Airblue down near Islamabad
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Gulfcapt:
I can't recall whether this data has been posted yet or not; sorry if its a repeat.
We have discussed the CTL protected area a lot, and have used the premise of 205 knots, MDA 2,150, because that is in fact the protected airspace the ill-fated flight had, whether the airplane was Approach Category C or D.
I have all the current Jepps for the airport. Because the "right circuit to Runway 12" note is on the airport diagram page, I took it (and take it) to be a VFR operations advisory. Because the weather was less than VFR the CTL charted minimums would, to me at least, take precedence over an "airport manager's preferences." Had the state aviation authority concurred, it would have not authorized unrestricted circling.
I can't recall whether this data has been posted yet or not; sorry if its a repeat.
From the Jepp 10-9 Airport/Info dated 24 Feb 06: Runway 30 right-hand circuit.
From the Jepp 11-1 ILS DME Rwy 30 dated 23 May 03: No restrictions shown for circling pattern. Straight in mins of 1965' (309')/800m with ALS. Circling mins at 135 kts of 2410' (742')/1600m and 180 kts of 2510' (842')/2400m.
There is the prohibited area due south of the airport, plus a note on the 11-1 to avoid overflight of the city south and west. Certainly casts doubt on the right-hand circuit.
From the Jepp 11-1 ILS DME Rwy 30 dated 23 May 03: No restrictions shown for circling pattern. Straight in mins of 1965' (309')/800m with ALS. Circling mins at 135 kts of 2410' (742')/1600m and 180 kts of 2510' (842')/2400m.
There is the prohibited area due south of the airport, plus a note on the 11-1 to avoid overflight of the city south and west. Certainly casts doubt on the right-hand circuit.
I have all the current Jepps for the airport. Because the "right circuit to Runway 12" note is on the airport diagram page, I took it (and take it) to be a VFR operations advisory. Because the weather was less than VFR the CTL charted minimums would, to me at least, take precedence over an "airport manager's preferences." Had the state aviation authority concurred, it would have not authorized unrestricted circling.
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BOAC:
I doubt we can reconcile our differing view on the authorities responsibilies at their air carrier airports.
Bad analogy. The ill-fated captain wasn't attempting an unauthorized procedure.
See my recent post on that one.
They wouldn't have been required to file any report because they didn't do anything wrong nor did they request priority handling.
After AAL crashed a 707 at KCVG in, I believe 1964, we soon thereafter stopped doing CTLs in weather of less than 1,000 and 3. The only airport on our system in the U.S. at which that was an issue was KMKC. The FAA designed a marginal VOR approach to help us avoid the high-risk CTL we had been doing at that airport. New ILS IAPs sprung up "everywhere" after the AAL KCVG crash. But, MKC had bad terrain to the south, so a good IAP for landing north was not possible in pre-TERPs days. (2 or 3 years later TWA moved out of KMKC to KMCI, but not before a 707-300 left his main landing gear on Runway 18's levee on a nice clear day.)
- of course, but as a firm believer and practiser of 'Captain's responsibilities' I still say that P cannot be 'blamed' in any way for the crash. Blame them for lack of foresight, intelligence, common-sense, management ability, attention to practical safety issues, governmental oversight - yes.
If a facility is not there to be used, you make the best of what you have. EG You cannot 'blame' an airport with a CATI ILS if someone crashes trying to fly to CATIII limits.
Incidentally - I'm sure there is a restriction in Islamabad on circuit direction is there not? I seem to recall it was only on R30 (!?) but restricted circuits to the north? Now who on earth thought no-one would do circuits on R12?
As for being CP of TWA - suppose YOU had been, and one of your high-time crew filed an ASR for a g/a in hilly terrain in marginal weather at around DME9 on a visual circle - "don't worry - the airport should have put in an ILS"?
After AAL crashed a 707 at KCVG in, I believe 1964, we soon thereafter stopped doing CTLs in weather of less than 1,000 and 3. The only airport on our system in the U.S. at which that was an issue was KMKC. The FAA designed a marginal VOR approach to help us avoid the high-risk CTL we had been doing at that airport. New ILS IAPs sprung up "everywhere" after the AAL KCVG crash. But, MKC had bad terrain to the south, so a good IAP for landing north was not possible in pre-TERPs days. (2 or 3 years later TWA moved out of KMKC to KMCI, but not before a 707-300 left his main landing gear on Runway 18's levee on a nice clear day.)
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BOAC, thanks but I'm gonna quit while I'm behind; aterpster was able to make the point I was trying to much better than I could. UTC+8 tonight so I'm off to bed.
Best,
GC
Best,
GC
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I doubt we can reconcile our differing view on the authorities responsibilies at their air carrier airports
Bad analogy. The ill-fated captain wasn't attempting an unauthorized procedure.
See my recent post on that one.
They wouldn't have been required to file any report because they didn't do anything wrong nor did they request priority handling.
PS Your last paragraph will wake up 411A, I predict. I'm sure we are about to be 'educated' on AAL
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BOAC:
I didn't realize that.
Nonetheless, unlike your flying CAT III on a CAT II ILS, he was authorized to CTL. Using your ILS analogy, he was flying an authorized CAT II ILS, he just couldn't keep the localizer from going full scale.
My Post 483 was about both.
I thought my statement was quite clear. Where did I go wrong?
BTW, I don't want to put words in your mouth, but I believe both you and I have been operating on the premise that the ill-fated captain was required to keep the airport, if not runway, in sight at all times during the CTL. Because it was an in-country carrier, they were subject to only state aviation rules. In the U.S., until 1981, or so, we did not have to have the runway in sight if we knew the area and had objects we could associate with the airport in sight during progession to sighting the actual runway. It was called "The Farmer Jones' Barn Rule." The Pakis may have a similar such rule today.
Quote:
I doubt we can reconcile our differing view on the authorities responsibilies at their air carrier airports
- I think we are well apart on other issues too!
I doubt we can reconcile our differing view on the authorities responsibilies at their air carrier airports
- I think we are well apart on other issues too!
Quote:
Bad analogy. The ill-fated captain wasn't attempting an unauthorized procedure.
- my 'authorisation' never permitted me to CTL 4nm outside the protected area in the hills - did yours?
Bad analogy. The ill-fated captain wasn't attempting an unauthorized procedure.
- my 'authorisation' never permitted me to CTL 4nm outside the protected area in the hills - did yours?
Quote:
See my recent post on that one.
- yep - seen it. My comment was about 'circuit' not 'circle'.
See my recent post on that one.
- yep - seen it. My comment was about 'circuit' not 'circle'.
Quote:
They wouldn't have been required to file any report because they didn't do anything wrong nor did they request priority handling.
- no understand.
They wouldn't have been required to file any report because they didn't do anything wrong nor did they request priority handling.
- no understand.
BTW, I don't want to put words in your mouth, but I believe both you and I have been operating on the premise that the ill-fated captain was required to keep the airport, if not runway, in sight at all times during the CTL. Because it was an in-country carrier, they were subject to only state aviation rules. In the U.S., until 1981, or so, we did not have to have the runway in sight if we knew the area and had objects we could associate with the airport in sight during progession to sighting the actual runway. It was called "The Farmer Jones' Barn Rule." The Pakis may have a similar such rule today.
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we did not have to have the runway in sight if we knew the area and had objects we could associate with the airport in sight during progession to sighting the actual runway.
My concern of today was that I might find myself head on to Gulfcapt on base leg while I am flying a right-hand circuit.
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BOAC:
I'll drag it out further, then. The rule changed in the U.S. (and for U.S. carriers operating home or abroad) circa 1981 that the airport, per se, must be in sight at all times during CTL.
Pertinent regulation:
(A missed approach must be commenced) "...Whenever an identifiable part of the airport is not distinctly visible to the pilot during a circling maneuver at or above MDA, unless the inability to see an identifiable part of the airport results only from a normal bank of the aircraft during the circling approach." (emphasis mine)
Hopefully, that wouldn't be the case when the weather is such that VFR operations are not permitted.
Quote:
we did not have to have the runway in sight if we knew the area and had objects we could associate with the airport in sight during progession to sighting the actual runway.
- I do not want to drag this out any further because it is going nowhere, but need to point out in case others may be confused - that is STILL the case. Whether it changed or not between 1981 and 1988 I do not know. It is called the 'runway environment' I believe.
we did not have to have the runway in sight if we knew the area and had objects we could associate with the airport in sight during progession to sighting the actual runway.
- I do not want to drag this out any further because it is going nowhere, but need to point out in case others may be confused - that is STILL the case. Whether it changed or not between 1981 and 1988 I do not know. It is called the 'runway environment' I believe.
Pertinent regulation:
(A missed approach must be commenced) "...Whenever an identifiable part of the airport is not distinctly visible to the pilot during a circling maneuver at or above MDA, unless the inability to see an identifiable part of the airport results only from a normal bank of the aircraft during the circling approach." (emphasis mine)
My concern of today was that I might find myself head on to Gulfcapt on base leg while I am flying a right-hand circuit.
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"My concern of today was that I might find myself head on to Gulfcapt on base leg while I am flying a right-hand circuit"
Doah! I guess I deserved that...
That's it, no more posts after happy hour.
Best,
GC
Doah! I guess I deserved that...
That's it, no more posts after happy hour.
Best,
GC
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Pakistan Air Crash Blamed on Poor Visibilty, Pilot Error
By ANDY PASZTOR
An international team of safety experts believes poor visibility and pilot navigation slipups likely caused last month's crash of a Pakistani airliner that killed 152 people on approach to Islamabad, aviation-industry officials said.
The Airbus A321 operated by Airblue Ltd. was en route from Karachi when it flew into heavily forested hills as it was circling to land at the Islamabad airport in fog and rain. Preliminary information retrieved from the plane's flight-data recorder, according to officials familiar with the details, indicates that its engines, flight-control systems and other onboard equipment operated normally before impact.
Readouts of the recovered "black box," these officials said, also indicate that the cockpit crew at the last moment may have realized the jetliner was on a collision course with the slope and apparently tried to climb out of danger. The plane impacted near a ridge of the Margalla Hills. Early reports indicated that many flights into Islamabad had been cancelled or diverted that morning due to poor visibility, but some eyewitnesses said the weather improved somewhat before the Airblue plane's approach.
While the Islamabad probe is far from finished and no determination s have been made, Airbus last week gave the strongest signal yet that it essentially has ruled out aircraft malfunction as a probable cause of the crash
Continue with the article
By ANDY PASZTOR
An international team of safety experts believes poor visibility and pilot navigation slipups likely caused last month's crash of a Pakistani airliner that killed 152 people on approach to Islamabad, aviation-industry officials said.
The Airbus A321 operated by Airblue Ltd. was en route from Karachi when it flew into heavily forested hills as it was circling to land at the Islamabad airport in fog and rain. Preliminary information retrieved from the plane's flight-data recorder, according to officials familiar with the details, indicates that its engines, flight-control systems and other onboard equipment operated normally before impact.
Readouts of the recovered "black box," these officials said, also indicate that the cockpit crew at the last moment may have realized the jetliner was on a collision course with the slope and apparently tried to climb out of danger. The plane impacted near a ridge of the Margalla Hills. Early reports indicated that many flights into Islamabad had been cancelled or diverted that morning due to poor visibility, but some eyewitnesses said the weather improved somewhat before the Airblue plane's approach.
While the Islamabad probe is far from finished and no determination s have been made, Airbus last week gave the strongest signal yet that it essentially has ruled out aircraft malfunction as a probable cause of the crash
Continue with the article
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aterpster post #483 (Jepp chart error)
I have all the current Jepps for the airport. Because the "right circuit to Runway 12" note is on the airport diagram page,
even if drawing on the chart was CORRECT, that "note" is definitely WRONG.
If it stated: "Turn Right to Downwind", it would be OK,
but definitely not the "right circuit",
whether you are in UK, USA or any other country in the world today.
Cheers
PS. Sorry , to disrupt the party.
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GG - the 'note' as I understand it is that Ccts on R30 are right hand. I am not aware of any 'note' for R12. I think most of us normal folk would interpret that as a gentle nudge that we should consider circling to the north too, especially in view of the 'sensitive' areas.
PS Welcome to the party
PS Welcome to the party
BOAC;
Let's clarify this to avoid these unplanned meetings between BOAC and Gulfcaptain!: a right-hand circuit places the airport on the starboard side of the aircraft when the aircraft is downwind and a left-hand circuit places the airport on the port side of the aircraft when downwind. Left-hand circuits are preferred because that affords the PIC the best view of the airport; right-hand circuits are "non-standard".
This may or may not have any bearing on which side a CTL procedure would begin. In the absence of guidance, (as is apparent here), a left-hand start to the CTL procedure, (airport to the left) may be preferred simply because the PIC is sitting on the left side of the aircraft and has the best opportunity to keep the airport in view even if the F/O is flying. Of course, we here know nothing although it seems that there are those who have read/heard the recorders now know.
While the PIC is always responsible for all that happens on or to the aircraft, that requirement makes complete sense and is indeed a duty of care responsibility.
PJ2
Originally Posted by BOAC Post #480
I think we have a different interpretation of a 'right-hand circuit'.
This may or may not have any bearing on which side a CTL procedure would begin. In the absence of guidance, (as is apparent here), a left-hand start to the CTL procedure, (airport to the left) may be preferred simply because the PIC is sitting on the left side of the aircraft and has the best opportunity to keep the airport in view even if the F/O is flying. Of course, we here know nothing although it seems that there are those who have read/heard the recorders now know.
Originally Posted by aterpster Post#474
Mitigation is the duty of the airport owner and national aviation authority.
PJ2
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PJ - I think we cleared GulfCaptain's confusion up a few days back.
-got my heart racing for a moment but then you recovered with
Regarding "authorities' duties" - it seems to me that the P authorities provided a perfectly safe, well-tried and used procedure to land on 12 from a 30 approach. Quite safe if flown properly - mitigation complete? If, for whatever reason, someone then cocks that up, who's fault is that? If they, for whatever reason, decide not to spend money on an IAP for 12, to me the only criticism you can lay at them is that they were too mean with money.
a left-hand start to the CTL procedure,
(airport to the left) may be preferred
Regarding "authorities' duties" - it seems to me that the P authorities provided a perfectly safe, well-tried and used procedure to land on 12 from a 30 approach. Quite safe if flown properly - mitigation complete? If, for whatever reason, someone then cocks that up, who's fault is that? If they, for whatever reason, decide not to spend money on an IAP for 12, to me the only criticism you can lay at them is that they were too mean with money.
BOAC;
That was the CTL PANS-OPS procedure I believe?, (don't have the chart in front of me)
The questions remain however: Why 9nm north in poor vis? Why not climb to the sector altitude and turn left to the airport to re-establish? What made sense to them such that they continued what they were doing? Why didn't the EGPWS (TAWS) warn earlier, (or did it and they ignored it, or was it u/s and the TAWS turned was off or was there map-shift?) We don't yet know the answer to any of these questions. One hopes the P authorities will provide this information shortly.
PJ2
it seems to me that the P authorities provided a perfectly safe, well-tried and used procedure to land on 12 from a 30 approach.
The questions remain however: Why 9nm north in poor vis? Why not climb to the sector altitude and turn left to the airport to re-establish? What made sense to them such that they continued what they were doing? Why didn't the EGPWS (TAWS) warn earlier, (or did it and they ignored it, or was it u/s and the TAWS turned was off or was there map-shift?) We don't yet know the answer to any of these questions. One hopes the P authorities will provide this information shortly.
PJ2
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That was the CTL PANS-OPS procedure I believe?, (don't have the chart in front of me)
I don't believe anyone is disputing your 'questions' - whether we will ever know...................
BOAC, thanks...yes, that's all I meant - that the chart was labelled pans-ops and not terps - I know there isn't a CTL chart as such. The accident referenced earlier (I think by aterpster) was an AA B727 into Cincinnati, 1965.
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Quite some accident!
- what can you say?
Originally Posted by From Wiki
The airport is situated at an altitude of 853 feet (260 m) and the aircraft had descended to the level of 553 ft (169 m) above the airport while it was still about 5 nm (9.3 km) northeast of the airport. It descended to just 3 ft (per altimeter) above the airport while it was about 3 nm north of the airport.