Afriqiyah Airbus 330 Crash
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takata, in the first image, in the middle right of the frame, could that be the first pole knocked down in C-SARs set of pole images? If so, the last pole standing would then be at the right edge of the image.
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If you don't see that I can only conclude you are trying to cover up incompetence.
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Originally Posted by SaturnV
takata, in the first image, in the middle right of the frame, could that be the first pole knocked down in C-SARs set of pole images? If so, the last pole standing would then be at the right edge of the image.
S~
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wings?
The last picture is puzzling: are these the two wings? Or it is a single wing and what is left of the fuselage?
I cannot understand how the two wings would manage to be at the front end of the crash without any big other pieces (engines?) around.
I cannot understand how the two wings would manage to be at the front end of the crash without any big other pieces (engines?) around.
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The last picture is puzzling: are these the two wings? Or it is a single wing and what is left of the fuselage?
I cannot understand how the two wings would manage to be at the front end of the crash without any big other pieces (engines?) around.
I cannot understand how the two wings would manage to be at the front end of the crash without any big other pieces (engines?) around.
And everyone lets not bash at each other, keep on subject please....
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Originally Posted by valvanuz
The last picture is puzzling: are these the two wings? Or it is a single wing and what is left of the fuselage?
I cannot understand how the two wings would manage to be at the front end of the crash without any big other pieces (engines?) around.
I cannot understand how the two wings would manage to be at the front end of the crash without any big other pieces (engines?) around.
One identifiable piece of the front fuselage seems to be lying there:
wings?
The last picture is puzzling: are these the two wings? Or it is a single wing and what is left of the fuselage? I cannot understand how the two wings would manage to be at the front end of the crash without any big other pieces (engines?) around.
The last picture is puzzling: are these the two wings? Or it is a single wing and what is left of the fuselage? I cannot understand how the two wings would manage to be at the front end of the crash without any big other pieces (engines?) around.
Altimetry.
Has anyone here had the interesting exercise in the sim where you are given a nasty NPA and passed an incorrect QNH?
Hllt 120420z 27007kt 5000 Br Nsc 19/17 Q1009
Temperature one nine, QNH one zero one nine.
It has be puzzling me how you crash an Airbus at the lateral point that is roughly at MDA. Really, you should crash it on the runway, or at least abeam.
To crash 0.8 nm short, you need to start at the right point and have a high ROD, or start at the wrong point (too low) and have the correct ROD. Given that the Airbus uses FPA, going for the wrong ROD is tricky.
Now I realise I am creating a scenario to fit, and not looking at evidence to make a scenario - so this is just food for thought. But the 330 was 250' off-profile, and then bust minima. If the altimeters said they were on profile and at minima when the ground arrived, then you'd end up where they were. If your first warning was "50" then conceivably you could get your tail tangled in wires as you went around.
And yes, I know that the RA would be the clue, but fatigue can knock you so so easily. But how else do you end up on the ground so far short of the r/w?
Has anyone here had the interesting exercise in the sim where you are given a nasty NPA and passed an incorrect QNH?
Hllt 120420z 27007kt 5000 Br Nsc 19/17 Q1009
Temperature one nine, QNH one zero one nine.
It has be puzzling me how you crash an Airbus at the lateral point that is roughly at MDA. Really, you should crash it on the runway, or at least abeam.
To crash 0.8 nm short, you need to start at the right point and have a high ROD, or start at the wrong point (too low) and have the correct ROD. Given that the Airbus uses FPA, going for the wrong ROD is tricky.
Now I realise I am creating a scenario to fit, and not looking at evidence to make a scenario - so this is just food for thought. But the 330 was 250' off-profile, and then bust minima. If the altimeters said they were on profile and at minima when the ground arrived, then you'd end up where they were. If your first warning was "50" then conceivably you could get your tail tangled in wires as you went around.
And yes, I know that the RA would be the clue, but fatigue can knock you so so easily. But how else do you end up on the ground so far short of the r/w?
Originally Posted by valvanuz
I cannot understand how the two wings would manage to be at the front end of the crash without any big other pieces around.
- The ground contact marks indicate the aircraft hit the ground tail first in a nose-up attitude
- The first major piece of wreckage is the tailplane with all three control surfaces attached and (relatively) intact, facing the opposite direction of travel, about 200 metres from initial impact.
- The last piece of wreckage are the wings, both still attached to the central wing box, structurally largely intact except for destruction by the post-crash fire, located about 700 metres from the initial impact point
- The fuselage is shattered to tiny bits, littering the area between the tailplane and the wings in a narrow 500m long wreckage path
- At least one engine was producing thrust at time of impact (2nd stage compressor blades show clear FOD)
- Aircraft strikes the ground with the tail in a strong nose-up pitch attitude. The impact is strong enough to fracture the rear fuselage, and the tail breaks off.
- The forward momentum (and possible impact rebound) carries the fuselage up and forward (probably aided by TOGA thrust, with the associated pitch-up moment countering the pitch-down moment caused by the loss of the tail for a few moments). While this is happening, the tail tumbles on the ground (attested by the damage on the tip of the V/S) one or more times, and comes to a rest facing rearwards
- Loss of tail results in a rapid pitch down of the remaining fuselage, hitting the ground in a sharp nose-down attitude, probably pushed by the engines at full power.
- Nose and front fuselage is crushed and fragmented, while the whole structure pivots around the ground contact point, propelling the still intact wings forward. The crushing of the forward fuselage cushions the impact sufficiently that the wing structure remains intact. The engines would still run at this point (for another few miliseconds) ingesting gravel and aircraft debris.
- The wings tumble over, crushing the remaining fuselage over and aft of the wing and probably losing the engines at this point. This would be the point where fuel tank integrity would be lost, producing a fireball of vaporized fuel, moving forward together with the wing structure. (this explains the lack of major fire in the earlier part of the wreckage path)
- The remaining momentum causes the wings to tumble over once more, coming to rest facing the original direction of travel, and are partially consumed by fire fed by fuel remaining in the wings and centre tank.
SkyGod
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Towerdog, so far you have spewed out nothing but invective and paranoia which adequately reflects your putrid state of mind.
Must have hit the nail on the head.
I am saying to you, and morons who blame dead pilots like you
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andrasz
A plausible theory. If I may add another thought - given that selecting TOGA did not prevent the initial impact, the engines would still be accelerating and achieved thrust would be less than maximum. The nose-down pitch following the loss of the tailplane would be massive, probably well in excess of the airframe negative g limit. With enough height, and it need not be much, some structural failure could have occurred before the major ground impact.
A plausible theory. If I may add another thought - given that selecting TOGA did not prevent the initial impact, the engines would still be accelerating and achieved thrust would be less than maximum. The nose-down pitch following the loss of the tailplane would be massive, probably well in excess of the airframe negative g limit. With enough height, and it need not be much, some structural failure could have occurred before the major ground impact.
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andrasz
Just a clarification -- the engine damage visible in the photos is the turbine section. As pointed out by Lomapaseo, this also supports a nose-high AoA wherein first contact with the ground would cause such initial damage to the aft part of the engines.
Just a clarification -- the engine damage visible in the photos is the turbine section. As pointed out by Lomapaseo, this also supports a nose-high AoA wherein first contact with the ground would cause such initial damage to the aft part of the engines.
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As a member of the SLF club I am awed by the depth of experience being shown here in describing all the different scenarios in which the accident aircraft may have been involved.
I am equally amazed that anyone at all escaped this accident with their life, as the little
boy(?) did. I cannot grasp how he survived the sheer destruction of this magnitude.
Would be interesting to note, for me anyway, where the 10 year old was sitting at the time. Not that it really matters but did his location have something to do with his survival? Or was it just a matter of plain ol' good luck?
I am equally amazed that anyone at all escaped this accident with their life, as the little
boy(?) did. I cannot grasp how he survived the sheer destruction of this magnitude.
Would be interesting to note, for me anyway, where the 10 year old was sitting at the time. Not that it really matters but did his location have something to do with his survival? Or was it just a matter of plain ol' good luck?
HundredPercentPlease;
A reasonable hypothesis I think. But I wonder if it perhaps assumes poor visibility or nobody watching out the windows? It seems, given the experience of the captain and possibly his F/O, that the latter is less material; - there have been reports of "pockets" of poor visibility.
We have the METARS which indicates VMC but we also have a few comments about "sun", "dust", poor visibility in certain areas, etc.
So one outstanding question among many therefore is, what comments if any were offered by incoming aircraft regarding the approach both before and after the accident? Did any aircraft, a) request a runway change or even specifically comment to others that 09 was questionable, b) go-around, or c) divert? Was the crew of the accident aircraft executing a full-blown NPA (selected-selected) on 09, were they partially visual or, as you observe, is there another reason the aircraft was so low 0.8nm back? Were they executing an approach on a runway others had avoided or gone-around from? - if so, what was the decision-making process?
It is likely, as indicated by many comments from those we would expect to know, that a fully-managed NPA was likely not being conducted but was either being hand-flown or on the autopilot using the selected-selected method. This method is straightforward enough and is perhaps even slightly easier than the managed-approach method; neither are a challenge, however.
To cover off the possibility of the VS/FPA mode confusion, although the issue is well understood by Airbus pilots, the Strasbourg A320 accident was (likely, but not established as) a setting of "3.0" for the FPA but the mode was in "V/S" and resulted in a descent rate of 3000fpm, (roughly).
I hasten to add that I doubt this scenario, but the question has to be asked. The display has been modified and these issues are well-known and trained for and hasn't been an issue.
Regarding impact, I have a slightly different sense of the go-around; I sense that the go-around was very nearly successful and that the only part of the aircraft that 'touched down' was the tail and even then only due to the slightly higher ground near the mosque just at the road.
The wires, in and of themselves, may not have done enough damage to render the aircraft unflyable. We don't know if/how they embedded in the very aft structure.
I agree that the collision between the empennage and the slightly higher ground was sufficient to fracture and separate that section of the aircraft and, with the loss of this structure, the aircraft became unflyable as has already been described, but I don't think anything else, (gear, engines, wingtips) touched the ground until after the tail left the structure, although they may have hit cacti/trees etc.
Especially with a slight rise in ground elevation, (4 to 6 feet is sufficient), the pitch attitude to hit the tail would not have to be beyond ordinary go-around pitch attitudes of, say, 15deg or slightly higher.
In direct response to your hypothesis HPP which I think is possible, hopefully the recorders will tell us what approach method was being used, what autoflight selections were being made, what the aircraft and engine performance was in the moments before impact and during what we may now reasonably conclude was a go-around attempt.
Hopefully too, the CVR will tell us what the discussions were regarding the approach, what their assessment of the visibility was and, through standard analysis techniques, what their state of mind and alertness was. Another primary question to ask/determine the answer to is, therefore, questions regarding this crew's schedule, their crew rest on the layover and their combined duty days; were there any delays and if so were rest periods compromised? These are all a matter of record and thus are easily answered questions but, except for positing the notion of fatigue, so far these details haven't been directly provided or even asked or answered here or in other sources.
A reasonable hypothesis I think. But I wonder if it perhaps assumes poor visibility or nobody watching out the windows? It seems, given the experience of the captain and possibly his F/O, that the latter is less material; - there have been reports of "pockets" of poor visibility.
We have the METARS which indicates VMC but we also have a few comments about "sun", "dust", poor visibility in certain areas, etc.
So one outstanding question among many therefore is, what comments if any were offered by incoming aircraft regarding the approach both before and after the accident? Did any aircraft, a) request a runway change or even specifically comment to others that 09 was questionable, b) go-around, or c) divert? Was the crew of the accident aircraft executing a full-blown NPA (selected-selected) on 09, were they partially visual or, as you observe, is there another reason the aircraft was so low 0.8nm back? Were they executing an approach on a runway others had avoided or gone-around from? - if so, what was the decision-making process?
It is likely, as indicated by many comments from those we would expect to know, that a fully-managed NPA was likely not being conducted but was either being hand-flown or on the autopilot using the selected-selected method. This method is straightforward enough and is perhaps even slightly easier than the managed-approach method; neither are a challenge, however.
To cover off the possibility of the VS/FPA mode confusion, although the issue is well understood by Airbus pilots, the Strasbourg A320 accident was (likely, but not established as) a setting of "3.0" for the FPA but the mode was in "V/S" and resulted in a descent rate of 3000fpm, (roughly).
I hasten to add that I doubt this scenario, but the question has to be asked. The display has been modified and these issues are well-known and trained for and hasn't been an issue.
Regarding impact, I have a slightly different sense of the go-around; I sense that the go-around was very nearly successful and that the only part of the aircraft that 'touched down' was the tail and even then only due to the slightly higher ground near the mosque just at the road.
The wires, in and of themselves, may not have done enough damage to render the aircraft unflyable. We don't know if/how they embedded in the very aft structure.
I agree that the collision between the empennage and the slightly higher ground was sufficient to fracture and separate that section of the aircraft and, with the loss of this structure, the aircraft became unflyable as has already been described, but I don't think anything else, (gear, engines, wingtips) touched the ground until after the tail left the structure, although they may have hit cacti/trees etc.
Especially with a slight rise in ground elevation, (4 to 6 feet is sufficient), the pitch attitude to hit the tail would not have to be beyond ordinary go-around pitch attitudes of, say, 15deg or slightly higher.
In direct response to your hypothesis HPP which I think is possible, hopefully the recorders will tell us what approach method was being used, what autoflight selections were being made, what the aircraft and engine performance was in the moments before impact and during what we may now reasonably conclude was a go-around attempt.
Hopefully too, the CVR will tell us what the discussions were regarding the approach, what their assessment of the visibility was and, through standard analysis techniques, what their state of mind and alertness was. Another primary question to ask/determine the answer to is, therefore, questions regarding this crew's schedule, their crew rest on the layover and their combined duty days; were there any delays and if so were rest periods compromised? These are all a matter of record and thus are easily answered questions but, except for positing the notion of fatigue, so far these details haven't been directly provided or even asked or answered here or in other sources.
Last edited by PJ2; 18th May 2010 at 17:11. Reason: finish a sentence...
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Right Way Up:
Sounds like you're speaking of a missed approach from DA on a vertically-guided IAP. There should be no altitude loss on go-around from MDA on a non-precision IAP. Further, in either a DA or MDA missed approach the engines should already be sufficiently spooled up to provide a significant increase in power in far less than 4 to 5 seconds.
Also, in the case of an approach with a DA, the missed approach obstacle clearance criteria provides for a height loss below DA for a prescribed distance before the missed approach obstacle clearance starts its slope upwards.
In the accident at issue it would have been an MDA which should have resulted in no height loss unless the decision to miss was made subsequent to descent below MDA (always a dicey situation in poor visibility.)
If you go-around at minima, you pitch at a normal rate towards approx 15 degrees which will take roughly 4-5 secs. At the same time the engines will be spooling up towards TOGA and again that will take roughly 5 seconds. The engine thrust increase should be quick enough to maintain speed whilst carrying out the pitch manoeuvre. The altitude loss if the manoeuvre is carried out correctly will be roughly 20-30 feet. Even allowing for 3 secs pilot delay the total loss will only be 50-60 feet which is still safe if not advisable. If a pilot delays more than that then you cannot account for that behaviour or lack of ability. It is quite safe and proper to go-around at minima.
Also, in the case of an approach with a DA, the missed approach obstacle clearance criteria provides for a height loss below DA for a prescribed distance before the missed approach obstacle clearance starts its slope upwards.
In the accident at issue it would have been an MDA which should have resulted in no height loss unless the decision to miss was made subsequent to descent below MDA (always a dicey situation in poor visibility.)
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Since we're into what if's, I do wonder the crew's experience on type is.
If the Italians are to be believed, they could have been coming in on an intercept from above, messed up their mode selections hoping for an automatic capture that probably never happened, and ended up with a high ROD (>1000'/min) below the planned approach path close to the threshold, possibly with the spoilers out. That's the only way I can explain the impact trajectory in my head.
If the Italians are to be believed, they could have been coming in on an intercept from above, messed up their mode selections hoping for an automatic capture that probably never happened, and ended up with a high ROD (>1000'/min) below the planned approach path close to the threshold, possibly with the spoilers out. That's the only way I can explain the impact trajectory in my head.
Aterpster,
That all depends what side of the fence you sit on. In Europe the majority of operators fly a constant descent approach, and will adjust an MDA to allow for height loss during the go-around. That is why I specifically mentioned "minima" rather than MDA. However EU-Ops is now calculating minima for non-precision approach (constant descent) as DAs allowing for the height loss. Whichever way it is flown the MDA should not be breached.
I have no idea whether this carrier fly constant descent or level non-precision approaches.
That all depends what side of the fence you sit on. In Europe the majority of operators fly a constant descent approach, and will adjust an MDA to allow for height loss during the go-around. That is why I specifically mentioned "minima" rather than MDA. However EU-Ops is now calculating minima for non-precision approach (constant descent) as DAs allowing for the height loss. Whichever way it is flown the MDA should not be breached.
I have no idea whether this carrier fly constant descent or level non-precision approaches.
Originally Posted by Flying Bagel
they could have been coming in on an intercept from above, messed up their mode selections hoping for an automatic capture
However, you allude to the only too common, most-modern-accidents-feature-it unstable approach. If you are a betting man, it is a good bet.
PJ2,
As I say, it was just a thought. In a calm, prepared environment, a selected-selected NPA is a complete doddle (though I prefer and love managed-managed!). There will be something amiss on this one, which only the boxes will reveal.