I would humbly suggest that you have no idea what the crew knew.

Lads....this article quotes the Accident Investigation.

It seems to be a nice summary of the findings to include quoting the CVR record of the conversations between the Crew.

Take a minute to read it then go back to your Saber crossing!


https://www.ainonline.com/aviation-n...ture-confusion

An indication of the problems with being over-reliant on the autopilot and insistence upon using its modes to alter the course of the aircraft - the delay between asking for HDG mode to be selected and it actually happening was too long for the situation they were in. The cyclic still works and a prompt right turn would have saved them.

There are more CRM and procedural issues involved with this tragedy but we can wait for the report to analyse those.

Not a nice summary at all SAS, this is a summary. Captain, Co-pilot, Backseat. Timing in seconds. When is it they become aware of the "blob" and its significance? 28.261 or 59.005?

Sabres holstered.

28.261 OK so small target at six miles eleven o’clock Large out to the right there ehm

31.234 Roger

31.533

33.58 Eh just a small little island…that's BLMO itself

36.184 ""

46.767 K...looking at an island just in, directly ahead of us now guys, you want to come right [Commander’s Name]

50.417 ""

50.862 OK, come right just confirm?

51.81About..

52.035 twenty degrees right yeah

52.888 ""

53.404 OK Come Right...select heading

54.416 ""

55.231 Select

55.38 Roger

55.691 heading

56.164 Heading selected

57.231 ""

57.691 Come right now come right COME RIGHT

59.005 ""

59.893 [Expletive]

60.73 OOOHHHH

61.198[Expletive]

62.557 We’re gone

8.588 seconds between the first backseat advise and the ultimate come right command.:ok::D

I see it as being 46.7 when the Back Seater clearly calls it and directs a turn.

There seems to be some mis-identification by the Pilots.

With the comment about two targets...with one being to the right...and the back seater calling for a right turn....I can imagine (assume...guess) that complicated the thinking by the Pilots.

We have to remember there were three inputs to the situation....what the Pilots were seeing and what the Back Seater was seeing....with the Pilots having to fly the aircraft (even if just pushing buttons for the Autopilot).

The Captain had to process all of this....and make the decisions as to what needed to be done.

It was a very dark night....with a low ceiling....which did not help.

Before being too critical of the Crew....put yourself into their shoes and think about what they were dealing with that night.

There are legitimate questions that can and should be asked.....but we have to recall that it is a far different situation when you are doing it....rather than sitting at your computer and discussing it after the fact.

We are all human....and last time I checked there are no Super Humans amongst us.

Doesn’t sound to good :-(

Easy to point fingers - but we‘re all only humans

As always, main point is, you need to be ahead of your aircraft, where am I, whats next - when and how to execute it and what’s after that?
Any uncertainty- reduce pressure (speed) and get ahead again.

What I recognized is, that quite a lot of pilots only turn right/left to avoid traffic- even so we have the ability to play with altitude (no option with low ceiling so).

Hope, that pilots remember this accident and take their time to get ahead again instead of pressing on

It's far too simplistic to boil this down to the last 20 seconds or so where things rapidly went wrong. No doubt there were many layers of failure starting way before the incident and permeating through all levels of the organisation. I suspect one of the reasons the report has taken so long (too long) is the complex interactions between the multiple failures that conspired to end with the loss of an experienced SAR crew and highly capable modern helicopter.

We might remember all the Stake Holders who get to challenge the Findings before the Report is published.....that puts into motion a process where covering one's hind end becomes both possible and convenient.

That pertains to a question I have SAS. The co-pilot calls a small radar target at six miles eleven o'çlock and a large to the right, with no range to the latter, was it six miles as well? What intrigues me is that at the speed they were doing, 75 KASI, from the time of the radar call to crash would indicate a distance of point six of a mile, or there abouts. Miss call of the range?

There were many slices of swiss cheese where the holes shouldn't have aligned but that last one was the operating crew, presumably following their SOPs (Ops manual).

It was, in the final analysis, a relatively straightforward night letdown over water in a very capable helicopter and they hit the only high ground for several miles in any direction.

£40K worth of NVG would have saved a £30+ Million helicopter and 4 lives.......................

Crab is right on that....nothing beats being able to see in the dark as compared to not being able to see in the darkl

The ability to see "white" light sources, no matter now small, at great distances is amazing.

Even the ability to see unlighted objects is astounding!

crab, I have absolutely no idea of system capabilities, but the aircraft had High Definition Electro-Optic and Infrared (EO/IR) Camera System, and the front seat crew were able to view if selected. Would NVG be more capable?

NVG will be more capable and more useful... both pilots can e.g.
https://cimg2.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune....527fa5430.jpeg
https://cimg3.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune....f93e98f8e.jpeg
scan different directions and the view is not restricted to aircraft heading or to that direction which the camera is pointing...

I agree and share your thoughts Crab, but I think that the ”radar set up” was also one key factor in order to avoid this sad accident...

I’d like visualize my thoughts with some hypotetic radar pictures (taken from AW139). Btw. The red radar echo is a faulty echo from radar radome,
which seems to be at approximately 0,4 NM distance with WX mode.

If the radar was on 10 NM scale/WX mode it will be almost impossible to detect the targets, when they appear closer than 0,5 NM.

Seeing visible light sources is where NVG's really perform.

I have watched Airliner Strobe and Landing lights for aircraft landing at Atlanta.....from Augusta......about 150 miles away on a clear night.

Star gazing from the helipad at a remote site was breath taking.

Something as small as a cigarette shows up like a beacon.

If the Light House light was working that night....it would have been a very bright point of light and very easy to see if the aircraft was clear of cloud.

Beat me to it S&R:ok:.

Megan, the best solution is for the front crew to be on NVG and have a radar picture on an MFD and for the rearcrew to monitor radar and FLIR on their screen - that way all the bases are covered and with some overlap.

FLIR is excellent but relies on thermal contrast to detect things - it doesn't work in fog or cloud and rain degrades the picture too (the moisture tends to attenuate much of the thermal energy and greatly reduces contrast.) You also get periods of thermal washout/crossover when the background is radiating the same energy as objects in the foreground.

https://cimg9.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune....ed333e0f5.jpeg
5 NM scale
https://cimg0.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune....327468e07.jpeg
2,5 NM scale
https://cimg1.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune....cca1a6013.jpeg
1,0 NM scale
https://cimg2.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune....9320df55f.jpeg
0,5 NM scale

S&R - very good point re the radar scale.

Which Mode would you have the Radar set to for detecting terrain/obstacles ahead of you?

GMAP2 (and WX/RCT for weather scanning). It will be quite easy to toggle between the modes, if you are using Autotilt e.g. with
WX PRIMUS P701 Radar...

Sorry Crab, I disagree.
Some 70% plus of accidents are caused by crew, CFIT even higher.
It is urgent to get this report out as it will also reveal a large amount of recommendations for this specific company and Irish SAR and IAA, I suspect.
I do feel for the Crew and the relatives, but that is no excuse for us to enter year 4 without a final report.
Regards
Cpt B

I wasn't suggesting they should be protected from criticism but their families would be considered stakeholders so naturally they would try to limit such criticism from the final report.

The" criticism" of the crew should be fair, based upon straight facts, and carefully consider the related factors and actions/in-actions of other persons, agencies, and authorities.

They are not to be the scapegoats in this tragedy.

The sister of the Aircraft Commander is about to release a book dealing with her grief post the accident.
Available online for March 1st .Just before the 3rd anniversary.

Tell Me the Truth About Loss

A Psychologist's Personal Story of Loss, Grief and Finding Hope.

https://www.rte.ie/news/connacht/202...w-r116-report/

https://www.gov.ie/en/news/803d53-es...indings-of-th/

https://www.irishtimes.com/news/irel...ined-1.4200241

3rd anniversary of the loss of 4 crew aboard R116

https://www.thejournal.ie/rescue-116...46281-Mar2020/

JAS

I thought the rather lovely Coastguard R116 heart would look better the right way up.... RIP

https://cimg5.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune....35a470b43f.png

airsound

R116 accident review faces new delay after UK expert resigns

http://www.rte.ie/news/ireland/2020/...0-r116-review/

4 years tonight. Still no report. Still no accountability. Families still demanding answers.

Disgraceful

Wasn't the report delayed because the family didn't like the answers?

Probably. Doesn’t matter how much window dressing you use around company SMS, training, maps, EGPWS database etc etc, when a crew flies a serviceable aircraft into a large rock, in VMC, that is detectable on radar, it’s unlikely the findings will come out in their favour

The vast majority of accidents come about because of decisions made in the cockpit, the question is why they made those decisions, if we just hang it on the crew we learn nothing. Management prefers that all fingers point to the crew.

But sometimes that is the cause, despite mitigating circumstances - poor decision making.

As I hinted crab, why the poor decision? No one, at least very few, set out to screw the pooch.

Would the NTSB Final Report on N76EX being released some 54 weeks post crash be an unfair comparison?

Feeling too comfortable following a legacy procedure instead of using the aircraft's actual capability perhaps Megan - you can ask why as much as you like but in the final analysis, as 212 man says, they flew into a rock that they shouldn't have at an altitude they had no necessity to be at at that point.

Standard Operating Procedures are 'handrails not handcuffs' as our SAR Standards use to say - you get paid the money to keep the aircraft and crew safe as your primary objective.

That is certainly true.

What is also true is that there are elements of this that go all the way up through CHC management to the Coastguard and to Ministers. Wasn't there a minister a few years back bragging to the Brits about how cheap the Irish service was. In part, it was cheap because the technical requirements were the same rubbish that the Brits had been using in their inadequate contracts for 40 years and had now abandoned. CHC need to keep their people safe and legal no matter what the contract says and there may be questions to answer there. In the next two years, new contracts will evolve on both sides of the Irish Sea and let's hope both achieve the highest standards.

But yes, aircraft, large rock, pretty clear.

Megan, I fully understand that and I have been formally trained in air accident investigation at a well known institution. However, I have also spent enough time in cockpits, and simulator instructor operating stations, to know that at some point there is a limit to how diluted and shared the accountabilities can be made, in some incidents.