It is a very sad story. Experiences and well known crew who were appreciated by all their peers. My sympathies to their collegues anf families.

Many of you are asking why they did an approach to BlackRock when in fact they wanted to take fuel at BlackSod. I think because of the weather, the ceiling was to low to do any kind of approach at Blacksod, therefore the crew elected to do an approach similar to a NDB ARA at BlackRock, and then proceed VFR/NVG to Blacksod. The reason they didn't do the similar approach at Blacksod is normally a NDB ARA have to be at a certain distance from shore to comply with obstacles clearance (between 10 n.m. and 14n.m.). For me it show that way the crew knew exactly what they were doing.

My two cents.
FH

Questions on Survival Vests
 

As a former SAR pilot and RCC worker I was wondering if anyone can help with these questions regarding the survival vests worn by Irish CG crew:

What type survival beacon(s)/radios are carried in the vests?

I thought I saw on one posting that their survival beacon is a manual activation type; is that correct? Or is it an automatic type that activates upon immersion?

Is the inflatable part of the vest equipped with an AIS Man Overboard type beacon that activates upon inflation?

Replies to the thread ok with me or you can send it privately to me.

My condolences to all; especially to the families.

Hi Flying Head,

How come they never flew near BlackSOD though if this was the case?

Looking at AIS data there were about 5nm south of BlackSOD on track to BlackROCK. At no point on ATC or Coast Guard frequency did they say that they were approaching BlackROCK to get visual. 2 minutes before the crash as they commenced the 180 degrees turn the said that they were approaching BlackSOD. This indicates to me that the crew may have thought that they were approaching BlackSOD instead.

Just my interpretation of the evidence so far and I'm sure I could be far from the truth.

Flying Head - it maybe that they were using a legacy procedure that pre-dated the S-92, something that they used to do in that area in the S-61.

The S-92 is far more capable and could have easily conducted a letdown without routing via Blackrock but maybe it was just what they were used to doing.

I start to wonder if the AIS track West of Blackrock is just an anomaly and that they never went that far away from the rock before water impact - if there really was that much damage to the aircraft after hitting the rock then it would seem to have to render it unflyable.

As for the survival aspects, it is certainly possible to release your harness and egress the aircraft yet drown on the way to the surface - I don't know if Dara's lifejacket was inflated or not.

I was just wondering could the Coastguard Controllers at Malin Head or Valentia who may be looking at Rescue 116 on their live AIS screens have contacted them on Marine Frequency and asked them why they were at Blackrock and not Blacksod or would they not get involved when they are going to land

If the report about the radio call ''landing in Blacksod'' is correct, why would they do so as far out as about 10 NM from destination?

Hi GJOYT, if you know the weather is to low at Blacksod, why fly over, or like CRAB said maybe a pre dated procedure have been used. I think at this stage all theory are valid to a certain point. I hope the CVR/FDR will answer most of the questions!

Cheers
FH

I heard that Dara's life jacket was inflated and helmet was not on.... upon recovery...

If the cloud base is 200-300 feet how can you explain using Black Rock at 275 odd feet for routing in towards Blacksod at 40 odd feet?

AAIU Statement.

AAIU Statement: AAIU Investigation into the loss of R116 | AAIU.ie

Hi catch21, I thought the ceiling was a little bit higher.

Belmullet (30 km to the northeast, 9 m amsl) was Overcast at 300 ft. Mace Head, 80 km to the southeast of Blackrock, was Overcast 400 ft but down to 200 ft 1 hour later.

How would they know exactly what the ceiling was at Blackrock, there is no weather reporting at that site.

Last couple of hours Granuaile has been operating close to Blackrock. Hope they launched ROV, some divers, or better.

Wind is currently 10kn was 30.

Seems we are presuming that there is no weather reporting at Blacksod - when I asked this some time ago no-one responded. Given that this is one of the few refuelling points on the north west coast and the presumably frequent poor weather, this is surely a major omission, the modest cost of which must be justified in the future. Furthermore, does anyone know if there was any ground to air RT at Blacksod? It's hard to believe a simple hand held receiver was not in use, but there again I have seen no reports of comms here.

And then we come to the critical issue of navigation. Given that there is a significant chance that this aircraft was not where its crew thought it was, I am astonished to gather from some posts that there is a possibility this S92 did not have a moving map display in the cockpit? Is this really the case? It seems incredible if so that a $20m aircraft can have less such kit than most single engined VFR helis. And such an omission may well be a major contributory factor in this accident.

There is weather reporting at Blacksod and the comms are marine VHF, I have heard other Helicopters going in for fuel at other times asking for the latest weather and visibility as they are coming in,there is also a remotely operated Coastguard Station at nearby Belmullet operated by Malin Head Coastguard Station

Blacksod has an automatic weather station 10 miles from the lighthouse. It used to be at the lighthouse and it was the Blacksod Lighthouse forecast that they relied on to give the Go-ahead for the D-Day landings.

Ok good, so does anyone have any idea what the reported vis and cloudbase was at Blacksod around the time of the accident?

Belmullet Automatic is listed here
Coastal Reports - Met Éireann - The Irish Meteorological Service Online

Someone posted a while back that the cloud base on the night was 300 feet don't have any other info

You can select BELMULLET (A) and date on the menu on the right. It just a basic report
Daily Data - Climate - Met Éireann - The Irish Meteorological Service Online

Both Granuaile and LE Eithne on the way back in from Black Rock area now and returning to Blacksod Bay. Hopefully weather remains ok for search tomorrow morning.

Not as standard they don't, it's a cost option, no knowledge if the SAR 92's have them or not.

As for not being where they thought it was I find it hard to think they mistook the lighthouse for Blacksod, aircraft heading would mean they were aproaching Blacksod from the wrong direction and put them over land?

This is the 1 am synop report for Belmullet station (9 m amsl), 14 km north of Blacksod, 27 km northeast of Blackrock.

AAXX 14011 03976 47130 /2210 10106 20099 30242 40254 55003 7818/ 88///
333 88/03==

Visibility 3 km, Wind 220 @ 10 m/s (19 knots), Temp 10.6 °C, Dewpoint 9.9 °C, Sea-level pressure 1025.4 hPa, Stable, rain shower, Overcast at 300 ft.

I've made up this chart showing Belmullet and Mace Head obs. Cloudbase had lowered to 200 ft at Mace Head at 2 am.

http://www.pprune.org/attachment.php...1&d=1490140755

Hi everyone.
Been reading through all the posts on here. Very sad and tragic. Regarding Rescue 116's positioning, the following may be of interest to you all. Seems to be the very last ATC conversations between Rescue 116 and Shannon (SNN)

EINN-High-Mar-14-2017-0000Z.mp3

The pertinent part of that recording starts at 19:30

Shannon ATC have noted that R116 are continuing to head out to sea and have asked the question, Where are you going?
Very sad to listen to the long radio silence after that. RIP

But what is most pertinent is that 116 told Shannon that its intention was to refuel at Blacksod.....

Is it known what type of PLB the crew were issued with and any reason why the PLB did not assist in the early location of Captain Fitzpatrick"s position post accident,,, thank you

They said they were finding it hard getting "two-way" (comms) with R118. Nothing about not being sure about making it to the ship. Their plan was definite to land at Blacksod. From there they would then see what to do.

With my trained Air traffikers ears ( I talk to these guys on a daily basis) they definately say their intention is to refuel at Blacksod.
I am guessing that most of the navigation is done by the crew in the back of the cab using all the bells and whistles available to them. And I understand that is some pretty good kit with a map display going down to Ordnance Survey quality. So why end up at Black rock when they think they are going to Blacksod?
I am certain all will be clear once the contents of the CVR are revealed.

What they said was:

"We are having problems getting two-way with Rescue 118 at the moment so our intentions are to land ON Blacksod, refuel and we'll figure it out from there I suppose."

I think using the word "ON" instead of "AT" could indicate they may have been aware they were landing on an island (rock in this case) and not at a landing area on the mainland?

What? ATC asks them what their intentions are and they say "we're landing at Blacksod for fuel". That means they're going to land at Blacksod for fuel. The word "Definite" is not required in ATC.

You're getting caught up in semantics. I don't see any confusion in their intentions, and obviously neither did the controller.

I've landed on occasion to conjur up a plan when faced with a tricky situation that required a bit of thought, much easier to do the conjuring when sitting safely on the ground. However when I see the daylight photo of that helipad on Blackrock, surrounded by cold water, at night and in bad weather, there is no way I'd contemplate landing on that in those conditions for that reason. It just doesn't make sense to me as an alternative compared with the other option. Which is why I suspect they thought they were somewhere other than where they actually were, for whatever set of reasons. The under the weather transit reason from where they were to where they wanted to go does make operational sense, except when you look at it from the angle that they actually hit the rock. So by implication, the fact that the rock was there came as a surprise to them. Of course a serious malfunction at a critical point might explain why they hit a rock that they knew was there.

Don't forget that 2 minutes before the crash as they turned towards BlackROCK, they transmitted on the Coastguard frequency that they were approaching BlackSOD.....

Mitchaa
 

Your just trolling now, you are obviously not a professional pilot, so what qualifies you to make such outlandish claims.

Any one that has flown, or still fly's on a SAR flight knows the professionalism that such crews fly with, and to say that they misidentified Blackrock as Blacksod is just rediculous.

If you know what the low level approach to Blacksod looks like, you wouldn't be making such comments.

No once have you asked have the missing crew been recovered yet? Instead it looks as if you are only interested in questioning their descision making on a 30 second ATC clip.

Norunway
 

Professionals make mistakes too!

Were you in the helicopter when the accident happened?? No.. So anything is possible until they get more evidence from more wreckage and the black box.

The arrogance of some people on this...

Anyone who has ever launched for a SAR flight with a rescue callsign will know that apart from a basic intent there is no plan as there is seldom time to make one. The plan evolves as the flight progresses and is constantly changed as more information becomes available.

Everything is a 'possibility' Mitchaa until it becomes an impossibility.

I think we need to keep an open mind. In the Glasgow thread there were some very, very loud voices in the room proclaiming "no way in the world could this helicopter be run to fuel exhaustion".

Apart from the RT references to Blacksod, the information I have is that the helipad at Blackrock is 9m. It was built around the Bo105 which served the lighthouses for many years and, I understand, is just about acceptable for an EC135. I think we can be satisfied that nobody was planning to land an S92 there.


Establishing what they were doing in such close proximity to it and what brought about their ultimate, and increasingly apparent contact with it will have to wait just a little longer until crews recover the data recorder.


In the meantime, for the sake of the families and those close to them who are most seriously affected, we must hope that the missing crew members can be found sooner rather than later in what remains an extremely challenging environment for the services involved.