Don't specifically disagree with any of that except:

But when there is an ILS, why not take the safer option and do an ILS? (There was at the base I'm talking about).

Yes, the "SAR stuff" is more difficult and carries higher risk, and thus needs more training and practice time. But not 100% of the training and practice time.

"Any competent IR pilot ... ILS" etc - to be competent, you need to practice. Your dismissal of this point is exactly the problem I'm referring to.

The plan that was reported as being in place a couple of years ago was that full NVG was being introduced and would be operational across the fleet at some time during early 2016. Maybe somebody could confirm whether that plan was indeed completed.


(That doesn't mean there was no NVG before that. For instance, when this aircraft was at Sumburgh at Oscar Charlie, it was not flown on NVG though I believe goggles were available up the back for searching, as happened with Bristow on UK GAP-North until recently.)

Old days on the North Sea were pretty much done as low as required to maintain contact with the surface in the day.....and low enough at night to avoid ice in the Winter.

But then it was single pilot for a lot of us too.

Times change and technology improves!

Which navigation suite is installed in the S92? My SkyDemon does not show up Blackrock or the larger Duvillaun More island at all. Is it possible that it doesn't show up in the S92 too? ("An Fód Dubh" is Blacksod)

SkyDemon
http://www.boards.ie/vbulletin/attac...8&d=1489711248

Ordance Survey
http://www.pprune.org/attachment.php...1&d=1489790424

HC - I understand your point and largely agree with you in relation to a predisposition for 'self-contained' let downs, flying around in marginal VMC, etc. on SAR but I'm not sure it's particularly relevant to this incident.

The average let down on SAR is usually as safe or even safer (especially at night) than the average ARA to an oil rig in my opinion, having done both.

With the advantages of NVG, FLIR, AIS and another couple of pairs of eyes and ears on the aircraft tuned in to what's going on, SA and indeed the visual sight picture are often significantly improved.

Of course, there are the awful, dark, foggy, stormy, [insert further terrifying adjectives here] approaches, scraping in to the significantly reduced mimima that SAR is granted which obviously - necessarily - expose the aircraft and crew to increased risk but these are the expection rather than the rule.

I think any implication that the crew here were pushing the limits or operating at an increased level of risk seems misplaced - an overwater letdown on what (as far as I can see) wasn't a particularly awful night weather wise is bread and butter for a qualified crew and a necessary part of the job.

Times change and, mostly, expectations of safety improve. This is why N Sea aviators no longer go VFR when the conditions are too bad for IFR.

Yes you are absolutely right, my points may well be completely irrelevant to this accident. However in the vacuum created by waiting for any concrete cause, we might as well talk generalities. If it does transpire that, for example, they mistakenly made an approach to the wrong place, then my contention is that it is time to challenge the whole paradigm of SAR Ops to ensure that safety margins are only slim when they absolutely need to be, and maximised at all other times, something I feel is not always the case at the moment. But be careful - just because something is "bread and butter" doesn't mean it is always the right thing to do.

This is the 1 am synop report for Belmullet, 30 m northeast of Blackrock. Overcast @ 300 ft, visibility 3 km.

AAXX 14011 03976 47130 /2210 10106 20099 30242 40254 55003 7818/ 88///
333 88/03==

Visibility: 3 km
Wind: 220 (SE) @ 10 m/s (19 kts)
Temp 10.6 °C, Dewpoint 9.9 °C
Sea level pressure: 1025.4 hPa
Pressure trend past 3 hours: almost no change
Weather: rain showers
Cloud: Overcast with base at 300 ft

At Mace Head, 80 km to the southeast, conditions were similar, with cloud Overcast at 400 ft, lowering to 200 ft by 2 am.

What's the source of that second Ordnance survey map? I ask because Black Rock is clearly shown on that map you have posted yet as per my last post, it or it's lighthouse doesn't appear at all on OSI mapping at 1:50,000 which seems to be very much an anomaly as far as I can see.

So you've found an aviation mapping system that doesn't show Black Rock and a report of cloud base around the top of the lighthouse.

Makes me shudder.

Yes, very unpleasant conditions but well within the remit of a well-trained SAR crew - which these guys and gal were.

No - it's not Oil and Gas and it's very disappointing that HC chooses to tar all SAR crews with the same brush based on what went on in the N Sea many years ago - not mil or CG SAR btw! Move on and accept that just because it's not Oil and Gas doesn't make it dangerous, gash, unprofessional or 'just tooling around at 200''.

Have some respect that a professional crew somehow ended up dying in the course of their duties for reasons we can only speculate on - dissing the profession based on personal gripes really doesn't help anyone.

Regardless of that, radar and EGPWS should definitely have been painting Black Rock and I'd be very surprised if the observer's mapping system wasn't running approved VFR charting which would include these obstacles.

HC - it's a fine line to tread IMO. I totally agree that pointlessly pushing on VFR when the weather is marginal and IFR is the easier and safer option is very much an anachronism and should be avoided.

'Minimising risk' at one end of the spectrum to the extent that training is not regularly carried out close to operational limits and/or in weather close to operational limits will start to increase risk at the other end of the spectrum though. If crews are not current or comfortable doing that, then when that horrible approach right down to SAR mins comes along you are piling on extra stress and taking away capacity when it's needed most.

The crew routed to that location it appears from the Track....otherwise that would be a HUGE coincidence.

Radar would be showing the island clearly if the unit was working properly and tuned per SOP.

Perhaps Crab can tell us.....would Procedure require an Offset from the Target in a case like this if Blackrock Lifht House was the intended ( even if mistakenly) point of landing.....or would it be a straight head on approach?

It's from here



Both are clearly shown on the paper 1:500,000 and 1:250,000 flight charts, but the crew would probably not have been using these I'm sure.

That's been bugging me right from the off. An official from the Coast Guard said that it is standard procedure to pass Blacksod and aproach it from the west, however, I wondered why they would go so far west. 10 NM seems a lot. No one else seemed bothered by it so I thought it was just me. Their path seems more in line what I would imagine an arrival should look like, albeit to the wrong location.

Many theories. Within a few days the CVR / FDR hopefully will be recovered and answer the questions.

Helicrazi with the SK3 (raw picture) we practiced to 150yds - moving and fixed targets.

Using an offset or target on the nose?

Wouldn't that lighthouse light overpower NVDs?

I am not familiar with the are but can anyone indicate a refuelling point at the nearest airport with ILS?

NVD or NOT?
 

Cant find any information that they refitted theire S92s to fly with NVD...
FLIR is standard but no one has confirmed they actually had NVD?
NVD is a big help and increased safety in an operation like this.

SAS Offset

cncpc No

Which is why I asked the question back in post #93. I would be surprised if they were not using NVD on this type of mission, but maybe someone closer to this could answer.

Could you expand on that no?

CNCPC early marks of NVG would 'flare out' with bright lights, later models cope. By the time one was close enough to a light house for it to become a problem one would be 'off' goggles and using white light or even a combination of the two techniques. I don't know what civilian crews might do. It might be completely different with FLIR, which we didn't have in my time in the mil.

cncpc - yes a bright light will tend to shut down the goggles if you look straight at it. However, the light isn't pointing at you all the time, it is rotating, and you can look away if required.

If the cloudbase as reported was at 300' and the rock is 300' high, the lighthouse will have been in cloud anyway, significantly attenuating the strength of the beam.

SAS - in answer to an earlier question, yes, SAR crews will have a working knowledge of the lighthouse idents in their local area.

If that is aimed at my point then I think you miss it a bit. I am not saying that they should have sought a refuelling airfield with ILS. I am not even referring specifically to the accident in this thread since obviously we have no idea what the cause was. I am questioning the concept of having to use "SAR limits" to provide "top cover" or for other activities that are not directly about saving lives and that perhaps, if the weather requires that, it might be better simply to dispense with the top cover in the light of modern communications. My feeling is that when top cover or other such things are tasked, no-one is really thinking that it may be a higher risk than normal aviation and properly considering whether the increased risk is justified. From the crews' point of view it's just "what they do" and are accustomed to the increased level of risk so they don't notice it.

Whilst we are covering the usual speculation, HC makes a valid point.
Top Cover at what cost?

tistisnot - I would love to but just note who started this anti-SAR crusade, again! and on a thread most unsuited to it.

I think I have tried to provide useful information for those not versed in SAR and I will continue to do so without further engaging with HC.

Coincidences.
 

Captain Duffy was from a village called Blackrock, in Co. Louth.

Captain FitzPatrick will be laid to rest this morning in a cemetery on the R116 road in south Dublin.

RIP to all

what terrible irony....RIP all the crew.


Julie that is an argument based on 20/20 hindsight - there is significant risk to the rescue crew going out to the fishing vessel since they are out there by themselves with often patchy comms. In order to mitigate some of that risk, top cover provides comms relay and, in the case of it being provided by another SAR helicopter, a means of rescuing the rescuers or completing the rescue in the event of failure of systems on the primary rescue aircraft.

Therefore, it is highly efficient to utilise a second SAR aircraft for top-cover on a long -range job in the Atlantic.

The primary rescue isn't complete until the casualties are safe back on land and there are many things that can go wrong during that process. The aircraft can develop a fault requiring turnback, the conditions on scene can be so bad that the rescue just isn't possible or the aircraft reaches its time on scene and has to depart in order to make land, the winch could be damaged delivering the winchman or the winchman could be injured in the process of getting on the deck. For all of those reasons and many more - top cover by a SAR helo is very desireable and , as part of the overall mission, operating to the same limits and procedures (all trained for) is more than appropriate.

Thanks for the enhanced explanation. This debate is not a 20:20 hindsight one since we don't know why the accident happened, and as far as I'm concerned we are talking generalisations.

With the advent of satellite phones, surely the Comms thing isn't much of an issue these days? If top cover is provided by FW, most of your remaining points aren't relevant. If provided by SAR heli then they do mostly seem to be "nice to have"s. How often does a heli have to rtb mid-mission due to a technical issue? If time on scene exceeds endurance then surely this also applies to the top cover heli? The case for taking the enhanced risk with the second crews lives doesn't immediately seem easily justified to me, unless there are actual statistics showing the need, which I somehow doubt.

It is all a matter of opinion and acceptable level of risk, but I wonder if anyone considers just how necessary a second heli is vs the risk when tasking, or whether they just do what they have always done because that's how it's always been done.

Interesting article Malabo, with some good insights to the kit they have. Curious to see them using V/S mode to maintain Altitude?

From another Irish forum, not sure how accurate, but apparently the actual terminology for one CHC heli supporting another is 'mutual support' rather than 'top-cover'. Which makes more sense; two aircraft with the same capabilities supporting each other and unfortunately thereby experiencing the same problems and challenges.

Very few SAR contracts, actually none that I've found, appear to require the contractor to implement fixed-wing top-cover ( manned or unmanned ). And no contractor is going to do so voluntarily without an increase in the contract award, so often the crews find no option but mutual support.

Mutual SAR is a tried and tested method of providing just that; SAR support for a helicopter on a long range SAR mission away from the likelihood of support if trouble is encountered.

Quite why HC is so determined to highjack this thread with questionable assertions against known experts is disappointing, and I trust that such sidetracks will cease.

The availability of NVD is a common question being asked. The Irish CG were going through an introduction process, but I am unsure how far into the program things had progressed.

It is quite likely that NVD was not in use.

Why would you "trust" that? The heli in question was providing "top cover" - terminology I picked up from the SAR folk on here - and so in what way is it irrelevant to discuss the risk balance of that concept? That all the SAR brigade gang up against any hint of outside comment or any outsider with the temerity to have an opinion just shows how insular and arrogant they (the ones on here) have become.

Apate - unless someone from CHC or Irish CG can answer that question we will have to wait and see.

However, although NVD would help once below the weather, they are of no use during the letdown process other than to spot when you are VMC below.

Even without NVD, the letdown process can still be performed, it is designed to be used in very low visibility day or night - hence the use of radar for clearances. Once established in the hover at the bottom, the AP is used in conjunction with the radar and any visual cues that may be available to close with the target, be that the land or a vessel/structure.

One safety element that would be briefed during the letdown would be the escape route in the even of malfunction - this could be to continue straight ahead and trans up if you aren't pointing at any obstacles or it could be a pre-briefed turn onto a specific heading.

Either way I find it difficult to believe that a crew would trans down pointing at the only obstacle for miles but, if they didn't know it was there (for whatever reasons), that might be what happened.

HC - We just prefer to deal with 'informed opinion' rather than wild-assed guessing from those with an axe to grind.

Remember, we have established that families read these pages and I for one won't help you criticise their loved ones professionalism.

Just a reader on the thread, but couldn't let this pass without comment. Insular and arrogant heh? HC, you come across as the most opinionated, insular, arrogant, strident, know it all on this forum. Yes, I know you have experience, but how about a little humility. You're just one among equals.