Mid-air collision over Brasil

[vapilot2004]

Buenos Dias und Wilkommen

1.) Flight plan is only a plan when in controlled airspace. While routing can be autonomous, ATC must approve altitude changes. When we have known lost commumications, follow the ICAO 7 min rule. They were at less than 5min when this accident occurred.

2.) Frequencies are not always the same. Each controller needs a channel. If you have 5 ATCOS in a center, there are five different working frequencies. Also, there is nothing in the cockpit that goes 'bing bong' when you move from sector to sector. We rely on the controllers to hand us off to the next one at the transition point. It is their ball game. Help here comes in the form of the guard channel.

3.) TCAS requires a working transponder. A malfunctioning transponder would not affect radios unless there is some unlikely data bus or power issue.

4.) The route they were on is an established and direct flow pattern.

5.) Back a few pages this is covered. (magnetic variation)


Much of the above has been covered in this long thread, but may require some distillation.

[threemiles]

To journos

They were at less than 5min when this accident occurred.

It can't be emphasized enough to those who blame the pilots that there is no alert on the flight deck that rings or an iron lady that yells when communications to ATC is lost.

When you fly on a long thin route where your own compulsary reporting points are scattered over 200 or 300 NM distance, it is not unlikely that you hear nothing from ATC or another aircraft for 30 or 40 minutes. Depending on time of the day. As a foreign pilot you have no idea whether this is normal or not.

In a radar environment (when radar contact is confirmed) by local rules (I don't know about Brazil, but certainly U.S.) even compulsary reporting points may be omitted to report. How can a pilot then realize that a loss of communication has occurred?

I know those long VHF extended range comm routes from a portion of the South Atlantic. You hear nothing for an hour, you trust ATC that they put you to the right level and the right distance to your neighbours.

Unlike the pilots ATC does know that an abnormal condition exists when radar contact is lost and appropriate action is required to verify the current circumstances of flight. Despite any primary target that still may be visible this is done by immediately picking up the mike and asking to recycle the transponder. This is a standard procedure. You simply don't sleep for 24 minutes and forget about the target. Only when ATC calls and there is no reply the problem becomes apparent.

Still and even when working on the uncertainty about the flight status there is the one primary duty for ATC NEVER to be forgotten: SEPARATION. Horizontally or vertically, here: totally neglected over more than 20 minutes, from notice of communication loss until collision. A clearance for a simple level change to a level on the safe side (below 360) plus a 20 NM track deviation for GOL would have done. There was enough time.

Here you find an example how ATC normally works:
http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthr...us#post2894664

Who is reponsible?

[agusaleale]

Emergency declared

Wouldn´t have been declared an emergency if the Legay disappeared from the radars?
And if the Legacy didn´t disappeared from the primary radar, Didn´t they know by the crt that both planes where pretty much closer and that if they maintained fl370 they where going to collide?
Please, could somebody explain this?

[ATC Watcher]

Originally Posted by threemiles

I don’t know Mr ATCWatcher where you have all your knowledge from that you carry to market here but it has nothing to do with reality. Read ICAO manuals .

Oh Dear ,oh Dear ! where to start ?
I do not know who you are but there are enough people on this site who know who I am. I make no secret of it, and I do not have to market anything .
If you knew a bit how modern ATC Centres works you would not write in such a way. It also always frighten me to see people using ICAO as some do with a holy book , while they have not understood what is behind.
You also write :

Here you find an example how ATC normally works:
http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthr...#post2894 664

the link is referring to one of your earlier posts giving a very good indication that you do not understand much about ATC .
Let me try to educate you If you allow me :
The system used in Brasilia is a standard Thales system well known all over the world.
It has a good Flight Plan processing system and when coupled to a primary/SSR radar, correlates a/c ID ( the call sign) with BOTH a Primary radar track and an SSR code.
If you lose the transponder signal, (A+C) the correlation is not lost but kept in the Primary signal the only thing that you lose is Altitude reporting.
That is visualized on Thales systems in various ways as the display of information shown to controllers is customized , but generally what you have normally under the call sign is something like 360 - 36 . 360 being the mode C and 36 the coordinated level ( i.e the level at which the a/c should be now of in the near future ) .
If you loose Mode C you can have --- - 36 or something else, as probably in Brasilia (*)
That is all you will notice on the label . There are no bells ringing or alerts coming on , as loosing C is not that uncommon.
My point was that if the controller was busy with other traffic, there was no reason for him to concentrate on the Legacy label and notice the loss of Mode C. And even if he noticed during his normal screen scanning, he might have thought this as temporary or garbling, etc..
Loosing Primary is basically the same, the flight plan processing continues to display the label, but now it is updated by the PLN and not by the radar tracker, in most systems you would have a clear indication ( like a symbol change or letter popping up on the label )
But unless you lose your radar head of trackers, you would not be that much alerted.
Now if you put this in the context of the Amazon where known interferences and other factors are causing temporary losses of radar returns and VHF coverage, and this on a daily basis, you would not “ ring the bells and call SAR every time you lose a return. .
Also if one look at the MAP, the first airway crossing on UZ6 ,is nearly 300 NM away from Brasilia , so nothing is very time critical , we are not in the US East Cost here.
Therefore I said the facts as reported in the preliminary report do not shock me per se.
An advice : Do not throw stones to the controllers there without knowing , and in your case, understanding , what happened .
Finally by concluding “

Who is responsible ?

you show that primary instinct of “ blaming someone “ for an accident before knowing all the facts . An accident is never one responsibility, or one person, or one cause, but ,often more than 10 put together ( 13 in Ueberlingen for instance ).
I bet you this will be the case here. Sure Brazilian ATC will get its errors pointed out, but the key issue , the ONLY key issue is what the Brazilian Government will do to make sure those errors do not happen again .
Most of us in this Forum are not interested in the blame or responsibilities game,
In the meantime let’s campaign for the release of the 2 Legacy pilots , who have done nothing criminal here . That much the meager preliminary report is telling us .
(*)Before somebody asks what do I mean by the " as probably in Brasilia " above , we know that Brazil is using 3 D radars ( see previous posts here ) and we know that the vertical component is imprecise . How this vertical component is integrated on the label and how this is visualized when mode C is lost would be interesting to watch.
If one reads the terminology used in the preliminary report (i.e. “ precise altitude” ) this could indicate that the mode C ( i.e “ precise altitude” ) could be replaced on the label by the Vertical primary return ( i.e : imprecise altitude )
If that imprecise altitude would be around the same value of the expected altitude , then there will be very little or no difference on the label ,( perhaps a symbol, or a letter ) reducing the chances to spot the altitude difference.
Just a thought.
I Would also be very interested to know at which FL the 737 was coordinated with Brasilia, and what the 737 label looked like in Brasilia a couple of minutes before the collision .

[Oldiemeister]

Thanks to VAPILOT2004 for trying to answer my questions.

I am not really satisfied, though, as I am sure most of you are not either. This has, of course, something to do with the preliminary report, which appears to me like the "Swiss cheese type", with lots of holes in it.

Question 1 re the original flight plan - "While routing can be autonomous, ATC must approve altitude changes". I agree 100%, but why did the Legacy then stay on FL370 for the whole flight, while their plan said FL370 until Brasilia, then FL360 and FL380 from Teres). They did not even contact ATC when they changed airways.

threemiles wrote: "In a radar environment (when radar contact is confirmed) by local rules (I don't know about Brazil, but certainly U.S.) even compulsary reporting points may be omitted to report. How can a pilot then realize that a loss of communication has occurred?"

If I would be flying over unknown territory, some of it dense rain forest or otherwise unknow terrain, I would not omit any reporting point...just to be on the safe side. Or do you think, ATC would tell me to "get lost...don't bother us..."?

Question 2) OK, frequencies are not always the same...granted..., but don't you think that it would have been a good idea to also try some of the Cindacta-4 (Manaus) frequencies, when there is not communication with the other ATC? And what about the Emergency channel.

All this does not - in any way - exempt Cindacta-1 (Brasilia) from their obligations to react as soon as they have loss of communication, secondary radar or any other abnormal occurrences. 24 minutes is clearly not acceptable...

Nothing goes bing-bong - Sure, but why is this still so in the 21st Century? Is it impossible to create a system that, once you pass, e.g. an VOR, gives you all the relevant information on a screen, such as

- Information on airway/FL etc.
- Possibly even information on traffic on the same airway/FL
- Frequency nos. of ATCs behind and ahead of you
- Your own transponder reading, sent back to you for verification and to let you know that it is working fine
etc.

I hope, you know what I mean. From what it looks like, it appears that most new cars are probably better equipped (with GPS navi systems etc.) than modern aircraft or ATCs. My cell knows when I enter a new provider area and sends me a welcome message...in my cell's language , even when I am in China...

3) I still find it strange that the radio started to work again only near the transition point. And the transponder "healed" himself, but only 3 minutes after the accident?

4) Let me rephrase the question - If there are only a few flights between Brasilia and Manaus, why use only UZ6 for both south and north traffic? Why not use always only one-directional airways, e.g., UZ6 for traffic to Manaus and any other airway for the traffic going to Brasilia?

5) I did not find the thread with "magnetic variation", but found other threads that are also asking the same thing: Why was FL370 authorized, confirmed and maintained, knowing that normally an odd numbered FL is only used for the north-south traffic?

I always understood that the main issue in air traffic is to keep the aircrafts as safely as possible apart - horizontal and vertical separation. If this some works most of the time in much more crowded air space, such as e.g. ORD, why was it possible that 2 planes were authorized to use the same airway, the same FL...and neither any ATC on the way nor any of the pilots questioned this. The immediate reaction of a neighbour of mine, a commercial pilot for more than 15 years (now out of work due to the recent "problems" in Brazilian commercial aviation - Vasp, Transbrasil, Varig...), some minutes after the basic accident facts were known, was: What was he (the legacy) doing on FL370, that level is only used for southgoing traffic...". As the keyword in ATC

Thanks again and btw: Buenos dias is Spanish, the language in Brazil is Portuguese - BOM DIA (Good morning), BOA TARDE (Good afternoon), BOA NOITE (Good evening and Good Night)...

Bom dia, good luck and always happy landings !!

[threemiles]

that you do not understand much about ATC

I am not here to argue with you. You are kind enough to explain the radar and technical side of the incident. This is all taken for granted and you may be right about a lack of reliability of the SSR returns in the area and the primary keeping the tracker up-to-date. But ATC as flying is over procedures, procedures and procedures. Yes, these procedures are a bible. After an incident asherence to procedures is the first thing to be investigated.

Especially when a flight is let flown at a non semicircular flight level in a critical surveillance environment with the obvious risk of comm loss, radar loss and heads-on traffic. This requires continuous alertness, watching the flight label, proper coordination with adjacent sectors and centers. I hope you don't doubt. 4 compulsary reporting points along the way BRS, TERES, NABOL, ISTAR, none of them reported by 600XL and nobody cared about it.

I don't know much about Thales systems but about P1 and Madap. When --- 36 appears in your label example it must have been entered manually as the assigned flight level by a controller. (Unless the Thales system fills in the planned FL, which I really cannot believe, but you will tell me).

There is one aspect that leads to my view that ATC simply forgot that 600XL was still at 370 and never ever cleared to or maintained 360:
At 16:53, i.e. 3 minutes before the collision, they asked for a frequency change to Manaus. Despite the fact that there was opposite traffic 3 minutes out and communication was critical, they did not say: "Immediate descend to FL360 due to opposite traffic". Believe me this is first ATC duty. SEPARATION.

Also: FL380 was filed for TERES. With the lack of a Mode-C readout there MUST have been some doubt about the actual FL of 600XL at the handover to Manaus. Did they climb to 380? Where they still at 370 or 360?

You are right, there is nobody to blame until all circumstances have been uncovered. But don't forget the two innocent pilots who still cannot leave their hotel in Rio. As it becomes apparent that ATC acted with negligence it is time to let the pilots go.

[Belgique]

Legacy Radio Management Unit Suspected in Brazil Midair Collision

Non-evident critical system’s status lights strike again
.
While air traffic control errors seem to be more likely as the primary cause for the Sept. 29 midair collision in Brazil that killed 154, it is beginning to look as if the avionics trend for centralized control and bland advisories in lieu of warnings may be a villain in the supporting cast. A centralized control unit called an RMU (Radio Management Unit) allows pilots to control their communications with the pressing of a few buttons and the turn of a tuning knob. Typically an RMU allows pilots to change frequency, squawk IDENT, change transponder codes or put the transponder into a standby mode, tune into and listen to NAVAID idents or select Public Address and intercom channels. The RMU can store and display up to 12 communication and 12 navigation frequencies. Some variants called communications controllers include hookups to SATCOM (satellite communications), ACARS printers (Aircraft Communication Addressing and Reporting System) or digital telephones. It's thought the Honeywell Unit used in the Legacy was the Honeywell Primus 1000’s Dual RMU-850 or 855B. The RMU control panel’s been narrowed down as the likely cause for the Legacy transponder and TCAS dropping off line – due to crew error (switchology).
.
The RMU has six keys on the side of the digital screen, along with a tuning knob. Two keys are used to program the plane's VHF comms radio, two are for the transponder, and two are for the collision avoidance system, or TCAS. Investigators are looking at whether the American pilots of the Legacy may have hit the wrong combination of keys, which would place the transponder in standby mode. It is known that the transponder on the Legacy was not operating before the collision but began working just afterward. That re-awakening is accepted as having been due to the pilots selecting the international distress code of 7700 after their collision.
.
The American pilots were experienced and have used this model and similar RMUs for years, making a keying mistake unlikely unless they were distracted and mashing RMU buttons while urgently trying to re-establish radio contact with controllers. It should be noted that the RMU's are usually in a dual configuration (i.e. one for each pilot). It's not known whether mutual interference is possible – if being simultaneously addressed by both pilots. Families of some of the GOL victims are alleging in a lawsuit filed in New York that the ExcelAire pilots improperly operated the RMU, accidentally placing the transponder in standby mode, and then compounded that error by "failing to take note of a warning light." If the transponder is ineptly switched to standby, the only warning of that to the pilots is a green light that reads "TCAS OFF". The lawsuit is also directed against Honeywell and argues that the key that puts the transponder into standby is located too close to another button pilots use to IDENT the aircraft for controllers (i.e. identify via a magnified blip). If a line key is inadvertently hit twice, instead of once, for a function, then the transponder will revert to standby mode.
.
Non-evident Failure Modes
When a weather radar fails, its malfunctioning is obvious, i.e. you lose the picture or it distorts. When a TCAS collision avoidance system is inadvertently switched off due to placing to standby a system upon which it's dependent for its functionality (i.e. the ATC transponder), then the warning system should annunciate (i.e. either flash very visibly or orally announce the inappropriate status or condition for an aural alert). But this doesn’t happen. Why? Avionics designers have concentrated on building in redundancy and fool-proof BITE functionality (Built-in Test Equipment) to advise of actual systems failure - however they have been allowed to get away with NOT designing against (or adequately advising of) human input failures (i.e. an inadvertent switch-off). Provision of a mere steady green status light, rather than an attention-getting flashing amber annunciator was what directly led to the Helios 737 crew failing to notice the MANUAL pressurization caption amongst a sea of captions, indicators and lights above their heads. The sounding of a "rarely heard airborne" pressurization horn alarm merely reminded the Helios 737 crew of the scenario where it had its other completely different meaning (i.e. as a configuration warning alert on the ground, pre-takeoff). That led to confusion and ultimately to the Helios pilots passing out due to lack of oxygen as the 737 climbed on autopilot.
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The Honeywell RMU was included in a September FAA airworthiness directive (AD) requiring changes by 18 Oct 2006 in the Primus software because the unit would go into standby if code-changing was not completed within 5 seconds. A separate series of Honeywell Primus AD's called for integrity checks of the aviation standard communications bus (ASCB) and the installation of avionics software updates due to screen failures. Honeywell says the replacement software had already been installed in the Legacy before ExcelAire bought the Legacy 600 jet. The earlier software version had contributed to two midair near-misses in Europe, but we are not aware of any incidents caused by pilots pushing the wrong keys on a RMU. That's possibly because in most instances an inadvertent condition will not be a prelude to an ATC-constructed head-on collision..... and will soon be sorted by either/both the pilots and controllers. Such a glitch wouldn’t come to Honeywell’s attention as something needing rectification. Unfortunately in the GOL versus Legacy case, that “sorting out” time wasn't available and, courtesy of an apparently lax ATC, the lack of TCAS made the head-on collision inevitable.
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It's noteworthy and ironic that Embraer's comments upon that Notice of Proposed Rule-making (introducing the Primus AD) had requested a lengthier time interval for implementation, saying: "Empresa Brasileira de Aeronautica S.A. (EMBRAER) is requesting that we (the FAA) should extend the compliance time for the AFM revision from 5 to 30 days. EMBRAER asserts that the loss of the transponder does not pose so great of a hazard to justify such an urgent compliance time."
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The Brazilian investigators have published their preliminary report and an English translation is available at this link: http://tinyurl.com/y2vubt

[threemiles]

Depiction of the incident sequence as reported by Globo

Added: it is obvious that Brasilia called 600XL shortly before TERES to ask whether they were able to climb to FL380 as filed (would be a standard practice). Either before or thereafter they forgot about 370 being the actual FL.

[mm_flynn]

I am not an ATC expert either only a user so my comments should be taken in that light.

Originally Posted by Oldiemeister

1) Why did the Legacy pilots not stick to their own Flight Plan....

A flight plan is only a plan. It would be pretty common for both ATC and aircraft to request/instruct different actions. In this case, with a route turning across the heading for odd or even flight levels and 'empty' airspace, it would make sense for both pilots and ATC to leave the aircraft at FL370 until either 1907 or Legacy asked for or was sent to their higher level (why this wasn't done is a key question).

Originally Posted by Oldiemeister

especially when they could not contact any ATC en route anymore.

remember Legacy could only have known about the loss of communication until at the earliest 8 minutes before impact.

Originally Posted by Oldiemeister

4) As far as I understand, there are several airways between Manaus and Brasilia. Now, why use an opposite direction FL, such as UZ6, at all, especially as there are only very few flights between these areas?

For convenience so that the decent to FL360 doesn't have to be undertaken, particularly given that there are 'so few flights'. I don't have the charts to hand but assume at some point further in the flight they would either be climbing as they burned off fuel or turning back to the NorthEast where FL370 would be OK.

[ATC Watcher]

3miles : I am glad to see you changed your style if not your views. I would just say , do not be so affirmative and sure of who “ acted with negligence “ as you put it , when all of the facts are still unknown .

Valpilot 2004 : you said :

They were at less than 5min when this accident occurred.

5 min or over 1hour , it depends when you start counting. For me the first mandatory Reporting point after the last two way contact (15 51) is BRS overflown at 15 55 .
If the legacy has reported over and got not reply the count would start there.

Belgique ; many thanks for this very informative post . I did not know the precise features of a Primus, this really helps.

A point however , you said :

That re-awakening is accepted as having been due to the pilots selecting the international distress code of 7700 after their collision.

That is what we all thought first, but the initial report is saying otherwise :
Quoting from the report :

At 16 59 50 , 3 min after the collision Manaus stated to receive SSR info with C and with the code allocated to N600XL .

At 17 02 10 Manaus received SSR info of N600XL of a code change to A7700

Also the VHF worked 3 min before the collision ( at 1653 39 ) the N600Xl heard the last blind call from Brasilia instructing it to contact Manaus.

So your theory is not 100% sustained by what the initial report is saying, but nevertheless what you wrote is very interesting.

[westhawk]

In light of the investigatory findings so far released, does anyone here really believe that the needs of the investigation into the cause of the accident or the search for criminal culpability and civil liability actually justify the further detainment of the Legacy crew? I do NOT. So far, just about everything initially reported by the press regarding the role and actions of the Legacy crew in this ACCIDENT has failed to find any factual support. No "aerobatics" or "fooling around" of any kind are indicated or suggested by the objective investigatory findings to date. In fact, all such allegations appear to have been roundly refuted by the FDR traces.

I said then, and I'll say now, that when this whole affair began, it displayed all the earmarks of an intentional media smear job right from the start. As time has gone on and subsequent findings have discredited initial assertions made by officials and reported by media, said media have altered their reporting somewhat, and officials have backed away from their initial factually incorrect, and apparently intentional attempts to lay sole blame on the backs of the Legacy crew.

Even in light of the fact that the findings thus far revealed by the investigatory body tend to discredit these initial assertions made by officials and reported by the media, the judiciary has still seen fit to deny the Legacy crew it's right to liberty even though there appears to be no real case against them to support any charge of criminal culpability as it is defined by most western cultures. Most distressing indeed.

This could be YOU... or YOU... or YOU.... Or me... ANY of us!

Best,

Westhawk

[caos]

Westhawk,
They are not detained, but they are retained.
This depends on the Justice and not of the Air Force.
Days behind, the Air Force had to give the material from the investigation to the Justice, and under a judicial order.

Nov 17 2006 from O Globo News
TRF DENIES REQUEST OF DEVOLUTION OF PASSPORTS OF PILOTS OF LEGACY

The Federal Regional Tribunal of the first area, in Brasília, denied on this Friday (17) the request of devolution of passports of the American pilots' of the jet Legacy.

The pilots' lawyer had request to the judge a definition on the documents until today, but the decision will only be made after judgement of the merit by the plenary session of TRF.

Joe Lepore and Jan Paladino had the passports apprehended by order of the Justice to avoid that they leave the country during the investigations.

[con-pilot]

They are not detained, but they are retained.

True, a fine point, in fact a very fine point. However, when one does not have the freedom to go home, one is detained.

A prison is a prison, whether it is a hotel or a jail. (Okay, I'll admit a 5 start hotel is a lot better than any prison I've ever heard of, agreed.)

Bottom line is that these pilot have lost their freedom. Their freedom of travel, their freedom of earning a living and being home with their families.

Remember, these guys are not airline pilots. They are corporate pilots, they do not have the backing and influence of a union. However, the NBAA/INBAA is also working on their release. So there is hope.

I have sent letters to my U.S. Representative and both Oklahoma Senators to apply pressure to Brazil to release these two pilots.

As Westhawk said, this can happen to any of us.

Now on the controversy of the altitude change. I have been flying for over 40 years and there is no way in hell I would/will change an assigned altitude without permission from ATC. I don't care what was on the filed flight plan. Unless ATC tells me to change FL at such and such intersection, which is not the case here, I will maintain my last assigned altitude.

This was an accident, a very tragic accident and hopefully sooner or later the truth will come out.

I do wonder however, what would have happened if they had landed at a civil airport?

Also I believe that offsetting should be the way of the future. Many years ago back when INS was the greatest and bestest nav tool there was I was flying on an airway heading down to South America at FL-350, fat dumb and happy, we came out of some clouds and a Lear 35 (yeah, it was close enough I could tell it was a Lear 35) came flashing by our left side at the same altitude. Both of us blocked each other out on the frequency asking ATC why we were at the same altitude. This was in an no radar area.

ATC came back and told both of us that we had no traffic in our area.

[westhawk]

Originally Posted by caos

Westhawk,
They are not detained, but they are retained.
This depends on the Justice and not of the Air Force.
Days behind, the Air Force had to give the material from the investigation to the Justice, and under a judicial order.

Whatever words are used to describe the fact that they are not free to travel as they wish, the fact remains that they are not. This liberty has been suspended by judicial order. My observations are intended to convey my belief that this judicial action is no longer justified, if it ever was. Given the accusations originally made in the immediate aftermath of the accident, and the highly sensational nature of the public and media reaction, it is understandable that certain facts needed to be established prior to any decision as to whether or not criminal conduct on the part of the Legacy crew had taken place, or that the filing of criminal charges is warranted. No evidence of any such conduct has been presented to date. In fact, the data released to the public thus far appears to refute any such claims.

Preventing them from leaving the country is difficult to justify in this light. I merely opine that the interests of justice are not well served by continuing to hold these individuals against their will when the objective evidence related to the occurrence tends to refute any claims that they were acting in a criminally negligent manner. They should be free to return to their homes. File criminal charges and be prepared to objectively prove the case or release them. I'll leave the talk of politics and economic repercussions to others!

BTW, some excellent analysis of the known facts is taking place here. If only the judiciary had such keen analysis available to them. Keep up the good work!

Best,

Westhawk

[caos]

I agree with you Westhawk,
But, Mr. Sayão the Federal investigator has said that he needs the antecedents of the investigation of the Air force (supposedly today in his hands) and an interview with the Controllers (in psychological treatment) before speaking with the pilots of the Legacy. Sayão has also requested the amplification of the term to investigate (I believe that for 90 days more) and only when he closes the investigation the charges take place if there is any.
I see difficult that Lepore and Paladino can leave from Brazil before 90-120 days.

For what I read they have 2 points in shadows:
1. Why Legacy was at FL370?
2. Why TCAS was not operating?

[con-pilot]

1. Why Legacy was at FL370?

Because that was their last cleared altitude. From everything I have seen on the released ATC tapes they were never cleared to a different altitude.

2. Why TCAS was not operating?

I don't know, no one at this time knows. This issue should come out in an open and fair accident investigation.

Sadly for the crew Brazil is between a rock and hard place. The accident may come down between the Brazilian ATC or the Brazilian aircraft manufacturer.

So, blame the U.S. crew, problem solved.

[Casper]

Have the authorities also confiscated the passports of the air traffic controllers on duty in the appropriate area regarding this mid-air?

Surely, they should be prevented from leaving the country in order that "they may also assist in the investigation."

[con-pilot]

Have the authorities also confiscated the passports of the air traffic controllers on duty in the appropriate area regarding this mid-air?

Excellent question, I'll foward that to my Congressional and Senatorial representatives.

Thanks.

[GlueBall]

ATC Procedural Error

Upon loss of contact with the EMB jet, Brasilia Center should have advised Manaus Center that the EMB jet's last assigned altitude was FL370, and that contact was lost. Manaus Center then should have ordered the B737 to vacate FL 370.

[bubbers44]

One day I passed Swan Island north of Nicaragua in the clouds at FL350. A minute later World Airways reported Swan Island at FL 350. I asked them if they indeed crossed the same point at the same altitude one minute from us and they concurred. After we assured that they were SE bound and we were S bound about three minutes later ATC cleared them to FL 370. We never reported it because that is expected down there. We were on crossing airways so GPS wouldn't have made it worse. I guess we would be in custody in Managua if we had made contact. Please let these pilots go home. They did not cause this accident.