AF 447 report out
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No one should be tempted to think that Lyman is trying to extrapolate his little knowledge into some miraculous proof of dirty dealing.
In the time I worked as an investigator, I would from time to time get the idea that my report might be lacking, if not in data, in disclosure thereof, and also of methodology and group discussion in and within the team.
To wit: X is interesting, let us take a close look.... In preparing my report, I would check each area of investigation, and review it as to lost of requirements.
For this, I would push the red ? , and a list may come up.
"Was X exhaustively researched"? Was there a determination made? What was it? "Yes, it was material, and here's why..." "No, it was not, and here's why..."
"No conclusion..."
"No conclusion" was as important as the big Ah HA! It demanded a mention, else I would be thought other than thorough... And if at a later time, there would be data to refer to, if only for a reading list.
It seems to me, BEA is guilty of a kind of non disclosure that does not serve their mission, nor the public.
PJ2, what was the result of BEA's exhaustive research in re: the EEBay?
I may have missed it, truly, and if I did, my bad.....
In the time I worked as an investigator, I would from time to time get the idea that my report might be lacking, if not in data, in disclosure thereof, and also of methodology and group discussion in and within the team.
To wit: X is interesting, let us take a close look.... In preparing my report, I would check each area of investigation, and review it as to lost of requirements.
For this, I would push the red ? , and a list may come up.
"Was X exhaustively researched"? Was there a determination made? What was it? "Yes, it was material, and here's why..." "No, it was not, and here's why..."
"No conclusion..."
"No conclusion" was as important as the big Ah HA! It demanded a mention, else I would be thought other than thorough... And if at a later time, there would be data to refer to, if only for a reading list.
It seems to me, BEA is guilty of a kind of non disclosure that does not serve their mission, nor the public.
PJ2, what was the result of BEA's exhaustive research in re: the EEBay?
I may have missed it, truly, and if I did, my bad.....
Originally Posted by BOAC
We have already seen the fallacy of the '2 out of three' sensors voting at Perpignan.
Originally Posted by Lyman
If you cannot establish for yourself the intriguing similarities to EI-EAT, I won't bother to explain them to you, except to say that the schematic included does establish the location for you of the EEbay,
Originally Posted by Lyman
PJ2, what was the result of BEA's exhaustive research in re: the EEBay?
Originally Posted by Lyman
Also, what of RIO or Anchorage, or Johannesburg, when a long haul jetliner experiences low temps far colder than Finland or Rio, or at time the ANTARCTIC?
Originally Posted by Lyman
In the time I worked as an investigator, I would from time to time get the idea that my report might be lacking, if not in data, in disclosure thereof, and also of methodology and group discussion in and within the team.
Lyman, you were posting completely unsupported claims. When pressed for reference, you provided irrelevant one and when warned it makes no sense, you became evasive and abusive. It looks to me you are more interested in eliciting certain reactions than having a sensible discussion.
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"We" seemingly have no clue about either normal operation of FCS or certification scope.
Exactly! No use in arguing if what one brings to discussion is unduly biased. As can be seen from AF447 (or almost any) accident report, findings and conclusions are more likely to be true and useful if they follow after and conform to factual information.
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Not sure who you are arguing with there, Clandestino, since your post appears unaddressed, but my comment was directed to 'gleaf' on 'programming' issues (and quoted out of context) and I refer to your post above. It would have been more sensible to quote my whole paragraph to gleaf
Regarding
- you should remind yourself of the saying about something 'foolproof' - the world can always find a better fool, as is often evidenced here. Human history is stuffed with demonstrations of Murphy's Law, and if you don't cater for that. in aircraft and software design....................
Originally Posted by BOAC
Each false or failed input that enables you normally to identify 'it is not flying' has to be 'protected' against generating a false warning on its own and in an 'and' scenario with other units. We have already seen the fallacy of the '2 out of three' sensors voting at Perpignan.
to beat the technical genius
The message I'm trying to get across is what you refer to as "'gleaf' on 'programming' issues" is actually design feature that, if you rely solely on it, will keep you out of trouble when single probe goes haywire or kill you in extremely low probability event of two out of three measurements become synchronously false in the absolutely same manner. Its normal operation is based on assumption everyone sticks to reasonable, established and approved procedures so Perpignan doesn't cut it as proof something is wrong with the design.
Sorry if you feel that your sentence is misunderstood because I've taken it out of context but It seems to me the context just reinforces your notion that "voting" in Airbus FCS is fundamentally wrong. It is all very nice to wish for:
Problem is that at our level of technology such a feat is simply impossible. It is easy to detect unequivocal fault but If you take the mass of data which don't contradict each other outright but paint a picture which looks wrong, the computer that would first recognize something is wrong and then point to it would need near-human intelligence. Sure you can try to program the computer compare this to that, that and that and make conclusions of its own, but you would inevitably end up with program code so complex it would be extremely unreliable.
One can blame a computer for not being able to do pilot's work if it gives him emotional satisfaction but anyway it's ignorant and otherwise useless to do so.
It's fundamentally incaterable for to design aircraft or system resilient to human ignorance so it is very basic requirement anyone working on or around aeroplanes know them very well, and is aware how dangerous they can be so he doesn't take his job lightly. When we're talking about that specific occurrence, why would anyone in the world design alpha probes to withstand the water jet from pressure washer when there are covers for them available with their use prescribed when washing the aeroplane?
Sorry if you feel that your sentence is misunderstood because I've taken it out of context but It seems to me the context just reinforces your notion that "voting" in Airbus FCS is fundamentally wrong. It is all very nice to wish for:
Originally Posted by BOAC
Each false or failed input that enables you normally to identify 'it is not flying' has to be 'protected' against generating a false warning on its own and in an 'and' scenario with other units.
One can blame a computer for not being able to do pilot's work if it gives him emotional satisfaction but anyway it's ignorant and otherwise useless to do so.
Originally Posted by BOAC
you should remind yourself of the saying about something 'foolproof' - the world can always find a better fool, as is often evidenced here. Human history is stuffed with demonstrations of Murphy's Law, and if you don't cater for that. in aircraft and software design...................
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This thread is decending into a farce of irrelevance and should probably be closed.
There is only one simple connection between AF447 and Perpignon, they are both the result of a pilot doing something so unbelievably stupid that "pilot error" cannot even begin to describe their idiocy.
No system is foolproof, the world just finds a better fool.
There is only one simple connection between AF447 and Perpignon, they are both the result of a pilot doing something so unbelievably stupid that "pilot error" cannot even begin to describe their idiocy.
No system is foolproof, the world just finds a better fool.
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ACARS TEAM / AIRBUS WORKED AS DESIGNED : 2 "solutions"
@Lonewolf50
Thank you for the colored and interactive ACARS display.
AF knew exactly as soon as the june 1. 2009 early morning, in REAL TIME! what had happened.
The engineers team who concepted the ACARS system was/is really EXCELLENT. Much much better than the team who built the control system. Informative, reliable, working as designed, simple, cheap, always well accepted by the pilot, etc. (all the qualities!) This team should redesign and correct the FCS for AIRBUS with all the dangerous garbage addenda. (please no graceful degradation only direct informations).
AIRBUS thought the mekanik function of the Flying Mekanik - the 3. Man in the cockpit for the 4. function (aviate,navigate,communicate, MEKANIK) - could be replaced by automation. He should have made the UAS reliable and rapid diagnostic for pilots' decision. HE WAS MISSING in that system.
I can remember the AIRBUS lecture in february 1988 (4 months before Habsheim) to AFCET (association francaise de cybernetique economique et technique, workteam "securite des systemes informatiques") i was belonging to -Paris 15 place St Quentin (CNES) . Issue was "The airbus is the only aircraft IN THE WORLD That may be piloted by fools".
Thank you for the colored and interactive ACARS display.
AF knew exactly as soon as the june 1. 2009 early morning, in REAL TIME! what had happened.
The engineers team who concepted the ACARS system was/is really EXCELLENT. Much much better than the team who built the control system. Informative, reliable, working as designed, simple, cheap, always well accepted by the pilot, etc. (all the qualities!) This team should redesign and correct the FCS for AIRBUS with all the dangerous garbage addenda. (please no graceful degradation only direct informations).
AIRBUS thought the mekanik function of the Flying Mekanik - the 3. Man in the cockpit for the 4. function (aviate,navigate,communicate, MEKANIK) - could be replaced by automation. He should have made the UAS reliable and rapid diagnostic for pilots' decision. HE WAS MISSING in that system.
I can remember the AIRBUS lecture in february 1988 (4 months before Habsheim) to AFCET (association francaise de cybernetique economique et technique, workteam "securite des systemes informatiques") i was belonging to -Paris 15 place St Quentin (CNES) . Issue was "The airbus is the only aircraft IN THE WORLD That may be piloted by fools".
Last edited by roulishollandais; 3rd Aug 2012 at 16:07. Reason: ponctuation
roulis, I suspect that many an aircraft has been piloted by a fool, and by fools, but it never occurred to me that such was once a design criterion! 
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Issue was "The airbus is the only aircraft IN THE WORLD That may be piloted by fools".
But it is presumptuous to say that it is the only aircraft in the world that may be piloted by fools
A lot of Boeing and other brands aircraft have been flown by fools .. it is not shortage of examples ..
Last edited by jcjeant; 2nd Aug 2012 at 21:01.
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Originally Posted by roulis
Issue was "The airbus is the only aircraft IN THE WORLD That may be piloted by fools".
I can't begin to believe that the design team that came up with the AB FBW system (w/protections) intended to make things harder than necessary, nor that they would knowingly design a confusing system. Therefore, the confusing and harder than necessary situations they created were a mistake.
My only question would be: will they now correct their mistake, or will they add further layers of complexity in an attempt to prove the original design philosophy correct?
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My only question would be: will they now correct their mistake, or will they add further layers of complexity in an attempt to prove the original design philosophy correct?
Those folks flying FBW aircraft should remember that from a historical viewpoint, we are only at an approximate mid-point of the evolutionary cycle to FBW aircraft. What you are flying can be made better.....once the engineers begin to realize what kind of traps they have created inadvertently.
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My guess is that ego prevents re-evaluation. So many words extolling the virtues of AB "protections" have been uttered/printed that there's a real unwillingness to admit to problems.
(Duh!)
(Duh!)
Last edited by Organfreak; 3rd Aug 2012 at 16:15. Reason: bad speeling
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Originally Posted by Lonewolf50
roulis, I suspect that many an aircraft has been piloted by a fool, and by fools, but it never occurred to me that such was once a design criterion! 
Dozy will surely say it was the case with Asseline ! May be Habsheim crash decreased the use of that criterion ?
I think Airbus pilots are bad informed and need to (re)learn physic of flight. And automation engineers have to learn about flying and rapid decisions.
It is still the case with AF447, and with the BEA final report...
It seems two worlds are not able to connect themselves.The lecture was very serious ! Public was made with around 30 persons in charge of computer divisions of the greatest french companies... See : I did not give the name of the Airbus Guy due to charity !
Last edited by Jetdriver; 3rd Aug 2012 at 20:41.
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Originally Posted by Maching Bird
Those folks flying FBW aircraft should remember that from a historical viewpoint, we are only at an approximate mid-point of the evolutionary cycle to FBW aircraft. What you are flying can be made better...
Originally Posted by Maching Bird
.....once the engineers begin to realize what kind of traps they have created inadvertently
Could an new annex to the Chicago Convention help about flying automation ?
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Machinebird, Organfreak, Roulishollandais,
Good comments, and let me make clear. I don't specifically condemn the "protections", I question the entire system.
>Flat panel displays that require interpretation vs recognition. (I can recognize a specific speed, say 250kts on a round dial by noticing where the needle points - no thought necessary - while a tape requires more attention.)
>An attention DEMANDING ECAM system. And the training philosophy that accompanies it.
>Controls with no feedback.
>An airframe that does not trim for speed, but for flight path.
>An institutional reliance, almost religious reliance on FD's - in training and operations........and FD's that are allowed to provide misleading data.
>Warning systems (in combination with ECAM) that adds to sensory overload vs providing help for focus when in sensory overload.
>A manufacturers training program that assumes competence and yet demands compliance.
Combine all that with an AirFrance trained, Airbus only experienced flight crew and you just might get AF447.
BTW, for any new readers. I'm not necessarily anti AB, I prefer steam gauges over tapes no matter what the airplane. I don't like Boeings with tapes either. But at least the little Boeings don't add to the confusion.
Good comments, and let me make clear. I don't specifically condemn the "protections", I question the entire system.
>Flat panel displays that require interpretation vs recognition. (I can recognize a specific speed, say 250kts on a round dial by noticing where the needle points - no thought necessary - while a tape requires more attention.)
>An attention DEMANDING ECAM system. And the training philosophy that accompanies it.
>Controls with no feedback.
>An airframe that does not trim for speed, but for flight path.
>An institutional reliance, almost religious reliance on FD's - in training and operations........and FD's that are allowed to provide misleading data.
>Warning systems (in combination with ECAM) that adds to sensory overload vs providing help for focus when in sensory overload.
>A manufacturers training program that assumes competence and yet demands compliance.
Combine all that with an AirFrance trained, Airbus only experienced flight crew and you just might get AF447.
BTW, for any new readers. I'm not necessarily anti AB, I prefer steam gauges over tapes no matter what the airplane. I don't like Boeings with tapes either. But at least the little Boeings don't add to the confusion.
Last edited by TTex600; 3rd Aug 2012 at 17:13.
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TTex600,
Just so you know, I think you are dead-on with all of this. You get my Clear-Thinker o' the ThreadŽ Award.
(Probably not even worth the paper it's not printed on.)
Just so you know, I think you are dead-on with all of this. You get my Clear-Thinker o' the ThreadŽ Award.
(Probably not even worth the paper it's not printed on.)
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TTex - that last post should be a 'cut and stick on the wall' for ALL designers of FBW and modern instrument systems. The temptation will be to 'add another layer' and increase the complexity.