Overrun, yes, and there are other examples.
Another thing that strikes me about AF447 training for (lack of) is push for stall recovery. In gliding, we realised that for donkeys years we had taught that push means nose down/go faster, pull for nose up/go slower, for probably 90% of training flights for the entire sortie; and even for the stall/spin awareness training flights, only a tiny proportion of the time was showing that in a stall, pull does not yield nose up.
There is a move towards demo and practice on every pre-solo flight that when too slow, pull keeps nose down; and then push will get the aircraft flying again.
Clearly, if AB330 is believed unstallable, and training for it never goes there, only other training if any will have any chance of teaching F/Os about this. Will they recall it in a high stress situation? There is enough evidence that too many ATPL’s. at many levels, not just low hours, have not known or recalled it - Colgan, Staines Trident, and various others. The training for recovery from approaching stall described by others on these AF447 threads included TOGA power and not losing “a foor of height” – but only in lowish altitude recoveries, where air is dense, TOGA gives a lot of extra power AIUI, and it can work.
I too don’t want to make a big thing about gliding read-across to CAT. But human factors read across all accident scenarios, in aviation and elsewhere. We humans don’t always work perfectly. The right training, and frequent reinforcement, can overcome many of our deficiencies. If we don’t get that training, is it a deficiency in the trainees, or in their training organisations (and those who lay down what the latter should be doing)?
Chris N.
(written before I saw Bubbers post)