Brand new Etihad A340-600 damaged in Toulouse; several wounded
Yeh don't tell me. The pilot got promoted and became fleet manager on another fleet and then nearly ran out of fuel in West Africa on one of his new twin engined airbus aeroplanes. Did he get promoted again - I can't remember.
You can say that if you like, Fly380 (whoever you are); I couldn't possibly comment...
He wouldn't have been the first ex-short-haul pilot to get caught out in West Africa with lousy weather-forecasting in the Harmattan season. The Airbus... is immaterial!
He wouldn't have been the first ex-short-haul pilot to get caught out in West Africa with lousy weather-forecasting in the Harmattan season. The Airbus... is immaterial!
Well Chris Scott - it seems we both remember the event and as a direct result the system changed. Any high speed taxi checks had to be crewed and prepared for a normal flight with a load sheet and 2 pilots. For anyone interested in this particular event the aircraft became airborne when the flaps were selected (don't know why). It was out of trim and the pilot managed to stay airborne narrowly missing the Gatwick control tower - the old one! - before completing a very hairy circuit and landing safely. A very narrow escape. I am not aware of a similar occurence since - fortunately.
Oh and by the way I didn't think The Hamattan reached Libreville.
Oh and by the way I didn't think The Hamattan reached Libreville.
Lessons (not always) handed down
Yes, Fly380, you are spot-on.
I hope the Moderators will accept that this discussion is not entirely off-topic. When maintenance procedures suddenly turn into what equates to an operational incident/accident, lessons have to be learned (or, sadly, relearned) and, if necessary, new procedures worked out:
a) by those intimately concerned, the fleet, and the company;
b) by the whole industry, via the MOR system;
c) the lessons must be handed down from generation to generation. There is nothing new under the sun.
Unfortunately, every generation thinks that its predecessors were (a) idiots and (b) operating archaic kit that bears no relevance to the latest miracles of technology.
What happened was, I think, unprecedented on a jet airliner at the time, and the gentleman concerned was no fool. Normal practice had been to park the A/C after flight with the TPI (stab trim) at a nose-up-trim angle suitable for T/O well-laden, rather than zero. The A/C was naturally tail-heavy when empty. The flaps would have been at zero. The aeroplane rotated spontaneously, like even a B707 can do, but at a low speed... The flaps were, I think, selected deliberately to stop the aeroplane stalling when it was already well airborne.
The revised procedure for high-speed taxiing, as you say, was effectively to prepare the aircraft for flight. Will this concept be handed down the generations?
We have all learned a lot from reading on this thread about Airbus's mixed fortunes at Blagnac, and the way they could have avoided losing an aircraft. We understand a lot more about the role of chocks on large aeroplanes. Let's hope the next generation, somewhere in the world, doesn't make history repeat itself. Can't say I'm confident...
I hope the Moderators will accept that this discussion is not entirely off-topic. When maintenance procedures suddenly turn into what equates to an operational incident/accident, lessons have to be learned (or, sadly, relearned) and, if necessary, new procedures worked out:
a) by those intimately concerned, the fleet, and the company;
b) by the whole industry, via the MOR system;
c) the lessons must be handed down from generation to generation. There is nothing new under the sun.
Unfortunately, every generation thinks that its predecessors were (a) idiots and (b) operating archaic kit that bears no relevance to the latest miracles of technology.
What happened was, I think, unprecedented on a jet airliner at the time, and the gentleman concerned was no fool. Normal practice had been to park the A/C after flight with the TPI (stab trim) at a nose-up-trim angle suitable for T/O well-laden, rather than zero. The A/C was naturally tail-heavy when empty. The flaps would have been at zero. The aeroplane rotated spontaneously, like even a B707 can do, but at a low speed... The flaps were, I think, selected deliberately to stop the aeroplane stalling when it was already well airborne.
The revised procedure for high-speed taxiing, as you say, was effectively to prepare the aircraft for flight. Will this concept be handed down the generations?
We have all learned a lot from reading on this thread about Airbus's mixed fortunes at Blagnac, and the way they could have avoided losing an aircraft. We understand a lot more about the role of chocks on large aeroplanes. Let's hope the next generation, somewhere in the world, doesn't make history repeat itself. Can't say I'm confident...
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Have they found the cause?
There is a email rumor circulating on the internet which seems to come from someone with inside knowledge of this accident. Anyone hear of a possible "official" report?
I have cleaned it up a bit.
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Employees of the airline were in the aircraft, but no employees from the manufacturer were on board.
All four engines were set to takeoff power in this virtually empty aircraft. The run-up protocol prohibits this.
No chocks were set. Brakes will not hold aircraft at full power.
Takeoff warning horn was sounding in the cockpit because all four engines were at full power.
The flight computer thought they were trying to takeoff but the plane had not been configured properly (flaps/slats, etc, etc).
One of the crew pulled the 'Ground Sense' circuit breaker to quiet the alarms.
The aircraft now assumes it’s in the air.
The flight computer automatically releases the brakes. This is a safety feature to prevent the brakes from operating before landing.
The throttles were not retarded by manual control until about 2 seconds before impact.
I have cleaned it up a bit.
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Employees of the airline were in the aircraft, but no employees from the manufacturer were on board.
All four engines were set to takeoff power in this virtually empty aircraft. The run-up protocol prohibits this.
No chocks were set. Brakes will not hold aircraft at full power.
Takeoff warning horn was sounding in the cockpit because all four engines were at full power.
The flight computer thought they were trying to takeoff but the plane had not been configured properly (flaps/slats, etc, etc).
One of the crew pulled the 'Ground Sense' circuit breaker to quiet the alarms.
The aircraft now assumes it’s in the air.
The flight computer automatically releases the brakes. This is a safety feature to prevent the brakes from operating before landing.
The throttles were not retarded by manual control until about 2 seconds before impact.
Last edited by jfill; 27th Mar 2008 at 21:08.
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quote " But, if you're going to do run up tests surely the manual states the braking/anchorage requirements.
Were these requirements met?"
I think the manual probably says only run-up one engine at a time in which case the brakes are adequate to hold the a/c
Were these requirements met?"
I think the manual probably says only run-up one engine at a time in which case the brakes are adequate to hold the a/c
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Interesting Post - Good memories
Post #312 by "Good memories" previously raised a similar focus on the cause. The email source is thought to be an active pilot who doesn't follow internet forums. Maybe we are closely circling around the actual events.
These types of post get to be massive in size and a little hard to follow. Some argue let's just wait for the "official" report but that would take all the fun out of it. But more importantly there is significant educational value in many of the well thought out and insightful post.
I think it is the nature of pilots to want to troubleshoot problems real time. When flying, you don't have the luxury to wait for the "official report."
These types of post get to be massive in size and a little hard to follow. Some argue let's just wait for the "official" report but that would take all the fun out of it. But more importantly there is significant educational value in many of the well thought out and insightful post.
I think it is the nature of pilots to want to troubleshoot problems real time. When flying, you don't have the luxury to wait for the "official report."
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Chris Scott and Fly380
IIRC the flaps were selected to silence the T/O Config Warning - Flap extension happened about 80 kts. and with the TPI nose-up (set after landing to allow water to drain?) the aircraft was destined to fly...
TP
IIRC the flaps were selected to silence the T/O Config Warning - Flap extension happened about 80 kts. and with the TPI nose-up (set after landing to allow water to drain?) the aircraft was destined to fly...
TP
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Employees of the airline were in the aircraft, but no employees from the manufacturer were on board.
There is a email rumor circulating on the internet
Lessons (not always) handed down.
Thanks for setting me straight on that one, TP. Your memory seems to be better than mine. We did indeed leave the TPI (tailplane) parked at 3deg nose-up (trim) for water draining. [Why did we not do the opposite, i.e., leave the trailing edge down? That would have kept the nosewheel on the ground.]
But we three are at risk of running a parallel topic here...
But we three are at risk of running a parallel topic here...
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I can't really see the French releasing something that officially shows Airbus in a bad light - but we live in hope
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Employees of the airline were in the aircraft, but no employees from the manufacturer were on board
That's cobblers.
There were nine people on board. Two from Airbus, the other seven from ADAT - formerly GAMCO. None from Etihad, afaik.
Both Airbus employees were among the five taken to hospital afterwards.
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A340-600 demaged at Toulouse
Hi, As far as i know, looking the photos from different sides i could not see any chocks around on ground.
To my knoledge choks should be fitted on, in testing engine area.
Also the aircraft is facing the testing area, instead been backwards.
Really i'im very interested to know if chocks were on, as is an important matter on my job.
Thanks , Alex
To my knoledge choks should be fitted on, in testing engine area.
Also the aircraft is facing the testing area, instead been backwards.
Really i'im very interested to know if chocks were on, as is an important matter on my job.
Thanks , Alex