Mid-air collision over Brasil
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Complete transcription of today's Folha of S.Paulo article:
02/11/2006 - 09:40
Black box of Legacy reveals that tower mistook
ELIANE CANTANHÊDE
Columnist of the Folha of S.Paulo
The control tower of flights of São José dos Campos (SP) authorized the pilots of Legacy, Joe Lepore and Jan Paladino, to fly in the altitude of 37 thousand feet to the airport Eduardo Gomes, in Manaus, in spite of that altitude turned "wrong way" in the route after Brasília--and where was the Gol Boeing-737 reached and dropped in the shock with the jet of Embraer.
That was the first of a succession of mistakes that generated the shock, on September 29, killing 154 people. After that, there was flaw in the communication between Legacy and Cindacta-1 (center of control of the air traffic of Brasília), the transponder (that would alert the system anti-collision of Boeing) it was not working in Legacy and the Gol airplane was not alerted for the risk.
The plan of original flight of Legacy foresaw three altitudes: 37 thousand feet between São José dos Campos and Brasília, passing for 36 thousand feet starting from the capital and for 38 thousand feet starting from the point Teres of the aeronautical letter (to 480 km of Brasília, in Mato Grosso) until Manaus. Legacy, however, it flew the whole time in 37 thousand feet.
For the black box of Legacy, that is under the responsibility of Cenipa (National Center of Investigation and Prevention of Aeronautical Accidents), the controller of the tower of São José dos Campos communicated in English with the Americans Lepore and Paladino during the "clearence" procedure--in other words, of authorization for the takeoff.
In that dialogue, recording, Lepore asks to take off, the tower authorizes and says, clearly, that he should arise for 37 thousand feet "until the airport Eduardo Gomes", of Manaus, contradicting what specified the flight plan--in hands of the pilots and the aeronautical authorities.
The version obtained by Folha confirms what the pilots' lawyers, the Brazilian Theo Dias and the American Robert Torricelli say, that they would have authorization to fly in 37 thousand feet, in spite of being "wrong-way" in the direction Brasília-Manaus.
In the registrations of Cindacta-1, the last contact of Legacy was when the aircraft was to 52 miles--or near to seven minutes--of Brasília, for a common procedure: the pilots communicated to the control center that they had reached the altitude of 37 thousand feet.
Pilot Lepore gave the registration of the airplane, Legacy N600XL, informed that it was in the level 370, that it corresponds to 37 thousand feet, and he wished "good afternoon" in English.
The plant controller answered, he asked that the pilot pressed the button of identification of the flight and he wished good trip. The button that he referred is the transponder--that didn't work. The pilots confirm that they activated it to register the identification of the flight, but Cindacta-1 says that the equipment was not working starting from Brasília and that the controllers tried several times, without success, to alert the crew. The pilots react saying that they also tried, without success, to communicate with Cindacta-1 when they flew over Brasília. Without that contact, they decided to follow the original orientation, according to lawyers and representatives of the company ExcelAire that talked with Folha.
According to Aeronautics, one of the American pilots' mistakes was not to activate the code 7600 in the transponder, registering the communication loss. The apparel was out of the air for about two minutes after the shock with Boeing, in the area of Mato Grosso, when it worked already with the code 7700 again, of emergency.
Already according to the pilots' lawyers and the representatives of the American company, Cindacta-1 also mistook, when noticing that there was something wrong with the flight and not to immediately alert Boeing that came in contrary way and in the same altitude. The allegation of Cindacta-1, annulled by Aeronautics, it is that the center didn't identify accurately that Legacy was in the altitude of 37 thousand feet, what could only be made case the transponder was working. Without it, the altitude is checked in the radar by safety's primary equipment, that is imprecise. In that case, there is a variation in the radar that can arrive even to 1,500 feet.
Everything added, there is a succession of mistakes. Original was the authorization of the tower of São José dos Campos for the flight if it accomplishes in 37 thousand feet, but that have been correct with the communication between the airplane and Cindacta-1, for the transponder and the system anti-collision and, finally, for the determination that Boeing deviated, or upward or sidelong, as they determine flight safety's international and national norms.
Source: http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/folha/c...5u127743.shtml
Black box of Legacy reveals that tower mistook
ELIANE CANTANHÊDE
Columnist of the Folha of S.Paulo
The control tower of flights of São José dos Campos (SP) authorized the pilots of Legacy, Joe Lepore and Jan Paladino, to fly in the altitude of 37 thousand feet to the airport Eduardo Gomes, in Manaus, in spite of that altitude turned "wrong way" in the route after Brasília--and where was the Gol Boeing-737 reached and dropped in the shock with the jet of Embraer.
That was the first of a succession of mistakes that generated the shock, on September 29, killing 154 people. After that, there was flaw in the communication between Legacy and Cindacta-1 (center of control of the air traffic of Brasília), the transponder (that would alert the system anti-collision of Boeing) it was not working in Legacy and the Gol airplane was not alerted for the risk.
The plan of original flight of Legacy foresaw three altitudes: 37 thousand feet between São José dos Campos and Brasília, passing for 36 thousand feet starting from the capital and for 38 thousand feet starting from the point Teres of the aeronautical letter (to 480 km of Brasília, in Mato Grosso) until Manaus. Legacy, however, it flew the whole time in 37 thousand feet.
For the black box of Legacy, that is under the responsibility of Cenipa (National Center of Investigation and Prevention of Aeronautical Accidents), the controller of the tower of São José dos Campos communicated in English with the Americans Lepore and Paladino during the "clearence" procedure--in other words, of authorization for the takeoff.
In that dialogue, recording, Lepore asks to take off, the tower authorizes and says, clearly, that he should arise for 37 thousand feet "until the airport Eduardo Gomes", of Manaus, contradicting what specified the flight plan--in hands of the pilots and the aeronautical authorities.
The version obtained by Folha confirms what the pilots' lawyers, the Brazilian Theo Dias and the American Robert Torricelli say, that they would have authorization to fly in 37 thousand feet, in spite of being "wrong-way" in the direction Brasília-Manaus.
In the registrations of Cindacta-1, the last contact of Legacy was when the aircraft was to 52 miles--or near to seven minutes--of Brasília, for a common procedure: the pilots communicated to the control center that they had reached the altitude of 37 thousand feet.
Pilot Lepore gave the registration of the airplane, Legacy N600XL, informed that it was in the level 370, that it corresponds to 37 thousand feet, and he wished "good afternoon" in English.
The plant controller answered, he asked that the pilot pressed the button of identification of the flight and he wished good trip. The button that he referred is the transponder--that didn't work. The pilots confirm that they activated it to register the identification of the flight, but Cindacta-1 says that the equipment was not working starting from Brasília and that the controllers tried several times, without success, to alert the crew. The pilots react saying that they also tried, without success, to communicate with Cindacta-1 when they flew over Brasília. Without that contact, they decided to follow the original orientation, according to lawyers and representatives of the company ExcelAire that talked with Folha.
According to Aeronautics, one of the American pilots' mistakes was not to activate the code 7600 in the transponder, registering the communication loss. The apparel was out of the air for about two minutes after the shock with Boeing, in the area of Mato Grosso, when it worked already with the code 7700 again, of emergency.
Already according to the pilots' lawyers and the representatives of the American company, Cindacta-1 also mistook, when noticing that there was something wrong with the flight and not to immediately alert Boeing that came in contrary way and in the same altitude. The allegation of Cindacta-1, annulled by Aeronautics, it is that the center didn't identify accurately that Legacy was in the altitude of 37 thousand feet, what could only be made case the transponder was working. Without it, the altitude is checked in the radar by safety's primary equipment, that is imprecise. In that case, there is a variation in the radar that can arrive even to 1,500 feet.
Everything added, there is a succession of mistakes. Original was the authorization of the tower of São José dos Campos for the flight if it accomplishes in 37 thousand feet, but that have been correct with the communication between the airplane and Cindacta-1, for the transponder and the system anti-collision and, finally, for the determination that Boeing deviated, or upward or sidelong, as they determine flight safety's international and national norms.
Source: http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/folha/c...5u127743.shtml
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altitude
According to Folha, the flight recorder shows American pilot Joseph Lepore receiving instructions from the tower in Sao Jose dos Campos to fly northwest at 37,000 feet (11,277 meters) "until Eduardo Gomes," the airport in Manaus.
Just how over-worked would an ATCO have to be to issue a 370 altitude to a Northward-departing aircraft? Or would that be a normal flight level in some circumstances?
Would a pilot not normally ask for confirmation if givea "wrong" flight level for the direction he was flying?
(apologies if this is a "silly question" but, as you can see from my handle,I'm not a Professional Pilot, just someone with a sim-eng history who has read every page of this one and trying to grasp "what went wrong" on this horrendous tragid accident - and yes, I do appreciate the concept of the holes in a bit of cheese, remembering the L1011 in the Everglades)
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Just how over-worked would an ATCO have to be to issue a 370 altitude to a Northward-departing aircraft? Or would that be a normal flight level in some circumstances?
Would a pilot not normally ask for confirmation if givea "wrong" flight level for the direction he was flying?
Would a pilot not normally ask for confirmation if givea "wrong" flight level for the direction he was flying?
NoD
[COLOR=Blue]
Just how over-worked would an ATCO have to be to issue a 370 altitude to a Northward-departing aircraft? Or would that be a normal flight level in some circumstances?
Would a pilot not normally ask for confirmation if givea "wrong" flight level for the direction he was flying?
Just how over-worked would an ATCO have to be to issue a 370 altitude to a Northward-departing aircraft? Or would that be a normal flight level in some circumstances?
Would a pilot not normally ask for confirmation if givea "wrong" flight level for the direction he was flying?
To clarify, the controller on Ground/Delivery issued the clearance at FL370?
Wasn't there a plan to have assistants man that position in the UK?
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Just how over-worked would an ATCO have to be to issue a 370 altitude to a Northward-departing aircraft? Or would that be a normal flight level in some circumstances?
Would a pilot not normally ask for confirmation if givea "wrong" flight level for the direction he was flying?
Just how over-worked would an ATCO have to be to issue a 370 altitude to a Northward-departing aircraft? Or would that be a normal flight level in some circumstances?
Would a pilot not normally ask for confirmation if givea "wrong" flight level for the direction he was flying?
Looking to the airways chart: 370 was the correct flight level between SJC and Brasilia. Though ground track of the airway is North North West, magnetic course is slightly Northeast due to magnetic variation. Semi circular rules are applied after magnetic courses not ground tracks.
Therefore 370 (odd=East) was correctly filed until Brasilia, where a change to 360 (even=West) was correctly planned, because a left turn makes the magnetic course to become Northwestbound.
380 was filed for climb an hour after passing BRS, probably because as of burnt fuel a ceiling restriction due to weight was lifted.
Consequently 370 was correctly cleared by ATC in the en-route clearance for the initial segment of the flight until BRS. The wording "Cleared to Manaus via bla bla, FL370, squawk bla bla" is normal. There is no ICAO procedure that calls for subsequently filed level changes to be included in the en-route clearance. Only the first filed altitude is part of the clearance (climb to 4000, expect FLxxx 10 minutes after departure), not even that one in most countries any more. If a comm failure occurs along the route and at a position of a filed level change ICAO comm failure procedures apply.
Remark: I doubt this "information" about the ground controller at SJC being responsible is taken from the Legacy CVR as recording is limited to 30 minutes and the en-route clearance was issued more than 90 minutes before the emergency landing. Here is a different agenda going on.
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No overwork, all normal procedures, no sensation.
Remark: I doubt this "information" about the ground controller at SJC being responsible is taken from the Legacy CVR as recording is limited to 30 minutes and the en-route clearance was issued more than 90 minutes before the emergency landing. Here is a different agenda going on.
Remark: I doubt this "information" about the ground controller at SJC being responsible is taken from the Legacy CVR as recording is limited to 30 minutes and the en-route clearance was issued more than 90 minutes before the emergency landing. Here is a different agenda going on.
There is also the recordingo from SJC ATC.
The press in Brazil say they said: “N600XL. Clear, 370, Manaus.”
Is that enought to cancel the proposed/approved original flight plan?
or is it just lawyer talk?
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Remark: I doubt this "information" about the ground controller at SJC being responsible is taken from the Legacy CVR as recording is limited to 30 minutes and the en-route clearance was issued more than 90 minutes before the emergency landing. Here is a different agenda going on.
But it seems a maneuver of the lawyers to try to share responsibilities.
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Hmm...
So what has happened to all the folks who posted here demanding that the pilots of the Embraer be taken out and hanged for 'switching off their transponder and doing aerobatics'? Do you suppose they learned not to be too hasty to judge? Probably not!
I always liked the idea that I will be heavily second-guessed whenever it goes pear-shaped. I guess that goes with the job.
I guess the idea was to stay at FL370 and then be better situated to climb to FL390 when light enough, but a chain of errors made that work out really badly. It will be very interesting to learn what went on with the transponder. Of course, no transponder, no TCAS but probably with TCAS, no accident!
One thing I find a bit scary is the way we all go wazzing along right down the centreline of the airways nowadays. With the reduced vertical separation being used there's not much margin for error. The system needs to work darn near perfectly where it used to be you were just on the airway but probably not right in the middle of it as is the case today.
I always liked the idea that I will be heavily second-guessed whenever it goes pear-shaped. I guess that goes with the job.
I guess the idea was to stay at FL370 and then be better situated to climb to FL390 when light enough, but a chain of errors made that work out really badly. It will be very interesting to learn what went on with the transponder. Of course, no transponder, no TCAS but probably with TCAS, no accident!
One thing I find a bit scary is the way we all go wazzing along right down the centreline of the airways nowadays. With the reduced vertical separation being used there's not much margin for error. The system needs to work darn near perfectly where it used to be you were just on the airway but probably not right in the middle of it as is the case today.
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For interest, I have spent part of today recording GPS readings from a stationary location to check variation, for a project that I am working on (no WAAS available here, so less precision, which would have made things better - or worse!)
(I wasn't looking for "absolute accuracy" for this purpose, just repeatability - I don't know the absolute coordinates of this location)
Mostly the variation was within about 6 metres, and the maximum variation was around 12m. Didn't note the height difference (sorry - wasn't part of my requirements), but the horizontal "error" was way less than the wingspan of most aircraft. "Lines up the cheese holes" very nicely!
If we can't rely on TCAS (with no redundancy) a whole 100%, then track offset really seems to make sense to me. Am I naive? or are our "regulatory authorities" slow to respond?
I'm not the first to suggest that, whatever other lessons are learned from this tragic acident, our nav-aids these days are, in some ways, too accurate.
(From the opinion of a "frequent flyer" who would prefer to remain flying frequently!)
(I wasn't looking for "absolute accuracy" for this purpose, just repeatability - I don't know the absolute coordinates of this location)
Mostly the variation was within about 6 metres, and the maximum variation was around 12m. Didn't note the height difference (sorry - wasn't part of my requirements), but the horizontal "error" was way less than the wingspan of most aircraft. "Lines up the cheese holes" very nicely!
If we can't rely on TCAS (with no redundancy) a whole 100%, then track offset really seems to make sense to me. Am I naive? or are our "regulatory authorities" slow to respond?
I'm not the first to suggest that, whatever other lessons are learned from this tragic acident, our nav-aids these days are, in some ways, too accurate.
(From the opinion of a "frequent flyer" who would prefer to remain flying frequently!)
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Track Offset
ExSimGuy;
"track offset really seems to make sense to me. Am I naive? or are our "regulatory authorities" slow to respond?"
After 35 years of flying heavy metal world-wide I endorse track offset.
Regulatory authorities are slow to change the status quo, but after this I'm sure it will be studied for unexpected, undesirable side-effects. If I were flying today, requesting track-offset would be standard procedure for me.
"track offset really seems to make sense to me. Am I naive? or are our "regulatory authorities" slow to respond?"
After 35 years of flying heavy metal world-wide I endorse track offset.
Regulatory authorities are slow to change the status quo, but after this I'm sure it will be studied for unexpected, undesirable side-effects. If I were flying today, requesting track-offset would be standard procedure for me.
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GPS
The variations in GPS readings was noted. But this is not the whole story. Where two gps units are not far apart, at any given instant they will both have the same direction and magnitude of error.
Thus two planes following the same tract guided by GPS will have compensating errors. If one is "on tract" but in fact 100 ft to the side, so too will the other plane show "on tract' when it is also 100ft to the same side.
The same will also be true for the vertical element. If both are tracking the same elevation, say FL370, they will both be at the same elevation when they meet, though it might be at 36,900.
Thus two planes following the same tract guided by GPS will have compensating errors. If one is "on tract" but in fact 100 ft to the side, so too will the other plane show "on tract' when it is also 100ft to the same side.
The same will also be true for the vertical element. If both are tracking the same elevation, say FL370, they will both be at the same elevation when they meet, though it might be at 36,900.
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GPS errors Track Offset ATC and Common Sense
Who in this world can notice or complain
if a crew selects TK OFFset R.33 NM
which means zero decimal thirty three NM = 2000 feet right of track,
any time when on an AIRWAY?
Direct vectors are random anyway
if a crew selects TK OFFset R.33 NM
which means zero decimal thirty three NM = 2000 feet right of track,
any time when on an AIRWAY?
Direct vectors are random anyway
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Aerobatics? I doubt, but black box can tell.
Question now is if ATC saying “N600XL. Clear, 370, Manaus.” during clearence should overcome the flight plans.
Another question is about Radio comm. Why didn´t they answer BSB ATC? They were called 7 times. Was volume tunned down?
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KC -
- is it not MORE significant that the risk from a navigation system which places two aircraft in almost exactly the same piece of sky is incredibly simple to determine?
and makes the maths which determine whether airspace procedures contain a collision risk - much more complicated.
More than just an ATCO
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As mentioned earlier ODLs are commonly used in today's busy airspace, even sometimes requested by pilots to optimise fuel burn. Aircraft may also be requested at an ODL by an adjacent sector in order to solve a traffic conflict.
Although not acquainted with the ATC system there I would query the statement that the Tower cleared him to FL370 as i feel this is Journalist Speak / lost in translation for ATC in general.
ODL = Opposite Direction Level
Although not acquainted with the ATC system there I would query the statement that the Tower cleared him to FL370 as i feel this is Journalist Speak / lost in translation for ATC in general.
ODL = Opposite Direction Level
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Offsetting might appear to be a no-brainer when certain events are studied individually.
No one is advocating offsetting in high density terminal areas. It's out there in the cruise/enroute that concerns most of us and it is in that area that some of us have been calling for offsetting for quite some years now.
I accept that offsetting is not a panacea - you'd have to permanently park and chain down every aircraft in the world to ensure no midairs could occur in any circumstances. However, the chance of two aircraft on crossing tracks hitting each other must be to a factor of ‘n’ millions more unlikely than the odds of two aircraft on reciprocal tracks on the same air route – which, thanks to GPS, means they are on EXACTLY the same line across the earth’s surface for hours on end.
I can't understand the arguments that ATCOs and regulators always trot out saying enroute airways would have to be re-designed if an offset of under a mile was inbuilt into aircraft FMSs (or crews were allowed to insert one manually). Surely such airways are still designed to tolerances that allow for navigation systems less accurate than GPS, and therefore current tolerances in computing crossing traffic clearances must allow for errors of more than 1 mile left or right of track?
I can remember years ago flying an Omega-equipped 727 between Perth and Melbourne, when the opposition flew the same routes at the same time in the same type but without Omega. (Omega was pretty cutting edge technology at the time.) Mt Hope VOR was the first ground aid for quite some time after crossing the Great Australian Bite eastbound and it wasn’t uncommon to see the other 727 approaching the aid at damn near 90 degrees to the airway. Somewhere along the way, it was certainly more than 10 miles off track – off the airway, in fact – but the ATC system seemed to cope with these gross inaccuracies.
What we’re asking for with an offset would still leave the aircraft well within the confines of the existing airway – and would be a life-saver should all the other safety systems ever break down, as they so tragically did over Brazil, for whatever reason, last month.
I hope I’m not misunderstood when I say I don’t give a tuppeny **** who’s to blame for the recent tragedy in Brazil – I’d just like to ensure another one never occurs in similar circumstances because someone – I don’t care who – makes another mistake at some time in the future. I think I could say with quite a high degree of safety that the grieving families of the 154 dead in the Brazil tragedy would share my feelings.
*****
TCAS is a life saver, and in 99.9% of cases, will give timely warning. However, what I don’t like about it is that you’re relying on the other pilot, as well as yourself, to take the right avoiding action. The midair between the DHL 757 and the Russian Tupolev a year or two over southern Germany proves that you can’t always rely on that.
Lon More,
Journospeak, slanted news and translation losses based on partial leaks have been rampant throughout the coverage of this accident. So one might take with a pinch of salt the "Folha de Sao Paulo" item last night stating that FAB (Brazilian Air Force) sources confirmed that, a) based on tower transcripts, he Sao Jose dos Campos controller had cleared the Legacy to FL 370 straight through to Manaus, thus overriding the original flight plan; b) SBSJ/SJK clearances are pre-approved by Brasilia; c) on reaching FL370 the Legacy contacted Brasilia and had a short exchange in which no change other than setting the transponder was requested. After that, no transponder signal nor radio contact although both BSB and the Legacy repeatedly tried to contact each other.
"Looking good for the Legacy crew"? In the legal sense, probably, but one wonders at the scar all this will leave on them. Some might remember it’s good to get back on the horse as quickly as possible after a fall. No news on the return of their passports yet and I confess to over-optimism on that score. The prosecutor who asked for their detention must be keeping his head down.
Earlier this week the ATC situation deteriorated into a free-for-all with everyone blaming everyone else and culminating in almost total paralisation of all air traffic on Thursday 2 Nov, first day of a long weekend. It’s improved since then but, despite official promises to the contrary, is expected to descend into chaos again tomorrow. An ATC collapse has been predicted since 2003 and there were official alerts to the need for doubling the number of controllers as early as 2001. Defense minister Pires, who’s been the government spokesman throughout, is now being accused of caving in to civil ATC demands; airforce are saying this is “contaminating” airforce controllers who make up more than three quarters of the staff. Controllers themselves are talking about greatly increased stress due to the conflicting pressures. Airlines have said they will be suing the government for, so far, losses approaching US$20 mio; hotels and travelers will not be far behind.
Journospeak, slanted news and translation losses based on partial leaks have been rampant throughout the coverage of this accident. So one might take with a pinch of salt the "Folha de Sao Paulo" item last night stating that FAB (Brazilian Air Force) sources confirmed that, a) based on tower transcripts, he Sao Jose dos Campos controller had cleared the Legacy to FL 370 straight through to Manaus, thus overriding the original flight plan; b) SBSJ/SJK clearances are pre-approved by Brasilia; c) on reaching FL370 the Legacy contacted Brasilia and had a short exchange in which no change other than setting the transponder was requested. After that, no transponder signal nor radio contact although both BSB and the Legacy repeatedly tried to contact each other.
"Looking good for the Legacy crew"? In the legal sense, probably, but one wonders at the scar all this will leave on them. Some might remember it’s good to get back on the horse as quickly as possible after a fall. No news on the return of their passports yet and I confess to over-optimism on that score. The prosecutor who asked for their detention must be keeping his head down.
Earlier this week the ATC situation deteriorated into a free-for-all with everyone blaming everyone else and culminating in almost total paralisation of all air traffic on Thursday 2 Nov, first day of a long weekend. It’s improved since then but, despite official promises to the contrary, is expected to descend into chaos again tomorrow. An ATC collapse has been predicted since 2003 and there were official alerts to the need for doubling the number of controllers as early as 2001. Defense minister Pires, who’s been the government spokesman throughout, is now being accused of caving in to civil ATC demands; airforce are saying this is “contaminating” airforce controllers who make up more than three quarters of the staff. Controllers themselves are talking about greatly increased stress due to the conflicting pressures. Airlines have said they will be suing the government for, so far, losses approaching US$20 mio; hotels and travelers will not be far behind.
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ExSimGuy:
You're not naive, but it's not quite as simple as it seems. Offsetting changes the traffic distribution. It might lower the risk for traffic travelling in opposite directions but you have to consider how the offset affects (among other things) the airspace collision-risk safety case in relation to other traffic, on other airways. If you think about it, flying offset by a mile takes you a mile out of the way of opposing traffic - but brings you a mile closer to whatever traffic patterns or airway structures happen to be on your right (and can bring other offsetting traffic closer to you). The paradox is that offsetting would be easiest to implement in airspace where airway interference would be minimal - and of course, if the airway interference is already minimal, then there's probably little genuine need to offset in the first place.
You're not naive, but it's not quite as simple as it seems. Offsetting changes the traffic distribution. It might lower the risk for traffic travelling in opposite directions but you have to consider how the offset affects (among other things) the airspace collision-risk safety case in relation to other traffic, on other airways. If you think about it, flying offset by a mile takes you a mile out of the way of opposing traffic - but brings you a mile closer to whatever traffic patterns or airway structures happen to be on your right (and can bring other offsetting traffic closer to you). The paradox is that offsetting would be easiest to implement in airspace where airway interference would be minimal - and of course, if the airway interference is already minimal, then there's probably little genuine need to offset in the first place.
Last edited by formulaben; 4th Nov 2006 at 16:20.
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Sorry to sound so simplistic, but I'll take my chances with an offset, sir. I've seen far too many jets at my 12 with only 1000 feet of separation. While it was a mathematical certainty that an accident such as this Brazilian accident would eventually occur, it's obvious to this simpleton that a lateral offset would have prevented it, TCAS or no. The bigger question here is why there was no TA/RA.