Some airlines require you to push an autopilot button at about 500'? Tell me that this is quite an exaggeration. Even at 1,000', if permitted by systems limitations, that might be strange. How can this save money if you follow the flight director (even climbing in VS mode using 1500 fpm or so at "two to go" callouts, up to about 10,000', in order to avoid abrupt level offs: maybe "they" don't "allow" such choice of vertical modes?) and leave the planned FMC speeds alone?
Are the Program Managers and Fleet Captains really pilots, or just weenies? "Empty suits" who must allow the company Chief Pilots or a VP of Flight Ops with no real pilot background to override them and make such decisions regarding line flying. Is there fear that the line pilots can not safely hand-fly, as the non-flying pilot must reset the altitude knob and LNAV ["Dir/Intercept" Legs page) + white execute, and VNAV execute buttons, as he/she also responds to ATC clearances and requests deviation for weather 20* left? I saw numerous Captains hand-fly the 757 up to about FL 180 or higher, mostly when nearby traffic was light or moderate-not on each leg, but at least above 5000'. Since most planes have no Flight Engineer, is Flt Ops Management not believing the manufacturers' mantra (to enhance sales) that automation with only two pilots is both more economical and as safe-without the third c0ckp1t crewmember? Pilots must tell the automation what to do-not the other way around. Otherwise, they will never have the experience to substitute whenever the new-age 'pilot in command' (automation) is slow to respond or capture a course climbing out from LAS, EGE, BOZ or SEA. This also requires extra patience and experience to learn, whether with a MCDU or FMS+(even with moving) autothrottles.
There must be many such airlines with little faith in, nor understanding of their pilots. How can the beancounters be allowed to tell pilots how and when to fly, running the department with lock-step regimentation, or do these nations simply have no broad civilian aviation heritage to draw from? Maybe certain local pilot cultures have allowed themselves to be pushed into a tight corner with no escape, ending up as mode managers, with total confidence in and blind obedience to software, instead of experience
Maybe none of my vague impressions are valid. But even with some pilots having various amounts of FMC exposure, tragedies at Cali, Columbus, Toulouse, Mulhouse, Habsheim, Nagoya...near-tragedies at Lajes (Azores) and Vienna are possible .
