It certainly goes a long way towards answering the many questions we had.

As mentioned above

https://www.rte.ie/player/ie/show/pr...3379/10794966/

Duration = 24 minutes

(might need an Irish proxy)

It was available to me in UK.

This is an excellent documentary that reports several apparently disturbing issues surrounding this crash.

Indeed, I was surprised to see that neither Department of Tranport nor Irish Aviation Authority would take responsiblity to oversee safety in Irish SAR.

Am I missing something, the primetime report showed on the 1;250,000 map clearly indicated Blackrock as 282ft! The crew were using unapproved iPads? I wonder if they'd used paper charts & radar the outcome would have been very different. I'm sure the AAIU report will clear all of this up, we'll finally know for fact what the crew did and of course did not brief.

At that altitude over water the radar should always be the primary tool anyway. Mapping systems are generally 'not to be used for primary navigation'.
It doesn't help with the IAA not taking a leading role in the SAR approach.

Bringing the iPads looks like a symptom of distrust in on board systems.

@14.42 in the Prime Time report there is an image of a Safety Meeting report. In the last sentence, the fact that Bristow crew's have a good moving map system is mentioned.

Attachment 3457

Have to say, if the crew knew of concerns on accuracy of charts and mapping systems it's even more surprising they chose a 10nm approach path at 200ft at night. Minimising low altitude transit would seem to be even more prudent to me. Radar may have supposed to be the primary navigation at such a time but clearly that had big risks too.

Saw that but point still stands, what was wrong with their 1;250,000 Map? from what I can see from the report, nothing as it had the correct spot height for Blackrock!

It was probably still sealed in the map case. The iPad is King these days.

Embrace technology ...... or not.

The map probably sits on a computer somewhere waiting to be printed. Why not offer the map in digital format so that it can be found on the Ipad - like the approach charts -available clear, crisp and highly zoomable for detail.

If Google can produce street names, why can HMG not overlay their map and quickly discover which islands are missing. The tedious updating system would become much quicker, though the state would no doubt need still to produce AIP style coordinates of heights, obstacles, lighthouses etc. Which makes one immediately question how the EGPWS terrain database might differ from the map. Good old adage ..... Garbage In, Garbage Out.

Oh, and you could place all the company's manuals there as well - saving 30 lbs of paper stuffed in a bag. How nice if the OEM's played ball and produced a decent digital flight manual; speedily accessed using .pdf search function.

Philistines .......

All very good till the batteries go flat!!

You need an USB charger upgrade for your aircraft. :p

The Digital Vertical Obstruction File (DVOF) is produced by OS for UK and available (at a cost) but I doubt if Eire is covered by it.

The technology is out there but someone has to pay for the data.

Well, in modern helicopters thatˋs included
Holder for Tablet PC
NOTE Due to the restricted field of view the Tablet PC provision should be placed in the stow position if no tablet PC is installed
Power can be applied to the USB port on the side of the instrument panel when Non-essential bus is powered. A switch is located in the overhead console....

Thanks Flying Bull .... ignore the cynics and detractors ..... some crew and some regulators - unbelievers! Follow the chord, kill the heretic

The question has never been answered and the CVR transcript does not appear to reveal why a descent to such a low level was made so far from the target HLS given the SAR AFCS has preset programmes to descend from 2400’ to preset hover height as low as 50’? This was used in anger so often and trained for almost daily at the UKSAR bases where the airframe in question served for 6 years. Were lessons such as this from UKSAR ignored? Is there a ‘we know what we’re doing’ or ‘we know better’ attitude given apparent screen setup, use of and navigation by rearcrew almost non existent until too late a stage contrary to known best practise in UKSAR given that was the ideal place to draw relevant experience from? CRM questions arise from the transcript but also what about SOP’s for provision of top cover and appropriate fuelling, again a practise UKSAR conducted successfully post RAF Nimrod retirement. It appears the mapping issue is clouding what actually may be the real hazards involved in low level IMC offshore operations and best practises.

I think they call it "legacy practices".....

A friend of mine went from UKSAR to ICG on 61 then 92 - the 'we know better' attitude was apparently difficult to overcome - typical was the reluctance to push for NVG.

212, I understand your desire for best practice but for whatever reason the crew elected to transit at 200' probably on the presumption that the lighthouse was at 47' - crucial in their decision making / risk assessment as no-one challenged it. Offshore radar procedures are quite simple - never overfly the blob unless you are visual or at MSA otherwise turn to avoid. EGPWS is useless as a last barrier of defence without the correct mapping data.

I think you misunderstood me - I was implying a fact, not a 'best practice'.

212, how high are the newer container ships seen in European coastal waters?

The OOCL Hong Kong currently the largest of the 20,000TEU ships has an air draft of 239 ft.

RAF SAR SOP was 'never overfly a radar contact below 1000'

In the early eighties when there was a bit of a slump in the oil industry there were a few semisub oil rigs stacked in Aberdeen harbour. I was a single pilot (at that time) S76A pilot at Aberdeen.

I was called in to to do a crew changeover on one of those semis in the harbour. The Haar was established so as soon as you left the coast it went into fog. A weather check with the rig said fog. Give it a go, said the company; if you can't find it then come back but we will still charge the rig.

I launched and called up for the beacon. It came up solid as a rock so I carried out a low level rig radar approach. I knew the rig from before so I used 200ft as a decision height and eventually arrived on finals. At 200ft I was passing through the tops of the fog with the needle at 12 o'clock and the rig welded to the radar. I saw nothing as I passed over it; there being no requirement to turn left at 3/4 mile in those days.

I returned to Aberdeen and shut down. As I got out the passengers told me that they had seen the derrick top flash by the rotor tips on the starboard side.

What had happened was that the semisub had floated itself so it was a 100 ft. higher than when it was working which was the only time I had flown to it before. Fortunately I was a an ace pilot because the position of their beacon was above the radio shack and because I had gone precisely over it the orientation of the rig caused my rotor to miss the derrick. Slightly off line to the right and Fareastdriver wouldn't be here.

That was over thirty years ago but stand back for the armchair experts to analyse what I did wrong. Times have changed since then; that job would not have been offered now but it was all part of (lucky) experience.

It sounds like you already know the answer to that question!

The revelations from RTE are all very interesting but the number one question that remains is 'Why did the island not appear as a contact on the radar?' Everything else merely amounts to contributory and aggravating factors. It's all about the radar. How many radar approaches were individual ICG pilots required to conduct per quarter?

Even if the Lighthouse had been at 47 Feet AGL....a night transit over water in bad vis....using 153 feet (plus or minus Altimeter error, Radalt instrument error, Auto Pilot/Pilot height holding error) seems a bit bold.

There were some very interesting posts a few hundred pages back about what the screen might have looked like with a waypoint symbol overlaid on the radar picture.

I think it's available via the CAA for interested parties?

Yes, so the question remains. How much radar training do the Irish pilots do per quarter?

To correct my previous post, it's not all about the radar. It's also about the lack of NVG, and what appears to have been a reluctance to build them in to the operation. Why would that be?

Very little of actual significance or meaning. A TRE maintaining low level IF currency by conducting a few rate 1 turns at 500’ for less than 30 seconds just to tick the box tells how much interest there actually is. What about all that well used and demonstrated technology proven in UKSAR on the moving map screen in the main cabin including sea charts and overlaid AIS data for ships. Not much use of that either.

That's astonishing. Is this lack of proper training and the willingness to simply box tick where RTE will be focusing the next strand of their investigation or are the Irish public being fed the side of the story that disenchanted employees (with actors' voices) want them to hear?

Maybe. Certainly it’s an avenue that deflects away from potential problems and further prevents an inward focus..... Currency is a minimum, not confidence inspiring in such a role if perhaps treated as box ticking exercise unless of course there is no inputus to improve amongst a feeling of knowing it all.

Does anyone know how many hours per month are allocated to training in the contract?

You don't need to be an aviator to know where that leads.

Unknown but unlike UKSAR tasking hours reduce training allocation. Maybe hours are precious overall if annual CRM courses last as little as 90 minutes delivered by an off duty ryanair captain apparently with little interactive exercises or case studies. Not like any CRM course I’ve been on, even those I’ve been less than impressed with.

Hedski, is that actually the case?

If so it is a major change of position from what Bristow were stating pre-contract when they were asked about training hours.

They were quite adamant that trg could be conducted on ops and count towards the required hours/stats.

Much of my concern and criticism of the contractorisation was founded on their poor attitude to trg hours so maybe the reality of SAR skills trg has been acknowledged by the management.

The ICG attitude is exactly why I railed against commercial SAR for UK.

Crab,
Are you saying stats cannot be gained during ops?
As far as I am aware the UKSar training hours allocation is working fine.

UKSAR retains training hours allocation regardless of ops. Ireland the contrary. Currency can include operational evolutions in both places.

Jeepys - no that would clearly be silly.

Hedski - if that is the case then they have been re-educated in management since their original statements regarding training.

When questioned about the reduced hours available for trg (1.5 hrs per shift vs SARF 4 hrs per shift) they clearly stated that trg could be claimed on ops - they probably meant stats as in a deck or a radar letdown but they clearly believed MilSAR did far too much trg and was therefore too expensive.

Accidents like the ICG tragedy would seem to prove otherwise. Pay lipservice to trg and eventually get bitten.