USCG aborted rescue possible microburst
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USCG aborted rescue possible microburst
https://www.reddit.com/r/aviation/co...g_hh60jayhawk/
better view
https://www.tiktok.com/@slb7506/vide...ial_sharing=v2
better view
https://www.tiktok.com/@slb7506/vide...ial_sharing=v2
Last edited by Senior Pilot; 2nd May 2023 at 06:48. Reason: Fix url….again 😇
Second link doesn’t work for me. I’m curious about the sequence of events - they seem to abort the winching and move left whilst maintaining height, and then descend. So, if they hadn’t moved the outcome could have been worse, and I wonder what prompted the move?
Perhaps they saw the squall coming.
If they had just put someone aboard they might have just moved clear for them to work without the noise and downwash of the helicopter in the overhead.
I am surprised they were forced down if they had a rad-alt hold engaged, but I have had holds disengage in extreme weather before.
If they had just put someone aboard they might have just moved clear for them to work without the noise and downwash of the helicopter in the overhead.
I am surprised they were forced down if they had a rad-alt hold engaged, but I have had holds disengage in extreme weather before.
Ever stop to think that Ma Nature decided to remind Humans of where they fit into the scheme of things....and simply over power the ability of the helicopter to hover?
Probably unlikely to overpower a Jhawk, my feeling is there was another issue - certainly the visibility didn't help and it would have been difficult to tell sea from sky. Possible disorientation and late recognition of the descent.
The second video shows the high level of turbulence encountered before the move left and I wonder if the wind was coming across the starboard side of the vessel (it appears to be a cruise liner so will be very slab-sided) and downdraughting on the port side to add to the turbulence.
Much like sitting below the demarcation line when the wind is blowing across a ridge.
I have experienced such downdraughts in far less dramatic conditions than in the video.
All in all an interesting and character-building experience for the crew - perhaps a little brown trouser moment too.
Well done for keeping it out of the oggin
The second video shows the high level of turbulence encountered before the move left and I wonder if the wind was coming across the starboard side of the vessel (it appears to be a cruise liner so will be very slab-sided) and downdraughting on the port side to add to the turbulence.
Much like sitting below the demarcation line when the wind is blowing across a ridge.
I have experienced such downdraughts in far less dramatic conditions than in the video.
All in all an interesting and character-building experience for the crew - perhaps a little brown trouser moment too.
Well done for keeping it out of the oggin
Originally Posted by [email protected]
The second video shows the high level of turbulence encountered before the move left and I wonder if the wind was coming across the starboard side of the vessel (it appears to be a cruise liner so will be very slab-sided) and downdraughting on the port side to add to the turbulence.
Much like sitting below the demarcation line when the wind is blowing across a ridge.
I have experienced such downdraughts in far less dramatic conditions than in the video.
All in all an interesting and character-building experience for the crew - perhaps a little brown trouser moment too.
Well done for keeping it out of the oggin
There is an official statement from the USCG on their instagram account @uscg_rs that confirms this theory
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Yup, a great job in sh*tty conditions
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Avoid imitations
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I’ve experienced what can only have been a microburst event in Central America.
A very sobering thing and although it happened some forty years ago in my early career it remains a disturbing memory. The aircraft kept descending very rapidly despite full power and flaring to min power speed. We lost about 1,000 feet and came out of extremely heavy rain only a couple of hundred feet above the jungle tree tops. As soon as we came out of the rain the aircraft began climbing like a dingbat,
I came close to making headlines with that one, especially bearing in mind that a very senior army officer was one of the passengers. We turned back to the departure point (a jungle camp) and stayed the night!
A very sobering thing and although it happened some forty years ago in my early career it remains a disturbing memory. The aircraft kept descending very rapidly despite full power and flaring to min power speed. We lost about 1,000 feet and came out of extremely heavy rain only a couple of hundred feet above the jungle tree tops. As soon as we came out of the rain the aircraft began climbing like a dingbat,
I came close to making headlines with that one, especially bearing in mind that a very senior army officer was one of the passengers. We turned back to the departure point (a jungle camp) and stayed the night!
Originally Posted by [email protected]
Yup, a great job in sh*tty conditions
We were 2 Captains flying as a crew and I was the Pilot Flying.
As things when rapidly pear-shaped going down the ILS into the shear/downburst. ( I would have liked to see the sim actions from outside…we were bouncing around pretty good ). I asked the PNF to take control of the collective and maintain 100% Q as I tried to maintain best climb wings level, straight ahead at 58 knots.
We managed to fly straight ahead out of it.
The instructor said he had never seen a crew divide control like that. He thought it was good CRM which he would share with others. Apparently a lot of crews did not manage to fly out of it. He asked where I had learned that.
I told him I got the idea from DC-3 crews I had flown with who did that on takeoff. ( Later on I watched a WW2 USAAF training film on the B-26 Marauder and they used the same technique so I guess it was far from a new idea.)
What made me think to do it at that time I have no idea.
My concern was as we bounced around was I would over-torque a bit and get into Torque limiting. Some of the 212s I had flown had torque limiting set way too low. 102-103%.
We later told a Check Pilot about it he maintained that the PF was to manipulate Cyclic, Pedals and Collective at all times and he would fail the rides of any crew who did that.
I guess he thought the PNF’s function was to be an interested spectator and contribute nothing more to events than fervent prayer and childish screams.
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Incredible winds, ship appears to be listing to port, causing extreme turbulence off the superstructure. Downwind abort. Lucky the engines didn't roll back from salt water injestion.
We later told a Check Pilot about it he maintained that the PF was to manipulate Cyclic, Pedals and Collective at all times and he would fail the rides of any crew who did that.
I guess he thought the PNF’s function was to be an interested spectator and contribute nothing more to events than fervent prayer and childish screams
I guess he thought the PNF’s function was to be an interested spectator and contribute nothing more to events than fervent prayer and childish screams
I told him I got the idea from DC-3 crews I had flown with who did that on takeoff.
Albatross,
I flew that Sim Scenario as the victim and as the Instructor......lots of times.
It is an attention getter.
Once paired with an up and coming young Spark with him at the controls and watched some serious learning be accomplished.
My opining that he would be experiencing some real turbulence and interesting weather conditions I was informed he knew about such from his time on the North Sea.
During the ILS he correctly identified a sink rate that he appeared unable to correct.....was advised to pull maximum power and reduce his IAS to Vbroc (as you described)
He did...and reported the sink rate was still excessive.....and demonstrated he felt he had done everything he could do.....when I reached down and pulled the Collective up until we bled Nr to 90% or so thus gaining control of the sink rate.
We broke out of cloud to see the airport and probably. were harvesting ears of corn (virtually).
My comment about Redlines being for normal operations and there being nothing normal about crashing....seemed to bother him somewhat but he did admit to the wisdom if not caring for the delivery.
The operator we flew for at the time incorporated as part of a continued takeoff after an engine failure the procedure of bleeding off the Nr and my view was if it was fine and dandy to do it VMC during OEI procedures then doing it IMC and crashing it was ok to do it with both engines running.
As to the CRM thing of having the Non-Handling Pilot handle the Collective.....could be a blessing and a curse.
How would you structure the CRM technique, procedure, control, and determination of who moves the collective and in what manner and to what extent would take some serious thought and structure.
Bottom line question....some of these aircraft are flown Single Pilot IFR....Bell 412's for instance.....are we saying a Single Pilot is not capable of controlling the aircraft that such a CRM Technique would be required if there was a second Pilot?
I might not be a hard headed as that Checkf Pilot that took complete refusal but I would ask that the justification be well sourced and it be proven such a procedure be needed and structured for the maximum safety and minimum risk of complications that could pose additional risks.
I flew that Sim Scenario as the victim and as the Instructor......lots of times.
It is an attention getter.
Once paired with an up and coming young Spark with him at the controls and watched some serious learning be accomplished.
My opining that he would be experiencing some real turbulence and interesting weather conditions I was informed he knew about such from his time on the North Sea.
During the ILS he correctly identified a sink rate that he appeared unable to correct.....was advised to pull maximum power and reduce his IAS to Vbroc (as you described)
He did...and reported the sink rate was still excessive.....and demonstrated he felt he had done everything he could do.....when I reached down and pulled the Collective up until we bled Nr to 90% or so thus gaining control of the sink rate.
We broke out of cloud to see the airport and probably. were harvesting ears of corn (virtually).
My comment about Redlines being for normal operations and there being nothing normal about crashing....seemed to bother him somewhat but he did admit to the wisdom if not caring for the delivery.
The operator we flew for at the time incorporated as part of a continued takeoff after an engine failure the procedure of bleeding off the Nr and my view was if it was fine and dandy to do it VMC during OEI procedures then doing it IMC and crashing it was ok to do it with both engines running.
As to the CRM thing of having the Non-Handling Pilot handle the Collective.....could be a blessing and a curse.
How would you structure the CRM technique, procedure, control, and determination of who moves the collective and in what manner and to what extent would take some serious thought and structure.
Bottom line question....some of these aircraft are flown Single Pilot IFR....Bell 412's for instance.....are we saying a Single Pilot is not capable of controlling the aircraft that such a CRM Technique would be required if there was a second Pilot?
I might not be a hard headed as that Checkf Pilot that took complete refusal but I would ask that the justification be well sourced and it be proven such a procedure be needed and structured for the maximum safety and minimum risk of complications that could pose additional risks.
Getting the NHP to operate the collective is simple as long as you tell him what to do.
In the above example the instruction was clear - maintain 100%.
You could use 'Maintain Nr in the green arc or at ***%' or 'Set ***% for landing' or any number of specific commands - most of which we used for double manual approaches on the Sea King.
In the above example the instruction was clear - maintain 100%.
You could use 'Maintain Nr in the green arc or at ***%' or 'Set ***% for landing' or any number of specific commands - most of which we used for double manual approaches on the Sea King.
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Those in power can have some odd ideas, was riding shotgun while a lad was gaining the requisite ICUS time to progress to a command in a two crew operation, a problem developed and in good CRM manner the issue was discussed and an option decided, chief pilot wouldn't let the lad log ICUS as he didn't make all the decisions ie we were not to discuss our options.
Warren Vanderburgh in one of the "Children of the magenta" series, examined the Delta Tristar microburst at Atlanta and illustrated the event with the FDR readouts against the video. He makes the case for using every last ounce of available energy (to hell with limits).