The Demise of the Professional Pilot
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Guybrush,
There are tonloads of rules, CAA, FAA, whicheverAA, - the thing is, there is not much enforcement unless some poor tired pilot cocks up.
ICAO has many guidelines that countries can opt into or out of, piecemeal if they want. Many countries register exceptions.
IATA is an airline association that tends to be involved more in fares and ticketing and the like.
There are tonloads of rules, CAA, FAA, whicheverAA, - the thing is, there is not much enforcement unless some poor tired pilot cocks up.
ICAO has many guidelines that countries can opt into or out of, piecemeal if they want. Many countries register exceptions.
IATA is an airline association that tends to be involved more in fares and ticketing and the like.
Moderate, Modest & Mild.
"Clearly you have no REAL concept as to what most of us are having to put up" 
I realise that some operators, more than others, might try to push their pilots further - and some of the weaker pilots, who don't have the confidence in themselves, or are wanting "just a little bit more experience, to move on to that next job 
" take it.
That is WHY pilots NEED a union - to protect them from themselves in some cases.
"No one has ever told us what this profession is gonna turn into eventually."
It going to "turn into" whatever pilots allow it to.
There are regulations that MUST be followed by pilots, regardless of what the scheduler allocates you.
There is a company Operations Manual, that has been approved by the regulatory authority, that you - the employee - MUST abide by.
Yes, I know that schedulers will sometimes roster pilots to the maximum of the these limits - max. duty periods with min. rest, followed by minimum rest prior to the following duties.
Whilst some of these limitations might be acceptable to desk bound Johnnies, I don't believe they sufficiently take into account the work we do, in O2 deprived environments, for extended periods.
In all probability we need to have some research into formulating a table similar to that (decompression tables) used by scuba divers making repetitive dives.
Most pilots are aware of the difference in personal fatigue levels following flights at say FL390 - with a cabin altitude of around 8,000' - vs those at FL220, where the cabin altitude is down around 1200'.
For that reason, on long multi-sector days, I have elected for the (much) lower level, and **** the burn.
I think some of you are mis-reading my intentions - I DON'T disagree that there has been a vigorous attack on our conditions - financially, and workplace (wrt flight and duty times) wise.
I DON'T disagree that some of the regulations, when used to the limit, by managers and schedulers who lack knowledge of the physiological effects of flying - WILL CAUSE FATIGUE.
However I DO disagree that it is up to the regulator to make the first move of stepping in to "save" the pilot and his charges.
That is our responsibility - for the sake of the pax in our care, the aircraft, ourselves, and the EMPLOYER. Because it is the EMPLOYER'S business that is going to suffer the longer term effects, following any incident or accident.
Long after all the pilots have left, and found employment elsewhere - and they will - the employer is going to be left with a LIABILITY.
I realise that some operators, more than others, might try to push their pilots further - and some of the weaker pilots, who don't have the confidence in themselves, or are wanting "just a little bit more experience, to move on to that next job " take it.That is WHY pilots NEED a union - to protect them from themselves in some cases.
"No one has ever told us what this profession is gonna turn into eventually."
It going to "turn into" whatever pilots allow it to.
There are regulations that MUST be followed by pilots, regardless of what the scheduler allocates you.
There is a company Operations Manual, that has been approved by the regulatory authority, that you - the employee - MUST abide by.
Yes, I know that schedulers will sometimes roster pilots to the maximum of the these limits - max. duty periods with min. rest, followed by minimum rest prior to the following duties.
Whilst some of these limitations might be acceptable to desk bound Johnnies, I don't believe they sufficiently take into account the work we do, in O2 deprived environments, for extended periods.
In all probability we need to have some research into formulating a table similar to that (decompression tables) used by scuba divers making repetitive dives.
Most pilots are aware of the difference in personal fatigue levels following flights at say FL390 - with a cabin altitude of around 8,000' - vs those at FL220, where the cabin altitude is down around 1200'.
For that reason, on long multi-sector days, I have elected for the (much) lower level, and **** the burn.
I think some of you are mis-reading my intentions - I DON'T disagree that there has been a vigorous attack on our conditions - financially, and workplace (wrt flight and duty times) wise.
I DON'T disagree that some of the regulations, when used to the limit, by managers and schedulers who lack knowledge of the physiological effects of flying - WILL CAUSE FATIGUE.
However I DO disagree that it is up to the regulator to make the first move of stepping in to "save" the pilot and his charges.
That is our responsibility - for the sake of the pax in our care, the aircraft, ourselves, and the EMPLOYER. Because it is the EMPLOYER'S business that is going to suffer the longer term effects, following any incident or accident.
Long after all the pilots have left, and found employment elsewhere - and they will - the employer is going to be left with a LIABILITY.
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Unions?????
What have they done for anyone lately?
Certainly not in the USA
As for the far East, well ask the 49rs over at Cathay and I am sure they would say the same.
I couldnt say as to the EU, but I would guess its pretty much the same
Boys and Girls the unions days are over!!! Supply and demand
Certainly not in the USA
As for the far East, well ask the 49rs over at Cathay and I am sure they would say the same.
I couldnt say as to the EU, but I would guess its pretty much the same
Boys and Girls the unions days are over!!! Supply and demand
Moderate, Modest & Mild.
What have they done for anyone lately?
One has only to look at the conditions of pilots, and the advances gained for us by strong union membership, and compare it to current times when most pilots DON'T have the PROTECTION of a union against ruthless management, to see WHY pilots' conditions are where they're at now.
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I see you are US based, and I understand your disillusion given whats happened to the once mighty majors there, like United.
But the guys at United had it very very good for a very long time. It just makes the fall seem harder and further.
As far as my own company is concerned, we made sacrifices, but the union prevented the kind of rape we've seen elsewhere. The word that best describes it is 'managed change'.
The majors in the US haven't changed the way we did...and I'm not referring to pilots, because (for example) the United guys seem to have given a helluva lot, including around 50% pay reductions (according to what I've read) and the recent deal offerring complete dismantling of the defined benefit pension scheme.
The problem is that MANAGEMENTS haven't changed their approach to the new market realities. Frightening ammounts of money are still being lost under their current business models, and no ammount of pilot pay cuts or working conditions sacrifices are going to cure those ills. We're all waiting for the other boot to drop in the US, and unfortunately it seems unavoidable that there will have to be a serious shakeout at the top end of the market. Don't blame the unions for the lack of management acumen.
But the guys at United had it very very good for a very long time. It just makes the fall seem harder and further.
As far as my own company is concerned, we made sacrifices, but the union prevented the kind of rape we've seen elsewhere. The word that best describes it is 'managed change'.
The majors in the US haven't changed the way we did...and I'm not referring to pilots, because (for example) the United guys seem to have given a helluva lot, including around 50% pay reductions (according to what I've read) and the recent deal offerring complete dismantling of the defined benefit pension scheme.
The problem is that MANAGEMENTS haven't changed their approach to the new market realities. Frightening ammounts of money are still being lost under their current business models, and no ammount of pilot pay cuts or working conditions sacrifices are going to cure those ills. We're all waiting for the other boot to drop in the US, and unfortunately it seems unavoidable that there will have to be a serious shakeout at the top end of the market. Don't blame the unions for the lack of management acumen.
Sonic-the highly acclaimed Southwest has been heavily unionized for many years. Check out the pay rates, and have been good for quite a while. The more senior/older pilots ahd other employees have also done well with stock and profit sharing.
US hub-and-spoke airlines (AMR, United, Delta, NWA, CO, USAirways...) requiring passengers and crews (sometimes hanging around over two hours at hubs) to change planes most of the time, were NEVER designed for high employee productivity. Managements strongly denied it, but they all used pattern bargaining when negotiating contracts-they always looked at the competition. High business fares were apparently the foundation for these wasteful hub operations. After a 10 or 12-hour duty day with short, intense legs flown requiring three or even four rushed changes of aircraft (weather delays in the c0ckp1t can quickly result in no time to eat between flights), we feel very productive and tired, but sometimes have logged only about 6 hours of 'block time'. Even with seven hours, indefinite weather delays between the dep. gate and runway in the summer can threaten our arrival contingency fuel-we must choose between running both engines+APU in an attempt to cool a really hot plane, or making it unbearable for over 100 people. Winter can mean swiftly changing weather and fuel requirements (do the destination and alternates still have required vis, crosswinds and good braking action?). Never mind guessing at crowded skies or holding over the Great Lakes or eastern US. Frustrating, even IF we had more than five hours of sleep in a hotel.
But upper management wants the public to believe that it is the unions' fault that these inefficient operations were created and are still, after decades, the heart and soul of daily business, except at Southwest Airlines, which carefully designed linear routes, sort of like the railroads. Another major US passenger carrier seems to have made most of its profit years ago by flying several cargo planes-but its Pacific route authority was never fully utilized, and the reasons have remained a mystery to many. Was freight not fashionable?
Southwest's 737 pilots are the highest-paid 737 aviators in the US! How is this possible, at an airline which is splashed throughout the media as a "low cost carrier"? and Southwest has been HEAVILY UNIONIZED for MANY YEARS. CEOs at other airlines don't want the public to be aware of this paradox.
Don't think so? Just check the history over there.... Employee costs, which were far better than at the rock-bottom-paying upstart airlines, have not prevented Southwest's brilliant success. They seem to have almost no hub-and-spoke operations. Productivity, linear route structures, one aircraft type and high staff/employee morale seem to be the key elements, concepts which seem lost on typically indifferent, conventional airline managements in the US, which now pretend that their hubs-and-spoke networks can be productive-if staff makeup for both these inefficient hubs and high fuel prices by taking unending paycuts. Some airlines attempt to create the superficial facade of a caring management. But unlike Southwest years ago, there is no steep discount to own shares of company stock, and half-hearted attempts, if any, to promote a true team spirit while at work. Which airline CEOs would go down to the ramp and load some bags for a while, or fly around a little, chatting with employees? Who are these "leaders" really fooling? Most of these so-called "leaders" have no true background in actual airline operations, and little interest in real aviation, as Howard Hughes, Bob Six, Juan Trippe (?) and Eddie Rickenbacker had long ago. Continental Airlines might have a pretty good CEO (Bethune) who might have saved the company years ago: no matter how typical he now appears, he earned his pilot ratings and has ferried B-757s from the factory. And American Trans Air was created by an 'operations type', Mr. Mickelson.
Even a beginning as a smaller airport Station Manager, even ramp worker or gate agent (at UPS, except for the pilots, most have worked their way up from loading packages), would create more insight into which staffing, equipment $upport is needed (many of us still doubt that good passenger service is the goal-airline seats seem to be just a perishable cash commodity in the eyes of the executives) , than what most of today's airline CEOs will ever acquire by the time their "golden parachutes" are opened.
US hub-and-spoke airlines (AMR, United, Delta, NWA, CO, USAirways...) requiring passengers and crews (sometimes hanging around over two hours at hubs) to change planes most of the time, were NEVER designed for high employee productivity. Managements strongly denied it, but they all used pattern bargaining when negotiating contracts-they always looked at the competition. High business fares were apparently the foundation for these wasteful hub operations. After a 10 or 12-hour duty day with short, intense legs flown requiring three or even four rushed changes of aircraft (weather delays in the c0ckp1t can quickly result in no time to eat between flights), we feel very productive and tired, but sometimes have logged only about 6 hours of 'block time'. Even with seven hours, indefinite weather delays between the dep. gate and runway in the summer can threaten our arrival contingency fuel-we must choose between running both engines+APU in an attempt to cool a really hot plane, or making it unbearable for over 100 people. Winter can mean swiftly changing weather and fuel requirements (do the destination and alternates still have required vis, crosswinds and good braking action?). Never mind guessing at crowded skies or holding over the Great Lakes or eastern US. Frustrating, even IF we had more than five hours of sleep in a hotel.
But upper management wants the public to believe that it is the unions' fault that these inefficient operations were created and are still, after decades, the heart and soul of daily business, except at Southwest Airlines, which carefully designed linear routes, sort of like the railroads. Another major US passenger carrier seems to have made most of its profit years ago by flying several cargo planes-but its Pacific route authority was never fully utilized, and the reasons have remained a mystery to many. Was freight not fashionable?
Southwest's 737 pilots are the highest-paid 737 aviators in the US! How is this possible, at an airline which is splashed throughout the media as a "low cost carrier"? and Southwest has been HEAVILY UNIONIZED for MANY YEARS. CEOs at other airlines don't want the public to be aware of this paradox.
Don't think so? Just check the history over there.... Employee costs, which were far better than at the rock-bottom-paying upstart airlines, have not prevented Southwest's brilliant success. They seem to have almost no hub-and-spoke operations. Productivity, linear route structures, one aircraft type and high staff/employee morale seem to be the key elements, concepts which seem lost on typically indifferent, conventional airline managements in the US, which now pretend that their hubs-and-spoke networks can be productive-if staff makeup for both these inefficient hubs and high fuel prices by taking unending paycuts. Some airlines attempt to create the superficial facade of a caring management. But unlike Southwest years ago, there is no steep discount to own shares of company stock, and half-hearted attempts, if any, to promote a true team spirit while at work. Which airline CEOs would go down to the ramp and load some bags for a while, or fly around a little, chatting with employees? Who are these "leaders" really fooling? Most of these so-called "leaders" have no true background in actual airline operations, and little interest in real aviation, as Howard Hughes, Bob Six, Juan Trippe (?) and Eddie Rickenbacker had long ago. Continental Airlines might have a pretty good CEO (Bethune) who might have saved the company years ago: no matter how typical he now appears, he earned his pilot ratings and has ferried B-757s from the factory. And American Trans Air was created by an 'operations type', Mr. Mickelson.
Even a beginning as a smaller airport Station Manager, even ramp worker or gate agent (at UPS, except for the pilots, most have worked their way up from loading packages), would create more insight into which staffing, equipment $upport is needed (many of us still doubt that good passenger service is the goal-airline seats seem to be just a perishable cash commodity in the eyes of the executives) , than what most of today's airline CEOs will ever acquire by the time their "golden parachutes" are opened.
Last edited by Ignition Override; 17th Feb 2005 at 19:23.
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I agree with the sentiments about this problem. I left BA (without a mega pension)and jioned a far east company now multisector days on the 744 with a duty limit of 24hrs but if you divert there is no limit to the duty hours. Only limited by the Captain willing to say enough. So next tme you see a far east airline please call them up as they may be asleep!
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the subtle pleasures derived from a well handled approach and landing under difficult conditions are still a source of extreme satisfaction.
In too many cases, the beancounters have taken over so much, it's now SOP that the autoland HAS to be used more often than not, and there's all sorts of reasons used to justify that decision. In the same way, SOP dictates that for economy, the automation has to be switched on at 500 Ft on the departure. I can't think of a way to demotivate people faster than to tell them that their skills are no longer needed.
The harsh truth is that the modern aircraft and it's operation is now so automated, while many people don't like to admit it, things have changed massively over recent years.
I can remember a visit to the local medical centre for a renewal, and sitting beside me was a senior captain of a well known green airline, in for his 6 monthly Class 1 renewal. He had just moved over to the A330, having flown early generation 747's for a number of years.
His somewhat crusty but interesting comment went "f******n stoopid this nonsense of coming in here every 6 months to get all manner of insults thrown at me, I could die 30 seconds after take off, and no b****r would notice until we were 20 minutes out of New York.!" He wasn't altogether joking.
Not much more than 30 years earlier, his predecessor would have launched out of Shannon not even knowing at that stage if they had enough fuel to get them past the PNR, and some days, they didn't, and had to come back.
Now, and I've seen this, the cabin entertainment system is showing an estimated arrival time that quite often is less than 5 minutes out for a flight that can be 11 hours.
In the same vein, that same crew 30+ years ago would be delighted if they landed with as many engines running as they had when they departed. Now, it's regarded as a major incident if an engine is shut down, and the vast majority of professional pilots will go through their entire career without having to ever fly for real on less than all of the engines that the manufacturer has provided, the only time that there will be any stress in this area will be in the recurrent sim checks.
Navigation aids are now so accurate, it's a relief when a not too stressed ATCer has time to tell you "opposite direction traffic 1000 above you", as it avoids the serious pucker factor of wondering if the opposite direction traffic that's right on the nose is above you, the centre line holding of the modern aids is now is so accurate, though that may not be seen by all as good.
All the other things that have been mentioned are also valid, there are new stress factors from fuel, weather, duty hours, and all of the other things mentioned. How many of them are down to beancounters, often beancounters that have never had any exposure to the real world at the sharp end of aviation. How many times has it been the professionalism of the flight crew who are on the front line that has been the only factor in preventing a disaster that need not even have been an issue other than for the attitude of those same beancounters.
Equally, someone made the comment about a Flight Sim pilot landing a 747-400 if the crew became incapacitated. Sad truth, if everything on the aircraft is working, and where it's going is not unreasonable, the flight simmer would probably get it on the ground in one piece. It might not be tidy, or legal, but it probably would happen, there are PC based simulators out there now that are very close to accurate representations of the flight deck of most modern jets. Ok, in some cases they might not be absolutely accurate in the modelling, but some of the level D full motion sims are not innocent in that respect, I can recall one A320 sim in Europe that was a nightmare to try and fly in manual reversion, so we ended up going to another 320 sim over 4000 miles away to do the research work we had to do. In the same vein, I've seen a non pilot with no real flight simulator experience, after less than an hour of careful instruction, handle a heavy jet full flight sim landing into the old Kai Tak. OK, don't get me wrong on this, it was in very good VFR conditions, with coaching from the people that knew what should be happening, but the handling was still being done by someone that an hour earlier had never handled the controls of a heavy jet.
Maybe that's part of the problem, the modern heavy jet is so much easier to handle, the professionals have allowed the idea to escape, as has been mentioned, that's it's easy. It's only easy because it's under control, and everyone knows exactly what it going on, and why. That's already been touched on before. The truth is that the underlying skill levels required are still high, maybe not as often, and maybe not for as long when things are getting tense, but those underlying skills are still needed. In some cases they may not be there to the same depth, and that's another point to be made.
Flying has changed, and it's going to continue to do so, dramatically. Some of the changes are going to be worrying, in that (beancounters again) it's no longer deemed essential that flight crew members have the raw data handling skills that used to be standard and expected. That's going to lead to accidents happening in future that might not have happened before, because the bean counters have decided (for now) that the cost of training to recover from some of the more unusual problems that might occur is not justified when the rarity of the possible occurrence is taken into account. Quite how you explain that logic to a grieving family (and the bean counters are rarely seen in that scenario) I don't know.
Don't get me wrong. Any airline has to be profitable, there's no charity cases that I know of, but there comes a point when the exact level of profit, and as many have already commented, the distribution of that profit has to be looked at very carefully, if the present trends continue, it's not clear if there will be fewer airlines because they've all cut each other's throats, or fewer airlines because some of them cut too many corners, and paid the ultimate price as a result of serious accidents or incidents.
Has this progressed things any. I'm not sure, but I do know that the discussion has to happen, and all concerned have to find a way to make sure that the entire industry doesn't become something that everyone takes for granted, and worse, accepts a higher failure level as a result.
I've already seen that the advent of the loco no frills carriers has taken the "special" factor out of flying for increasing numbers of passengers, now, flying is in the same category as getting in the car to go round the corner for the paper, or getting on the bus or train to go to work. That's a pity in some respects, because it's lowered the anticipation and expectation that people used to have, and it's reduced the recognition of the very different skills and commitment that is required to keep aviation safe for everyone. Bad drivers on the roads are a sad fact of life, bad pilots in the same way must never be, for the sake of all the people on the ground under them, the stakes are just too high.
Moderate, Modest & Mild.
it's now SOP that the autoland HAS to be used more often than not....In the same way, SOP dictates that for economy, the automation has to be switched on at 500 Ft on the departure.
Now, it's regarded as a major incident if an engine is shut down,
Engine shutdowns are a relatively regular occurrence in worldwide commercial aviation operations, and BECAUSE they are handled proficiently, more often than not, they don't rate a mention.
I've seen a non pilot with no real flight simulator experience, after less than an hour of careful instruction, handle a heavy jet full flight sim landing into the old Kai Tak.
Some airlines require you to push an autopilot button at about 500'? Tell me that this is quite an exaggeration. Even at 1,000', if permitted by systems limitations, that might be strange. How can this save money if you follow the flight director (even climbing in VS mode using 1500 fpm or so at "two to go" callouts, up to about 10,000', in order to avoid abrupt level offs: maybe "they" don't "allow" such choice of vertical modes?) and leave the planned FMC speeds alone?
Are the Program Managers and Fleet Captains really pilots, or just weenies? "Empty suits" who must allow the company Chief Pilots or a VP of Flight Ops with no real pilot background to override them and make such decisions regarding line flying. Is there fear that the line pilots can not safely hand-fly, as the non-flying pilot must reset the altitude knob and LNAV ["Dir/Intercept" Legs page) + white execute, and VNAV execute buttons, as he/she also responds to ATC clearances and requests deviation for weather 20* left? I saw numerous Captains hand-fly the 757 up to about FL 180 or higher, mostly when nearby traffic was light or moderate-not on each leg, but at least above 5000'. Since most planes have no Flight Engineer, is Flt Ops Management not believing the manufacturers' mantra (to enhance sales) that automation with only two pilots is both more economical and as safe-without the third c0ckp1t crewmember? Pilots must tell the automation what to do-not the other way around. Otherwise, they will never have the experience to substitute whenever the new-age 'pilot in command' (automation) is slow to respond or capture a course climbing out from LAS, EGE, BOZ or SEA. This also requires extra patience and experience to learn, whether with a MCDU or FMS+(even with moving) autothrottles.
There must be many such airlines with little faith in, nor understanding of their pilots. How can the beancounters be allowed to tell pilots how and when to fly, running the department with lock-step regimentation, or do these nations simply have no broad civilian aviation heritage to draw from? Maybe certain local pilot cultures have allowed themselves to be pushed into a tight corner with no escape, ending up as mode managers, with total confidence in and blind obedience to software, instead of experience
Maybe none of my vague impressions are valid. But even with some pilots having various amounts of FMC exposure, tragedies at Cali, Columbus, Toulouse, Mulhouse, Habsheim, Nagoya...near-tragedies at Lajes (Azores) and Vienna are possible .
Are the Program Managers and Fleet Captains really pilots, or just weenies? "Empty suits" who must allow the company Chief Pilots or a VP of Flight Ops with no real pilot background to override them and make such decisions regarding line flying. Is there fear that the line pilots can not safely hand-fly, as the non-flying pilot must reset the altitude knob and LNAV ["Dir/Intercept" Legs page) + white execute, and VNAV execute buttons, as he/she also responds to ATC clearances and requests deviation for weather 20* left? I saw numerous Captains hand-fly the 757 up to about FL 180 or higher, mostly when nearby traffic was light or moderate-not on each leg, but at least above 5000'. Since most planes have no Flight Engineer, is Flt Ops Management not believing the manufacturers' mantra (to enhance sales) that automation with only two pilots is both more economical and as safe-without the third c0ckp1t crewmember? Pilots must tell the automation what to do-not the other way around. Otherwise, they will never have the experience to substitute whenever the new-age 'pilot in command' (automation) is slow to respond or capture a course climbing out from LAS, EGE, BOZ or SEA. This also requires extra patience and experience to learn, whether with a MCDU or FMS+(even with moving) autothrottles.
There must be many such airlines with little faith in, nor understanding of their pilots. How can the beancounters be allowed to tell pilots how and when to fly, running the department with lock-step regimentation, or do these nations simply have no broad civilian aviation heritage to draw from? Maybe certain local pilot cultures have allowed themselves to be pushed into a tight corner with no escape, ending up as mode managers, with total confidence in and blind obedience to software, instead of experience
Maybe none of my vague impressions are valid. But even with some pilots having various amounts of FMC exposure, tragedies at Cali, Columbus, Toulouse, Mulhouse, Habsheim, Nagoya...near-tragedies at Lajes (Azores) and Vienna are possible .
Last edited by Ignition Override; 21st Feb 2005 at 03:52.
Moderate, Modest & Mild.
Well, before we get to that stage, we can expect to see driverless trains and buses, fully automated check-in at airports, and fully automated luggage and cargo loading.
Looking at space travel, the first capsules were unmanned, but as time has progressed, humans have been introduced - to fix the problems with the automatics
Be seein' you round, ut!
Looking at space travel, the first capsules were unmanned, but as time has progressed, humans have been introduced - to fix the problems with the automatics
Be seein' you round, ut!
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So here we are 7 miles up and 1500 miles east of JFK heading for LHR with 300 pax in a 2 engine jet when one of the engine's blows a gasket and has to be shut down.
Are the pilots or '' systems monitors '' capable of getting everybody safely to their intended destination ???
Are the pilots or '' systems monitors '' capable of getting everybody safely to their intended destination ???
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Problem is that if they could teach monkeys to fly then we would be replaced in a heartbeat.
But I wonder how long before they would be cutting the monkey's
rations.
Flying him to the point that he even forgets he is a monkey.
These managment types should be replaced with cockpit crew.
But I wonder how long before they would be cutting the monkey's
rations.
Flying him to the point that he even forgets he is a monkey.
These managment types should be replaced with cockpit crew.