Turkish airliner crashes at Schiphol
PMUSTpep
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cargun
I appreciate your viewpoint.
At the end of the day we fly (or in my case flew) the aircraft we are given. It is our job to understand it and how it works. Over time systems develop and evolve but all we have is that aircraft on that day. It is fully certified as being appropriate and safe for the task in hand. We are expected to deal with its imperfections apart from catastrophic failure.
It would appear that on this day a very minor fault led to the aircraft crashing.
I am sure Boeing will look carefully at the reasons but at this point in time it looks horribly like the crew were at fault.
Lessons of all sorts will be learnt but I do not believe any system design errors will come to light.
At the end of the day we fly (or in my case flew) the aircraft we are given. It is our job to understand it and how it works. Over time systems develop and evolve but all we have is that aircraft on that day. It is fully certified as being appropriate and safe for the task in hand. We are expected to deal with its imperfections apart from catastrophic failure.
It would appear that on this day a very minor fault led to the aircraft crashing.
I am sure Boeing will look carefully at the reasons but at this point in time it looks horribly like the crew were at fault.
Lessons of all sorts will be learnt but I do not believe any system design errors will come to light.
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radalt and weight on wheels
I'm not an RA expert, but on many aircraft the "Weight on wheels" discrete (boolean) is broadcast to almost all avionics. A simple enhancement might be if the RA notices negative or very low height for, say, 10 sec without "Weight on wheels" true, it shuts itself down as unserviceable?
I don't know whether this would have prevented this accident, but it would have made the AT disconnect explicitly.
I don't know whether this would have prevented this accident, but it would have made the AT disconnect explicitly.
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Rainboe
I agree with most of what you say, in that a RA failure in itself is a non event, especially as you do not even need a RA for CAT1.
However, you have to bear in mind that when it is coupled with the AT, the undetected errorneous information creates a more severe hazard.
However, again, this hazard should still not have been a catastrophic event, as I'm sure a FHA would verify.
I agree with most of what you say, in that a RA failure in itself is a non event, especially as you do not even need a RA for CAT1.
However, you have to bear in mind that when it is coupled with the AT, the undetected errorneous information creates a more severe hazard.
However, again, this hazard should still not have been a catastrophic event, as I'm sure a FHA would verify.
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Rainboe, you are probably right, but when you say; ''Turkish'', you'll probably mean;''Airforce'' and when you say;''Airforce'' you'll probably mean;''State'' And if you say'' State'', that really hurts in Turkey..........
Let's wait until we have the full report with all details, before we jump to conclusions.
Fly safe,
QTA
Let's wait until we have the full report with all details, before we jump to conclusions.
Fly safe,
QTA
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However, you have to bear in mind that when it is coupled with the AT, the undetected errorneous information creates a more severe hazard.
You can have all the information you want but if there is no-one taking it in, it is pointless.
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If the above is anything close to what actually happened, it is certainly a failure of the whole system. Sully had it bang to rights.
I wouldn't blame the pilots, or the Turkish system in isolation .... this is a typical result of the "dumbing down" of the whole industry by big business. Aviation professionals who can prioritise have been replaced by the cheapest trained labour worked for the longest possible hours.
And there is a lot more like this waiting to happen unless the public wakes up to what is happening in our industry.
I wouldn't blame the pilots, or the Turkish system in isolation .... this is a typical result of the "dumbing down" of the whole industry by big business. Aviation professionals who can prioritise have been replaced by the cheapest trained labour worked for the longest possible hours.
And there is a lot more like this waiting to happen unless the public wakes up to what is happening in our industry.
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Fact; If in case of RA2 failure (e.g. readout difference between the two) A/T automatically uses RA1 as fallback, then this most likely would not have happened. It is single device dependancy w/o backups (or clear system feedback) that creates dangerous situations.
We can have a long debate as to pilots becoming computer programmers or staying airmen. Fact is these days you cant do w/o computers and the complexity understanding the dependancies are, to say the least, challenging as we see again and again.
We can have a long debate as to pilots becoming computer programmers or staying airmen. Fact is these days you cant do w/o computers and the complexity understanding the dependancies are, to say the least, challenging as we see again and again.
Per Ardua ad Astraeus
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Never mind disappearing flight directors,
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wiggy wrote:
I may fall in that category. Not a professional pilot but a professional software developer. Anyway...
There is someting rather interesting about the Boeing vs. Airbus discussion. Airbus having the alpha floor that protects the plane from stalling. Probably fine, but too much automation is bad (IMHO). But the big question is: Why is it possible to program a Boing 737NG to stall????
Having a stall protection may be fine (although not necessary), but having a computer that can be programed to stall the aircraft is not. Forget about how to configure Autoland for a while. Why does Boeing allow the automation being programmed for disaster in the first place?
It's like putting a button in the cockpit with a sign "Do not press this button!". Eventually soneone will press it.
And yes, I know (and agree) the pilots are responsible to flying the aircraft. My point is that the automation should not be able to cause disaster. In single channel approach the A/T should not RETARD. I've learned that Autoland is always dual channel so why do you guys need the A/T to throttle down after a single channel approach? You know how to stop an aircraft as soon as it hits the runway...
and in it's way is quite illuminating (IMHO), on one hand we have the techies who want to analyse every single wiggly Amp, line of code or whatever, looking for a "reason" for the accident and then perhaps opportion some of the blame to Boeing, the Company Engineers, even ATC.
There is someting rather interesting about the Boeing vs. Airbus discussion. Airbus having the alpha floor that protects the plane from stalling. Probably fine, but too much automation is bad (IMHO). But the big question is: Why is it possible to program a Boing 737NG to stall????
Having a stall protection may be fine (although not necessary), but having a computer that can be programed to stall the aircraft is not. Forget about how to configure Autoland for a while. Why does Boeing allow the automation being programmed for disaster in the first place?
It's like putting a button in the cockpit with a sign "Do not press this button!". Eventually soneone will press it.
And yes, I know (and agree) the pilots are responsible to flying the aircraft. My point is that the automation should not be able to cause disaster. In single channel approach the A/T should not RETARD. I've learned that Autoland is always dual channel so why do you guys need the A/T to throttle down after a single channel approach? You know how to stop an aircraft as soon as it hits the runway...
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BOAC
Flight Directors - off the Boeing MOM 'from memory' as I can't find the darn thing now.
ROD - true but must have increased dramatically when there was still a good chance of recovery.
I think you get my general point though.
ROD - true but must have increased dramatically when there was still a good chance of recovery.
I think you get my general point though.
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@BOAC: This was posted way back that according to Boeing one or both F/D had failed. I've asked for the source but there was no reply.
RA and F/D failure - I don't get the connection here.
bobcat4: I also fall in your category and it really bewilders me how airplane systems can operate like in this case. There is so much sophistication and yet basic logic to prevent the ultimate deadlock situation is missing. Look at Birgenair - the pitot filled with dirt, automation did nothing here but left the pilots in total state of confusion. That is not well designed automation!
RA and F/D failure - I don't get the connection here.
bobcat4: I also fall in your category and it really bewilders me how airplane systems can operate like in this case. There is so much sophistication and yet basic logic to prevent the ultimate deadlock situation is missing. Look at Birgenair - the pitot filled with dirt, automation did nothing here but left the pilots in total state of confusion. That is not well designed automation!