EC 225 Return to REAL Service
Jim - are you serious?
Quoting a partial accident record utterly undermines your creditability. Quote the full record or nothing at all. It is the easiest thing in the world to select a 'golden period' and then make an argument from it. Now try the 4 accidents and tell someone that the 10 year mean it is a really.
Quoting a partial accident record utterly undermines your creditability. Quote the full record or nothing at all. It is the easiest thing in the world to select a 'golden period' and then make an argument from it. Now try the 4 accidents and tell someone that the 10 year mean it is a really.
Hmm, not disagreeing with the rest of your statements but Jim was referring to only one fatal accident in the 225. You are referring to 4.
Which 4 fatal accidents of the 225 do you have in mind. And he didn't say anything about 10 years. Perhaps you should wipe the Foam off your Mouth and take the time and properly read what others are writing before trying to set them straight on things they never said just because you disagree.
And before you think I try to support the 225: Yes: I agree that the 225 in the current situation is in my eyes not acceptable for Offshore operations or any commercial operations for that matter. AH have very obviously not properly understood why things went wrong and how to absolutely make sure it won't occur again. Worse: They don't seem to have a clue how the event unfolding can be detected/predicted reliably.
But let's stay fact based and not rage get us carried away and denigrating other based on half- read posts.
Last edited by henra; 23rd Dec 2016 at 10:53.
Think that the 10 years were from this part of the posting: 'across more than a decade, the 225 has had only one fatal accident' .
Meanwhile it is not fair to say the ELUBE system worked fine when in the event the instrumentation indicated that it was not. That actually compounds the failure, at least imho.
Meanwhile it is not fair to say the ELUBE system worked fine when in the event the instrumentation indicated that it was not. That actually compounds the failure, at least imho.
Some people seem to be interchanging "Super Puma", AS332L, L1, L2, and EC225.
My understanding is that the AS332L2 (one member of the "Super Puma" family), and the EC225* have a different gearbox to the "L" and "L1" Super Pumas.
This new gearbox has failed several times with fatal results. These failures have not been adequately explained, let alone fixed.
Does that sum up the factual situation?
Lots of statistics quoted on this thread, try to cover the whole family, from AS330 - EC225, and blur the actual current problem.
IE Not that the family of helicopters doesn't have an acceptable or unacceptable safety record. Not even that the EC225 has an unacceptable or acceptable safety record.
But simply the transmission design used in the the L2 model, and the EC225 model has failed fatally, and there seems no reason why it won't fail fatally again if they continue to fly.
That is the problem, and I believe the basis for grounding of those two variants by every responsible aviation authority.
*(not generally refered to as a "Super Puma" by anyone in the industry. Sometimes referred to comedically as a "Super Doopa Pumu")
My understanding is that the AS332L2 (one member of the "Super Puma" family), and the EC225* have a different gearbox to the "L" and "L1" Super Pumas.
This new gearbox has failed several times with fatal results. These failures have not been adequately explained, let alone fixed.
Does that sum up the factual situation?
Lots of statistics quoted on this thread, try to cover the whole family, from AS330 - EC225, and blur the actual current problem.
IE Not that the family of helicopters doesn't have an acceptable or unacceptable safety record. Not even that the EC225 has an unacceptable or acceptable safety record.
But simply the transmission design used in the the L2 model, and the EC225 model has failed fatally, and there seems no reason why it won't fail fatally again if they continue to fly.
That is the problem, and I believe the basis for grounding of those two variants by every responsible aviation authority.
*(not generally refered to as a "Super Puma" by anyone in the industry. Sometimes referred to comedically as a "Super Doopa Pumu")
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As has been said many times here perceptions alone will ground this aircraft
Does anyone want to flame me for saying that AH have made a very difficult situation worse to the point it may be irreparable? Anyone want to defend their management of this problem?
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In both cases (DW & CN), although EMLUB had been correctly activated and was functioning correctly, a warning of EMLUB failure was indicated shortly after activation and the crews followed procedure and ditched. It subsequently turned out that there was a design fault in the warning system.
Chances of the aircraft making it back to land with a third of the shaft supporting bearings not present not guaranteed hence the AH flight manual requirement after the events to land immediately even with functioning EM LUBE system in the event of shaft failure if memory serves me correctly.
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Regarding the EMLUB, it may have been forgotten that in the first ditching, REDW, there was loss of MGB oil pressure followed by a chip indication to the cockpit via the VMS. The previous accident to that was the REDL fatal one and the AAIB report on it, which the later crew would likely be familiar with, gave FDR data showing chip indications followed by loss of MGB oil pressure. I.E. Similar warnings although presented in reverse sequence (within 15 secs). Even without the EMLUB caption illuminating there may have been some concern that ‘something’ was breaking up inside the gearbox (which indeed there was). When you get a chip indication how many metal chips do you know there are?
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Lies, damn lies, and statistics...
Logs to the fire gents.
1. Lies: Passengers prefer the 225 vs 92...I think not...
2. Damn lies: The performance of the 225 is better than the 92... Only until u have to calculate take off performance with any climb above 150 feet per minute OEI...(As in required climb gradients)
3. (Safety) Statistics: There really is no comparison...Really...
The 225 will not be welcome in NS operations anytime soon.
It is hard to trust a manufacturer who points his finger to the operator, as soon as anything bad happens..
Torcher
1. Lies: Passengers prefer the 225 vs 92...I think not...
2. Damn lies: The performance of the 225 is better than the 92... Only until u have to calculate take off performance with any climb above 150 feet per minute OEI...(As in required climb gradients)
3. (Safety) Statistics: There really is no comparison...Really...
The 225 will not be welcome in NS operations anytime soon.
It is hard to trust a manufacturer who points his finger to the operator, as soon as anything bad happens..
Torcher
Last edited by Torcher; 23rd Dec 2016 at 23:17. Reason: grammar
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In reality, magnetic chip detectors are mostly helpful at detecting the types of gear/bearing failures that are not catastrophic. Modest surface spalling failures rather than fracture failures.
Emergency lube systems are designed to keep a gearbox functioning in the event a loss of lube oil flow occurs. Assuming everything else in the gearbox is still working OK.
Hmmm, it is not so much the statistics. They are not very different between the S-92 and the 225. Each had one fatal accident with 18 and 13 fatalities, respectively. Admittedly the S-92 fleet is a bit bigger, so the statistic for the S-92 is indeed a little bit better. That said, statistics with only one fatal accident don't tell much. Concorde went from safest Airliner of all times to unsafest in one single unfortunate day.
The difference is that Sikorsky was able to address the issues that led to the crash and there is a strategy how to avoid a similar accident in the future. AH currently is not on top of the issue.
And not speaking of communication strategy of both Manufacturers. This is where there is really no comparison. At all.
The 225 will not be welcome in NS operations anytime soon.
It is hard to trust a manufacturer who points his finger to the operator, as soon as anything bad happens..
It is hard to trust a manufacturer who points his finger to the operator, as soon as anything bad happens..
Fully agreed and not much to add.
Agreed.
The problem is both Manufacturer's Gearbox issues have a common denominator: Weight saving + a bit carry over of components from their predecessors. And that is driven by the cut- throat cost driven competition in O&G. When you bring a new type of Helicopter it has to be much more efficient than its predecessors and it mustn't cost twice as much. Unfortunately Helicopter Technology is so much matured that there are no easy gains any more. Only by shaving off every ounce possible an advantage can be generated. The difficulty is to foresee where it is one ounce too much saved. Both manufacturers found out the hard way now. Sikorsky was in so far lucky that their weak spot was easier to fix (at least the immediate cause -the Gears themselves remain too weak to work without Oil for much more than 10 minutes). Their airframe had more Greenfield portion where they were not limited by existing components. Coincidentally its Achilles heel is also the Element where things were carried over from the smaller Blackhawk.
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And that is driven by the cut- throat cost driven competition in O&G.
(those three accidents were with BP, Exxon or Statoil
).Of the S92
Coincidentally its Achilles heel is also the Element where things were
carried over from the smaller Blackhawk.
Still waiting to hear the severity of the damage due to the gearbox being involved in a road transportation accident. What actually was performed after that incident and how deep did they go on the repair ?Until that is revealed all of the folks who are swirling gearbox engineering formulas and stress analysis are just blowing smoke. Maybe it's a fat red herring but maybe fate was sealed as a result of something that happened (or didn't happen) half a world away and a long time ago. l can't help but think that the things you know about should be evaluated before the things you hypothesize about.
There is a work order somewhere that has the details and an insurance report on the accident with photos and descriptions. I suspect that stuff won't see the light of day outside a courtroom but it might be interesting.
There is a work order somewhere that has the details and an insurance report on the accident with photos and descriptions. I suspect that stuff won't see the light of day outside a courtroom but it might be interesting.
Originally Posted by Concentric
When you get a chip indication how many metal chips do you know there are?
When you get a chip indication how many metal chips do you know there are?
Posted by rifraf
The obvious answer is, "enough ferrous debris to bridge the sensor gap".
The obvious answer is, "enough ferrous debris to bridge the sensor gap".
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Still waiting to hear the severity of the damage due to the gearbox being involved in a road transportation accident. What actually was performed after that incident and how deep did they go on the repair ?Until that is revealed all of the folks who are swirling gearbox engineering formulas and stress analysis are just blowing smoke. Maybe it's a fat red herring but maybe fate was sealed as a result of something that happened (or didn't happen) half a world away and a long time ago. l can't help but think that the things you know about should be evaluated before the things you hypothesize about.
There is a work order somewhere that has the details and an insurance report on the accident with photos and descriptions. I suspect that stuff won't see the light of day outside a courtroom but it might be interesting.
There is a work order somewhere that has the details and an insurance report on the accident with photos and descriptions. I suspect that stuff won't see the light of day outside a courtroom but it might be interesting.
Shortcomings and omissions in the stress analyses of both the 2nd stage planet gear and the bevel gear shaft that I have referred to are not hypotheses. They are documented in AAIB reports. I generally give references. If I have missed some please point them out and I will cite the relevant source(s) for you.
If AH were sure it was the RTA that caused the planet gear to fail, why remove the -07 gear from service and why increase MCD and oil filter inspections on the -06 gear to every 10 flying hours?
Concentric,
Perhaps I was rude in that you feel I was addressing you in specific about blowing smoke. Not so, I respect the thoroughness and thoughtfulness of the posts from folks who apparently have the engineering background which I lack. Perhaps the planet gear was the point of catastrophic failure but consider that perhaps the initiator was the thud that may have happened when it fell off the truck. AB could not be expected to say "we think its good, just don't let the unit fall more than half a meter if you should drop it". My only point is that perhaps if they had thrown away the guts of this GB after the road accident, this never would have happened. If they did that my point is moot. They do the next best thing at the worst time (post catastrophe) and address what failed. Not saying there weren't serious design weaknesses, just suggesting that they might not have manifested themselves at this time and place if the truck didn't crash.
Perhaps I was rude in that you feel I was addressing you in specific about blowing smoke. Not so, I respect the thoroughness and thoughtfulness of the posts from folks who apparently have the engineering background which I lack. Perhaps the planet gear was the point of catastrophic failure but consider that perhaps the initiator was the thud that may have happened when it fell off the truck. AB could not be expected to say "we think its good, just don't let the unit fall more than half a meter if you should drop it". My only point is that perhaps if they had thrown away the guts of this GB after the road accident, this never would have happened. If they did that my point is moot. They do the next best thing at the worst time (post catastrophe) and address what failed. Not saying there weren't serious design weaknesses, just suggesting that they might not have manifested themselves at this time and place if the truck didn't crash.
My lucky day.
Is that some of the notorious British Understatement I have heard so much about?
I hope folks did not wear out your Shirt...for rubbing on your Shoulder trying to gain some of your very good luck!
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Roscoe1,
I didn’t think your post was rude at all, so I apologize if you think my reply was a bit sharp. You are absolutely right that details of the RTA seem a long time in coming out, particularly (I would add) when you consider that against the backdrop of other unilateral statements by AH. But then again, your later comment regarding courtrooms could well explain that and a certain desire by AH to cloud the actual cause, for instance by removing -07 gears from service and imposing daily inspections with -06 gears fitted. Red herrings, possibly.
That was why I thought your comment “l can't help but think that the things you know about should be evaluated before the things you hypothesize about” had a certain irony about it (although I am not sure if irony is appreciated in all cultures) that I turned in the direction of AH (not you) and suggesting they had been laying a smokescreen.
Any report on that post-RTA inspection and ‘repair’ would probably fall short of expectations in identifying the root cause, since if it did then AH would (hopefully) have done exactly what you suggested right there and then and binned it. It would only be gaps in the report that would open up more hypotheses.
I didn’t think your post was rude at all, so I apologize if you think my reply was a bit sharp. You are absolutely right that details of the RTA seem a long time in coming out, particularly (I would add) when you consider that against the backdrop of other unilateral statements by AH. But then again, your later comment regarding courtrooms could well explain that and a certain desire by AH to cloud the actual cause, for instance by removing -07 gears from service and imposing daily inspections with -06 gears fitted. Red herrings, possibly.
That was why I thought your comment “l can't help but think that the things you know about should be evaluated before the things you hypothesize about” had a certain irony about it (although I am not sure if irony is appreciated in all cultures) that I turned in the direction of AH (not you) and suggesting they had been laying a smokescreen.
Any report on that post-RTA inspection and ‘repair’ would probably fall short of expectations in identifying the root cause, since if it did then AH would (hopefully) have done exactly what you suggested right there and then and binned it. It would only be gaps in the report that would open up more hypotheses.