Article about lack of hand flying skills - FAA concerned
My 2p worth.
I think we operate modern aircraft much closer to the edge of the performance envelope than we used to with first or second generation jets. Modern jets fly higher, further, carry more payload, for less fuel than ever before. The whole sale installation of computers and the increase in computing power has made this possible. The aircraft need to be flown with much more accuracy than ever before to achieve the required performance, where 1 or 2 knots could make all the difference.
This step change in aircraft performance has, however, not been followed up with a change in pilot training. Everything is fine while the computers are working correctly, however its only when things start going wrong that the pilots realise just how close to the edge of the performance envelope they are. And being able to handle a big jet aircraft at the edge of its envelope while stuff is going wrong around you is not something civilian pilots are trained for.
It is the training that needs to change not the aircraft.
When I converted to a 3rd generation jet about 3 years ago, one of the first things the instructor said was "its impossible to stall this aircraft". Well tell that to the crew of the Air France 330. That phrase still plays on my mind every time I look at the Unreliable Air Speed QRH checklist.
I think we operate modern aircraft much closer to the edge of the performance envelope than we used to with first or second generation jets. Modern jets fly higher, further, carry more payload, for less fuel than ever before. The whole sale installation of computers and the increase in computing power has made this possible. The aircraft need to be flown with much more accuracy than ever before to achieve the required performance, where 1 or 2 knots could make all the difference.
This step change in aircraft performance has, however, not been followed up with a change in pilot training. Everything is fine while the computers are working correctly, however its only when things start going wrong that the pilots realise just how close to the edge of the performance envelope they are. And being able to handle a big jet aircraft at the edge of its envelope while stuff is going wrong around you is not something civilian pilots are trained for.
It is the training that needs to change not the aircraft.
When I converted to a 3rd generation jet about 3 years ago, one of the first things the instructor said was "its impossible to stall this aircraft". Well tell that to the crew of the Air France 330. That phrase still plays on my mind every time I look at the Unreliable Air Speed QRH checklist.
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Why would there be no need for training in hand flying above FL 300?
In AF447, the PF was given the aircraft, as the computer gave up, to hand fly at about FL 350 (from my memory – can’t easily check at present).
Nothing in the thousands of posts on the various AF447 threads, nor anything in the BEA reports AIUI, shows that PF (or PNF for that matter) had ever hand flown at high altitude, for real or in a simulator, at Mach 0.8 or 0.82; nor at slow, close to stall speed at high altitude; and certainly not at a high AoA in a stall.
PF’s movements with the side stick shortly after the incident started caused the PNF to try to persuade him to use less coarse movements and be gentler, which again suggests little or no training in hand flying at high speed and high altitude.
The graphic on one of the AF447 threads shows SS movements described by some as “mixing mayonnaise”, and included pitch commands as well as roll. People have speculated why he ever commanded nose up in the first place, to climb from FL 350 to about 380 – but a very early poster suggested it might have been inadvertent, while trying to do coarse roll inputs. Nobody made a better suggestion that I saw.
PF’s references to “crazy speed” and his persistent holding nose up suggested to some that he confused mach buffet with pre- stall buffet, and high noise with high speed rather than high AoA, which kept him thinking all the way down that he had an overspeed problem.
In my own limited sphere of aviation, I have long been concerned at accidents that happen because “we” thought we were training people well enough, but some accidents showed we were not – people had forgotten, or not known in the first place, things we thought we had taught well. To that, I fear we can add things people thought did not need any tuition – like what being in a fully developed a stall is like, and how to recover from it by hand flying, in an “unstallable” airliner.
(no experience of flying airliners, but interested in safety and training in GA, particularly gliding.)
In AF447, the PF was given the aircraft, as the computer gave up, to hand fly at about FL 350 (from my memory – can’t easily check at present).
Nothing in the thousands of posts on the various AF447 threads, nor anything in the BEA reports AIUI, shows that PF (or PNF for that matter) had ever hand flown at high altitude, for real or in a simulator, at Mach 0.8 or 0.82; nor at slow, close to stall speed at high altitude; and certainly not at a high AoA in a stall.
PF’s movements with the side stick shortly after the incident started caused the PNF to try to persuade him to use less coarse movements and be gentler, which again suggests little or no training in hand flying at high speed and high altitude.
The graphic on one of the AF447 threads shows SS movements described by some as “mixing mayonnaise”, and included pitch commands as well as roll. People have speculated why he ever commanded nose up in the first place, to climb from FL 350 to about 380 – but a very early poster suggested it might have been inadvertent, while trying to do coarse roll inputs. Nobody made a better suggestion that I saw.
PF’s references to “crazy speed” and his persistent holding nose up suggested to some that he confused mach buffet with pre- stall buffet, and high noise with high speed rather than high AoA, which kept him thinking all the way down that he had an overspeed problem.
In my own limited sphere of aviation, I have long been concerned at accidents that happen because “we” thought we were training people well enough, but some accidents showed we were not – people had forgotten, or not known in the first place, things we thought we had taught well. To that, I fear we can add things people thought did not need any tuition – like what being in a fully developed a stall is like, and how to recover from it by hand flying, in an “unstallable” airliner.
(no experience of flying airliners, but interested in safety and training in GA, particularly gliding.)
Please explain how you can do that without FD's!!
For those who might actually have serious doubts regarding a pilots ability to "hand fly" PRNAV, RNAV1 procedures or RNP1 route segments with or without FD guidance:
It's really not that challenging folks. It's just basic instrument flying proficiency. You control bank so as to control heading so as to control course so as to keep the CDI centered. You control attitude and thrust so as to control altitude and speed. Basic stuff learned in the beginning. It's not that demanding. If you maintain your skills that is. When over reliance on automation takes hold, then confidence in your own abilities decreases. Greater reliance on automation results. The insidious cycle of over dependence is perpetuated. Pretty soon even experienced and formerly skilled pilots find themselves rationalizing their dependence on "the magic" as being "normal". A great many airlines and other organizations actively support these excuses with policies and directives encouraging or requiring such reliance. An ill advised approach and a case of throwing out the baby with the bath water in my considered opinion.
It's been my personal experience as an instructor and former check airman on bizjets that hand flying these procedures is one of the few opportunities available to exercise the instrument scan and aircraft control skills associated with basic instrument flying proficiency. The airline arena must surely provide even fewer opportunities.
Sim time doesn't cut it. Owing to cost and scheduling considerations, sim time is cut to the bone and practicing for a few minutes every 6 months is entirely insufficient to maintain basic skills. This can only be done in the airplane on regular flights. In any case the bulk of sim time is reserved for operations which either cannot be done in the airplane or would be highly cost ineffective.
Again according to my own personal observation and experience, those who regularly utilize their basic instrument skills tend to be among the more proficient pilots overall. They handle the airplane with greater precision and smoothness in all phases of flight. While any reasonably tech conscious trained individual can memorize rote procedures and learn which buttons to press in order to cause the automation to execute programmed procedures, not every individual has gained sufficient overall and recency of experience at using lesser levels of automation to develop or maintain the required level of proficiency. Losing use of the autopilot should not be considered to be such a big deal as so many seem to think.
While mastery of the automation is also necessary in today's flight environment, it does not stand alone as a method of safely and efficiently conducting flights. Whether it's fly-by-wire or not, inappropriate automation dependence will continue to be a factor in accidents unless attitudes are modified. Nor are these skills mutually exclusive. In fact they are complimentary. A more balanced approach to the use of automation is clearly necessary given the evidence I've seen.
It should go without saying that proficiency at all levels of automation use is the ideal. As pointed out by others, the appropriate level should be utilized in consideration of workload and weather. Whether it's a nice day in ideal conditions or a tight approach in crap weather at the end of a long day, the situation demands some command judgment in selecting which level of automation is most appropriate. I'm just advocating for basic proficiency being one of the things considered when deciding.
Opinions may vary, but I like to think that most pro pilots believe as I do that better pilots produce better results. And just as an aside, I consider myself to be just as vulnerable to the insidious effects of automation dependence as anyone else. It takes considerable introspective awareness and self discipline to keep stock of and maintain one's own skills. It doesn't help when the system works counter to these objectives by encouraging complacency.
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Automation
I personally feel that a lot of sensible things have been said on this thread. All accidents are being blamed on automation and lack of flying skills when the actual reasons for the accidents have been failures that went unnoticed.
Incase of the Turkish Airlines, the malfuntion in the Radio Altimeter led to the Auto throttle failure which should have been monitored especially when there was a training Captain on board.It was a failure to monitor the Flight Mode Annunciators.Also probably lack of knowledge. The event lasted a long time with the speed decaying.
The stall recovery procedures, wind shear escape manouvres, EGPWS Warning ,TCAS manouvres and upsets should be mandatory procedures and included in Simulator checks. The simulator time needs to be increased and taken more seriously. I have observed that a lot of times the crews reduce their 4 hour slots to practically 03 effective hours especially during graveyard shifts in order to get back to catch up on sleep or make it the nearest bar for Happy hours!These 4 hours were good enough in the old times when all the above manouvres were not included. Also hand flying approaches during line checks and inflight monitoring by Instructors and Examiners is not a bad idea ...although an unpalatable one for a lot of us.
Incase of the Turkish Airlines, the malfuntion in the Radio Altimeter led to the Auto throttle failure which should have been monitored especially when there was a training Captain on board.It was a failure to monitor the Flight Mode Annunciators.Also probably lack of knowledge. The event lasted a long time with the speed decaying.
The stall recovery procedures, wind shear escape manouvres, EGPWS Warning ,TCAS manouvres and upsets should be mandatory procedures and included in Simulator checks. The simulator time needs to be increased and taken more seriously. I have observed that a lot of times the crews reduce their 4 hour slots to practically 03 effective hours especially during graveyard shifts in order to get back to catch up on sleep or make it the nearest bar for Happy hours!These 4 hours were good enough in the old times when all the above manouvres were not included. Also hand flying approaches during line checks and inflight monitoring by Instructors and Examiners is not a bad idea ...although an unpalatable one for a lot of us.
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Actually, just a normal 737NG. And of course you have computer representation for RNAV navigation (actually, for everything except an ILS), hardly possible to do it raw data if it's not an overlay procedure. But that is not the point, the point is that it is perfectly possible to keep your basic manual flying skills up while doing your everyday job.
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westhawk explained it very well. Automation is good as long as the pilot doesn't need it because of his lack of basic flying skills. The only way to maintain those basic flying skills is to practice them in the airplane when conditions are right. We all know the sim check is filling the squares with 10 minutes at the end to play.
I always flew up to 10,000 and down from 10,000 manually and so did most of my FO's in a 757. If you give up your basic skills to let the autopilot do it for you, you have given up as a pilot, and have let your employer take over your career for good. Don't let that happen to you. Yes, they can hire cheap pilots with low experience to fly with automation but what happens when the automation fails? How many more examples do we have to show everybody?
I always flew up to 10,000 and down from 10,000 manually and so did most of my FO's in a 757. If you give up your basic skills to let the autopilot do it for you, you have given up as a pilot, and have let your employer take over your career for good. Don't let that happen to you. Yes, they can hire cheap pilots with low experience to fly with automation but what happens when the automation fails? How many more examples do we have to show everybody?
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Denti
Thanks for the explanation as it is now clearer what you mean. The problem is there are some big jets that do not have that presentation and there are also a lot of procedures that have no overlay.
Thanks for the explanation as it is now clearer what you mean. The problem is there are some big jets that do not have that presentation and there are also a lot of procedures that have no overlay.
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pulling back on the yoke during the stall
on the matter of why the AF 447 Crew as well as the Buffalo crash Crew desperately and incessantly pulled back on their yoke in a stall rather than simply jamming the yoke forward as they should have and as one is taught in the primary aspect of flight training, I offer this to ponder:
During my initial training, I was taught to recover from the stall by pushing forward on the yoke. Back then, in the "practice area" in the good old Skyhawk, you weren't "busted" for losing some altitude in order to recover from the stall. The objective was simply to recover before hitting the ground, of course minimizing the altitude loss, but that was secondary in consideration to breaking the stall. But throughout my decades of advanced initial and recurrent training, in order to comply with "training objectives" or "practical test standards" or pedantic check airmen and examiners, I was admonished not to lose a single foot of altitude during a simulated stall, for fear of "busting the ride". Certainly if I am on short final or immediately after departure, not losing a single foot in a stall would be of the essence. But when one is at altitude, then I would rather lose a few thousand feet if necessary and break the stall rather than hopelessly yank back on the yoke in the desperate hope that I might somehow maintain my altitude with application of power alone.
We are thus creating pilots who in real scenarios revert to simulator mentality of desperately trying not to lose a single foot, or achieving some other arbitrary standard of measurement rather than simply use up some of the ample altitude they have and trade it for airspeed in order to egress from the stall and recover. The objective has become "don't lose a single foot" during the check ride and don't dare "bust an altitude" in real life, rather than reinforcing what should be the real objective, which is to stay alive at all costs, and in the process, try to minimize damage to equipment if that is possible.
Just my thoughts. In any case, though there has been much success in increasing safety due to automation, the pendulum needs to swing back the other way a little, and allow pilot involvement in the art of flying airplanes once again. It's essential, because as we all know, that when the s**t hits the fan, then the Autopilot and Autoland and computers by the dozen are of very little help.
During my initial training, I was taught to recover from the stall by pushing forward on the yoke. Back then, in the "practice area" in the good old Skyhawk, you weren't "busted" for losing some altitude in order to recover from the stall. The objective was simply to recover before hitting the ground, of course minimizing the altitude loss, but that was secondary in consideration to breaking the stall. But throughout my decades of advanced initial and recurrent training, in order to comply with "training objectives" or "practical test standards" or pedantic check airmen and examiners, I was admonished not to lose a single foot of altitude during a simulated stall, for fear of "busting the ride". Certainly if I am on short final or immediately after departure, not losing a single foot in a stall would be of the essence. But when one is at altitude, then I would rather lose a few thousand feet if necessary and break the stall rather than hopelessly yank back on the yoke in the desperate hope that I might somehow maintain my altitude with application of power alone.
We are thus creating pilots who in real scenarios revert to simulator mentality of desperately trying not to lose a single foot, or achieving some other arbitrary standard of measurement rather than simply use up some of the ample altitude they have and trade it for airspeed in order to egress from the stall and recover. The objective has become "don't lose a single foot" during the check ride and don't dare "bust an altitude" in real life, rather than reinforcing what should be the real objective, which is to stay alive at all costs, and in the process, try to minimize damage to equipment if that is possible.
Just my thoughts. In any case, though there has been much success in increasing safety due to automation, the pendulum needs to swing back the other way a little, and allow pilot involvement in the art of flying airplanes once again. It's essential, because as we all know, that when the s**t hits the fan, then the Autopilot and Autoland and computers by the dozen are of very little help.
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dc10
Howdy. 447's pilots were familiar with a "recovery" at the time they crashed, that was from "Approach to Stall". This does NOT involve PUSHING FORWARD on the 'YOKE' (Stick). Neither does it require "PULLING BACK" on the Stick. Required is "Maintenance of Altitude." Clearly, the pilot pulled back on his Sidestick, it is in the report.
Why? There are reasons NOT addressed here, that may have played a part. It is not completely understood, and especially in light of the minimal data released, an open mind might be a handy tool.
Why this is yet unclear is a mystery. These pilots were not familiar, nor had they been trained, to recover from STALL in this aircraft.
And that is for the most part, irrelevant. As per rudderrrat, an uncorrected ROLL may have led to a spin, and an even earlier demise.
This accident happened in a sequence, and focusing on downline issues is not helping understand what happened in the 20 seconds surrounding the loss of autopilot, (and AoA Vane #1?)
Is it absolutely necessary to keep up the comparison to ColganAir?
Howdy. 447's pilots were familiar with a "recovery" at the time they crashed, that was from "Approach to Stall". This does NOT involve PUSHING FORWARD on the 'YOKE' (Stick). Neither does it require "PULLING BACK" on the Stick. Required is "Maintenance of Altitude." Clearly, the pilot pulled back on his Sidestick, it is in the report.
Why? There are reasons NOT addressed here, that may have played a part. It is not completely understood, and especially in light of the minimal data released, an open mind might be a handy tool.
Why this is yet unclear is a mystery. These pilots were not familiar, nor had they been trained, to recover from STALL in this aircraft.
And that is for the most part, irrelevant. As per rudderrrat, an uncorrected ROLL may have led to a spin, and an even earlier demise.
This accident happened in a sequence, and focusing on downline issues is not helping understand what happened in the 20 seconds surrounding the loss of autopilot, (and AoA Vane #1?)
Is it absolutely necessary to keep up the comparison to ColganAir?
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Well I think one of these systems must be in order on the new computerized third generation aircraft being flown by the new third generation pilots. 
Good points dc10.
In addition to the "don't lose any altitude" mentality imposed during sim training, the stall recognition and recovery demos also tend to be under what I'd categorize as "overly favorable circumstances" to begin with. First, they're usually performed at 10-15K' and at light "training weight" where engine thrust to weight ratio invariably allows the airplane to be "blown" out of an incipient stall with the nose up 10 or more degrees. Typical pilot response times to first stall warning indication are very quick when the demo is fully briefed and hands are tensed on the yoke and T/Ls, ready to react. It seems to me that real world stall events aren't so well planned!
The induced drag associated with flight at or near CL max is easily overcome in a lightly loaded jet at low altitude. This is highly unlikely to prepare a pilot for a more real-world incipient stall event, let alone a more developed stall or while at at max cruise altitude.
Unfortunately, the sim probably won't have reliable data for AOA beyond critical values so training in that regime would be impractical. But I think that after practicing the demo at low or mid altitude, it might be instructive to try
it again at near maximum altitude, perhaps while simulating a climb into warmer air or an increasing tailwind component with the AP engaged and "nobody minding the store". When the AP lets go, you'll see your trade of altitude for airspeed or you'll see something which would be marked as a failure to recover. Either way it would be most instructive. I thought this matter should have been settled following the Pinnacle "four-one-oh-it dude" episode.
The forgoing represents my personal experience at each of the major bizjet training providers in three different types. I'd be interested in comparing how airline sim training treats stall demos.
westhawk
In addition to the "don't lose any altitude" mentality imposed during sim training, the stall recognition and recovery demos also tend to be under what I'd categorize as "overly favorable circumstances" to begin with. First, they're usually performed at 10-15K' and at light "training weight" where engine thrust to weight ratio invariably allows the airplane to be "blown" out of an incipient stall with the nose up 10 or more degrees. Typical pilot response times to first stall warning indication are very quick when the demo is fully briefed and hands are tensed on the yoke and T/Ls, ready to react. It seems to me that real world stall events aren't so well planned!
The induced drag associated with flight at or near CL max is easily overcome in a lightly loaded jet at low altitude. This is highly unlikely to prepare a pilot for a more real-world incipient stall event, let alone a more developed stall or while at at max cruise altitude.
Unfortunately, the sim probably won't have reliable data for AOA beyond critical values so training in that regime would be impractical. But I think that after practicing the demo at low or mid altitude, it might be instructive to try
it again at near maximum altitude, perhaps while simulating a climb into warmer air or an increasing tailwind component with the AP engaged and "nobody minding the store". When the AP lets go, you'll see your trade of altitude for airspeed or you'll see something which would be marked as a failure to recover. Either way it would be most instructive. I thought this matter should have been settled following the Pinnacle "four-one-oh-it dude" episode.
The forgoing represents my personal experience at each of the major bizjet training providers in three different types. I'd be interested in comparing how airline sim training treats stall demos.
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chrisN.
l`m surprised that nobody picked up on what you said, l suspect because of the reference to "mainly gliding".
We are talking about hand flying skills after all.
You will know of the K23 - for others, a first solo glider advertised as being unstallable - and the problems caused by pilots going on to fly "gliders" that could and would stall.
l don`t want to make a big thing of this but there is a connection.
l`m surprised that nobody picked up on what you said, l suspect because of the reference to "mainly gliding".
We are talking about hand flying skills after all.
You will know of the K23 - for others, a first solo glider advertised as being unstallable - and the problems caused by pilots going on to fly "gliders" that could and would stall.
l don`t want to make a big thing of this but there is a connection.
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I think now we allow some altitude loss to recover from a stall that doesn't involve wind shear near the ground to do what we did 40 years ago and lower the nose and add power. It is so simple and works so well.
40 years ago this accident wouldn't have happened because we all knew how to fly. Now It is a different story.
40 years ago this accident wouldn't have happened because we all knew how to fly. Now It is a different story.
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Overrun, yes, and there are other examples.
Another thing that strikes me about AF447 training for (lack of) is push for stall recovery. In gliding, we realised that for donkeys years we had taught that push means nose down/go faster, pull for nose up/go slower, for probably 90% of training flights for the entire sortie; and even for the stall/spin awareness training flights, only a tiny proportion of the time was showing that in a stall, pull does not yield nose up.
There is a move towards demo and practice on every pre-solo flight that when too slow, pull keeps nose down; and then push will get the aircraft flying again.
Clearly, if AB330 is believed unstallable, and training for it never goes there, only other training if any will have any chance of teaching F/Os about this. Will they recall it in a high stress situation? There is enough evidence that too many ATPL’s. at many levels, not just low hours, have not known or recalled it - Colgan, Staines Trident, and various others. The training for recovery from approaching stall described by others on these AF447 threads included TOGA power and not losing “a foor of height” – but only in lowish altitude recoveries, where air is dense, TOGA gives a lot of extra power AIUI, and it can work.
I too don’t want to make a big thing about gliding read-across to CAT. But human factors read across all accident scenarios, in aviation and elsewhere. We humans don’t always work perfectly. The right training, and frequent reinforcement, can overcome many of our deficiencies. If we don’t get that training, is it a deficiency in the trainees, or in their training organisations (and those who lay down what the latter should be doing)?
Chris N.
(written before I saw Bubbers post)
Another thing that strikes me about AF447 training for (lack of) is push for stall recovery. In gliding, we realised that for donkeys years we had taught that push means nose down/go faster, pull for nose up/go slower, for probably 90% of training flights for the entire sortie; and even for the stall/spin awareness training flights, only a tiny proportion of the time was showing that in a stall, pull does not yield nose up.
There is a move towards demo and practice on every pre-solo flight that when too slow, pull keeps nose down; and then push will get the aircraft flying again.
Clearly, if AB330 is believed unstallable, and training for it never goes there, only other training if any will have any chance of teaching F/Os about this. Will they recall it in a high stress situation? There is enough evidence that too many ATPL’s. at many levels, not just low hours, have not known or recalled it - Colgan, Staines Trident, and various others. The training for recovery from approaching stall described by others on these AF447 threads included TOGA power and not losing “a foor of height” – but only in lowish altitude recoveries, where air is dense, TOGA gives a lot of extra power AIUI, and it can work.
I too don’t want to make a big thing about gliding read-across to CAT. But human factors read across all accident scenarios, in aviation and elsewhere. We humans don’t always work perfectly. The right training, and frequent reinforcement, can overcome many of our deficiencies. If we don’t get that training, is it a deficiency in the trainees, or in their training organisations (and those who lay down what the latter should be doing)?
Chris N.
(written before I saw Bubbers post)
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40 years ago this accident wouldn't have happened because we all knew how to fly. Now It is a different story.
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Unfortunately, the sim probably won't have reliable data for AOA beyond critical values so training in that regime would be impractical.
Yes, I understand that no one has ever test flown the big jets in stall regimes and the exact numbers are not available. But we know what should happen, we know the direction where thing should be going when the pilot just keeps pulling the stick, and we can replicate this behaviour in a simulator. Yes, it will drop at a somewhat incorrect speed, some nasty effect may be overlooked, some extreme situations like going down at 60 knots with AOA 40 degrees will not be covered. But that is not the point - the idea is to provide the pilot with a training/evaluation tool that responds to clearly incorrect inputs (stick back) in a generally realistic manner (airspeed drops, cabin shakes, controls don't work, aircraft goes down) and requires basic corrective measures (stick forward) to fly again.
Wouldn't such a crude tool be better than having no tool at all, relying on mantras that "this aircraft cannot stall", on "computer protections", and a manual stall recovery procedure that is never trained in realistic conditions?
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As a cross country glider pilot I have experienced the great contribution to our sport made by the significant numbers of commercial pilots flying in our ranks.
Maybe this relationship could work both ways.
Maybe this relationship could work both ways.
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I agree, and yet disagree with all of this, these "modern airplanes" are designed to be "flown" (operated) at the highest level of automation as is consistent with the phase of flight, to be monitored and managed.....however when the wheels come off, then the workload is increased exponentially....so while the regulators are finger pointing at the pilots, they also should be looking at aircraft design and redundancy....it amazes me the long list of inop systems that arise on the status page after what should be relatively benign failure....these didn't use to affect the aircraft handling, but now.....????