The Flying Ireland article gives a good indication of the navigation equipment on-board the Irish S-92s.

It appears to indicate that the FMS system is identical across the fleet but is it possible there might be some small differences between the various aircraft in the fleet? Four aircraft came from the previous UK contract while one came direct from the factory in the USA (having been acquired specifically for the Irish operation).

Also, is the information stored in the FMS of each aircraft identical? If the aircraft are rotated around the various bases after coming in for maintenance, can there be different information stored in each FMS as the crews at a particular base add information to the system as best suited to their needs and the area of the country where they carry out the majority of their flying?

Say, for example, an S-92, having been based at Waterford for a considerable period of time, goes to Dublin for scheduled maintenance. It comes out of maintenance and is assigned to the Dublin SAR operation (R116). Its FMS may contain information optimized for work in the south eastern region of the country (having been inputted by the Waterford crews) and may lack many of the way-points that are programmed into the Shannon or Sligo-based machines by their respective crews. Could the crew of R116 have found themselves flying an unfamiliar aircraft (from an FMS point of view) towards an area they were not familiar with?

Well said. :ok:

To comment on some aspects of earlier posts first:

Did the crew think that the fuel was at Blackrock? There would be plenty of reference material at the planning stage and in flight to indicate where the fuel was.

As regards a mistake in FMS planning; if that had been made initially, the crew would not have disregarded the fact that one was on an inlet and one was an island, this would have been apparent as they coast out.

Would the crew have considered the elements of the required letdown on the west coast either at the planning stage or latest in the cruise and then have briefed them in detail? Absolutely!

The flight to Black Rock would seem to have been planned from close to the outset, as a known point of approach offshore around which they would manoeuver and approach Blacksod from the SW.

The next few questions are an attempt to gain insight into the SAR perspective:

Would the aim have been to descend inbound Blackrock from the east to obtain visual contact with the surface at around 200ft and then proceed to turn back towards the fuel at Blacksod?

The transition to contact flying may or may not have been achieved but what would a SAR crew be expected to do if surface contact was either never achieved or subsequently lost?

What would the SOP be for this?

Do SAROPS procedures allow continuation IMC below MSA after such types of letdown?

Would a gradual turn towards the lighthouse at Blackrock to regain visual contact be the natural thing to do?

I note that a track from Blackrock to Blacksod passes close to another island, Duvillaun More. From a SAR point of view, would this be preferable to a left turn overhead Blackrock to establish on a NEly 9nm final for Blacksod?

I know there are many ways to skin a cat but I’m trying to get a SAR perspective, considering the additional technology and SAR flight limitations available whilst on ops.

Not frequented Pprune for a while but I'm not surprised to see the usual egos locking horns! Personally, I think HC has every right to question the justification for, and risk aspects of providing top-cover on SAR missions. In the past, comms-relay was a big factor and that isn't such an issue with modern comms suites.

I know for a fact that, occasionally, the decision to launch a top-cover asset is made by someone who doesn't necessarily have experience as a SAR operator. The decision can be made because another asset is available so why not use it? Clearly, it's a great capability with which to enhance a long-range job and will always give the crews a warm fuzzy feeling.

Like any scenario where the boundaries of risk-taking are being explored, it often takes a tragic incident to question current practices and evolve safe operating procedures. If it was one of my loved ones that had been lost I would have no problem with people challenging the status quo.

I don't know whether this is relevant because we do not know what they where attempting to do towards the later part of the flight. However, Weather Radar can be tricky to set up correctly to pick up obstacles on the surface of the sea, especially if a turn is involved at sufficient height that when the turn is complete the radar sweep is now looking over the top of the obstacles. Or in other words, the descent angle from the helicopter is too steep for the radar to sweep the flight trajectory.

I managed to "miss" the Miller Platform doing just this positioning for an ARA to the BRAE A. A knee trembler when I saw the Miller go by my window not to far below me.

I struggle to accept though that with a well trained crew like SAR, three of them navigating and looking at screens, in a high workload flight phase like the final positioning and descent, that they could end up making the same mistake I did.

If I was tasked with that let-down I would have used the BLACKROCK island as well for my IP and transition onward from there to the bay, but then again I am not sure how tight you can make a let down pattern in the BLACK SOD bay and I am not SAR.

Maybe Crab can let us know what the "standard" approach (excuse the pun) to a problem like this let-down in the bay would normally be for a SAR crew.

It seems very reasonable to me what they did in terms of the flight path, and maybe the close proximity of the wreckage to the island could just be a misleading red herring, in that they were doing a solid procedure and something went wrong as the got close to the island.

As an Aviator who has spent a long time over the sea, bored, lonely and eating mainly crap meals, I would not criticise the SAR Community for anything as they have always been my last hope should something go tits up with me chopper.!!

DB

I think challenging the strategies and protocols of the SAR community and further, suggesting that a top-cover (mutual support) helicopter should not be there because it is "taking a risk" is nonsense.

The principle of top-cover and mutual support is fairly easy to grasp if you consider that when these boys and girls are tasked on these long distance jobs is not because it is bright and sunny. Their ability to securely conduct their operation is supported by the top-cover asset for a whole host of reasons and not just because someone has or has not fitted a SAT Comm.

What this crew were doing should have been fairly routine for them and whatever has happened should not immediately start calling to question the solid mutual support protocols for other crews who are tasked in hideous conditions on a very long bungy.

If is was me bobbing about in the oggin, a long way from home, I would be very happy to know that the Rescue Helicopter has a solid support and communication via whatever means necessary as it comes to get me.

Sorry HC but this thread needs some balance to stay on topic and the SAR crews deserve more of our support than I think you are giving them right now. Play nice in the sandpit!

:ok::D:D:D

I am new here but I live in the West of Ireland.

The issue of Topcover appears to be that it's provided by the Irish Air Corps using fixed wing. I understand that this stems from not wanting to tie up another Helicopter & leave cover thin for the rest of the Island. Plus a fixed wing will have a longer range, & loiter ability.

There is probably some politics here. The IAC used to provide SAR. They wanted to continue but it would of needed a big investment, so the government decided to contract it out.

An illustration of the thin resources is it took 5 hours to get a fixed wing airborne after the incident. Another "unspoken" aspect is whether the other helicopter, on route back from rescuing a casualty, passed close to the site as there were reports of a strobe being seen.

[QUOTE]I think challenging the strategies and protocols of the SAR community and further, suggesting that a top-cover (mutual support) helicopter should not be there because it is "taking a risk" is nonsense.[QUOTE]

I for one wasn't suggesting that a top-cover aircraft shouldn't have been there. My perspective, for what it's worth, is that it's healthy to occasionally challenge practices that have been routine for some time. The merits of a top-cover aircraft are obvious. The process whereby the decision to launch a second aircraft is made is what I feel merits consideration. This is by no means criticising an aviation community which demands the utmost respect, merely healthy debate.

The whole 'top cover isn't required due to SATCOM' is a bit of a non-argument in my opinion.

SATCOM is far from perfect and even the most modern systems can still suffer from delays, drop-outs, lack of clarity and all the other issues anyone who's used them much will know about.

In a hover at 50 feet hundreds of miles out to sea it's a much nicer option to have LOS VHF comms at the press of a button with someone sitting above you watching instead of -

'Engine failure, does anyone have the number for the ARCC handy?

0044... splosh.

Please hang up and try again' :hmm:

SAR helicopters use a search radar for let downs - not a weather radar. A different animal. In conjunction with FLIR and EGPWS the resulting picture is very accurate and large buoys can be detected easily. A cliff face or island would be obvious. Particularly so from 200 feet which is the level at which the helicopter would be 2 miles from the target.

FC80 - top cover (fixed wing) here would have been IMC and probably heard a landing call. Switch off, all safe. A satellite tracking system could have pinpointed the final tracked position if you paid for the more frequent 20 sec burst and had a true flight follower covering the SAR flight and seeing the last report probably just short of the HLS.

Especially relevant when ELT's etc fail to deploy / activate. You have an immediate position and can engage RCC. Of course mutual support would provide a rescue possibility but fixed wing only possibly air-drop a survival raft / kit. Depends upon your budget. CHC uses SkyTrac extensively in the rest of the world - it works well.

Not sure what you mean precisely, but the SAR S92 uses the Honeywell Primus wx radar: https://aerocontent.honeywell.com/ae...1A_for_SAR.pdf

DB - :ok:I don't know the CHC SOPs and I don't know how good their radar is (not a search radar I'm pretty sure though, that was what we had on the SK) but an IP over 10 Nm away from the intended LS is rather extreme.

We used to let down from MSA well within 5 Nm and the final trans down from 200' was at about 1.25nm.

There may well have been other factors such as radar contacts as I explained earlier that may have affected their letdown procedure.

IIRC the S-92 has the facility to mark a target on top at 1000' (or whatever the required height is) and then complete a fully automatic letdown to the hover.

As for continuing IMC below MSA, we had special dispensation to do so because of the accuracy of the radar and the crew composition (dedicated radar operator) - again I know not what the CG AOC permits.

Agreed.

In the UK, we are still mourning the loss of a world-class electronics suite and a working bomb-bay overhead.

Meanwhile, still messing with improvisations seven years later and no clarity on the SAR role of the next generation of MPA. No amount of armchair comms toys can replace the on-scene presence of skilled aviation professionals with good maritime tools at their disposal.

The warm fuzzy feeling that Crab referred to earlier is known to be available in a variety of strengths.

DB

Why would you have used Blackrock for an IP for the approach to Blacksod out of interest? It would have added 10 mins to flight time (when you need fuel), is 300ft elevation and has presumably similar lighting to the Blacksod refuelling destination lighthouse, which is also surrounded by flattish ground? On another point, anyone know if Blacksod had any weather reporting? And if not, given its function as a remote refuelling base, surely it should do for the relatively modest cost involved? What weather would the crew have had to best indicated what to expect at Blacksod?

If the crew were letting down to Blackrock to get visual underneath then the track they took seems reasonable for a straight in approach into wind (based on the info from the map from a previous post. Now, looking at that map, they appear to have gone around to the north-west, either because they didn't have sufficient visual references or because of a technical problem (which we still don't know at this stage of course).

What is puzzling me is why they took a left turn back towards Blackrock downwind & possibly low level especially at night? If the cloud base was 300-400ft & the lighthouse being 300ft above sea level on blackrock then there was a chance they wouldn't have seen it from the last known position just short of the island. Could it have been a case of being in a very vulnerable position, i.e; Vortex Ring? low forward indicated airspeed with a tail wind descending towards a very big wall of rocks & realising what was going on but then being too late when trying to pull power - too close to the ground?

Or some sort of technical problem either at a similar time of potential Vortex ring state (which would be extremely unfortunate) or from the initial go-around worsening?

RIP to such a talented & experienced crew... very sad time for all :(

Operated in the sea search mode for let downs. DB was talking about WX radar.

BM,

Just a what If.....assume the Crew was going to use Blackrock for an IP for a let down to Blacksod....and had a Technical issue it may have caused a need to amend their plan to perform a precautionary landing at Blackrock.

At this point anything is possible......and all of these questions should begin to be answered if the CVR/Data Recorders can be recovered and are in good condition.

Guys if any of you wish to leave a message of condolence check out the fan page for Rescue 115 where there is all the info on Rescue 116, hard to believe but over a million people have visited the page since the accident.link below


https://www.facebook.com/SAR115/


Granuaile getting equipment including submersible loaded in Galway Harbour


https://twitter.com/fcorby/status/843094580220313600

Top cover vs mutual support
 

The dispute above as to whether 116 was doing top cover or mutual support seems a bit silly - was 116 not the plan B for the unavailable *top cover* CASA?

One hopes that the investigation digs into plan A as deeply as it will the technical sequence of events which led to the loss of the aircraft and crew, even if that embarrasses command officers or ministers.

CRAB, thanks for your explanation. Rotorspeed, my choice of Blackeock as an IP is based on bugger all experience of the area or the SAR AP modes in the 92. However, armed with what I have flown over the ocean I would expect the radar return looking back East towards the coast to look very busy. 13 Km for an IP is nothing really when we use 6-7 No this days for the Base turn onto an ARA final with an uncluttered Radar return and one clean target destination.

It just seems to make sense that before getting close the the bay coastline you take the significant obstacle out of play i.e. Blackrock.

Like I said though I am not pontificating from a strong position experience wise rather I just think the flight path the trace implies is not too unreasonable.

Only one other thing I notice and that is the base turn on the trace looks very tight. It may be just the scale of it or it could mean they were very rapidly trying to course reverse. Anyone have an opinion on this?

DB, the base turn may not necessarily be as tight as drawn on a GPS track trace. Remember, it is simply a series of positions at fixed time intervals and the line drawn between does not always accurately depict the actual track flown.

Both FMS Computers will be of particular interest to the Investigation Team.
The FDR won't give them the "Planned" FMS Data.
Pretty sure the Individual doing the Flight Following IE Flight Track/Skywatch/Skytrack....whatever you want to call it has already asked plenty of questions.

I see Skytrack as a marketing tool and feel good thing for Oil & Gas Heli Op's,.....But SAR/EMS is a whole different story.
It's as good as ATC these days. It's as good as a third Pilot.

Modern Tech is only as good as the Individual/s interpreting/believing/monitoring & acting on the data as presented.
When confronted with the choice of optimism verses reality, most choose optimism because reality is just to confrontational to deal with.

BTW if the range on the Moving Map is scaled in tight, and it would be during approach......both Blackrock & Blacksod would look very much the same. Both are fringe coastal, both have have a lighthouse adjacent, both are approached from the water, depending on wind direction

The Stars all aligned the wrong way on this fateful night.

If top-cover is felt to be a necessity for SAR then that should be baked into the tender and bid cost.

If the parties involved decide to go ahead and low-ball without it, subbing helis when they can't persuade someone to give them non-contracted, non-guaranteed, unpaid fixed-wing top-cover, well... I know where the embarrased faces should be. Not at Air Corps HQ, Baldonnel.

If top cover was not to be called upon because it's a contractor responsibility, why would the DF have entertained the request at all, instead of pleading personnel shortages now?

Fuel
 

may have missed this
but why should there be 2 refueling possibilities within a few miles of each other?

I believe there aren't. Blackrock is not a refuel point.

The whole top-cover issue simply wan't a problem when we had a Royal Air Force that was interested in SAR and maritime aviation.

Any long-range jobs (more than 150Nm) from the Irish coast were done by RAF SAR from Valley or Chivenor or in extremis Navy SAR from Culdrose and Prestwick (RAF Sea Kings had the greater range).

Top cover was provided by the Nimrod fleet, as Jim671 has highlighted, with experienced maritime aviators, extensive comms and surveillance suite and the ability to drop liferafts and supplies.

All this went in relatively short order with the demise of the Nimrod and the contractorisation of the Mil SAR Force.

Somewhere in the change over, responsibility for the area W of Ireland was handed back to the Irish CG and Govt - if they didn't elect to provide adequate replacements then that is a matter for them.

However, having said that, it is the UK SRR (Search and Rescue Region) that extends much further West than a helicopter than reach - therefore should it not still be a UK responsibility?

Would this new machine perhaps have been equipped with the Sikorsky Rig Approach System?

Granuaile has left Galway Docks for Black Sod.

It took on extra equipment, including what looks like a underwater RV

Godspeed, and enough of the foul weather.


Families need word, and less importantly, the Salt water will destroy many aerospace materials the longer the exposure. And no official word on what the 'significant piece of wreckage' is.

It is an rv & I would of thought that the Celtic Explorer, which also has cranes & survey equipment would follow along.

Flying Ireland -reS92
 

A further important enhancement is in the pipeline, beginning in autumn 2014. Night Vision Goggle (NVG) equipment will be introduced, with the aim of being fully established across the fleet within 18 months.

Looks like the one from Celtic Explorer
Deepwater ROV | Marine Institute

Celtic Explorer looks like it off on some other task. On marinetraffic it is shown stopped between Blackhead and Ballyvaughan.
http://www.marine.ie/Home/site-area/...s/track-vessel

Celtic Explorer was tasked to the site,, may have been redirected

Its in the link I posted above

No, but it does have the SAR AFCS, which is more comprehensive and includes some of the modes that the Rig Approach uses, such as Velocity Hold.

Seems a bit strange to be tasked back to fish. They may only get windows of opportunity & you think that they would want all their assets available.

Another priority must be to get back on the Island for a full search.

So it seems feasible, if the information we have so far is all correct, that they may have clipped Black Rock during the letdown (debris on the rock that could not have been washed up) and then tried to keep control of the damaged aircraft and elect (or had no choice) to make a water landing.

This landing was clearly a hard one but survivable (at least for a short while) for one of them since you don't get thrown out of the cockpit of an S92 if you are properly strapped in.

The whys and wherefores of the choice of letdown position will only come from the accident investigation but, like so many accidents, it probably won't have one cause but many contributory factors where all the holes in the swiss cheese have lined up.

Lets hope the wreckage and the remaining crew-members can be recovered soon, for the sakes of all involved.