BA pax tried to halt 777 take-off after taxiing error

[Machinbird]

411a

As British Airways has been, to date, the only airline to have crashed a B777, one wonders if they are trying to enter the record books as the only airline to do so ..........

411a, Not really a fair comment. There was a technical cause to this accident that had to do with the airframe/engine design interface. BA's only mistake was their choice of engines, and that wasn't the fault of the aircrew in any case. If you have to have an accident, that one turned out very well.

[L337]

1. Continual role reversal on the FD, IE, non-standardized duties at a critical time, whilst entering the runway.

Wrong: It was the FO's sector. It is standard for the FO to taxi the aircraft.

2. The 'oh, let's all be friends' attitude that seems to permeate the BA flight deck culture, such as it is.

Wrong: CRM is not about "oh, lets all be friends." It might be in your book, but not in BA.

3. Quite possibly the presence of a non-authorized crew member on the FD at the time of this incident (which could well have been a very serious accident, as most would agree) leading to distraction of the FD crew at rather critical time IE: entering the runway prior to takeoff.

Wrong: Where is the evidence for that? If no evidence then this is simply libellous.

As British Airways has been, to date, the only airline to have crashed a B777, one wonders if they are trying to enter the record books as the only airline to do so...multiple times.

To suggest that the 777 accident at LHR is BA's fault is ridiculous. How exactly is it BAs fault that the fuel froze in an completely "new" way, u8nknown to the airframe or the engine manufacturer.

Once again your bigoted, and increasingly racist view of BA gets in the way of any logical thought processes you may have.

[Slickster]

1. Continual role reversal on the FD, IE, non-standardized duties at a critical time, whilst entering the runway.

Not really a problem, as it's the way we operate, so not "non-standardised" at all, unless you read the "Bible According to 411a". Luckily, most of us don't, but read FCOMs.

2. The 'oh, let's all be friends' attitude that seems to permeate the BA flight deck culture, such as it is.

Yeah, let's all be nasty to each other, and point-score - that'll make for a safer operation. Some of the guys I fly with are friends, others not, and others I don't know from Adam. As you have self-confessed to never applying to BA, how on earth do you know what the atmosphere on a BA flight deck is like?

3. Quite possibly the presence of a non-authorized crew member on the FD at the time of this incident (which could well have been a very serious accident, as most would agree) leading to distraction of the FD crew at rather critical time IE: entering the runway prior to takeoff.

Quite possibly completely irrelevant. I regularly have authorised people on the flight deck, and no sane BA pilot would ever have anyone unauthorised there - it would be in the papers before you'd taken off. I love the opportunity to offer a jumpseat to CC; it gives them a different view of our world, from what they are used to, and in the long term, can only foster flight safety.

4. Poor signage at the affected airport, a definite airport management liability.

And last, but not least, our intrepid aviator finally hits the mark. That's not to excuse the error, but mustn't have helped.

This incident has nothing to do with BA SOPs, and everything to with Human Factors. You can change your SOPs a million times, and God knows, I've seen a few, but whenever there are humans, there is the potential for a screw up. It happened, we all learn from it, and hopefully move on.

I wonder how much stuff goes on that we never hear about. Often I see an airline, and comment "I'd love to be fly on the wall in that flightdeck". I can't wait to see a Tristar - I'll even know who's taxying it. We don't hear about what goes on, because they are not as open as BA is. You are only giving us the benefit of your questionable wisdom due to BA's open culture.

[411A]

This incident has nothing to do with BA SOPs, and everything to with Human Factors.

Rubbish.
Human factors aside, it has everything to do with SOP's, or rather, lack thereof, applied in a proper way.

One primary example.
IF the referenced airplane had been taxied to the end of the runway, there would quite likely not have been an incident.
Ergo, BA allows intersection departures (even when the full length is available) and the pilots simply could not find the proper interesction. Even the tower thought this was odd, and the Captain mentioned that the runway looked rather short, and told the co-pilot (who was pilot handling) to perform a static engine runup...and yet, they still departed, without due regard to the safety of the operation.

As for BA's supposed 'open culture', the pilots simply could not have gotten away with this fiasco unnoticed, as it was observed by too many people, not the least of which was the BA ground engineer (who knew the position on the airfield was incorrect)...therefore it was bound to come out in the end.

I am shocked that current and former pilots at British Airways would condone this irresponsible bahavior on the part of the referenced crew, and continue to make any number of excuses...none of which hold much water.

One wonders when the next pile of aircraft rubble will have British Airways painted all over it?

This BA incident was gross FD crew negligence, without a doubt.

[GobonaStick]

Any journalist worth his name would only ever look to an anonymous forum for a pointer, at the very best. Never a direct quote and most certainly never for reliable information that doesn't need bang-to-rights verification.

Just look at the garbage and nonsense on the UPS crash which was being written by PPRuNe posters - while at the same time they had the gall to criticise journos for not checking their facts.

There are already websites claiming to offer professional aviation news but which are prepared to paste unsourced and unverified information - from places like PPRuNe - in a bid to be first, and those same websites then get quoted here. What a shambles.

[Right Engine]

This story disproves your contribution in full 411a

[Slickster]

IF the referenced airplane had been taxied to the end of the runway, there would quite likely not have been an incident.

Sort of correct. In fact, if the aeroplane had been taxied to the correct intersection, there would not have been an incident either. They got the wrong intersection. Don't tell me you've always used the full length. Most airlines I know use intersections, if it suits their's and ATC's purposes. What next? Build an infinitely long runway, always fill her up to the brim with fuel, because that's safer?

I am shocked that current and former pilots at British Airways would condone this irresponsible bahavior on the part of the referenced crew, and continue to make any number of excuses...none of which hold much water.

Nobody is "condoning" anything about this, but even yourself has presented mitigating circumstances, re. signage. I'm not defending the crew for screwing up, and I haven't seen a single person doing likewise.

Most of us are scratching our heads, and wondering how it happened, so that we can all learn from it.

[L337]

As for BA's supposed 'open culture', the pilots simply could not have gotten away with this fiasco unnoticed, as it was observed by too many people, not the least of which was the BA ground engineer (who knew the position on the airfield was incorrect)...therefore it was bound to come out in the end.

It is poor logic to say BA has a "supposed open culture" by linking it to the fact that the incident was noticed. The airline has an open reporting culture. Fact. You can decry that fact till you are blue in the face, but the fact remains is that it does.

I am shocked that current and former pilots at British Airways would condone this irresponsible bahavior on the part of the referenced crew, and continue to make any number of excuses...none of which hold much water.

I am most certainly not condoning his irresponsible behaviour. Not is anyone else. Indeed neither is BA, as the gentlemen concerned has lost his command. What I, and my fellow pilots are wanting to do, is learn from the incident, to see what can be done better.

There but for the grace of God go I.

You on the other hand are obsessed with blame, obsessed with BA, and continue to rant in your usual bigoted way.

[c130jbloke]

How did they manage to do that ?

This BA incident was gross FD crew negligence, without a doubt.

Rubbish

For those wondering with the "how did they" part of the thread, I commend: Amazon.com: The Field Guide to Human Error Investigations (9780754619246): Sidney Dekker: Books for a read.

It gives several explanations as to why they did what did and has some good case studies too ( I suspect this one would also make a good example).

As for the BA bashers and that fool who called for a criminal investigation (), get real. There are those who have screwed up and those who will...

[lederhosen]

I think it perfectly probable that the crew did not want to backtrack and turn on the runway. But it is stretching a point to say that it is impossible. The airfield chart clearly shows turning areas at each end. I am pretty sure 777 pilots would rarely be required to backtrack at the airports they normally fly into.

[wiggy]

411A

The dual engine flameouts (or rather, severely reduced thrust) experienced by BA with their B777 aircraft, enroute LHR...was entirely predictable.
Fly in very cool ambient temperatures aloft, whilst others diverted to warmer (aloft) temperatures strikes me as a...'we know best, we will not descend, nor change route, nor divert' attitude.,
In other words...press on regardless

Seems it wasn't just the Brits who had problems with their 777's. Care to give us your opinions of the performance of Delta's flightcrews?


NTSB investigates Heathrow-like Trent 800 engine issue

[WhatsaLizad?]

Some observations from operating into St Kitts, something I've done every couple of months in a twin jet airliner for a few years.

The ramp sits south of the runway. It is lower than the runway and both taxiway entrances are uphill. The grass is relatively long and blocks the runway from view into on the taxiway entrances.

As one departs the terminal ramp taxiing westbound, the first runway entrance is a half right turn. This is where BA entered the runway. To get to the proper entrance point, one must make a jog to the left to continue taxing. At this incorrect entry point, one is looking at what looks like the proper entry point (it isn't), and when looking at the proper dogleg left turn, it looks incorrect since it appears to be a long rectangular parking ramp and not a legitimate taxiway. The proper entry point at the far west of the ramp is not visible from this point. The correct way is to take the dogleg left and find the entry point hidden behind the sloping grass at the far end.

How do I know it's a little confusing? My last trip there, out of 10 or so in the last couple of years, we were cleared from the ramp to backtrack on the runway for takeoff. I taxied west on the terminal ramp, started making the right trun at the wrong exit point and suddenly realized something wasn't right and stopped. After reviewing the airport diagram, I had enough room to make the left dogleg for the proper route. I still felt I was going the wrong way until finally seeing the hidden entry point at the end. It was a beautiful sunny afternoon, I was reasonably familiar with the field, yet I still almost entered where BA did.

In my case, it was a loaded 737 and would not have attempted an intersection takeoff, nor would I at St Kitt's. As a former 777 crew member, the 737 is a ground loving pig compared to it. I see no problem with a light weight 777 performing the proper intersection takeoff at St Kitt's. My case could have been a problem if an unseen landing aircraft exited into me at high speed.

From my experience flying into SKB and on the B777, I can say that those pontificating here on the intersection takeoff are basically ignorant. that wasn't the issue.

The fact that the FO may have been taxiing the aircraft per procedures is another non-issue despite of what some greasy out of work, arrogant geriatric may have to say on the issue. If it's company procedure, it should not have been a problem. the Captain is in charge and can monitor ground operations like any other inflight phase. If it was two new guys and a new procedure, maybe it could be a problem.

As for general takeoff performance of the B777, we once had a 3000' ground roll with the aircraft loaded full of pax and 11 hours of fuel. The BA aircraft probably had the thrust to weight ratio or better of that of a light 20-series Learjet. Fortunately for them of course.

Any large airline with thousands of weekly operations will eventually test the safety chain at some point. The challenge is keeping the safety chain intact to prevent tragedies.

[wiggy]

To be fair to 411A ( though given the Brit bashing it requires a British thick skin to do so) you should be able to turn a 777-200 at the runway ends, using the turning pads. Whether you would choose do so during routine operations of a lightweight 777 is another matter.

Now about Delta and it's rollback.....

WhatsaLizad:

Thanks for that post - Your comments confirm what I heard about the taxiways, visibility and charting from other St Kitts regular's in the months following this incident.

[ExSp33db1rd]

and now for some light relief .......

Many years ago ( of course ) I was at an Asian airport when the incoming crew brought us a 747 with the body-gear steering inop.

According to The Boeing How-to-fly-a-747-Book, this would seriously increase the turning circle prescribed by the aircraft in making a 180 deg. turn at the end of the runway, and maybe scrub some tyres. Not a good idea as the width of the runway without a turning circle was deemed to be inadequate.

First Solution ........ taxi across the runway, enter the Country's Air Force property, turn left, turn left, turn left on to the runway from the other side. Brilliant - except ..........

Entry from the other side meant that we would be making an intersection take-off, albeit with only a small reduction in overall length, but this was not catered for on the airfield charts at our disposal, or in our Ops. Manual of RTOW field length calculations for take-off.

How much length are we losing by starting from taxyway A, we asked the tower, no idea, was the reply, but we have some charts here that you can examine.

Off to the Tower, where we were given UK War Office Survey charts dated circa. 1940, used to construct the then RAF Base during W.W.II, and from them measured the reduction in present length from the threshold to the Air Force taxiway that we would use.

Slide rules, and reference to long remembered (!) instruction on Performance A calculations needed to obtain an ATPL, resulted in a unanimous decision that we had enough length to complete the take-off on the slightly reduced length. ( in practice it was about 100m of a 10,000 m runway, so was a No-brainer issue from the start, but in the event of a Subsquent Court of Inquiry the crew " had satisfied themselves that they had sufficient length of runway and First Stage Climb Profile - over the sea - to safely conduct the operation " QED.

but ..........

Permission would be needed from the Air Force Commander to taxi through the Base, but yes, sufficient width, and bearing strength - they said - of taxyway was available.
Get it.
It's 03.00
That's why he is the Air Force Commander - ring him.
Permission granted. No problem, except.....
The Air Force Taxyways were blocked by H.M. The Queens' aircraft - H.M. being on a Royal Visit to an ex-Colony - and her support aircraft.

Why didn't you tell us, we asked ATC, before you awakened the Air Vice Marshall at 03.00
You didn't ask us, was the reply.

Second Solution........ ground engineers confirmed that they had a good tractor so we were pushed backwards to the threshold, started up, and blasted off. No problem.

If you question the intelligence of ATC in the above( or even mine ! ) it was akin to another ATC controller at an African Airport who told us the temperature was 28 C. We were cold, and it was about 10 C in our opinion. The Stn.Mgr. suggested we took his car to the tower, which we climbed, to find the ATC controller swathed in an old army greatcoat, balaclava, gloves with the ends of the fingers cut out, and huddled over a one bar electric fire that he had smuggled into the tower, and which was placed under a wooden, room thermometer hanging on the wall.

We asked him for the field temperature, and he pointed to the wall thermometer. What about this, we asked, pointing to the instrument on his control console ? " No Sah, dis is the temperature "

International Operations still fly through that African station.

My lips are sealed.

[tflier]

Now, I might have missed this as a previous comment...normally do.
But when lning up it is beholden of both pilots to check that their end of the runway and approach is clear of any 'unexpected' traffic. Would this not then highlight the point that there seems to be an awful lot of runway behind us?
Now would then be the time to troubleshoot. To try and rectify this scenario by standing on the brakes when you perceive the runway to be too short ahead should trigger at the very least some sort of doubt that what you have done is incorrect. Now think about it for a few seconds and put it right.
A training captain I used to fly with, told me that a mistake is never made if it is rectified in time, that is how we learn. Wise words from someone wiser than I'll be. Also, he was the first guy to tell me that 'if there is ever any doubt....then there is no doubt' as we are again beholden to put it right.
None of us are perfect that's why there are two of us, and in a perfect world..three. I make mistakes on a daily basis, be they major or minor, but I am always chuffed to bits when my f/o points them out, and I learn a little bit more........
Just my twopenneth worth, for what it's worth.

[Dont Hang Up]

Now, I might have missed this as a previous comment...normally do.
But when lning up it is beholden of both pilots to check that their end of the runway and approach is clear of any 'unexpected' traffic. Would this not then highlight the point that there seems to be an awful lot of runway behind us?

Intersection 'A' is still several hundred metres from the threshold and they would be looking straight into a low sun and mainly thinking about approaching aircraft.

Another implication of 'A' not being near the threshold is that the ATC query about further backtrack would not necessarily have raised any mental alarm bell.

To try and rectify this scenario by standing on the brakes when you perceive the runway to be too short ahead should trigger at the very least some sort of doubt that what you have done is incorrect.

One may suggest cognitive polyphasia at work. One's logical mind convinced all checks are done so all must be well, some baser instinct saying "take care".

[WhatsaLizad?]

"Wrong.
It was a low level engine failure in a Piper Navajo.
I speculated that it was pilot error, IE, fuel exhaustion...and this is precisely what it was...
The inability of the pilot in command to adhere to the operating parameters specified for takeoff, IE: fuel selectors selected to main tanks only.
Even the 'well respected' concerned airline pilots couldn't get it right...all they had to do was actually read the checklist and complete the task."

You didn't "speculate", you gleefully danced and pointed your finger before the bodies were cold.

The investigation did prove they killed themselves and didn't fly the aircraft according to procedure. The fact remained that immediately after the crash you picked out your favorite cause (agreeably a high percentage one) and jumped on it. Wow, a light twin crashes on T.O., what are the odds it was an engine failure handled wrong?

At that time it could have been many other possible factors, bad fuel, flight control failure, birdstrike ect. Jumping up and down and assigning blame without the facts was scummy, vindictive, immature, not respectful of the dead and their families who may have read your post seeking answers. It was also not very smart considering the other possible factors.They were AA and you were going to make them and every AA pilot pay no matter what. In the end, yes you were right, but even a broken clock is right twice a day.

Thanks for proving my point. I was too lazy to dig up the archives and open up another of your foul smelling posts of despicable thought.

I wondered if you were that lacking in judgement and brains to basically indict yourself, but you did a wonderful job.

My apoligies to the board for dredging this up from the archives.

Mods, please keep these posts, they are relevant to 411A's contribution to this board. I will not further comment on him on this thread. Thank you.

Now back to SKB.

[c130jbloke]

With these two, gross negligence, nothing more, nor less.

Who are you to make such an assumption !

Gross neglegence implies an almost willful neglect of the rules or a deliberate attmept at a reckless activity for unkown purposes.

This was nothing but an unfortunate case of incorrect mind set and a loss of situational awareness leading to the TO form an incorrect position ( ie not the point as briefed ).

I would like to know why BA felt it necessary to demote the Cmdr - I could see some retraining and informing the rest of the company about the pitfalls, but busting him seems harsh.

The act of him telling the FO to "stand on the brakes" during engine run up is interestering. Their mind set was telling him that they were good, but a latent cue ( not a lot of runway ) was telling him something else - hence that directive ? Or was it a standard proceedure for the B777 ( I have no experience on that type apart from as SLF ).

[edmundronald]

"The act of him telling the FO to "stand on the brakes"

"The act of him telling the FO to "stand on the brakes" during engine run up is interestering. "

This is a really interesting post - if training could help pilots emerge their uneasiness, then some take-off incidents might be averted. After all these are NOT mechanical incidents or reactions to outside events.

These threads were a healthy aircraft mispositioned or misconfigured by the crew just barely scratches its way into the sky with the help of a higher being are a recurrent theme on PPrune. And a disturbing one.

Maybe a new action category the "takeoff go around" should be introduced - no penalty to the crew, can be called instantly, pilot in-command or pilot flying says "I feel uneasy, let's go-around", and the aircraft goes back to the loading point, all take off numbers are recomputed, cabin crew gets asked if they see anything out of the ordinary, walkaround gets done again, all preflight checks rerun, and the taxi is done again?

Edmund

[Timothy Claypole]

An obtuse conclusion to draw. Perhaps he's just familiar with the idea that punishing people for making mistakes doesn't stop mistakes being made, it just stops people telling you about them.