Mid-air collision over Brasil
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Fairly said. Let me try this.
If there is a 1 in a million chance that some event will happen to you, what does that mean?
A) It does mean that it is unlikely to happen to you.
B) It also means that of the million people to whom it might happen, it will happen to one of them.
Probabilities work both ways, they say there is a small chance of something, but that small chance is going to happen to somebody.
If there is a 1 in a million chance that some event will happen to you, what does that mean?
A) It does mean that it is unlikely to happen to you.
B) It also means that of the million people to whom it might happen, it will happen to one of them.
Probabilities work both ways, they say there is a small chance of something, but that small chance is going to happen to somebody.
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Regarding offsets, I know some ATC centres will often position aircraft one side of an airway or another for traffic flow to assist with the flow between sectors.
One I can think of is one near Southampton to/from Lands End, north side for traffic to Lands End, south for traffic from Lands End.
One I can think of is one near Southampton to/from Lands End, north side for traffic to Lands End, south for traffic from Lands End.
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Good gosh, how more conservative can we be? The offset capability's here, the need is real, we have a good bit of real experience with it, and now we need to have another study?
How about implementing enroute offset NOW in certain countries, wait a few decades in other countries, and compare body counts?
How about implementing enroute offset NOW in certain countries, wait a few decades in other countries, and compare body counts?
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Good gosh, how more conservative can we be? The offset capability's here, the need is real, we have a good bit of real experience with it, and now we need to have another study?
How about implementing enroute offset NOW in certain countries, wait a few decades in other countries, and compare body counts?
How about implementing enroute offset NOW in certain countries, wait a few decades in other countries, and compare body counts?
It is amazing to watch how close opposite direction traffic passes by us. Often times within our wingspan, even while making turns over navigation fixes.
Father visited Monkton center years ago. Controller was just checking in one of the first flights westbound from Europe. Realized the a/c was an FMC equipped a/c and put a grease pencil mark on his screen.
My father asked, "what's that for?"
"Watch, every FMC equipped a/c will fly over the same spot. Non-FMC a/c won't."
The risk of a midair will go up when everyone flies the exact centerline.
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I had an absolutely fascinating encounter one day about 15 years ago while inbound to the Lagos VOR from Abuja. The approach handling was procedural, since the radar hadn't been working for a long time.
I was at FL60 with an HS125 above me at FL70 and we were both close to the fix. I was cleared to 2 000' and then the HS was cleared to 3 500'. I noticed that he wasn't given a rate restriction but I assumed that he had heard me and knew I was underneath him not too far away. I knew the pilot was a pretty sharp guy so I assumed we were reading from the same page there.
I had already sort of eased over towards the final inbound track for Runway 19L, thinking to get lined up at about five miles so that I could just get a straight-in. That meant a track change from 247 degrees to 186 degrees close to the fix. Sloppy airmanship or just local knowledge? There was no one beneath me in the stack so that I was anticipating a clearance for the approach close to the fix. Otherwise I would have had to hold on the 006 anyway so that it wasn't as if I was infringing with this slight lateral shift.
The next call was from the HS125 crew, levelling at 3 500'! I was just passing FL50 with a fairly brisk rate of descent so that they must have done some monster rate without noticing that there was traffic beneath them. I climbed back up to FL50 and sorted out the immediate problem by letting them go first.
Later I went over to talk to the Captain. It was an amicable discussion, snce we were both simply happy to be alive. From what we could figure out he had been on that normal track when I had been moving over but we still must have passed very close abeam given that we were about the same distance from the VOR, close enough that even 61 degrees would only have been something like a half-mile or so. We were solid IMC so that keeping a lookout was not a factor.
It was just one of those things; the controller should have given a rate restriction, the Captain should have noticed my traffic and not used the very high rate he did and I should have queried the lack of a rate restriction. The whole scenario played out in less time than it took to read this, I guess.
I was at FL60 with an HS125 above me at FL70 and we were both close to the fix. I was cleared to 2 000' and then the HS was cleared to 3 500'. I noticed that he wasn't given a rate restriction but I assumed that he had heard me and knew I was underneath him not too far away. I knew the pilot was a pretty sharp guy so I assumed we were reading from the same page there.
I had already sort of eased over towards the final inbound track for Runway 19L, thinking to get lined up at about five miles so that I could just get a straight-in. That meant a track change from 247 degrees to 186 degrees close to the fix. Sloppy airmanship or just local knowledge? There was no one beneath me in the stack so that I was anticipating a clearance for the approach close to the fix. Otherwise I would have had to hold on the 006 anyway so that it wasn't as if I was infringing with this slight lateral shift.
The next call was from the HS125 crew, levelling at 3 500'! I was just passing FL50 with a fairly brisk rate of descent so that they must have done some monster rate without noticing that there was traffic beneath them. I climbed back up to FL50 and sorted out the immediate problem by letting them go first.
Later I went over to talk to the Captain. It was an amicable discussion, snce we were both simply happy to be alive. From what we could figure out he had been on that normal track when I had been moving over but we still must have passed very close abeam given that we were about the same distance from the VOR, close enough that even 61 degrees would only have been something like a half-mile or so. We were solid IMC so that keeping a lookout was not a factor.
It was just one of those things; the controller should have given a rate restriction, the Captain should have noticed my traffic and not used the very high rate he did and I should have queried the lack of a rate restriction. The whole scenario played out in less time than it took to read this, I guess.
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Can we simply look at offset as similar to painting a yellow line down the middle of the road and everybody stays on their side of the road? By then again, which side of the road is the correct side?
Chuks, you state:
Chuks, I couldn’t agree more. As Chairman of the Australian Civil Aviation Safety Authority in 1998 I attempted to introduce as part of the Airspace 2000 changes a recommendation that all aircraft fly 0.1 nautical mile to the right of track when on a two way airway using GPS.
I was howled down by the professional pilots and professional air traffic controllers. They told me that no “professional” would intentionally fly off the centre of the track, and also pointed out some 1950s ICAO requirement to stay in the centre of the track as far as possible. Of course, this was when we were tracking around using VORs and NDBs, not highly accurate GPS.
I still have the Airspace 2000 publication with the 0.1 mile recommendation. I wondered whether a major airline accident would have to occur before the changes were made. It looks as if this is what will happen.
A previous poster on this thread compared the resistance to change of many airline pilots with the resistance to change of the Vatican. I couldn’t agree more.
One thing I find a bit scary is the way we all go wazzing along right down the centreline of the airways nowadays. With the reduced vertical separation being used there's not much margin for error.
I was howled down by the professional pilots and professional air traffic controllers. They told me that no “professional” would intentionally fly off the centre of the track, and also pointed out some 1950s ICAO requirement to stay in the centre of the track as far as possible. Of course, this was when we were tracking around using VORs and NDBs, not highly accurate GPS.
I still have the Airspace 2000 publication with the 0.1 mile recommendation. I wondered whether a major airline accident would have to occur before the changes were made. It looks as if this is what will happen.
A previous poster on this thread compared the resistance to change of many airline pilots with the resistance to change of the Vatican. I couldn’t agree more.
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A quarter mile offset works for me. At the scale we use on our radar, you wouldn't even notice that kind of distance and I can't, for the life of me, think of a scenario where it would make the kind of difference that would result in a near miss or worse. Of course, that kind of bold assertion is just ripe for proving wrong when all the holes in the cheese line up.
I'm not at work at the moment, but I think that we have something about offsets in our manuals. I can't remember if it's a "be aware that some aircraft may be doing this" type of warning or if it's suggested as an ATC tool to keep aircraft apart when radar's down or whatever. I'll have to check.
Anyway, it's been well known in ATC circles that greater accuracy in navigation leads to aircraft on same tracks being much closer than the old days. An official OK to offsetting would be timely, IMHO.
I'm not at work at the moment, but I think that we have something about offsets in our manuals. I can't remember if it's a "be aware that some aircraft may be doing this" type of warning or if it's suggested as an ATC tool to keep aircraft apart when radar's down or whatever. I'll have to check.
Anyway, it's been well known in ATC circles that greater accuracy in navigation leads to aircraft on same tracks being much closer than the old days. An official OK to offsetting would be timely, IMHO.
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Course Offset
Dick Smith is totally correct. With the introduction of GPS navigation, we are no longer trying to center swaying needles. Coupled to the autopilot, GPS nav provides for course accuracy generally within ten or so meters.
However, with RVSM, this creates a problem. Many times when a heavy overflies by 1000 feet...and, with light winds aloft, we get our #$^% kicked by the wake. This is because he is dead-nuts-on centerline...as are we. We just hope and pray that no one was hurt in the back.
It's easy to program 'the box' to do a slight offset. Unfortunately, doing so is not in our company's SOP, thereby prohibiting such a prudent action. In my opinion, there is nothing wrong with doing up to and including a two-mile offset (all offsets always to the right). With GPS, you're still much closer to course centerline than in the old days. (In the old days, even with the needle centered, you still probably were not exactly on course centerline.)
This two-mile offset can be reduced as desired, the decision based, perhaps, on the winds aloft. (For example, with a left crosswind, offsetting to the right might put you in wake that, normally centerline flying might avoid.)
In any event, operators should consider the course offset as SOP and encourage the use. A mile or two off centerline allows you to remain well within the boundaries of the airway, while providing a safety margin for both collision and wake turbulence avoidance.
PantLoad
However, with RVSM, this creates a problem. Many times when a heavy overflies by 1000 feet...and, with light winds aloft, we get our #$^% kicked by the wake. This is because he is dead-nuts-on centerline...as are we. We just hope and pray that no one was hurt in the back.
It's easy to program 'the box' to do a slight offset. Unfortunately, doing so is not in our company's SOP, thereby prohibiting such a prudent action. In my opinion, there is nothing wrong with doing up to and including a two-mile offset (all offsets always to the right). With GPS, you're still much closer to course centerline than in the old days. (In the old days, even with the needle centered, you still probably were not exactly on course centerline.)
This two-mile offset can be reduced as desired, the decision based, perhaps, on the winds aloft. (For example, with a left crosswind, offsetting to the right might put you in wake that, normally centerline flying might avoid.)
In any event, operators should consider the course offset as SOP and encourage the use. A mile or two off centerline allows you to remain well within the boundaries of the airway, while providing a safety margin for both collision and wake turbulence avoidance.
PantLoad
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How does the Offset idea hold up in terms of long range airspace issues. I haven't followed developments in that arena for a good long while, and I could be totally out to lunch on this, but wasn't there talk some while ago of narrowing airways to free up airspace.
I'm also puzzled about the TCAS failure. This was a relatively new design. Shouldn't there have been A TCAS FAIL alert in the EMBRAER warning systems somewhere.
I'm also puzzled about the TCAS failure. This was a relatively new design. Shouldn't there have been A TCAS FAIL alert in the EMBRAER warning systems somewhere.
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Maybe some good can come from this unfortunate collision if it gives some backbone to the airlines and the administrators for near-term (sooner rather than later) adoption of moderate lateral offsets on enroute airways as the baseline SOP.
Smurfjet and nnc0
Save you reading the whole thread, The legacy's transponder was temporarily inop at the time, for reason/s as yet unknown (I think.) Transponder off means TCAS - on either aircraft - will not produce an alert.
It would be good if there is someone reading this who is involved at the ATS OPS level of airway and separation design. I can't imagine a small offset will invalidate the separations applicable to airways. Say, up to half a mile or so. Airway separation incorporates a degree of Nav tolerance, plus a fixed buffer, plus (finally) the spacing required, usually 5nm. As an example, an ancient airway defined by NDB's at either end might require about 35nm space away from another similar airway at the midpoint - depending on the length, of course, because the Nav tolerance is so high. For an airway defined exclusively by GPS, that space is obviously a lot less.
And if including an offset invalidates that, well maybe it's time to redesign them a little further apart. An extra mile or so surely isn't going to result in reduced capacity because of reduced space available to fit the airways in?
I'm a tower controller, but when I was an area controller I wouldn't have cared in the slightest if someone was offset. Wouldn't have even been able to discern it.
Save you reading the whole thread, The legacy's transponder was temporarily inop at the time, for reason/s as yet unknown (I think.) Transponder off means TCAS - on either aircraft - will not produce an alert.
It would be good if there is someone reading this who is involved at the ATS OPS level of airway and separation design. I can't imagine a small offset will invalidate the separations applicable to airways. Say, up to half a mile or so. Airway separation incorporates a degree of Nav tolerance, plus a fixed buffer, plus (finally) the spacing required, usually 5nm. As an example, an ancient airway defined by NDB's at either end might require about 35nm space away from another similar airway at the midpoint - depending on the length, of course, because the Nav tolerance is so high. For an airway defined exclusively by GPS, that space is obviously a lot less.
And if including an offset invalidates that, well maybe it's time to redesign them a little further apart. An extra mile or so surely isn't going to result in reduced capacity because of reduced space available to fit the airways in?
I'm a tower controller, but when I was an area controller I wouldn't have cared in the slightest if someone was offset. Wouldn't have even been able to discern it.
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Have flown in a major airline. In certain airspace, outside radar coverage, an offset right of track was officially authorised.
This was before GPS. GPS is a bigger problem because of its increased accuracy and hence an offset is even more vital.
This was before GPS. GPS is a bigger problem because of its increased accuracy and hence an offset is even more vital.
Last edited by 4Greens; 7th Nov 2006 at 21:48.
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A quick question: is there equipment out there that allows offsetting to less than 1 mile? I've fown a variety of equipment and have never come across an FMS that will accept less than 1 mile in its offset function.
***
Again, I'm amazed at how many people within the industry continue to resist offsetting, even after the 747/IL76 midair near Delhi almost ten years ago, the C141/Tu154 midair off West Africa a few year later, and now the midair that's the subject of this thread. In round figures, that's almost 500 people dead who'd still be alive if this simple, life saving, last ditch safety measure was accepted and allowed to be used.
These three accidents prove that even with the most sophisticated high tech anti collision systems and (supposedly) ‘best practice’ ATC procedures it's possible to introduce, all the holes in the cheese STILL can line up.
It seems to me the only way this will ever be introduced is if pilots demand it. Maybe it’s a job for the tech committees of ALPA, BALPA and IFALPA?
What’s the name of the new guy in ALPA? Maybe he could cut his industrial teeth on this before he starts organising strikes to regain pilot pay and conditions. Surely keeping his members alive might be considered even more important than keeping them well paid?
***
Again, I'm amazed at how many people within the industry continue to resist offsetting, even after the 747/IL76 midair near Delhi almost ten years ago, the C141/Tu154 midair off West Africa a few year later, and now the midair that's the subject of this thread. In round figures, that's almost 500 people dead who'd still be alive if this simple, life saving, last ditch safety measure was accepted and allowed to be used.
These three accidents prove that even with the most sophisticated high tech anti collision systems and (supposedly) ‘best practice’ ATC procedures it's possible to introduce, all the holes in the cheese STILL can line up.
It seems to me the only way this will ever be introduced is if pilots demand it. Maybe it’s a job for the tech committees of ALPA, BALPA and IFALPA?
What’s the name of the new guy in ALPA? Maybe he could cut his industrial teeth on this before he starts organising strikes to regain pilot pay and conditions. Surely keeping his members alive might be considered even more important than keeping them well paid?
Per Ardua ad Astraeus
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410 - Way back somewhere in this thread I mentioned that the 'default' offset on the 737 is 0.1nm Right. That would put 2 'offsetting' 737s about 1200 ft apart (less half-span, of course) - which is more than enough, but not too much?
I'm in one of those moods
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Dick Smith
… yes well, like so many things in aviation (particularly Oz), the ‘whole’ is often the issue, then, as is the case since, the good bits often do not make it past first base because they are ‘part’ of demonstrably bad packages that do not stand up to overall ‘safety positive’ assessment (such as changing CTA C to G or E) …. That was, and still is repeatedly pointed out to those who would promote change without process!
… not on the subject of offsets
… that ICAO requirement was/is due to ‘ground based’ navigation tolerances and lateral separation calculation 'requirements'.
.
There is no doubt that even shallow angle crossing track lateral separation points can be calculated using an additional .5-1nm lateral buffer to all intercept angles (taking procedural latsep conflict points further away from the crossing points), making them more restrictive that they currently are. However, unless and until ICAO states (most countries) reconcile to reduce Latsep buffers for RNP aircraft, the problem remains.
.
.. are you aware of which countries permit track offset (if asked)?? … are you aware of why some companies do not permit crew initiated track offset??
.
In a general sense, the problem is/will always be the simplicity for ATS operators to be able to apply tolerances to ‘all’ IFR aircraft! … it is simply asking for trouble if a range of latsep distances are available for any given procedural crossing point which must be looked up (because there are so many different tolerances to be applied) by the ATC dependent on the nav gear of the conflict pair!
.
Additionally, (as has been discussed here already) is the FMS issue of offset being ‘confirmed cancelled’ during phases of flight other than en-route. .5-1nm might get real interesting in the approach phase (however unlikely) such as GPS tracking to the ARP! …
.
The answer may be to apply different latsep procedures above FL280 (which would more than likely nowadays capture only aircraft with RNP Nav)
… not really, GPS was around then, then as now, the issue is those aircraft that still do not carry GPS RNP equipment!
.. you presumably also then have the rest of the reasons why Airspace 2000 was not progressed!
… in this case, it is clear the multi-layered defences ‘failed’. Why is still at question, and it would be inappropriate to ‘assume’ that we understand the ‘how and why’, it is fair to say, that given the number of flights over a reasonable number of years that pass directly over or under or past by TCAS resolution, the ‘normal’ defences are robust …. Would offsets add another layer .. I think so! …. However, all of the risk inputs must be considered with this change … such as:-
.
.. would ATC become less vigilant knowing that offsets might save the day?
.. would Pilots become less vigilant knowing that offsets might save the day?
.
.. could a different fault tree be lurking as a result of this change? such as:-
.
… how might TCAS respond to a traffic conflict that will pass 1nm+ abeam?
… how might automated ATS systems respond to traffic that does not cross a waypoint?
… how might automated ATS conflict alarm systems be affected by offset?
... what effects could occur with FMS selection and management?
... do 'all' FMS systems support offset modes that do not present confusion/misunderstanding senarios to crews (display and auto cancellation etc)?
... could all current operators fly '.5 right offsets'?
.
…. Might all be innocuous, may be not, however ‘careful’ analysis is needed from both airborne and ground based view points! …. Should it be looked at … absolutely and ASAP … haste should not be allowed to 'cause' other issues though!!!
.
... another issue is of course single way route structures ... great thing they are too .. are they possible in all en-route environments ...no ... simply because it effectively doubles the number of crossing points for ATC operators to watch in any given area (particularly with lots of crossing tracks mid continent) ... it all comes down to 'resources' I guess ... oh no not that dirty word!
.
The fact remains, had existing defences not failed, the accident likley would not have happened! One of those last line defences is TCAS (and TXPDRS) … perhaps this is also a timely ‘reminder’ of the folly of airspace design that relies only on TCAS and TXPDR operation as a ‘last line of defence’ i.e. Non radar E airspace (remember AusNAS2b)
… resistance to change? … perhaps resistance to the type and mode of change!
.
Rather than seemingly besmirching RPT Pilots and Air Traffic Controllers (who in any common sense definition of the word have only one objective ‘SAFETY’ and its ongoing improvement) and looking for ‘I told you so’ headlines …. Lobby ICAO and systems manufacturers for automatic track offset ability/approval outside terminal areas!. .... did you lobby ICAO states for 'uniform' cross-border offsets back in 1998- or since???
As Chairman of the Australian Civil Aviation Safety Authority in 1998 I attempted to introduce as part of the Airspace 2000 changes a recommendation that all aircraft fly 0.1 nautical mile to the right of track when on a two way airway using GPS.
I was howled down by the professional pilots and professional air traffic controllers.
They told me that no “professional” would intentionally fly off the centre of the track, and also pointed out some 1950s ICAO requirement to stay in the centre of the track as far as possible.
.
There is no doubt that even shallow angle crossing track lateral separation points can be calculated using an additional .5-1nm lateral buffer to all intercept angles (taking procedural latsep conflict points further away from the crossing points), making them more restrictive that they currently are. However, unless and until ICAO states (most countries) reconcile to reduce Latsep buffers for RNP aircraft, the problem remains.
.
.. are you aware of which countries permit track offset (if asked)?? … are you aware of why some companies do not permit crew initiated track offset??
.
In a general sense, the problem is/will always be the simplicity for ATS operators to be able to apply tolerances to ‘all’ IFR aircraft! … it is simply asking for trouble if a range of latsep distances are available for any given procedural crossing point which must be looked up (because there are so many different tolerances to be applied) by the ATC dependent on the nav gear of the conflict pair!
.
Additionally, (as has been discussed here already) is the FMS issue of offset being ‘confirmed cancelled’ during phases of flight other than en-route. .5-1nm might get real interesting in the approach phase (however unlikely) such as GPS tracking to the ARP! …
.
The answer may be to apply different latsep procedures above FL280 (which would more than likely nowadays capture only aircraft with RNP Nav)
Of course, this was when we were tracking around using VORs and NDBs, not highly accurate GPS.
I still have the Airspace 2000 publication with the 0.1 mile recommendation.
I wondered whether a major airline accident would have to occur before the changes were made. It looks as if this is what will happen.
.
.. would ATC become less vigilant knowing that offsets might save the day?
.. would Pilots become less vigilant knowing that offsets might save the day?
.
.. could a different fault tree be lurking as a result of this change? such as:-
.
… how might TCAS respond to a traffic conflict that will pass 1nm+ abeam?
… how might automated ATS systems respond to traffic that does not cross a waypoint?
… how might automated ATS conflict alarm systems be affected by offset?
... what effects could occur with FMS selection and management?
... do 'all' FMS systems support offset modes that do not present confusion/misunderstanding senarios to crews (display and auto cancellation etc)?
... could all current operators fly '.5 right offsets'?
.
…. Might all be innocuous, may be not, however ‘careful’ analysis is needed from both airborne and ground based view points! …. Should it be looked at … absolutely and ASAP … haste should not be allowed to 'cause' other issues though!!!
.
... another issue is of course single way route structures ... great thing they are too .. are they possible in all en-route environments ...no ... simply because it effectively doubles the number of crossing points for ATC operators to watch in any given area (particularly with lots of crossing tracks mid continent) ... it all comes down to 'resources' I guess ... oh no not that dirty word!
.
The fact remains, had existing defences not failed, the accident likley would not have happened! One of those last line defences is TCAS (and TXPDRS) … perhaps this is also a timely ‘reminder’ of the folly of airspace design that relies only on TCAS and TXPDR operation as a ‘last line of defence’ i.e. Non radar E airspace (remember AusNAS2b)
A previous poster on this thread compared the resistance to change of many airline pilots with the resistance to change of the Vatican. I couldn’t agree more.
.
Rather than seemingly besmirching RPT Pilots and Air Traffic Controllers (who in any common sense definition of the word have only one objective ‘SAFETY’ and its ongoing improvement) and looking for ‘I told you so’ headlines …. Lobby ICAO and systems manufacturers for automatic track offset ability/approval outside terminal areas!. .... did you lobby ICAO states for 'uniform' cross-border offsets back in 1998- or since???