Afriqiyah Airbus 330 Crash
So one outstanding question among many therefore is, what comments if any were offered by incoming aircraft regarding the approach both before and after the accident? Did any aircraft, a) request a runway change or even specifically comment to others that 09 was questionable, b) go-around, or c) divert? Was the crew of the accident aircraft executing a full-blown NPA (selected-selected) on 09, were they partially visual or, as you observe, is there another reason the aircraft was so low 0.8nm back? Were they executing an approach on a runway others had avoided or gone-around from? - if so, what was the decision-making process?
If this is totally incorrect apologies all round.
- GY
HundredPercentPlease, PJ2, et al,
NPAs, unstable approach, problems of procedure, poor vis/ night, mistook lights, something amiss, etc, etc; - in many previous incidents, but what about EGPWS?
NPAs, unstable approach, problems of procedure, poor vis/ night, mistook lights, something amiss, etc, etc; - in many previous incidents, but what about EGPWS?
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A question for Airbus pilots:
If flown manually with autothrust ON, and you decide to go-around but forget to push the TOGA-buttons, merely pushing the throttles forward ( old habits by PF from former type?), what is the result?
Will the aircraft increase its AoA until alpha-floor is reached, still descending due to lack of thrust, after which the alpha-prot. is activated and go-around thrust is delivered? Alas, maybe in this case too close to the ground?
Result is a high decend rate with very high AoA, high-energy on the engines and a maybe very confused crew?
haven't touched a sidestick in 7 years now so please pardon me if talking complete rubbish.
If flown manually with autothrust ON, and you decide to go-around but forget to push the TOGA-buttons, merely pushing the throttles forward ( old habits by PF from former type?), what is the result?
Will the aircraft increase its AoA until alpha-floor is reached, still descending due to lack of thrust, after which the alpha-prot. is activated and go-around thrust is delivered? Alas, maybe in this case too close to the ground?
Result is a high decend rate with very high AoA, high-energy on the engines and a maybe very confused crew?
haven't touched a sidestick in 7 years now so please pardon me if talking complete rubbish.
despegue,
If flown manually, autothrust on or off, to go around you just slam the levers forwards. There is no "TOGA button". You get full thrust and some nice upwardly pointing flight directors (even if they were switched off before you commanded TOGA). You are given guidance to keep you going straight ahead (G/A track) and SRS (speed reference system - gets you going up, safely).
Nice and simple.
If flown manually, autothrust on or off, to go around you just slam the levers forwards. There is no "TOGA button". You get full thrust and some nice upwardly pointing flight directors (even if they were switched off before you commanded TOGA). You are given guidance to keep you going straight ahead (G/A track) and SRS (speed reference system - gets you going up, safely).
Nice and simple.
If flown manually, autothrust on or off, to go around you just slam the levers forwards. There is no "TOGA button". You get full thrust and some nice upwardly pointing flight directors (even if they were switched off before you commanded TOGA). You are given guidance to keep you going straight ahead (G/A track) and SRS (speed reference system - gets you going up, safely).
I keep reading about the loss of the tail plane leading to a rapid pitch down and agree that the tail plaine is an important part of keeping a balanced pitch attitude.
However, not knowing all the balances at play in this flight regime, my question is to the relative significance of the engine rapidly rising thrust on pylons ahead of the wing causing a pitch up mode vs the tail plane being there or not. Now once the engines get creamed against the ground then the loss of the tail plane might be logical to result in a pitch down
comments?
However, not knowing all the balances at play in this flight regime, my question is to the relative significance of the engine rapidly rising thrust on pylons ahead of the wing causing a pitch up mode vs the tail plane being there or not. Now once the engines get creamed against the ground then the loss of the tail plane might be logical to result in a pitch down
comments?
safetypee;
I think many would agree that early examining of the role, if any, of the EGPWS is important. First, we don't know if the airport is in the database which this a/c had, (411A?). We don't know the type of installation (Mk, Honeywell? etc). Differences in specifications may provide different (more enhanced) warnings.
In one schematic, (to use the term loosely - the entire description is poorly outlined), there is a 5nm circle which gradually descends from 400' AGL to ground level some distance from the runway. Because the diagram is so poor I can't tell what the distance is from the runway that the system "sort of gives up monitoring". In other words, the A330 FCOM section on EGPWS I am familiar with does not make it clear where EGPWS protections end. By the diagram I have, it ends some distance from the runway. It's strange I know but there it is - no information. Going to the Honeywell site offers a choice of Mk's but as mentioned, we don't know which it is.
So yes, absolutely the EGPWS needs to be examined for these limitations, if any, and then, if programmed to provide warnings of terrain right to the runway threshold, did it work as designed or was it or related systems on MEL, and if it did work what did the crew/PF do or say?, etc etc.
PJ2
I think many would agree that early examining of the role, if any, of the EGPWS is important. First, we don't know if the airport is in the database which this a/c had, (411A?). We don't know the type of installation (Mk, Honeywell? etc). Differences in specifications may provide different (more enhanced) warnings.
In one schematic, (to use the term loosely - the entire description is poorly outlined), there is a 5nm circle which gradually descends from 400' AGL to ground level some distance from the runway. Because the diagram is so poor I can't tell what the distance is from the runway that the system "sort of gives up monitoring". In other words, the A330 FCOM section on EGPWS I am familiar with does not make it clear where EGPWS protections end. By the diagram I have, it ends some distance from the runway. It's strange I know but there it is - no information. Going to the Honeywell site offers a choice of Mk's but as mentioned, we don't know which it is.
So yes, absolutely the EGPWS needs to be examined for these limitations, if any, and then, if programmed to provide warnings of terrain right to the runway threshold, did it work as designed or was it or related systems on MEL, and if it did work what did the crew/PF do or say?, etc etc.
PJ2
However, not knowing all the balances at play in this flight regime, my question is to the relative significance of the engine rapidly rising thrust on pylons ahead of the wing causing a pitch up mode vs the tail plane being there or not.
- GY
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Jetlag50,
Wise words, in this profession that used to be one of the closest tied communities, it is now "normal" to sling mud at eachother and behave like fish-sellers wives'. Another example of how our professional behaviour is going through the drains...
I've seen pilot error by all nationalities I flew with, not to mention own mistakes. But Pprune is notorious for its anal-retentive participants, some who pretend to be flightcrew, but are not. Luckily, there are also the very helpful, wise and knowledgeable contributors.
Wise words, in this profession that used to be one of the closest tied communities, it is now "normal" to sling mud at eachother and behave like fish-sellers wives'. Another example of how our professional behaviour is going through the drains...
I've seen pilot error by all nationalities I flew with, not to mention own mistakes. But Pprune is notorious for its anal-retentive participants, some who pretend to be flightcrew, but are not. Luckily, there are also the very helpful, wise and knowledgeable contributors.
SkyGod
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Towerdog, dont judge dead pilots till you get the facts. It is common decency and a basic pilot fraternity thing.
Not sure I have judged dead pilots, just being fed up with all the rubbish about a lack of an ILS caused the accident, or that ICAO was responsible, or other off the wall theories when the obvious cause, CFIT should be examined closer.
If the airplane was in good order, and the flight was not hijacked, then incompetence in the cockpit is a real possibillity....
I wish it was not so, but reality is that 100+ folks are dead and I doubt we can blame the Bogeyman or Tinkerbell, yet certain folks are leaving no stone un-turned to shift the focus away from pilot error in any sort or form.
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..
I know I am going to get shot down for this, as I have seen it specifically stated otherwise, but is it possible the plane went into a sharp nose down attitude then flipped?
I cannot see any other reason for such total destruction
undercarriage, wings, basic structure would have otherwise absorbed much of the impact, but an upside down impact would certainly destroy the whole cabin, seats etc.
I cannot see any other reason for such total destruction
undercarriage, wings, basic structure would have otherwise absorbed much of the impact, but an upside down impact would certainly destroy the whole cabin, seats etc.
SkyGod
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I've seen pilot error by all nationalities I flew with, not to mention own mistakes.
Aircraft from all nations have crashed and pilot error is not a local or national thing.
Training, attitude and lack of CRM may be instead.
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Somebody asked about the TAF forecast. I found this:
TAF HLLT 120700Z 1206/1306 36005KT 2000 BR SCT003 BECMG 1207/1209 8000 FEW025 SCT100 PROB30 TEMPO1209/1215 7000 -RA BKN080 BECMG 1212/1214 03010KT NSC BECMG 1216/1218 22015KT BECMG1302/1304 34006KT NSC
TAF HLLT 111700Z 1118/1218 35005KT 8000 NSC PROB40 1200/1206 5000 BR PROB30 TEMPO1212/1216 -RA FEW050 BKN100 BECMG 1215/1217 09010KT
TAF HLLT 102300Z 1100/1124 13015G25KT 8000 TEMPO 1100/1105 5000 BLSA BECMG 1105/1107 22015KT 8000 NSC BECMG 1112/1114 29015KT CAVOK BECMG 1121/1123 35010KT 8000 NSC
So only one forecast from the previous evening, hinting at reduced visibility.
(The accident occurred around 120400Z)
(For Metars see post #5)
HundredPercentPlease
Not bad at all at this stage 
FDR/CVR will tell of course.
TAF HLLT 120700Z 1206/1306 36005KT 2000 BR SCT003 BECMG 1207/1209 8000 FEW025 SCT100 PROB30 TEMPO1209/1215 7000 -RA BKN080 BECMG 1212/1214 03010KT NSC BECMG 1216/1218 22015KT BECMG1302/1304 34006KT NSC
TAF HLLT 111700Z 1118/1218 35005KT 8000 NSC PROB40 1200/1206 5000 BR PROB30 TEMPO1212/1216 -RA FEW050 BKN100 BECMG 1215/1217 09010KT
TAF HLLT 102300Z 1100/1124 13015G25KT 8000 TEMPO 1100/1105 5000 BLSA BECMG 1105/1107 22015KT 8000 NSC BECMG 1112/1114 29015KT CAVOK BECMG 1121/1123 35010KT 8000 NSC
So only one forecast from the previous evening, hinting at reduced visibility.
(The accident occurred around 120400Z)
(For Metars see post #5)
HundredPercentPlease
Temperature one nine, QNH one zero one nine.
FDR/CVR will tell of course.
TowerDog;
Some folks are, some aren't. Some are reserving judgement in favour of curiosity.
But if judgement deems "incompetence", then, what? It may seem a slight diversion to examine the word, "incompetence", but it means something.
The obvious meaning is, 'those in control weren't up to the task.'
But then, what? Were they not up to the task in that moment, or historically, or during that cycle or...?
Without discovering the many antecedents which, with hindsight may be reverse-engineered from the initial impact in the sand, the argument that "the pilots were incompetent" becomes both circular and meaningless.
In other words, examining the word isn't merely an irrelevant academic exercise in a philosophical decontructing of meaning from the text: These words convey real meaning to people, within the context of this accident and what we know about airplanes, people and people-in-airplanes.
If "what happened" is to be found out, then it is necessary to go beyond such notions as "competence", "pilot error", and even "human error". If the airplane was completely healthy, then, that the pilots were at the controls and made a mistake is plainly, bluntly obvious. What then? Where does that conclusion take us? What is fixed? What has changed?
The entire concept of a safety culture, a reporting culture, the sharing of incident data and collecting data to examine it for precursors to an accident is to take the discourse beyond but not away from, the crew. If the notion of blame, responsibility and even the notion of "forgiveness" is part of the discourse, the conversation, even among the experts and specialists if they permit such terms to enter their conversation, has changed from finding out what went wrong so it can be prevented from occurring again, to the human need to find fault to satisfy very real human needs and emotions.
When we or more commonly 'the system' whack(s) someone (with jail, fines, 'time off'), usually the pilot, (or ATC or....?), what really has been accomplished and what will occur the next time such circumstances arise?
I submit that we already know the answers to these questions; they are lurking here, occupying our time right now on this thread.
Blame only answers one question. Blame concludes the dialogue, it does not open it up nor does it benefit anyone. Blame also permits the excusing of others and allows those in charge and capable of responding, to ignore change in favour of quarterly reports.
I know this thinking seems black-and-white, but 'telescope' the notions and this is what we see. For some operations, these realities have been managed exceptionally well. For others, they just have to pee on the electric fence, sometimes more than once. A big, fatal accident for a major carrier these days is about a US$10b hit to the bottom line but, in my one blunt criticism about a characteristic which has common threads throughout this industry, the bean-counters scatter like rodents when the light is turned in their direction, preferring blaming pilots to honesty.
Just some thoughts, mainly at this moment for the passengers and pilots.
PJ2
If the airplane was in good order, and the flight was not hijacked, then incompetence in the cockpit is a real possibillity....
I wish it was not so, but reality is that 100+ folks are dead and I doubt we can blame the Bogeyman or Tinkerbell, yet certain folks are leaving no stone un-turned to shift the focus away from pilot error in any sort or form
I wish it was not so, but reality is that 100+ folks are dead and I doubt we can blame the Bogeyman or Tinkerbell, yet certain folks are leaving no stone un-turned to shift the focus away from pilot error in any sort or form
But if judgement deems "incompetence", then, what? It may seem a slight diversion to examine the word, "incompetence", but it means something.
The obvious meaning is, 'those in control weren't up to the task.'
But then, what? Were they not up to the task in that moment, or historically, or during that cycle or...?
Without discovering the many antecedents which, with hindsight may be reverse-engineered from the initial impact in the sand, the argument that "the pilots were incompetent" becomes both circular and meaningless.
In other words, examining the word isn't merely an irrelevant academic exercise in a philosophical decontructing of meaning from the text: These words convey real meaning to people, within the context of this accident and what we know about airplanes, people and people-in-airplanes.
If "what happened" is to be found out, then it is necessary to go beyond such notions as "competence", "pilot error", and even "human error". If the airplane was completely healthy, then, that the pilots were at the controls and made a mistake is plainly, bluntly obvious. What then? Where does that conclusion take us? What is fixed? What has changed?
The entire concept of a safety culture, a reporting culture, the sharing of incident data and collecting data to examine it for precursors to an accident is to take the discourse beyond but not away from, the crew. If the notion of blame, responsibility and even the notion of "forgiveness" is part of the discourse, the conversation, even among the experts and specialists if they permit such terms to enter their conversation, has changed from finding out what went wrong so it can be prevented from occurring again, to the human need to find fault to satisfy very real human needs and emotions.
When we or more commonly 'the system' whack(s) someone (with jail, fines, 'time off'), usually the pilot, (or ATC or....?), what really has been accomplished and what will occur the next time such circumstances arise?
I submit that we already know the answers to these questions; they are lurking here, occupying our time right now on this thread.
Blame only answers one question. Blame concludes the dialogue, it does not open it up nor does it benefit anyone. Blame also permits the excusing of others and allows those in charge and capable of responding, to ignore change in favour of quarterly reports.
I know this thinking seems black-and-white, but 'telescope' the notions and this is what we see. For some operations, these realities have been managed exceptionally well. For others, they just have to pee on the electric fence, sometimes more than once. A big, fatal accident for a major carrier these days is about a US$10b hit to the bottom line but, in my one blunt criticism about a characteristic which has common threads throughout this industry, the bean-counters scatter like rodents when the light is turned in their direction, preferring blaming pilots to honesty.
Just some thoughts, mainly at this moment for the passengers and pilots.
PJ2
Last edited by PJ2; 18th May 2010 at 20:22.
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Thank you PJ2, a more eloquent and incisive comment as one will ever see to expose those that seek to blame. Others look for ways of preventing future repetitions of similar accidents by looking at the whole picture of Navaids, regulation and other details. Even those are hounded by them saying that they are seeking to exonerate the pilot! PJ2 my hat off to you for your excellent essay!
JetLag50;
Lest one fine point be misunderstood, just as in a reporting culture, this approach to flight safety is not a 'get-out-of-jail' card, (for others, that means that just because the focus goes beyond just the pilot doesn't mean that the pilot didn't contribute to the accident or perhaps was the main cause of the accident. For example, (because the notion is under discussion here), if a pilot is historically marginal, does his/her continuance in the cockpit rest entirely with the judgement of the individual involved; are those who pass said pilot in checkrides involved; are training failures expensive?
Recognizing factors which lead to an accident does not equate with innocence of cause or vulnerability. It merely prevents blame from stopping further investigation; most formal reports now, do this very well and with great integrity. Others do not.
So to clarify myself for TowerDog and others who may at the moment think that such an approach means, "no one is responsible": - the difference in the approach here is subtle but a material difference nevertheless. When one seeks to find out, the one sure way to determine the difference between the two is to watch for the raised eyebrow, the held-up hand or the outright resistance to questions.
The former approach which intends to find out stuff, is in many countries, standard, but sadly in other countries, less so still. If RadAlt2010 wants change such that all areas are audited without compromise, this is an area to work hard in and make the changes he so vociferously pronounced upon here for a short little while.
This is one key area where help is badly needed from aviation professionals, especially pilots, who have a keen and abiding interest safety work and not just a passing fancy driven by current events, to contribute to their profession in the form of energy, drive, vision and a positive, collegial attitude.
Those who haven't done the work of changing regulatory environments cannot pronounce on either the work or the time it takes to accomplish change.
Believe it or not, not all official bodies, interested parties and corporate interests or even those organizations mentioned, are in accord with saving lives and preventing accidents and otherwise privileging flight safety principles over their respective bottom lines.
Sorry. Enough thread drift.
PJ2
Lest one fine point be misunderstood, just as in a reporting culture, this approach to flight safety is not a 'get-out-of-jail' card, (for others, that means that just because the focus goes beyond just the pilot doesn't mean that the pilot didn't contribute to the accident or perhaps was the main cause of the accident. For example, (because the notion is under discussion here), if a pilot is historically marginal, does his/her continuance in the cockpit rest entirely with the judgement of the individual involved; are those who pass said pilot in checkrides involved; are training failures expensive?
Recognizing factors which lead to an accident does not equate with innocence of cause or vulnerability. It merely prevents blame from stopping further investigation; most formal reports now, do this very well and with great integrity. Others do not.
So to clarify myself for TowerDog and others who may at the moment think that such an approach means, "no one is responsible": - the difference in the approach here is subtle but a material difference nevertheless. When one seeks to find out, the one sure way to determine the difference between the two is to watch for the raised eyebrow, the held-up hand or the outright resistance to questions.
The former approach which intends to find out stuff, is in many countries, standard, but sadly in other countries, less so still. If RadAlt2010 wants change such that all areas are audited without compromise, this is an area to work hard in and make the changes he so vociferously pronounced upon here for a short little while.
This is one key area where help is badly needed from aviation professionals, especially pilots, who have a keen and abiding interest safety work and not just a passing fancy driven by current events, to contribute to their profession in the form of energy, drive, vision and a positive, collegial attitude.
Those who haven't done the work of changing regulatory environments cannot pronounce on either the work or the time it takes to accomplish change.
Believe it or not, not all official bodies, interested parties and corporate interests or even those organizations mentioned, are in accord with saving lives and preventing accidents and otherwise privileging flight safety principles over their respective bottom lines.
Sorry. Enough thread drift.
PJ2
Last edited by PJ2; 18th May 2010 at 21:08.
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Right Way Up:
We have that in the U.S. provided the visual segment is 34:1 clear, the IAP has a straight-in MDA, and Jeppesen is able to code a Baro VNAV path into the procedure. (of course, if it is an LNAV/VNAV or LPV IAP this is unnecessary.) The operator must have special approval and it is limited to commercial operators.
That all depends what side of the fence you sit on. In Europe the majority of operators fly a constant descent approach, and will adjust an MDA to allow for height loss during the go-around. That is why I specifically mentioned "minima" rather than MDA. However EU-Ops is now calculating minima for non-precision approach (constant descent) as DAs allowing for the height loss. Whichever way it is flown the MDA should not be breached.
I have no idea whether this carrier fly constant descent or level non-precision approaches.
I have no idea whether this carrier fly constant descent or level non-precision approaches.