Afriqiyah Airbus 330 Crash
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RetiredF4:
My knowledge of the Dutch language is a bit rusty these days but
according to the link you supplied above does that link not say:
"Pilot reported technical problems"?
Never mind, it basically says the pilot reported no technical problems.
Geen being the negation of the object.
Es ist mir doch klar!!!
My knowledge of the Dutch language is a bit rusty these days but
according to the link you supplied above does that link not say:
"Pilot reported technical problems"?
Never mind, it basically says the pilot reported no technical problems.
Geen being the negation of the object.
Es ist mir doch klar!!!
Last edited by rgbrock1; 20th May 2010 at 15:28.
Originally Posted by Jetlag50
Two points of interest:
(a) I dont think the pilot had visual with the runway because he would have easily tucked into 09 after reaching his MDA at about 1 NM threshold (MAP is 0.6 NM threshold), even though he was slightly offset (4 degrees as reported).
(a) I dont think the pilot had visual with the runway because he would have easily tucked into 09 after reaching his MDA at about 1 NM threshold (MAP is 0.6 NM threshold), even though he was slightly offset (4 degrees as reported).
Originally Posted by Jetlag50
Plenty of time to select landing flaps and touch down had he seen the runway.
Originally Posted by Jetlag50
b) The impact point was approx. 500 metres from the threshold;
Originally Posted by Jetlag50
he would have reached the impact point approx 20 secs seconds after his MAP of 0.6 NM ,
Originally Posted by Jetlag50
the position of the marker. ie, the photo above (post #748) tallies with a missed approach executed at the correct point (Delta locator, at 360 ft AGL MDA))
Originally Posted by Jetlag50
but something catastrophic happened.
Look at high ROD due to calm conditions
Look at high ROD due to calm conditions
Originally Posted by Jetlag50
and also possibly turbine blade stall if manual GA.
I'm going to have a guess here: not a pilot.
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Hello 100% (are you really 100%?)
tell me what airline you fly for (if you fly). You select landing flaps (ie full flaps to a pilot) before committing to land? Hellloooo?
The offset is notammed and due to signal interference. If the VOR is offset 4 degrees it would say it on the chart. The chart does not say that.
Impact point is reported at 500 meters. I dont know where you get your facts from.
The NDB approach, if he was on NDB is 360. 550 ft for a VOR app would have still placed the impact point at about the same crash position. Dont split hairs
The high ROD of descent I was referring to is in the case of the pilot flying manual in GA. There is a reason why we dont land with a tailwind.
Compressor stall is when you apply power suddenly and the blades do just what is described: stall!. A basic jet engine feature which I am sure even Airbus hasnt cured.
Tuck in: make a corrective final manuever to get on the runway, but I am sure you are just being cantankerous on this one.
tell me what airline you fly for (if you fly). You select landing flaps (ie full flaps to a pilot) before committing to land? Hellloooo?
The offset is notammed and due to signal interference. If the VOR is offset 4 degrees it would say it on the chart. The chart does not say that.
Impact point is reported at 500 meters. I dont know where you get your facts from.
The NDB approach, if he was on NDB is 360. 550 ft for a VOR app would have still placed the impact point at about the same crash position. Dont split hairs
The high ROD of descent I was referring to is in the case of the pilot flying manual in GA. There is a reason why we dont land with a tailwind.
Compressor stall is when you apply power suddenly and the blades do just what is described: stall!. A basic jet engine feature which I am sure even Airbus hasnt cured.
Tuck in: make a corrective final manuever to get on the runway, but I am sure you are just being cantankerous on this one.
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my dear JetLag50
-the A330 (like all other wide-bodies) must be in full landing configuration before leaving the FAF when executing a Non-Precision Approach
-the NDB MDA is 620 ft
-the VOR MDA is 550 ft
-the VOR is always 4° offset (the Notam has nothing to do with it)
-the crew was cleared to fly the NDB 09 approach
now please: make only valid and informed remarks
-the A330 (like all other wide-bodies) must be in full landing configuration before leaving the FAF when executing a Non-Precision Approach
-the NDB MDA is 620 ft
-the VOR MDA is 550 ft
-the VOR is always 4° offset (the Notam has nothing to do with it)
-the crew was cleared to fly the NDB 09 approach
now please: make only valid and informed remarks
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Jet Lag...
Ahem.
Ladies and Gents, in addition to the myriad theories placed before us thus far, I would like to contribute a possibility.
If the possible consequences (some/all - there are many possibilities) of FCOM 3/QRH OEB 076/2A from March 2010 "ERRONEOUS RADIO ALTIMETER (RA) HEIGHT INDICATION were somehow to have played a part in the latter stages of this approach, then we may have some factors which may have contributed or exacerbated this accident. It may be worth incorporating that OEB in to the theorizing taking place. The OEB is too long for me too transcribe at the moment. I unfortunately don't have the time to paste it in. Perhaps some other intrepid soul may.
As I scan the photos placed on this forum so far, it occurs to me that the debris trail is in line with a perimeter fence, it must be the south fence. Is it possible that in the heat of the moment our departed brethren mistook this line for the approach lighting system (which may or may not have been operable?). This may explain the deviation from the centreline, perhaps.
In my personal experience, Airbus in Toulouse will most certainly have downloaded and sequenced the DFDR. It is very very quiet. This is in itself quite interesting.
Ahem.
Ladies and Gents, in addition to the myriad theories placed before us thus far, I would like to contribute a possibility.
If the possible consequences (some/all - there are many possibilities) of FCOM 3/QRH OEB 076/2A from March 2010 "ERRONEOUS RADIO ALTIMETER (RA) HEIGHT INDICATION were somehow to have played a part in the latter stages of this approach, then we may have some factors which may have contributed or exacerbated this accident. It may be worth incorporating that OEB in to the theorizing taking place. The OEB is too long for me too transcribe at the moment. I unfortunately don't have the time to paste it in. Perhaps some other intrepid soul may.
As I scan the photos placed on this forum so far, it occurs to me that the debris trail is in line with a perimeter fence, it must be the south fence. Is it possible that in the heat of the moment our departed brethren mistook this line for the approach lighting system (which may or may not have been operable?). This may explain the deviation from the centreline, perhaps.
In my personal experience, Airbus in Toulouse will most certainly have downloaded and sequenced the DFDR. It is very very quiet. This is in itself quite interesting.
Originally Posted by Jetlag50
Hello 100% (are you really 100%?)
tell me what airline you fly for (if you fly).
tell me what airline you fly for (if you fly).
Originally Posted by Jetlag50
You select landing flaps (ie full flaps to a pilot) before committing to land? Hellloooo?
Originally Posted by Jetlag50
The offset is notammed and due to signal interference. If the VOR is offset 4 degrees it would say it on the chart. The chart does not say that.
It is nothing to do with interference, it's because the VOR is not on the runway centreline.
Originally Posted by Jetlag50
Impact point is reported at 500 meters. I dont know where you get your facts from.
Originally Posted by Jetlag50
The NDB approach, if he was on NDB is 360. 550 ft for a VOR app would have still placed the impact point at about the same crash position. Dont split hairs
Originally Posted by Jetlag50
The high ROD of descent I was referring to is in the case of the pilot flying manual in GA.
Originally Posted by Jetlag50
There is a reason why we dont land with a tailwind.
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OK, I have never flown Airbus, just B727, 737 200. Obviously automation has changed the rules. My appologies.
The NDB minima you mention is QNH. I was at pains to stress AGL.
Any VOR chart would TELLyou of an inherent deviation, NOT a notammed deviation. Thats why you have notams. Not all VOR approaches are offset. Read your procedures.
How do you know he was on NDB approach? Do you know other details we dont?
re climb and GA. He would have trouble maintaining his MDA or climbing in a calm conditions approach esp if he applied power too fast and late. I hope you are not carrying passengers with your tailwind condition approaches.. keep quiet about it if you do.
The NDB minima you mention is QNH. I was at pains to stress AGL.
Any VOR chart would TELLyou of an inherent deviation, NOT a notammed deviation. Thats why you have notams. Not all VOR approaches are offset. Read your procedures.
How do you know he was on NDB approach? Do you know other details we dont?
re climb and GA. He would have trouble maintaining his MDA or climbing in a calm conditions approach esp if he applied power too fast and late. I hope you are not carrying passengers with your tailwind condition approaches.. keep quiet about it if you do.
Jetlag50,
I shall try to remain calm.
Many approaches are tailwind for the approach and landing. Some airfield even seem to favour them (for noise) - ZRH is a good example.
You do not ever maintain MDA.
Not all VOR charts tell you the offset. This one is a good example. And we are assuming he was on the VOR approach, not the NDB - though that is of course an assumption.
I am intrigued by the fact that you never set landing flaps until you committed to land. In this case that could be as low as 290'. Now, I have never flown the 737-200, but I have many years in the -300 and -700. Attempting to go from F15 to F40 at 290' would be pure madness, and not in any SOP I have seen.
I shall try to remain calm.
Many approaches are tailwind for the approach and landing. Some airfield even seem to favour them (for noise) - ZRH is a good example.
You do not ever maintain MDA.
Not all VOR charts tell you the offset. This one is a good example. And we are assuming he was on the VOR approach, not the NDB - though that is of course an assumption.
I am intrigued by the fact that you never set landing flaps until you committed to land. In this case that could be as low as 290'. Now, I have never flown the 737-200, but I have many years in the -300 and -700. Attempting to go from F15 to F40 at 290' would be pure madness, and not in any SOP I have seen.
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It is an Afriqiyah "policy" to fly the Ndb's approaches instead of the Vor as the latest is so unstable and swinging all the time.
They fly managed laterally and selected vertically Npa's.
cheers
They fly managed laterally and selected vertically Npa's.
cheers
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Tuck in: make a corrective final manuever to get on the runway
Hmmm, given the minimum "stable approach" SOP's I think a quick "tuck in" would lead to an even quicker "boot out". Especially if executed well below minimums...
Hmmm, given the minimum "stable approach" SOP's I think a quick "tuck in" would lead to an even quicker "boot out". Especially if executed well below minimums...
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100% Do stay calm. I would never elect to land in a tailwind. I am not saying its not all unsafe, but I wouldnt do it. How on earth do you maintain your ground speed and ROD? Even if you throttle fully back? Or are you talking about a 5 Kt tail?
On 727, you select F25 then F30 or F40 when you are visual. Any large flap retraction on GA would result in serious trim problems
On 727, you select F25 then F30 or F40 when you are visual. Any large flap retraction on GA would result in serious trim problems
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Hi guys this is my first post on this beautiful site, so forgive me for any mistake. If i think about a sort of controlled impact into terrain in landing configuration i think about the Dc.10 Crash at Sioux city, the aircraft rolled and snapped, and there was a big fire. Here the aircfraft looks ways more fragmented, like if the crash was harder and less controlled than the Sioux City One.
Originally Posted by Giggy
It is an Afriqiyah "policy" to fly the Ndb's approaches instead of the Vor as the latest is so unstable and swinging all the time.
They fly managed laterally and selected vertically Npa's.
They fly managed laterally and selected vertically Npa's.
By calculation*, the FPA you need to select to get to aerodrome level after 3.9 miles from the TW at 1350' is only -2.6
If you were to select -3.0, you would arrive at the ground at 3.4 nm from the TW (assuming you "forgot" to G/A at MDA, or something else went wrong).
There is no descent angle on the procedure plate.
* If someone could check my numbers that would be good.
Last edited by HundredPercentPlease; 20th May 2010 at 18:16.
100%;
I find 2.5 deg using 3.9 nm + 300 m from TW to TDZ09.
Also agree on the 3.4 nm from TW at a 3 deg FPA.
DJ.
I find 2.5 deg using 3.9 nm + 300 m from TW to TDZ09.
Also agree on the 3.4 nm from TW at a 3 deg FPA.
DJ.
Last edited by DJ77; 20th May 2010 at 19:54. Reason: added Remark about 3 deg FPA
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Flight 605
Flight 605 was an A320 rather than an A330 but they share very similar automation and fly by wire technology.
Airbus technology is complex and it is vital that one understands what the modes are and what they do. I suspect that the crews training and understanding of the automation will be a key factor in why this aircraft crashed.
Flight 605 was a flight on 14 February 1990 that crashed on its final approach to Bangalore airport, killing 92 people.
The flight, IC-605, took off from Mumbai (Bombay) at 11:58 for a flight to Bangalore. At 12:25 Bangalore approach was contacted and prevailing weather at Bangalore was passed on to the crew. At 12:44, the Airbus A320 was cleared to descend to 11,000 feet and visual approach into runway 9 was cleared.
On final approach, the aircraft descended well below the normal approach profile and kept descending until it struck the boundaries of the Karnataka Golf Club, 2,300 feet (700 m) short and 200 feet (61 m) right of the runway. The aircraft rolled for 80 feet (24 m) and lifted off again for about 230 feet (70 m) and came down again on the 17th green of the golf course.
The landing gear wheels dug into the ground and the aircraft impacted a 12 feet (3.7 m) high embankment, causing the gears and engines to be sheared off. The aircraft continued over the embankment and came to rest in a grassy, marshy and rocky area.
The official verdict of the crash was the "Failure of the pilots to realize the gravity of the situation and respond immediately towards proper action of moving the throttles, even after the radio altitude call-outs of "Four hundred", "Three hundred" and "Two hundred" feet, in spite of knowing that the plane was in idle/open descent mode." [1] However, there were aspersions cast on the then newly launched Airbus A320 and the complications of the aircraft coupled with lack of suitable training for pilots [2].
The well-known industrialist Ashok Vardhan Birla, his wife Sunanda and daughter Sujata were killed in the crash. [3]
Regards Bigpants
Airbus technology is complex and it is vital that one understands what the modes are and what they do. I suspect that the crews training and understanding of the automation will be a key factor in why this aircraft crashed.
Flight 605 was a flight on 14 February 1990 that crashed on its final approach to Bangalore airport, killing 92 people.
The flight, IC-605, took off from Mumbai (Bombay) at 11:58 for a flight to Bangalore. At 12:25 Bangalore approach was contacted and prevailing weather at Bangalore was passed on to the crew. At 12:44, the Airbus A320 was cleared to descend to 11,000 feet and visual approach into runway 9 was cleared.
On final approach, the aircraft descended well below the normal approach profile and kept descending until it struck the boundaries of the Karnataka Golf Club, 2,300 feet (700 m) short and 200 feet (61 m) right of the runway. The aircraft rolled for 80 feet (24 m) and lifted off again for about 230 feet (70 m) and came down again on the 17th green of the golf course.
The landing gear wheels dug into the ground and the aircraft impacted a 12 feet (3.7 m) high embankment, causing the gears and engines to be sheared off. The aircraft continued over the embankment and came to rest in a grassy, marshy and rocky area.
The official verdict of the crash was the "Failure of the pilots to realize the gravity of the situation and respond immediately towards proper action of moving the throttles, even after the radio altitude call-outs of "Four hundred", "Three hundred" and "Two hundred" feet, in spite of knowing that the plane was in idle/open descent mode." [1] However, there were aspersions cast on the then newly launched Airbus A320 and the complications of the aircraft coupled with lack of suitable training for pilots [2].
The well-known industrialist Ashok Vardhan Birla, his wife Sunanda and daughter Sujata were killed in the crash. [3]
Regards Bigpants
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Jetlag50 - from the A330-200 FCOM 3.01.20 p3
. Wind for takeoff:
Maximum TAILWIND................15 knots
. Wind for landing
Maximum TAILWIND................15 knots
Not quite sure what you're alluding to about 100% flying the approach and landing with a tailwind It's normal at many airfields due noise abatement - big whoopy deal
Besides - it's policy at our company to be fully configured by 1500' and stable by 1000' IMC and 500' VMC. That's a pretty standard deal with most airlines and types these days...
. Wind for takeoff:
Maximum TAILWIND................15 knots
. Wind for landing
Maximum TAILWIND................15 knots
Not quite sure what you're alluding to about 100% flying the approach and landing with a tailwind
It's normal at many airfields due noise abatement - big whoopy dealBesides - it's policy at our company to be fully configured by 1500' and stable by 1000' IMC and 500' VMC. That's a pretty standard deal with most airlines and types these days...
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Another thing Jetlag - this is a discussion about a 330, not a good 'ole 727 so your comments regarding flap settings are totally irrelevant...
Regarding trim changes at go around - you'll barely notice them manually flying 'cos it's FBW. Basically it will autotrim to give neutral sidestick and maintain 1g at the chosen attitude. Clever heh?
Regarding trim changes at go around - you'll barely notice them manually flying 'cos it's FBW. Basically it will autotrim to give neutral sidestick and maintain 1g at the chosen attitude. Clever heh?