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Originally Posted by RVDT;[url=tel:11138453
11138453]Koalatiger said -
Elevation maybe? When you are that low you need to fly and navigate like a boat to stay safe. |
Koalatiger - when I was doing UK SAR, we carried maritime charts but they sat in a nav bag and were seldom referred to.
That was mainly because we knew our local areas - especially the lighthouses - and we had Admiralty charts in our operations room at the SAR flight. I used to ask pilots questions about the charts during check rides. Unfortunately, in a modern digital cockpit, any mapping will be electronic and few would see the need for including digitised maritime charts. Coupled with that, they were operating away from their normal area and so were not as au fait with the letdown area as they might have been. |
Originally Posted by [email protected]
(Post 11138507)
Koalatiger - when I was doing UK SAR, we carried maritime charts but they sat in a nav bag and were seldom referred to.
That was mainly because we knew our local areas - especially the lighthouses - and we had Admiralty charts in our operations room at the SAR flight. I used to ask pilots questions about the charts during check rides. Unfortunately, in a modern digital cockpit, any mapping will be electronic and few would see the need for including digitised maritime charts. Coupled with that, they were operating away from their normal area and so were not as au fait with the letdown area as they might have been. Well that is about to change I guess. It does not matter what the maps are called, accurate maps are the key, I think we all can agree on that. The fact is that the maps being used for navigation/situation awareness did not have the lighthouse/island on it. |
A ‘Honeywell Primus 701A’ weather radar system was fitted. This system is a high resolution, fully stabilised, high power, digital radar, designed for high resolution weather detection and terrain mapping. The radar manufacturers’ manual includes the following warning: ‘THE SYSTEMS PERFORM ONLY THE FUNCTIONS OF WEATHER DETECTION OR MAPPING. IT SHOULD NOT BE USED OR RELIED UPON FOR PROXIMITY WARNING OR ANTI-COLLISION PROTECTION’. |
The fact is that the maps being used for navigation/situation awareness did not have the lighthouse/island on it. |
Just for the record:
Statement on the publication of AAIU’s Final Report into R116 air accidentMinister Eamon Ryan T.D. and Minister of State Hildegarde Naughton T.D. acknowledge and appreciate the completion of the investigation into the R116 air accident. The accident claimed the lives of R116 crew members Dara Fitzpatrick, Mark Duffy, Ciarán Smith and Paul Ormsby in March 2017 and today marks the publication of the final report into this investigation by the Air Accident Investigation Unit.The Department of Transport fully accepts the recommendations contained within the report and will continue to evaluate the findings of the report in the coming weeks. Since receiving the draft Final Report in September 2019, the Department of Transport has undertaken a significant programme of change across key areas to take account of issues raised and recommendations addressed to the Minister of Transport. Commenting on the publication of the AAIU R116 report Minister Ryan said: “This was a tragic accident that claimed the lives of four individuals who were dedicated to saving the lives of others. I would like to again convey my condolences to the families and loved ones of the R116’s crew at this time. The completion of the investigation and the publication of the report is a key step in ensuring that such accidents are prevented in the future. I wish to acknowledge the investigative work that has been done by the AAIU that has culminated in this report. This is clearly reflected in the level of detail and wide-ranging nature of the report, with safety recommendations that cover all aspects of SAR aviation, both nationally and internationally.” Minister of State Hildegarde Naughton added: “I would like to take this opportunity to again express my sincere condolences to the families and loved ones of the four members of R116’s crew, and to all who were affected by the accident. I understand that today’s publication of the AAIU’s Final Report will be a difficult time for all involved. I note the final report contains several safety recommendations addressed to the Department of Transport and I look forward to seeing all necessary work, much of which is already commenced, completed as soon as practicable. My door, and the doors of the Department, remain open to the families of the R116 Crew for any assistance that may be required going forward.” Ministers propose to seek time in Dáil Eireann to allow for Statements on the matter. Have CHC issued a statement? |
I have had a look at the mapping aspects of this matter.
OSI land mapping, of the kind one would expect for land SAR, does NOT include Black Rock. The nearest sheet stops at the western tip of the nearest mainland. I downloaded the digital version of the OSI mapping and although a detached piece of OSI's grid appears in the ocean where one would expect Black Rock to be, no land is shown at that location. I have established that this is not a historical omission caused by the previous rulers of Ireland since the OSGB maps held by the National Library of Scotland, and probably from surveys before 1913 but revised in the 1940s, DO include Black Rock, although not in great detail and probably without a spot height, although the NLS copy is not very legible in this respect. None of the secondary mapping providers, such as Open Street map, show useful detail for Black Rock even though some show the buildings and helipad. Worryingly, I also found an online map by SWC maps, that displayed a respresentation of Black Rock blessed with only a 10m contour line for height information. So there is information out there in the wild representing Black Rock as being between 10m and 20m in maximum height above the sea. Contrast this with the situation in a neighbouring territory. Alisa Craig is an island that, just like Black Rock, is less than 10NM off the coast. Even secondary mapping like Open Street Map shows the spot height for the highest point on the island. The normal OSGB mapping that one would expect to use for land SAR shows information from a full survey with 10m contours and spot heights. Similarly, considering an uninhabited and unexploited island, more than 30NM west of inhabited land, thus one that might be considered far less significant than Black Rock, Stac an Armin (extreme fragment of St Kilda), appears on OSGB mapping (including Landranger sheet 18 and digital versions) with 10m contours and a spot height and on Open Street Map with a spot height. I note that the OSI website is illustrated with more than one image of surveyors working on rugged coastlines with boats. One might hope that these recent photographs have been made possible by a realisation that there are consequences to dismissing even one square metres of Irish land when one's reputation and sales are based on a centimetre-accurate mapping service. |
Clearly other countries Ordnance Survey mapping isn't up to the same standard as the UKs.
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Maritime Mapping.
It’s relevance has been discussed above with some dismissing its importance for SAR operations. These are commonly used in UKSAR and have done since the beginning of the current contract. When conducting maritime and littoral let downs either IMC or on NVG, the front end are using aeronautical charts and the back end are following up with a combination of aeronautical and maritime digital mapping. Contacts on radar/FLIR are cross checked with the charts in order to identify buoys and low laying terrain. LZ |
because they had no NVG and the procedural let down was all they had. Could that have been executed better? Possibly At 00.10 hrs, the Commander briefed the Co-pilot on the approach into Blacksod: ‘I think we just go straight over and when we're happy enough to step it down em down below two four we'll do the approach one all the way down, let it just fly the route, get the speed back until we’re comfortable and literally just let it fly all the way round em if we're happy with the visuals on the first run-in it'll be on my side so it’ll be my landing. We’ll go in, if not we'll just do a circuit all the way around and eh we'll make sure it’s on a two four zero heading’ The let-down procedure was briefed by the Commander, with all timings and acknowledgements by the Co-pilot presented in square brackets, as follows: ‘[Commander at 00.30:01 hrs] okay let-down procedure, can I wait until we're abeam this alpha position [an apparent reference to waypoint BKSDA] here [Co-pilot acknowledged at 00.30:05 hrs: okay] [Commander at 00.30:06 hrs] and then we're going to, I'm going to select alt pre down to two thousand and four hundred feet, [Co-pilot acknowledged at 00.30:09 hrs: roger] [Commander at 00.30:10 hrs] if you're happy we're clear of everything [Co-pilot acknowledged at 00.30:11 hrs: understood] [Commander at 00.30:12 hrs] I’m going to do an approach one all the way down to two hundred feet, eighty knots, [Co-pilot acknowledged at 00.30:15 hrs: yes] [Commander at 00.30:16 hrs] eh, it might be slightly past M O [an apparent reference to waypoint BLKMO] at that moment so we'll see what, how we are height wise at that moment, so I think we'll just eh take a heading, continue on past there go back around and the aim is just to follow the route all the way round em and eh [Co-pilot acknowledged at 00.30:27 hrs: roger understood] [Commander at 00.30:29 hrs] getting the speed back as much as we're comfortable, we're aware we're going to have a pretty high ground speed on the way in. [Co-pilot acknowledged at 00.30:34 hrs: Okay]’ https://cimg0.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune....a3e1ce3821.png Having just finished reading the report there is much to cogitate upon, what I've written above re brief is merely one element in the mix of organisational failures, still would have saved the day though, length of time they had been awake would explain why anyone would be off their game. |
length of time they had been awake would explain why anyone would be off their game The nature of SAR is unpredictable and managing fatigue is essential - I always tried to have a nap in the afternoon if possible which helped enormously when the phone rang late in the evening or overnight, and yes, people did take the p*ss out of me for doing it but it worked for me. |
At 00.45 hrs, the Co-pilot announced ‘okay so small targets at six miles at 11 o'clock … large out to the right there’. This was followed approximately 20 seconds later by an Auto Callout ‘Altitude, Altitude’, which the Commander said was ‘just a small little island that's B L M O itself’. They had nearly 10 miles to run before they were even abeam Blacksod so they didn't need to be at 200'. I know it is easy to be wise with 20/20 hindsight but that was not a great let down route into the refuel site. |
Originally Posted by Aucky
(Post 11138544)
Are the implications of this statement more wide reaching than SAR? As someone who has never flown offshore ARAs, is the weather radar performing a purely ‘terrain mapping’ function during an ARA, i.e. confirmatory position information for the rig location, rather than proximity warning or anti-collision protection? I had always assumed, perhaps incorrectly, that it was used to ensure the path was clear on final approach track to the decision point (and thereby performing an anti-collision function), and also was also used to provide essential proximity information on which the decision point was based.
That being said the phrases “proximity warning” and “ant collision protection” are quite vague. On approach to a rig using the radar, it is used to determine floating obstacles such as standby vessels or other boats in the desired approach path and the range to those obstacles and the destination. Whiles this provides proximity information, it doesn’t provide a proximity “warning”, neither is that information considered particularly accurate below 0.5nm. Anti-collision protection falls under much the same logic I would think. In my anecdotal experience, the GMAP terrain modes of the radar weren’t particularly more effective than fiddling with the gain and tilt of the normal Wx mode |
Apart a host of other issues, the Conclusions section of this report highlights that Black Rock was not in the EGPWS database, on the 1:250,000 aeronautical chart, Euronav imagery or Toughbook. As others have commented on. So mapping was not 100% reliable. But is that really surprising? Would anyone sensible assume that every one of Ireland’s no doubt hundreds of small islands is accurately recorded? Accurately enough to be confident bowling along at night in IMC conditions at 200ft for a planned 10 miles? Just nuts, as I know Crab and gulli agree.
There is a far simpler check that could and should have been done if this highly risky approach was going to be followed – just look at Google Earth. In the corporate world I operate in, whenever I’m going somewhere new I (and I’m sure many others) look at the approach and landing site on Google Earth. Together of course with charts. But photos don’t lie. A 15 second look at the APBSS approach on Google Earth would have made Black Rock glaringly obvious. And there’s even a photo to click on that shows it to be a bloody great lump of rock, about 300ft high! Even if the elevation cursor only shows it as 11m – not that you’d ever rely on that. But amongst the 37 Safety Recommendations not one says do a check on Google Earth! Sometimes I feel that the world of aviation is so bogged down in a lifetime’s reading of documents and procedures that the obvious is missed. |
bowling along at night in IMC conditions at 200ft for a planned 10 miles? Just nuts, as I know Crab and gulli agree There is a far simpler check that could and should have been done if this highly risky approach was going to be followed – just look at Google Earth Checking Google Earth - The contract requirement was to be airborne 45 minutes after call out, they were 8 minutes late in meeting that requirement, so I doubt a lack of thoroughness in preparation was a factor. They originally were not going to Black Rock in any event, it was a diversion decision made in flight, I doubt Google would have been able to be accessed from the aircraft. |
Originally Posted by rotorspeed
(Post 11139169)
...Would anyone sensible assume that every one of Ireland’s no doubt hundreds of small islands is accurately recorded? Accurately enough to be confident bowling along at night in IMC conditions at 200ft for a planned 10 miles? Just nuts, as I know Crab and gulli agree..
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I find it difficult to believe that nobody "stepped back" and thought for a minute there must be a better way to do what they were doing. |
Originally Posted by megan
(Post 11139375)
What might you suggest was a "better" way, keep in mind they were not supposed to be at 200'?
The FMS could have been used to set up any number of interceptions for a downwind leg or base leg; cross-checking on the WX radar that the sector is free. The bay was otherwise almost entirely free of obstacles so why on earth did they fly out to the island anyway, as there were other POS RNAV WYPTS that could have been used to join the route? And why did nobody ask “how high is Black Rock?” And look at the chart to check. Even with the incorrect information on the chart, 200ft was always going to lead to a collision with the plan to fly over at that height.. From the moment the rear crewman called the object and suggested coming right (2nd call), they had about 12 seconds to impact. But the crew remained in a SA fog until the very last seconds. |
I am still disturbed by the 'CRM dance' of the PF asking the PM for a course correction when a trusted crew member in the back has identified terrain ahead. Fair enough they are following their SOPs for operating under AP when flying what they think is a safe approach. However as soon as un-identified terrain is sighted ahead then it might be a big clue that the approach/let down is no longer safe. The winch man in the back seeing a big rock/lighthouse ahead is analogous to a terrain command from the GPWS and surely at that point the AP should be disconnected immediately and avoiding action taken?
Caveat, I am fixed wing pilot but shocked that the crew acted in this way. Multiple calls and 12 seconds from sighting terrain until hitting it. Very sad. |
Megan - a far better way to do it would have been simply to do a let down from the NE to a point say 2nm NE of Blacksod. They would have been into wind, so with a G/S of circa 40kts, and around 2nm away from any other land. They would almost certainly have seen Blacksod lighthouse flashing at 300ft and positioned in. It would also been a lot faster and burst less fuel.
And anyhow, how did R118 get into Blacksod? That clearly worked. Does anyone know if that info is buried in the 350 pages of the report? Did R116 crew establish how R118 were planning on approaching? Would have been wise. Fostex - yes, the slowness of the response to the report of land ahead steer right was dreadful. An immediate action of uncoupling and doing a rapid climbing turn would have unquestionably saved the day. Or even not uncoupling but just doing it, not querying it. How much was tiredness or just inadequate competence from the crew I don't know, but decision making just was not good enough. I will try and read the report in full. |
"Fostex - yes, the slowness of the response to the report of land ahead steer right was dreadful. An immediate action of uncoupling and doing a rapid climbing turn would have unquestionably saved the day. Or even not uncoupling but just doing it, not querying it."
I couldn't agree more. Our SOP for a late sighting of an obstruction (with risk of collision) whilst at low level on NVG was a call of "Up, up, up" from any crew member which would initiate an immediate low level abort, without question. It absolutely saved me and my crew's life on one occasion when a crew member in the jump seat saw a significant mast in our flight path which hadn't been seen by either pilot. |
Originally Posted by megan
(Post 11139375)
What might you suggest was a "better" way, keep in mind they were not supposed to be at 200'?
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A better way would have been for any one of four people on board to say "this is not a good idea". I'm bewildered why nobody said so. I'm left to wonder if they had a newly minted 200 hour co-pilot on board who didn't have an ounce of operational experience, but had a bit of gumption, would have piped up and said so I'm pretty sure I know of the incident of which you speak, not much Marty hasn't told me, tooling about in fog, some thing done by all, but the organisation was not one to address issues other than giving the individual lowest on the totem pole a good kicking, I can give you a copy of a letter received by one (TE) who was a mere bystander to an incident that management had been told was going to occur if they didn't get their act in order. In typical management cowardice the lowest on the totem pole was given the task of penning the letter, BM. Remember taking a bunch of overseas VIPs offshore and one saying "I thought this was a VFR operation", yer, right, typical management completely out of the loop as to what goes on at the coal face because the budget is sacrosanct when it comes to spending money on infrastructure. |
I can’t help but think the primary (out of many) causes of this horrendous incident is that it was not clear to anyone what the ‘Route APBSS (Blacksod South) actually was! I assume when the route was first produced pre 1999 it was meant as a visual low-level route (not a low-level IMC route!) for an S61 or similar, equipped with something like Decca based RNAV 1 or RNAV 2 which (as the report mentions) required an overfly of the start point (BKLMO) to confirm the navigation accuracy. I assume this would have started with an offshore let-down to a suitable height to gain visual references.
Back then, this was probably a sensible solution as there were no other real options for an instrument approach. What I can’t understand, and what to me is unforgivable, is that 18 years later, the Authorities have still not insisted that the ONLY acceptable method for general aviation helicopters (including SAR helicopters flying to/from regular use sites) to descend below MSA from IMC is via a properly designed and published instrument/PinS procedure. From what I can see (I do not have access to the terrain or obstacle data for Ireland), you could easily have PinS approaches and departures both to/from the North East and West South/West which would have been more efficient and safer! Out of interest, I drew the route on a Google Earth image (attached) with the RNP 0.3 (CAT H) waypoint fix tolerance areas (for anyone not into PBN, 0.3NM either side of track [that’s your RNP 0.3 so 95% of the time the GNSS says you are over the waypoint you should be in the pink rectangle] and 0.24NM before and after the waypoint). Also shown are the area semi-width areas in amber for a helicopter flying a route 1.45NM each side of track and in green for an aircraft on a STAR, SID, Initial Segment, Intermediate Segment or Missed Approach 1.15NM. If drawn as a procedure, the route looks pretty flyable at MSA until BKSDB where the combination of establishing back on track after the turn and then turn anticipation for a rather interesting 148 degree turn at BKSDC is probably not doable in a distance of only 3.2NM. Cheers TeeS https://cimg0.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune....fef9ba5018.png |
Originally Posted by megan
(Post 11139575)
On what grounds would either of the two back seaters say "this is not a good idea"....
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Originally Posted by TeeS
(Post 11139610)
...What I can’t understand, and what to me is unforgivable, is that 18 years later, the Authorities have still not insisted that the ONLY acceptable method for general aviation helicopters (including SAR helicopters flying to/from regular use sites) to descend below MSA from IMC is via a properly designed and published instrument/PinS procedure.
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They sure would let it be known if they thought Plan A was not a good idea |
But it's seemingly OK to basically do that at night when stooging around the boonies at 200' when not on any IMC procedure and you can't even see 200' ahead of you. I kinda have a bit of difficulty trying to rationalize that. On the night of the accident, R116 was tasked by MRCC Dublin to provide Top Cover for R118 and was using a ‘Rescue’ call sign; the IAA informed the Investigation that based on these two factors the flight was considered to be a SAR flight and, at the Commander’s discretion, could avail of the alleviations/exemptions contained in the National SAR Approval. The CVR indicates that the Commander’s decision to go to Blacksod for fuel rather than Sligo was based on a concern to save thirty minutes flight time following R118 out, and also on the return journey; furthermore, the Commander received a report ‘conditions good at Blacksod’. The CVR indicates that the Commander later noted that reports from Blacksod indicated a cloud base as low as 300 ft and APP1 was used to bring the Helicopter down to 200 ft over open water before turning inbound to follow the APBSS route. This flight profile was in accordance with OMF which allows a minimum height of 200 ft with the helicopter’s collective axis coupled to RALT, and an absolute minimum of 50 ft helicopter hover with collective coupled to an AFCS SAR mode height hold. However, OMF also requires visibility sufficient for the requirements of the task and to satisfy any OMB requirements for system modes being used. Although not a system mode requirement, OMB says ‘DVE is defined as visibility less than 4000 metres or no distinct natural horizon. Circuits shall be flown at 500 feet with reference to the RADALT with speed at least VY. Once established on the final approach track inside 2 nm at 500 feet, couple or remain coupled to RALT, HDG and IAS and beep down to 300 feet (or deck elevation plus 50 feet, whichever is the higher), to be level by around 1 nm to run.’ The Crew completed DVE Approach checks, indicating that they expected that they would be operating in DVE conditions. However, in descending to 200 ft, whilst it allowed the Crew to obtain COCISS conditions (clear of cloud, in sight of the surface), it eroded a safety barrier – height above the surface – without a definite improvement in terms of horizontal visibility. Furthermore, at 9 NM from Blacksod and 200 ft above sea level, operating just below the cloud base, at night, there were no external visual cues available (e.g. identifiable light sources or discernible features), to allow the Crew to assess horizontal/forward visibility. |
I find it a bit disconcerting that the briefing for the descent/approach was not more `formalised` ,ie everyone on the same `Hymn-Sheet`, front and rear crew ,copies of the `route` and noting all the heights..nothing seemed to be mentioned.Consider also that the W/Op had been on the crew of R116 doing a similar sortie on 8 March just a few days earlier,and had `that big rock` pointed out by that crew`s W/Man,when it had been overflown on the departure from BLKSD at 900FT,as that crew initially decided on a flyover at 500ft,but then decided 900ft would be better.
I would have thought that on return there would have been crew-room chat/discussions about a sortie into an unfamiliar `patch`,and the procedures. For ref; page 66,p 1.8.7,;8/3/17. of the Report.... |
They could still have used their 'legacy S61' approach quite safely but kept at 2400' until BLKMO, descended to 1000' by BKSDA then 200' by BKSDB - that would have kept them clear of terrain and allowed them to get beneath the cloudbase by the time there might have been something (lights etc) to see to assess the weather/vis before a simple left turn into BLKSD into wind once abeam and visual.
Yes, it was 01:00 and they had been up for a while but this was an experienced crew who seemed happy to 'do it they way we have always done it' rather than utilise the capabilities of the aircraft. The profile they flew would have been safe using NVG - not ideal but safe enough - but unaided at night over the sea is IMC and you wouldn't dream of being below SALT unless you were on an approach (internal or external aids) to your LS. |
I don't disagree with you Crab and if a SAR crew were responding to a vessel in the bay there, I realise that is the sort of process they would follow; however, in the absence of the 'low level route' I think it was unlikely that a crew would fly over an unexpected radar return at low level and I also suspect that the crew's arousal level would be higher in that situation than if they were following a known/reported route and missed one key piece of information, which is something we are all capable of doing.
My point is that Blacksod is a refuel point and as such is expected to be used on a regular basis, so there is no excuse for having to fly an ad-hoc IFR approach into it. The Authorities should be driving this forward for all operations where at the moment routine ad-hoc approaches are flown to regularly used sites, that includes corporate, SAR and HEMS in some areas. Cheers TeeS |
TeeS - I agree and it highlights the complacency of the regulator and the operator in failing to ensure best practice.
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Originally Posted by [email protected]
(Post 11139990)
there might have been something (lights etc) to see to assess the weather/vis
They were flying straight towards a lighthouse flashing every 12 sec - an intense source - which they neither saw nor caught the loom of. To me this implies that the visibility at that position and height was far worse that the reports and may have been only a few metres. The lamp was only 82 feet above them. Both as a pilot who once spent a fair amount of time flying around at 200 feet over the sea in some appalling weather, and as a ship's navigating officer, I am mightily puzzled. |
Both as a pilot who once spent a fair amount of time flying around at 200 feet over the sea in some appalling weather, and as a ship's navigating officer, I am mightily puzzled. |
Originally Posted by HissingSyd
(Post 11140115)
This is something that has bugged me from the very beginning and rather pushes the question of NVG to one side.
They were flying straight towards a lighthouse flashing every 12 sec - an intense source - which they neither saw nor caught the loom of. To me this implies that the visibility at that position and height was far worse that the reports and may have been only a few metres. The lamp was only 82 feet above them. Both as a pilot who once spent a fair amount of time flying around at 200 feet over the sea in some appalling weather, and as a ship's navigating officer, I am mightily puzzled. |
Originally Posted by ChristopherRobin
(Post 11140159)
It bothered me too, however read Appendix W in the technical appendices document (page 103)
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I think the answer is that if you are not looking out of the window - because you are not expecting to see anything and you are heads in with FMS/radar etc - you won't see the lighthouse flash perhaps two or 3 times in that short period before you hit it.
Perhaps the weather was worse than expected and the lighthouse was in cloud - wearing NVG would have made that immediately obvious as you got to 200' in the letdown. |
Originally Posted by HissingSyd
(Post 11140163)
Thanks for pointing me to that. It does strike a memory of loosing a light when getting close inshore. However, I also remember how much the loom could be seen in poor visibility and for much longer than the flash, if less intense.
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My memory is of a ‘legacy’ route, initially created by Irish Helicopters to be used by the Bo105 servicing the Irish Lights contract. It’s purpose was to provide a ‘safe’ route between Blacksod and Blackrock Island, intended to be used for transit between both locations in poor weather conditions, subject to Day VFR regulations. At the time, flights at night could not be operated under VFR.
The ‘plate’ showed a magnetic track/reciprocal track and distance between each point on the route overlaid on the appropriate section of a VFR navigation chart. Each reference point was abeam an identifiable land feature. It pre-dated GPS and was flown on a time elapsed / dead reckoning basis. It was operated single pilot and without incident over the years although each pilot would have been very familiar with both the route and the topography of the area. It was never intended for navigation west of Blackrock Island. Let us all remember that 4 people needlessly lost their lives in this accident. If it serves only 1 purpose, that is, if it causes you to examine more closely, to question and re-evaluate EVERY approach you consider making in ‘undetermined and unknown’ areas / conditions, then their sacrifice will not have been in vain. |
Minister urged to accept all recommendations from R116 helicopter crash report
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