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Quote:

Originally Posted by minigundiplomat (Post 10601849)

Ah yes, he of 'meatgate' fame.

'Meatgate' :O

I did feel for them guys at the time.

I believe that CHC Ireland did have an ex-Bristow NVGI about a year ago but in-house politics got in the way and he left. I think he rejoined Bristow.

So to put it back on thread post crash March 2017 the lessons aren’t being learned even before the AAIU report is published, however damning it may turn out to be.

Quote:

Originally Posted by 212man (Post 10601794)

He was CHC in between Bristow (where he started) but was continuously in Stornoway for years I think.

Not Stornoway but Sumburgh AFAIK

If there’s a delay in training what’s the reason for it? Have they worked out that the provider is not all it’s been cracked up to be? Or are there more technical issues? Maybe the rumoured imminent publishing of the AAIB report has something to do with it. Who’s taking the fall etc. Wonder how crews will react to it.

Sunday Times Irish addition reporting that fatigue , poor management safety culture ,chart errors and dysfunctional over sight by the Irish Aviation Authority all contributed to the crash . Article is in the front page with expanded coverage in page 21.

Reform is still needed nearly three years after Rescue 116 crash, warns pilots' group

Quote:

THE FACTORS THAT led to a fatal helicopter crash off the Mayo coast in 2017 still exist, an organisation representing pilots in Ireland has claimed.

The Irish Air Line Pilots’ Association said it is concerned an accident could happen again if the causes contributing to the crash are not comprehensively addressed.

Four members of the Irish Coast Guard air crew died in the Rescue 116 crash in March 2017.

Captain Dara Fitzpatrick, 45, Captain Mark Duffy, 51, and winchmen Paul Ormsby, 53, and Ciaran Smith, 38, all died when their Sikorsky S-92 helicopter crashed into Blackrock island off the coast of Mayo.

It is understood that inaccurate charts and risk of fatigue were among some of the contributing factors in the tragic crash.

The Air Accident Investigation Unit is due to publish a report in the coming months.

The pilot union Irish Air Line Pilots’ Association has urged the Irish Government to make changes to the state regulator, the Irish Aviation Authority (IAA).

Irish Air Line Pilots’ Association president Captain Evan Cullen claimed there are serious issues with the corporate structure of the IAA.

“The IAA is an outlier in terms of its corporate structure,” he said.

“One of the things that makes it unique is that it has the safety regulatory function. But it also has a commercial agenda under its air navigation service provider function.

“In all other western jurisdictions those two are absolutely separate.

“In Ireland we’ve combined the two, so therefore the organisation has its safety mandate as a regulatory oversight and it also makes money out of the same entities that it tries to regulate.

“Certainly there’s a paradox and that’s not sustainable.”

He said that the IAA is not subject to any ombudsman, nor the Auditor General and the group is not subject to respond to requests under the Freedom of Information Act.

He added that the reasons behind the crash “are still out there”.

Capt Cullen said the organisation has raised concerns about the regulator on many occasions since 2003.

“Everything from flight time limitations to tiredness, and obviously the navigational inaccuracies, and security issues which are separate to safety,” he added.

Irish Air Line Pilots’ Association has raised many issues with the IAA in letters seen by the PA news agency.

“The issues raised are quite diverse and what’s been obvious over the years is that the IAA are judging the concerns raised by the source, rather than the actual subject,” Capt Cullen added.

“One of the things that will come out which has already been highlighted in the interim report is that the maps and charts are inaccurate, which was a contributing factor to the accident.

“Other pilots have reported that there were inaccuracies in the maps.

“There were two reports, in 2013 and 2015, that stated the maps were inaccurate and nothing was done about it.”

He has called for the Government to separate the safety regulatory department from the commercial part of the IAA.

Capt Cullen also said that pilots have expressed dissatisfaction in the way the IAA receives and investigates pilots’ complaints.

“Pilots have said they’ve made fatigue reports that have not been acted on and they made technical reports that have not been acted on,” he also claimed.

He said that many pilots who have flagged issues are not made aware if the issue has been investigated or whether it has been addressed.

It also emerged that the Department of Transport failed to appoint an individual to examine the safety and technical performance of the IAA for a long period.

“We discovered that this process had not been done between 2004 and 2014. Even though the law says it has to be done every three years,” he added.

The IAA and Department of Transport did not respond to requests for comment.

All those issues are just red herrings surely when people are raising or have raised concerns about culture, standards, training, unwillingness to listen/arrogance, even the possible CRM breakdown evident from how little interaction there was by the transcripts published. Or lack of rear crew involvement when they had tools at their disposal. Could it be a union just making noise claiming to be acting in the interests of its membership?

I hope the union keeps making noise so it forces those with entrenched positions within the SAR service provider to re-examine how they do business, why they are so resistant to change and why it is taking so long to rectify a simple matter like NVG training.

Did they not start NVG training in simulator? And who is the training provider? Are the Irish coast guard even aware of all this?

I find it quite ironic that IALPA stand shouting about the lack of change from the regulator when they themselves (and their membership) block a lot of the initiatives that have tried to be implemented since the crash.

A very broken train set that unfortunately IMHO won’t be transparently identified and acted on in the report.

LZ

Quote:

Originally Posted by Hot_LZ (Post 10650525)

What initiatives have been blocked by IALPA & IALPA Membership since the crash.

Brining in relevant qualified expertise from UKSAR?

Quote:

Originally Posted by Northernstar (Post 10650577)

Brining in relevant qualified expertise from UKSAR?

Northernstar - seeing as you have all the facts on that, would you care to explain.

It’s been reported on her openly that an NVG instructor with relevant experience was recruited and promptly left again rather rapidly. In fact it’s a very widely known fact in UKSAR and Aberdeen.

Quote:

Originally Posted by Northernstar (Post 10650614)

It’s been reported on her openly that an NVG instructor with relevant experience was recruited and promptly left again rather rapidly. In fact it’s a very widely known fact in UKSAR and Aberdeen.

GB is obviously not telling the full story to you boys as to why he left so promptly, and has instead decided to put a spin on it.
Reported on here - it is a rumour network.

Do you have the full story then? Are you an IALPA rep?

Quote:

Originally Posted by Northernstar (Post 10650630)

Do you have the full story then? Are you an IALPA rep?

Are you an NVGI instructor with an axe to grind?

Last edited by Senior Pilot; 31st Dec 2019 at 02:13. Reason: Add quote: this helps Rotorheads know what you're posting about!

It was about

SAR S-92 Missing Ireland.

Norunway - since it sounds like you are on the inside of Irish SAR, are you able to detail what changes have been made in light of this accident and what progress is being made with the introduction of NVG?

A serious question as an outsider.
What difference would NVG have made to driving a S-92 into a lighthouse at night, a structure whose sole purpose is to warn seafarers that there is a a bit of land that is a hazard to navigation?
Thanks

Because you can see it - even if the light isn't working.

Primarily because you are flying visually and using the nav kit and AFCS to take you where you can see.

Instead, they appear to have been flying in an IFR manner with minimal lookout and concentrating on the screens. Even that would have been safer if they had used the radar as their primary terrain avoidance and had the FLIR facing forward as a backup.

Exactly. So what’s being discussed here re NVG is relevant to the accident discussion. Also the question of who has or is providing whatever training is ongoing, now rumoured halted but unknown why, has relevance to culture, lack of oversight, safety etc.

Now that Norunway has revealed he’s on the inside of Irish SAR would he like to answer the question re NVG and his assertion about why a highly experienced SAR captain and NVG instructor left? Given he decided to state the persons initials openly.

Also why did an ex navy S92 SAR TRE leave Irish SAR for a contractor organisation flying SeaKings? He did also have NVG experience although being over 15 years ago that’s academic anyway as you couldn’t teach peers with such a lack of recency.

Nav.database was incorrect as well,..?

Still strange why they descended so early if they weren’t aware of the lighthouse. Scud-running usually only brings trouble - especially if you’re still flying as if IFR.
’contributory factors’ in an accident report always irks me.
Yes, some important stuff in there but nothing that should not have been completed/aware before the flight. Whilst responsibilities for such ‘errors’ can be directed throughout the Irish SAR establishment, basic flying /navigation / CRM skills were not evident.
Despite the number of individuals on board there appears never to have been a functioning crew onboard.
I wonder how many previous ‘near misses’ were overlooked.
tragedy.

Quote:

Nav.database was incorrect as well,..?

certainly an issue but relying on an old S-61 procedure that doesn't seem to have been checked or updated for years is just poor airmanship when you have such a well-equipped aircraft.

Quote:

Originally Posted by sycamore (Post 10650824)

Nav.database was incorrect as well,..?

Where do you see that? Are you referring to the EGPWS or the FMS?

Quote:

.... relying on an old S-61 procedure that doesn't seem to have been checked or updated for years is just poor airmanship when you have such a well-equipped aircraft.

Crew failure..... or Management/Flight Safety/Training failure?

Who....by name and position.....ignored the Iceberg and ordered full speed ahead?

Please do not point a single finger at the Crew without including everyone that assisted in setting up the environment that led to this tragedy....that would be very unfair and narrow minded.

Exactly. Culture and training are central to how crews operate in a large multinational company such as CHC or Bristow. Rearcrew lack of involvement won’t be their decision alone, they will act professionally according to their training, or lack thereof.

When previously reading about this accident, I had assumed that the helipad at Black Rock was near sea level.

After careful reading of the Preliminary Report, I see that the Route Guidance map shows the pad elevation as 262’ and the adjacent lighthouse at 310’. What would induce them to fly at 200’ towards a landing site adjacent to an obstacle that was 110’ above them?

https://cimg6.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune....079b5b2e6.jpeg
https://cimg9.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune....627ac6bb2.jpeg
https://cimg1.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune....fed13b702.jpeg

Quote:

Originally Posted by Northernstar (Post 10650820)

Now that Norunway has revealed he’s on the inside of Irish SAR would he like to answer the question re NVG and his assertion about why a highly experienced SAR captain and NVG instructor left? Given he decided to state the persons initials openly.

Also why did an ex navy S92 SAR TRE leave Irish SAR for a contractor organisation flying SeaKings? He did also have NVG experience although being over 15 years ago that’s academic anyway as you couldn’t teach peers with such a lack of recency.

Perhaps we should be asking why Northernstar has such strong views about this incident, yet has few posts elsewhere. What is his agenda?

Quote:

Originally Posted by India Four Two (Post 10651104)

Blackrock was not their intended landing site!

Indeed, Blacksod, 10nm east, was. But the question still remains as to why the crew thought being at 200ft in poor vis at night, for a 10nm approach to Blacksod, was the best method.

Why would it take this long for a final report? Politics?

almost 3 years since this tragic event that shook many around the world. It’s seems bizarre to have to wait this long.

Quote:

Indeed, Blacksod, 10nm east, was. But the question still remains as to why the crew thought being at 200ft in poor vis at night, for a 10nm approach to Blacksod, was the best method.

Absolutely - that was my point about the lazy use of an old S-61 procedure which they weren't really familiar with but followed, apparently without thinking, when a simple self-positioning radar letdown, much closer to Blacksod would have been far easier and safer.

Quote:

The publication of an Air Accident Investigation Unit (AAIU) report into the 2017 crash of Irish Coast Guard Rescue 116 helicopter has been delayed pending a new review.

The AAIU circulated a 333-page draft final report in November and was expected to publish its final report on the accident this month.

https://www.rte.ie/news/ireland/2020...icopter-crash/

It's been said that the stakeholder who objected to some of the conclusions represents family members. Understandable but unfortunate.

Report late by 2 years soon.

It is interesting reading the January RTE article.
As I understand it AAIU has no less then 73 findings and are now finally ready to publish the report.
A report we are all looking forward to so we can learn from this tragic accident.
But somehow one of the stakeholders see fit to drag this out more.
Tragic!

Sort of understandable if the report is critical of the crew members who aren't here to defend themselves.

The crew knew there was a blob in front of them yet did not take timely action to avoid it, so yes, in my world, that falls on the captain’s broad shoulders. Same responsibility as if they were to deviate from an SOP because of an on-the-spot assessment - like Sully did.

Anyway, lots of blame to go around, especially management. Crew selection, command assessment, SOP’s appropriate for avionics and location....looking forward to the report. Though I think ppruner’s work will be cut out for them to assign the correct weigh of each finding to the tragedy.