would appear to be a serial exercise, as you alluded to. One typically trains an "in order" priority of condition and task decisions by going from your primary instrument, the attitude gyro/artificial horizon/whatevertheycallitnow and then cross check your various performance parameters: airspeed, altitude, vertical speed (if any), heading, power, ball in, time, fuel, etcetera. The core conditions to consider are pitch, roll, and power, by which your aircraft's performance (flying) is governed.
Ab initio instrument training typically brings you back to the vertical gyro's display between each cross checked instrument, however, there are other effective instrument scans (NASA had a circular scan that better followed muscle movement in the eyeball) that for my money is more effective.
An instrument scan is "a rinse and repeat until conditions or performance changes," repetitive task. You switch to a tailored scan pattern suited to your task should your task be other than flying straight and level:
climbing turn, navigational problem, speed and heading change, configuration change, and so on.
You do this while dealing with all other matters within the aircraft in parallel, and are frequently (particularly when flying as a single pilot) multi tasking: doing several things at once.
Tasks and skills unique to instrument flying are suceptible to clumping and grouping, typically in most easily clumped or grouped aggregates of 3 to 5. Once you get over five, you can typically clump or group the greater number in to 2 heirarchies of three, and so on. I'll suggest to you that it is indeed multitasking when you are actually flying. When you are watching the plane fly, maybe not so much.
That disagreement aside, you are on to something in terms of serial prioritization, which we list as the holy triumvirate in aviation:
Aviate
Navigate
Communicate
Inside "aviate" are a lot of sub tasks, some of which you do in parallel when flying, some in series. You can talk and fly at the same time, that need not be done in serial, and you can also navigate and fly at the same time: many of us have done so. The reason we fall back to that holy triumvirate is to make sure that as we encounter changing conditions or changing requirements, we take care of first priority when task loading increases. Malfunctions and emergencies are typically a period of increased task loading. Responses are typically organized around the prioritization logic of the holy triumvirate.
Things get a bit more complex when dealing with change while operating under instrument conditions. (It's easier to do when VFR, since you peripheral senses help you with flying references ...)
As far as multi tasking, breaking down an instrument scan would appear to be a serial exercise, as you alluded to. One typically trains an "in order" priority of condition and task decisions by going from your primary instrument, the attitude gyro/artificial horizon/whatevertheycallitnow and then cross check your various performance parameters: airspeed, altitude, vertical speed (if any), heading, power, ball in, time, fuel, etcetera. The core conditions to consider are pitch, roll, and power, by which your aircraft's performance (flying) is governed.
Ab initio instrument training typically brings you back to the vertical gyro's display between each cross checked instrument, however, there are other effective instrument scans (NASA had a circular scan that better followed muscle movement in the eyeball) that for my money is more effective.
An instrument scan is "a rinse and repeat until conditions or performance changes," repetitive task. You switch to a tailored scan pattern suited to your task should your task be other than flying straight and level:
climbing turn, navigational problem, speed and heading change, configuration change, and so on.
You do this while dealing with all other matters within the aircraft in parallel, and are frequently (particularly when flying as a single pilot) multi tasking: doing several things at once.
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Greetings smart bovine.
"how was it that 'its not flying' was not made obvious?" As a computer person you will appreciate the number of if/thens required to provide a definitive 'it is not flying' to cope with all possible events and failures.
Each false or failed input that enables you normally to identify 'it is not flying' has to be 'protected' against generating a false warning on its own and in an 'and' scenario with other units. We have already seen the fallacy of the '2 out of three' sensors voting at Perpignan.
Then you must decide what to do about the situation. We are treading (some unwillingly) down the path of 'the machine will sort this out' so what will you programme to 'pick up the pieces, establish which values are right and then do ???????????? The other (my preferred) option is to ensure a basic skill set for aviators (until the perfect 'HAL' comes along) and 'drop' the misbehaving now basic a/c into the ?capable? hands of a pilot., who, while suffering the logic/thought processes you describe, has that un-progammable intuition/experience.
It may, of course, be that 'fuzzy logic' or whatever is around now will achieve your ideal.
"how was it that 'its not flying' was not made obvious?" As a computer person you will appreciate the number of if/thens required to provide a definitive 'it is not flying' to cope with all possible events and failures.
Each false or failed input that enables you normally to identify 'it is not flying' has to be 'protected' against generating a false warning on its own and in an 'and' scenario with other units. We have already seen the fallacy of the '2 out of three' sensors voting at Perpignan.
Then you must decide what to do about the situation. We are treading (some unwillingly) down the path of 'the machine will sort this out' so what will you programme to 'pick up the pieces, establish which values are right and then do ???????????? The other (my preferred) option is to ensure a basic skill set for aviators (until the perfect 'HAL' comes along) and 'drop' the misbehaving now basic a/c into the ?capable? hands of a pilot., who, while suffering the logic/thought processes you describe, has that un-progammable intuition/experience.
It may, of course, be that 'fuzzy logic' or whatever is around now will achieve your ideal.
Has the timing and the sequence convinced me that nose down is an error no matter what else the computer is telling me?
Returning the nose to a different pitch should help you with the altitude change, and may (depending on how you do it ) assist in your energy management and performance correction.
The altitude change tied to pitch up and airspeed loss (changing kinetic energy to potential energy) seems to have been lost track of despite, or due to, various warnings and alarms.
Pilot not flying is recorded as trying to get the pilot flying to stop climbing.
Why THAT was a failed exercise remains less than certain to me, as I am not familiar enough with climate and culture both in Air France, the company, and that particular cockpit.
Non-digital issues.
Don't disagree that while trying to catch up, any number of stimuli were present that would aid and abet in the misdiagnosis of "what's it doing now" once the crew were behind the aircraft.
BEA's discussion of that in the final report is pretty good, though some would prefer some more depth and detail.
Last edited by Lonewolf_50; 31st Jul 2012 at 14:53.
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There is no human ability to mentally multi-task.
However, your point is in fact very interesting. Apparently, human thought processes can be roughly divided in two categories, those that require logic and conscious effort and those that are performed instinctively, without actual "thinking". And the brain is capable of executing exactly one "logical" thread at a time, but many "instinctive" processes at once.
From that point we can return to the difference between "A" and "B" aircraft philosophy. The "B" aircraft provides tactile feedback (moving throttle, forces on the yoke, stick shaker, rotating trim wheel... etc.) which can be processed by instinctive threads of the human mind. The "A" only shows visual references, in the form of symbols rather than images, that require conscious effort to be processed. And there is only one thread capable of doing that, resulting in overload and confusion....
Last edited by ap08; 31st Jul 2012 at 16:02.
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Can't you drive it and talk at the same time?
To put it another way .. you employ half your concentration for driving and the other half to use your mobile phone ... it is already dangerous
If your attention to the conversation is greater than that devoted to drive .. you endanger your life and that of other road users
For this reason, many countries have passed legislation that prohibits the use of mobile phone while driving a vehicle ...
Multitasking yes .. but take care
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The problem with using mobile phone when driving, is not talking itself, but having to look at its screen and keyboard when dialing a number, therefore moving your eyes away from the road and re-focusing them to a very close distance, so that you cannot see the road even with peripheral vision. Having one hand off the steering wheel also doesn't help safety.
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Having one hand off the steering wheel also doesn't help safety.
Also .. brain can work in weird fashion when busy (EG people who forget their babies in car .. etc ..)
Last edited by jcjeant; 31st Jul 2012 at 16:13.