Turkish airliner crashes at Schiphol
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DC8
PFDs present TAS as a scrolling "tape measure" plus a larger digital readout of current speed. Scrolling direction should tell pilot the speed change trend - up or down. Not sure if rate meters are also at the pilots disposal which would read 0.0 if speed is constant or plus XX or minus YY if changing.
PFDs present TAS as a scrolling "tape measure" plus a larger digital readout of current speed. Scrolling direction should tell pilot the speed change trend - up or down. Not sure if rate meters are also at the pilots disposal which would read 0.0 if speed is constant or plus XX or minus YY if changing.
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hetfield, If you hand fly the aircraft as much as you say, I would suggest that you are probably overworking the other guys/girls you fly with. By doing this you are also probably cutting down both of your overall situational awareness, just to let you have all of this hands on practice. The automatics are installed for a reason!
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done
so we have beaten this subject to death, primary means of crash avoidance is , Aviate !!!
Let's wait when the CVR tapes are published and the we can read what stories were told on short final in the cockpit, and by whom.
The rest is ambiguous ....
Let's wait when the CVR tapes are published and the we can read what stories were told on short final in the cockpit, and by whom.
The rest is ambiguous ....
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Hetfield,
Quite right.
I too take out the A/P & A/T on a nice day - perhaps not as much as you. My point though is it shouldn't be frowned upon, it should be encouraged.
If it's SOP not to do this most will follow it unwilling to break the procedures - it shouldn't be up to a few 'diehard's' to go against SOP.
"Frowned" ? I don't care! I do about 50% of the approaches out of 10k feet manually, traffic and weather situation permitting.
I too take out the A/P & A/T on a nice day - perhaps not as much as you. My point though is it shouldn't be frowned upon, it should be encouraged.
If it's SOP not to do this most will follow it unwilling to break the procedures - it shouldn't be up to a few 'diehard's' to go against SOP.
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Phil gollin's post a few pages back has got me thinking ... If I were a 738 driver trying to bound WTF happened in this accident that might happen to me, what am I to learn good and take with me to work today?
The Boeing MOM issued less than 24 hours ago (see post #1053 and again #1366 above) was quite specific with warnings about what might happen, but quite unspecific as to how to prevent the risk either before flight or during flight, or how to deal with it except to fly first and read the manuals if you get a chance.
To me, a mere layman, the MOM reads as a warning that Radar Altimeters either better be both working when you need them to or you are to expect any one of at least five specific alligators up to your neck.
As has been pointed out, Boeing's best advice is for someone to carefully monitor primary flight instruments in case those alligators appear, and then do what pilots always do - fly their way out of it.
Something's kinda missing from that message ... do you feel lucky? Well do yer? ...
Maybe the message is benign and it's just saying that pilots with no alligator experience better get some, and there's no better way of getting some than operating an aircraft that has "Alligators sighted yesterday" in the Tech Log?
I don't think so ... let me remove my tongue from my cheek ... it's not benign at all, is it? Which explains the Notice to Airmen that was issued a few hours later (see post #1179). It's surely complulsory reading for 738 drivers and for immediate assimilation before next flight?
Heat on Boeing? Heat right now is on alligator spotters/dodgers in certain Boeings more like until this accident is better understood
As Esterhaus said best: Let's (ALL) be careful out there ...
The Boeing MOM issued less than 24 hours ago (see post #1053 and again #1366 above) was quite specific with warnings about what might happen, but quite unspecific as to how to prevent the risk either before flight or during flight, or how to deal with it except to fly first and read the manuals if you get a chance.
To me, a mere layman, the MOM reads as a warning that Radar Altimeters either better be both working when you need them to or you are to expect any one of at least five specific alligators up to your neck.
As has been pointed out, Boeing's best advice is for someone to carefully monitor primary flight instruments in case those alligators appear, and then do what pilots always do - fly their way out of it.
Something's kinda missing from that message ... do you feel lucky? Well do yer? ...
Maybe the message is benign and it's just saying that pilots with no alligator experience better get some, and there's no better way of getting some than operating an aircraft that has "Alligators sighted yesterday" in the Tech Log?
I don't think so ... let me remove my tongue from my cheek ... it's not benign at all, is it? Which explains the Notice to Airmen that was issued a few hours later (see post #1179). It's surely complulsory reading for 738 drivers and for immediate assimilation before next flight?
Heat on Boeing? Heat right now is on alligator spotters/dodgers in certain Boeings more like until this accident is better understood
As Esterhaus said best: Let's (ALL) be careful out there ...
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@rainboe: From where did you make up the 4th pilot all of a sudden (typo twice so intentional)? Read the report and the posts, a 737 only fits three in the cockpit - as you seem to not know...
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The trouble with todays policy on automation is becoming ever more clear.
Instead of being used to 'lighten the load' autos are more and more being used to carry the load.
The job has been 'de-skilled', although we all hate to admit it. The only arguament is about the extent.
Many pilots now RELY on the automatics.
The clever and reliable automatics mask their lack of basic flying skills and they feel no shame because they are encouraged to use the autos as much as possible when in training or on check.
Personally, I turn them off whenever I can be bothered, which is often.
Instead of being used to 'lighten the load' autos are more and more being used to carry the load.
The job has been 'de-skilled', although we all hate to admit it. The only arguament is about the extent.
Many pilots now RELY on the automatics.
The clever and reliable automatics mask their lack of basic flying skills and they feel no shame because they are encouraged to use the autos as much as possible when in training or on check.
Personally, I turn them off whenever I can be bothered, which is often.
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OK...thanks for the reply, Rainboe. The only time I've "used" one of those things is in a sim and quite frankly, don't like them. But, I'm just a stubborn old coot so what would you expect? All I know is that by having more than one instrument to look at all the time a little more spaced out, I think your scan is better.
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@rainboe: From where did you make up the 4th pilot all of a sudden (typo twice so intentional)? Read the report and the posts, a 737 only fits three in the cockpit - as you seem to not know...
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Quote:
@rainboe: From where did you make up the 4th pilot all of a sudden (typo twice so intentional)? Read the report and the posts, a 737 only fits three in the cockpit - as you seem to not know...
Autopilot?!
Excellent !! Someone is awake !
@rainboe: From where did you make up the 4th pilot all of a sudden (typo twice so intentional)? Read the report and the posts, a 737 only fits three in the cockpit - as you seem to not know...
Autopilot?!
Excellent !! Someone is awake !
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systems design again
Okay, flight crew may have made mistakes. Fine. Maybe maintenance, airline management and ATC also made mistakes. Fine.
This does not mean that systems/automation cannot be improved and it does not absolve Boeing from needing to have a very careful look at their automation logic.
It does not matter whether one or two autopilots were engaged and whether autothrust was and whether it was an autoland or not. It also does not matter whether the radalt had failed or simply gave a wrong reading.
The bottom line is that *no* onboard system should rely on one metric or instrument alone without it being cross-checked against others and if there is any significant discrepancy between sources of information, this should be flagged to pilots and *no* relevant automation should be provided.
That goes for altitude, airspeed and position (at least) and probably many other parameters.
Yes it is AVIATE, NAVIGATE, COMMUNICATE, but it also is CHECK. CHECK. AND CHECK AGAIN. That goes for humans as well as systems.
A number of instruments can provide cross-checks for altitude and whether or not idle throttles or retard or whatever mode that leads to decrease in speed and alt is appropriate. Use them!
Get your act together Boeing, or do you want to lose the first Dreamliner due to a faulty gauge and a couple of confused pilots on a bad day?
This does not mean that systems/automation cannot be improved and it does not absolve Boeing from needing to have a very careful look at their automation logic.
It does not matter whether one or two autopilots were engaged and whether autothrust was and whether it was an autoland or not. It also does not matter whether the radalt had failed or simply gave a wrong reading.
The bottom line is that *no* onboard system should rely on one metric or instrument alone without it being cross-checked against others and if there is any significant discrepancy between sources of information, this should be flagged to pilots and *no* relevant automation should be provided.
That goes for altitude, airspeed and position (at least) and probably many other parameters.
Yes it is AVIATE, NAVIGATE, COMMUNICATE, but it also is CHECK. CHECK. AND CHECK AGAIN. That goes for humans as well as systems.
A number of instruments can provide cross-checks for altitude and whether or not idle throttles or retard or whatever mode that leads to decrease in speed and alt is appropriate. Use them!
Get your act together Boeing, or do you want to lose the first Dreamliner due to a faulty gauge and a couple of confused pilots on a bad day?
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The question is, how do we address this?
The answer lies in priorities in simulator training. If statistics prove the validity of Loss of Control as the now major cause of serious accidents, then ops departments should remove the blinkers from their eyes and admit that manipulative raw data piloting skills are of equal importance to FMC button pressing skills.
It's fine to run a hour long LOFT on automatic pilot while introducing a series of non-normals scenarios requiring the captain to CRM his crew into a grid-iron football huddle and come up with a committee decision. Some of these scenarios even include the instructor wearing the hats of a tarmac despatch engineer, tug driver, various ATC, company operations radio operator, and CSM. Like Shakespeare he uses his vivid imagination to play the role. The captain and first officer play along with the game and become actors. The simulator becomes stage.
If for perfectly valid operational reasons on revenue flights the automatics are to to fly the aircraft for cost efficiency and safety reasons, and that is for 99 percent of the flight, then surely the priority for recurrent training in the simulator should be on manipulative skill training. And not just the odd hand flown flight director ILS. There is little skill needed for that. The more non-automatics hand flying that can be practiced in the simulator - the perfect training aid after all - the more competent the pilot must become.
Most keen pilots would relish the opportunity to throw away the automatics in the simulator and revisit strong crosswind landings at night, high altitude coffin corner buffet leading to an unusual attitude recovery on instruments, a dead stick landing, black hole circling approaches. Take your choice. At least with currency at manual flying as above, pilots will regain confidence in their own ability to react quickly and correctly to a sudden automatics puzzle that happened prior to the Amsterdam crash.
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Ballsout, I think you were responding to my post before also? Covering the flight controls does not mean your hand is glued to the thrust lever. You can move it (while AT/AP is in) to make MCP selections or allow for PNF to select flap.
I disagree, I think 40 secs of idle thrust late (late being the key - even for maintaining 160 to 4D) on the approach would draw your attention. I would be sat waiting for the thrust levers to come up. If they didn't I would be looking why. A lot of this was going on below 1500/1000ft. You should be configured therefore thrust should be on or coming on. At this point I would want approach thrust set anyway.
Either the thrust levers weren't covered or it was another warning sign missed.
Topslide6 - I totally agree with you.
I disagree, I think 40 secs of idle thrust late (late being the key - even for maintaining 160 to 4D) on the approach would draw your attention. I would be sat waiting for the thrust levers to come up. If they didn't I would be looking why. A lot of this was going on below 1500/1000ft. You should be configured therefore thrust should be on or coming on. At this point I would want approach thrust set anyway.
Either the thrust levers weren't covered or it was another warning sign missed.
Topslide6 - I totally agree with you.
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DC-ATE re:ASI displays:
I agree with you. I think it IS an age thing, and I first encountered a speed tape in the 70's on conversion to the BAC Lightning. It took some getting used to. What is missing for old farts like us is the rotary motion of the dial ASI which is a far better clue than scrolling numbers, sliding tapes or fancy green arrows.
Now, moving on - 'airbusa330' tells us a while back (around post 1356):
On LOC/GS autopilot disengages 2 sec after capture.
Did he make this up or have I missed some annnouncement?
I agree with you. I think it IS an age thing, and I first encountered a speed tape in the 70's on conversion to the BAC Lightning. It took some getting used to. What is missing for old farts like us is the rotary motion of the dial ASI which is a far better clue than scrolling numbers, sliding tapes or fancy green arrows.
Now, moving on - 'airbusa330' tells us a while back (around post 1356):
On LOC/GS autopilot disengages 2 sec after capture.
Did he make this up or have I missed some annnouncement?
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@rainboe: From where did you make up the 4th pilot all of a sudden (typo twice so intentional)? Read the report and the posts, a 737 only fits three in the cockpit - as you seem to not know...
Autopilot?!
Excellent !! Someone is awake !
Autopilot?!
Excellent !! Someone is awake !
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flightdeck crew rescue
Would like to get back to the issue raised earlier on about the access to the flightdeck and the rescue of the cockpit crew.
From photo material available it would seem reasonable to assmume that because of the impact the floor came up to a such an extent that this pushed the standing sills of the armoured flightdeck door came on both sides out through the top of the fuselage, leading the door to become stuck.
Early eyewitness report on Radio Noord Holland had said that the crew had been found slumped over the instrument panels in an obviously grave condition.
Pictures of the righthand side of the cockpit, where there is the only window which can be opened from the outside, show the release mechanism under the window (partly) extended. Independent whether this has been caused by the crash itself or manipulated by the rescue services, the bottom line is that the DV window remained unopened.
If the DV proved unopenable, it remains a question why, as the rescue operation progressed, the emergency services apparently saw it fit to start cutting substanitally in the fuselage in the fwd righthand side of the cabin (comprising two windows and the hull underneath, under the letter "H" in Turkish) and not apply the obviously present cutting gear to gain access to the flightdeck.
It has been said that access to the flightdeck would "disturb evidence" in the cockpit, but surely this cannot be put above attempts to save lives ? I won't state explicitly what I suspect is the reason for the initial absence (just after the crash) and later appearance (in the course of the rescue operation) of a white image in the cockpit just aft of the chart stuck in the right DV window. This image is of course no longer there on the second day.
There were reports later on in the rescue operation that an emergency worker had been seen on the cockpitroof. And indeed pictures taken the day after the crash, at the point where the flightcrew had been recovered from the flightdeck, show that the tear in the cockpitroof where the righthand side of the armoured door sill is sticking out has been substantially enlarged and the sill itself brought down and slightly forward in comparison with just after the crash.
Below links to some of the pictures to support these "constats".
http://www.brandweerschiphol.nl/incidenten/2009_02_26/crash.html
Image 76 of 104: rescue operation close after the crash; no white image aft of chart stuck in DV window. No cuts in hull of fwd cabin section under "H" of Turkish.
http://www.flickr.com/photos/rnw/3308530923/sizes/o/
Photo at stage where rescue operation is well underway. Cockpit roof still untouched. Rescuers looking into cockpit; White image aft of chart stuck in DV window. Why have they cut the hull in the fwd cabin section under the "H" of Turkish ?
http://www.nrc.nl/redactie/foto/vliegtuigongeluk2/soundslider.swf
Photo 8 of 13 shows emergency worker cutting hull in fwd cabin section under "H" of Turkish; no white image aft of chart stuck in DV window
http://www.flickr.com/photos/rnw/3311848160/sizes/o/
Photo after access has been gained to flightdeck; clear that cockpit roof has been worked on: door sill has been moved and hull tear has been enlarged. Obviously no longer white image aft of chart stuck in DV window.
From photo material available it would seem reasonable to assmume that because of the impact the floor came up to a such an extent that this pushed the standing sills of the armoured flightdeck door came on both sides out through the top of the fuselage, leading the door to become stuck.
Early eyewitness report on Radio Noord Holland had said that the crew had been found slumped over the instrument panels in an obviously grave condition.
Pictures of the righthand side of the cockpit, where there is the only window which can be opened from the outside, show the release mechanism under the window (partly) extended. Independent whether this has been caused by the crash itself or manipulated by the rescue services, the bottom line is that the DV window remained unopened.
If the DV proved unopenable, it remains a question why, as the rescue operation progressed, the emergency services apparently saw it fit to start cutting substanitally in the fuselage in the fwd righthand side of the cabin (comprising two windows and the hull underneath, under the letter "H" in Turkish) and not apply the obviously present cutting gear to gain access to the flightdeck.
It has been said that access to the flightdeck would "disturb evidence" in the cockpit, but surely this cannot be put above attempts to save lives ? I won't state explicitly what I suspect is the reason for the initial absence (just after the crash) and later appearance (in the course of the rescue operation) of a white image in the cockpit just aft of the chart stuck in the right DV window. This image is of course no longer there on the second day.
There were reports later on in the rescue operation that an emergency worker had been seen on the cockpitroof. And indeed pictures taken the day after the crash, at the point where the flightcrew had been recovered from the flightdeck, show that the tear in the cockpitroof where the righthand side of the armoured door sill is sticking out has been substantially enlarged and the sill itself brought down and slightly forward in comparison with just after the crash.
Below links to some of the pictures to support these "constats".
http://www.brandweerschiphol.nl/incidenten/2009_02_26/crash.html
Image 76 of 104: rescue operation close after the crash; no white image aft of chart stuck in DV window. No cuts in hull of fwd cabin section under "H" of Turkish.
http://www.flickr.com/photos/rnw/3308530923/sizes/o/
Photo at stage where rescue operation is well underway. Cockpit roof still untouched. Rescuers looking into cockpit; White image aft of chart stuck in DV window. Why have they cut the hull in the fwd cabin section under the "H" of Turkish ?
http://www.nrc.nl/redactie/foto/vliegtuigongeluk2/soundslider.swf
Photo 8 of 13 shows emergency worker cutting hull in fwd cabin section under "H" of Turkish; no white image aft of chart stuck in DV window
http://www.flickr.com/photos/rnw/3311848160/sizes/o/
Photo after access has been gained to flightdeck; clear that cockpit roof has been worked on: door sill has been moved and hull tear has been enlarged. Obviously no longer white image aft of chart stuck in DV window.
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Dutch - I think it inappropriate to discuss too much about this, but I would assume that following the enormous impact and deformation of the cockpit area it was judged that time would be better spent on access to the injured passengers. From what I have read, any sort of practical medical treatment of the crew would have been near impossible via the DV window, if indeed it had been openable.
The cutting under the 'H' may well have been the only access in the deformed structure to some of the business class seats?
The cutting under the 'H' may well have been the only access in the deformed structure to some of the business class seats?
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I'm not a pilot but a retired aerospace engineer with a great deal of experience in spacecraft control systems. Reading this thread and the one on the A320 lost at Perpignan, would it be fair to say that:
- human beings do a fair job of flying an airliner and are usually highly reliable
- and so does an automated system and is also highly reliable
- in fact either provides competent piloting, but
- the problem arises at the man/machine interface when either human beings or automated systems intrude or are called on to intervene in the other's territory.
Glaringly obvious maybe, but since we cannot reengineer human beings (yet), it's the automated systems interface to humans that need closer examination. Recent incidents show many failures in this area.
- human beings do a fair job of flying an airliner and are usually highly reliable
- and so does an automated system and is also highly reliable
- in fact either provides competent piloting, but
- the problem arises at the man/machine interface when either human beings or automated systems intrude or are called on to intervene in the other's territory.
Glaringly obvious maybe, but since we cannot reengineer human beings (yet), it's the automated systems interface to humans that need closer examination. Recent incidents show many failures in this area.