USCG aborted rescue possible microburst
Used the "split controls" procedure every now and then on the Wessex 3 (ASW) and I've also used it occasionally in a North Sea sim ride. It's a good means of reducing the workload of the PF when things are going a bit pear-shaped, as long as you brief the other pilot on exactly what to do. On the downwash issue, I was landing on my destroyer in our Wessex while she was replenishing from a tanker on the upwind side. As I moved over the deck we arrived in the downwash from the aft superstructure and landed with pretty much full up collective, much to our surprise and fortunately in the centre of the deck.
As to pulling to droop that works in a single engine scenario on the 212 when the good engine goes to N1 topping..we used that in the 205 a lot or a 212 with the -3 not -3B engines also at high density altitudes when you can have both engines at topping but torque below 100%. However in a 212 with both hamsters running torque limiting and RPM droop is not your friend ( not that we ran around pulling more than 100% torque ) …you can watch as RPM, N1 and TOT drop but torque is indicating high. perhaps 104+. you have to lower collective to get the indicated torque back below limiting. As one pilot described the system in simplistic terms “its like you are rolling off the throttles while pulling collective”. More than one accident has had the torque limiter as a contributing factor. ( one case was a high time 205 driver very recently converted to the 212. The difference between N1 topping and “torque limiting” had not been properly covered during his checkout. )
Getting the torque limiter correctly set up was and is important. There was a time when correct setup was often not done and there was considerable debate as to correct procedures..the manual was worded in such a way as to be ambiguous to some.
Last edited by albatross; 3rd May 2023 at 12:38.
Albatross,
I flew that Sim Scenario as the victim and as the Instructor......lots of times.
It is an attention getter.
As to the CRM thing of having the Non-Handling Pilot handle the Collective.....could be a blessing and a curse.
How would you structure the CRM technique, procedure, control, and determination of who moves the collective and in what manner and to what extent would take some serious thought and structure.
Bottom line question....some of these aircraft are flown Single Pilot IFR....Bell 412's for instance.....are we saying a Single Pilot is not capable of controlling the aircraft that such a CRM Technique would be required if there was a second Pilot?
I might not be a hard headed as that Checkf Pilot that took complete refusal but I would ask that the justification be well sourced and it be proven such a procedure be needed and structured for the maximum safety and minimum risk of complications that could pose additional risks.
I flew that Sim Scenario as the victim and as the Instructor......lots of times.
It is an attention getter.
As to the CRM thing of having the Non-Handling Pilot handle the Collective.....could be a blessing and a curse.
How would you structure the CRM technique, procedure, control, and determination of who moves the collective and in what manner and to what extent would take some serious thought and structure.
Bottom line question....some of these aircraft are flown Single Pilot IFR....Bell 412's for instance.....are we saying a Single Pilot is not capable of controlling the aircraft that such a CRM Technique would be required if there was a second Pilot?
I might not be a hard headed as that Checkf Pilot that took complete refusal but I would ask that the justification be well sourced and it be proven such a procedure be needed and structured for the maximum safety and minimum risk of complications that could pose additional risks.
Please understand I was and am not advocating that the PNF handle the collective in normal ops.
I too have flown 212/412 single pilot.
In this specific case I was getting rapidly “task saturated” and saw the PNF maintaining 100% Q as a way to let me better concentrate my limited skills on maintaining Vbroc, heading ect. I was still monitoring Q in my scan. The PNF kept it nailed and it helped in this particular case. The PNF was a resource to make things easier and I used him. He understood what I was attempting to do and happily complied…there was no time to brief it. It was a spur of the moment call.
However in a 212 with both hamsters running torque limiting and RPM droop is not your friend
Removing Torque Limiting also removed Torque Damping which easily led to torque surges caused by Pilot induced oscillations in the torque settings caused by Collective movement.
We had that inflicted upon us by that Operator as far too many of the young ones coming from the North Sea flying aircraft with bags of power came to the tropics and high temps to an aircraft that was weight limited rather than having excess power.
Handling techniques took a while to adapt.....but ultimately after enough serious over torques commonsense had the aircraft returned to the state the design engineers had decided upon.
I believe in CRM and have advocated for it long before it became as popular as it has. become.....as Crew Coordination, teamwork, and related concepts were part of flying a large crew served helicopter with a crew of Five or Six during normal Ops and more during other operations.
With the advent of radio communication even pilots flying solo can use CRM techniques during times of high stress or mechanical problems.
I am not faulting you for what you did.....am just saying such innovative measures needs to be well coordinated and no confusion be allowed to cause any new and extra problems.
What is unusual about the DFW scenario is the ugly is late in the approach and very near the ground leaving just a very short timeframe to counter the severe effects of the micro-burst but it is well within the abilities of the 212/412 modeling of the Simulator and one would hope the actual aircraft as well.
When we had free time for a Sim with no customers or maintenance preventing use of the Sim.... I used to set up the DFW Model or the Air Methods Blue Field WV model and fly those approaches several times solo in order to stay proficient.
Both of those were excellent tests of aircrew but each with very different underlying reasons.
One thing stands out from such training is there is usually more than one right answer and the discussion should be along the lines of what is the better way rather than what is the wrong way.
Wrong ways quickly identify themselves and can be discounted with a minimum of discussion.
Refusing to discuss something is sure the wrong answer in and of itself.
We had that inflicted upon us by that Operator as far too many of the young ones coming from the North Sea flying aircraft with bags of power came to the tropics and high temps to an aircraft that was weight limited rather than having excess power.
Handling techniques took a while to adapt.....but ultimately after enough serious over torques commonsense had the aircraft returned to the state the design engineers had decided upon.
I believe in CRM and have advocated for it long before it became as popular as it has. become.....as Crew Coordination, teamwork, and related concepts were part of flying a large crew served helicopter with a crew of Five or Six during normal Ops and more during other operations.
With the advent of radio communication even pilots flying solo can use CRM techniques during times of high stress or mechanical problems.
I am not faulting you for what you did.....am just saying such innovative measures needs to be well coordinated and no confusion be allowed to cause any new and extra problems.
What is unusual about the DFW scenario is the ugly is late in the approach and very near the ground leaving just a very short timeframe to counter the severe effects of the micro-burst but it is well within the abilities of the 212/412 modeling of the Simulator and one would hope the actual aircraft as well.
When we had free time for a Sim with no customers or maintenance preventing use of the Sim.... I used to set up the DFW Model or the Air Methods Blue Field WV model and fly those approaches several times solo in order to stay proficient.
Both of those were excellent tests of aircrew but each with very different underlying reasons.
One thing stands out from such training is there is usually more than one right answer and the discussion should be along the lines of what is the better way rather than what is the wrong way.
Wrong ways quickly identify themselves and can be discounted with a minimum of discussion.
Refusing to discuss something is sure the wrong answer in and of itself.
We had that inflicted upon us by that Operator as far too many of the young ones coming from the North Sea flying aircraft with bags of power came to the tropics and high temps to an aircraft that was weight limited rather than having excess power.
I think you will find that the torque TCU mod you refer to came about after a fatal North Sea accident, where the standard 104% Tq limiting MAY have contributed to the inability to avoid a water impact (See Para 2.2 pg 18 https://assets.publishing.service.go...982_G-BIJF.pdf).
I was told that one company was setting it up to limit at 108-110 but can’t say if that was true or not.
A Bell pilot told me that 2 working engines would provide well over 140% and the Transmission and mast could fail around the 120% mark. Hence the reason for the limiting system. What would have be happening in the C box I know not.
I do recall watching a 212 at a fire camp make a fast, steep downwind approach and hearing the RPM rapidly bleed off at the bottom as he tried to stop it. That noise got everyone’s attention. Our comments as we saw the approach was “What the hell is that guy doing??!!” We could do nothing but watch helplessly as the drama unfolded. Fortunately not one of our aircraft. End of a long day on fires and I think he was just tired and lost the picture as we had been flying full out dawn to dusk for about 2 weeks and living in less than comfortable conditions.
I was told that one company was setting it up to limit at 108-110 but can’t say if that was true or not.
In an interesting place where the Operator was not present.....their Engineer over Beer in a Sand Dune top sandbagged Bar....bragged he would set whatever power limits the Pilot desired on his Bell 212.
Upon him offering to work his magic on the one I was using I opined that as it was not on an American Registry there would be some problems in gaining a sign off of his work but thank you for offering.....and off to another part of the Bar.
That was the same Operator that had similar engineering standards in a very remote place on the same Continent where the Engineer used a set of Vise Grip pliers and a hacksaw to shorten the threaded part of some Main Rotor Push Pull Tubes Clevises on a Bell 206.
Their enticement to keep you from leaving was upon your first anniversary the Company would give you a US Navy Leather Flying Jacket.
I was many months shy of getting one of them after seeing the maintenance standard.....and bought the jacket on my own....as it seemed a better bargain.
As I sit here....I can see a Clock that came from the last 212 I flew....when it went to the scrap heap as being beyond economical repair.....with something like 41,000 Hours on it or some such silly number.
Upon him offering to work his magic on the one I was using I opined that as it was not on an American Registry there would be some problems in gaining a sign off of his work but thank you for offering.....and off to another part of the Bar.
That was the same Operator that had similar engineering standards in a very remote place on the same Continent where the Engineer used a set of Vise Grip pliers and a hacksaw to shorten the threaded part of some Main Rotor Push Pull Tubes Clevises on a Bell 206.
Their enticement to keep you from leaving was upon your first anniversary the Company would give you a US Navy Leather Flying Jacket.
I was many months shy of getting one of them after seeing the maintenance standard.....and bought the jacket on my own....as it seemed a better bargain.
As I sit here....I can see a Clock that came from the last 212 I flew....when it went to the scrap heap as being beyond economical repair.....with something like 41,000 Hours on it or some such silly number.
The following 2 users liked this post by SASless:
We seem to have drifted a long way off the topic of praising the USCG crew for keeping the aircraft salt water free in some crappy conditions.
Perhaps we need more SAR pilots on here
Perhaps we need more SAR pilots on here
Very true Crab….I plead guilty to unbridled thread drift.
It would be very interesting to find out what kind of power they had to pull to save the day.
The CVR would be interesting to. There are probably some lessons to be learned. I think there would be some “ Expletives Deleted “ and other non-PC remarks!
Well done to them for a recovery from a very bad situation.
It would be very interesting to find out what kind of power they had to pull to save the day.
The CVR would be interesting to. There are probably some lessons to be learned. I think there would be some “ Expletives Deleted “ and other non-PC remarks!
Well done to them for a recovery from a very bad situation.
Originally Posted by [email protected]
We seem to have drifted a long way off the topic of praising the USCG crew for keeping the aircraft salt water free in some crappy conditions.
Perhaps we need more SAR pilots on here
Perhaps we need more SAR pilots on here
The following users liked this post:
Originally Posted by [email protected]
We seem to have drifted a long way off the topic of praising the USCG crew for keeping the aircraft salt water free in some crappy conditions.
Perhaps we need more SAR pilots on here
Perhaps we need more SAR pilots on here
praising the USCG crew for keeping the aircraft salt water free
Once they moved away from the vessel, they probably went straight into a large downwind vortex. If the wx conditions were unpredictable, they were unlucky, then somewhat lucky.
Last edited by Torquetalk; 6th May 2023 at 08:17.
Agree with your opening bid, when you are dealing with 50kt winds plus a squall and then the mechanical turbulence from the ship, that is asking a lot from even a helicopter as capable as that
