End of the 225?
I know a few people who have done both.
That asked, the interaction of all of the parts trying to go in opposing directions does take a bit of time to sort out. What can kill you sometimes crops up in novel ways. The complete
design of the seat harness killed a friend of mine ...
Some testing, yes. But only the tests that someone thought to do, ie the tests that were required by the bits of paper. Wasn't it the S92 that had a big deal when one of allegedly duplex oil pumps lost drive? Apparently that scenario hadn't been taken into consideration during certification. Not much point in doing FMEA if you don't spend much time thinking up the Fs. That is where some intelligence is required.
I think one of the problems with large complex helicopters is that within a manufacturer, virtually no-one really understands how the whole thing hangs together. Lots of clever chaps with supreme knowledge about their little bit, but lacking the big picture.
I think one of the problems with large complex helicopters is that within a manufacturer, virtually no-one really understands how the whole thing hangs together. Lots of clever chaps with supreme knowledge about their little bit, but lacking the big picture.
Yup, a big deal HC. Just like when a bevel gear driving the pumps fail, without losing oil, and an emergency system comes on, never been evaluated with a box full of oil, and two ditchings result. Manufacturers need to learn from the other's mistakes as well as their own. In this case, the failure mode SHOULD have been predicted. certainly before the second occurrence. But according to your statistics, all of the events on S-92 should be counted as mishaps, but only one now on 225? The argument could be made the other way, as some have suggested - Seven (at least) gearbox events on puma either catastrophic or leading to ditching. Three catastrophic events, no time for pilot to react. S-92 actually zero direct - as the one breakup was secondary, with PIC ignoring the RFM. The previous event was cluttered with an unapproved repair, yet a solution was fielded, so not ignored at all. By the true 'catastrophic gearbox failure' count, it is puma three, S-92 zero. Real people died in all, so out of respect to consider all issues as significant, S-92 has corrected the issues you mention whilst puma has not.
17 occurrences in the puma family where input gear resonance caused failures, one led to a tragedy. Nobody looking at the big picture on that one?
C'mon, HC really. You are a smart dude, (not being sarcastic) be honest and Tell us how each of the identified puma 'issues' involving dynamic components were resolved, that are no longer an issue on the 225.
Even lightning striking a tail blade leading to loss of tail rotor gearbox, and a ditching. S-92 has experienced multiple lightning strikes, including large portions of blades departing, flew back safely every time. Thor must have been pissed.
Lost a freewheel camshaft too during firefighting, and ditched in Hong Kong - reason - power rating was increased without really thinking it through.
With some magic wand waving and similar AS/ EC/ AH style ignorance, er, approach, the S-92 could be upgraded to over 30,000 lb. Then it would beat 225 as well, and probably just as safe. As we see, when you up-rate higher power through an old design, and only are held to the 1960 standards, well you simply lose some margin. It is what it is, but maybe if the 225 was held to the same standards, it would need to lose payload to keep the loads down.
Let's talk data and facts as you suggest, rather than opinion that the 225 is superior in every way - just not true. Not in safety. and if you normalized the safety, it would not be as competitive in other areas. Not even considering the sardine experience.
Otherwise, I agree with a lot you are saying - in particular, no panic, be patient.
None, but I've seen the consequence. I'm sure that in the good old days of flying by steam, it was feasible for one chap to grasp the whole machine but these days where 50% of the design and behaviour is in electronics and software it is not really. Most folk are either good at whirly round bits, or good at dancing electrons, but not both. Well that's my experience of OEMs anyway.
@oneperrev. A bit of a ranty post if I may say so, but my point about the certification process was applicable to both sides of the Atlantic. The reason why I consider the 225 superior to the S92 in nearly every way (apart from the quickly detachable rotor head) is based on a pilot's perspective.
Uncluttered Avionics, autopilot and its protections, smoothness at speed, noise, ability to just put in full fuel regardless. We now have a lot of people bouncing from 225 to 92 and back, I know of one person who prefers the 92 but he is mad.
Uncluttered Avionics, autopilot and its protections, smoothness at speed, noise, ability to just put in full fuel regardless. We now have a lot of people bouncing from 225 to 92 and back, I know of one person who prefers the 92 but he is mad.
None, but I've seen the consequence. I'm sure that in the good old days of flying by steam, it was feasible for one chap to grasp the whole machine but these days where 50% of the design and behaviour is in electronics and software it is not really. Most folk are either good at whirly round bits, or good at dancing electrons, but not both. Well that's my experience of OEMs anyway.
This makes it hard to swallow your argument with TommyL, - I can't find a rational way to counter his voiced concern until a) the root cause is identified/agreed and b) the root cause is addressed/resolved/mitigated.
The failure mode that led to this crash is the antithesis of graceful degradation: seems to me that everyone -- pilots, OEMs, passengers, maintenance/engineering, operations folks -- should be speaking with one voice. This needs to be figured out and not guessed at.
This makes it hard to swallow your argument with TommyL, - I can't find a rational way to counter his voiced concern until a) the root cause is identified/agreed and b) the root cause is addressed/resolved/mitigated.
The failure mode that led to this crash is the antithesis of graceful degradation: seems to me that everyone -- pilots, OEMs, passengers, maintenance/engineering, operations folks -- should be speaking with one voice. This needs to be figured out and not guessed at.
My argument with TommyL et al is that there shouldn't be a clamour to kill the EC225 whilst the facts remain unknown. I'll agree that this latest news is not good and if it transpires that there was a flaw in one of the planet gears that caused the catastrophe, and there were no prior warnings such as chips or VHM in the preceding days, and there was no obvious maintenance error either on the aircraft or at the gearbox maintenance facility (or a manufacturing error for that matter) then I will be in the queue to say that the 225 shouldn't fly again unless the issue can be robustly and fundamentally addressed. But so far we don't have the information to make that call. We don't know the epicyclic module's history, when and where it was last overhauled, seen the records from the overhaul, know whether there were any chip or VHM warnings. In fact so far we know very little and it is thus too early to condemn the 225.
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Several Oil Companies in the last couple of days have decided that reintroduction of the 225 will take a long time, be very difficult from an IR perspective and have decided to move away from the 225 permanently.
As An oil company advisor who advises the board, I will wait until more information becomes available before adopting a final recommendation. Since the 225 is now grounded by my regulator and operator, there seems little point in rushing to a conclusion, adding my voice is meaningless in the current situation.
As An oil company advisor who advises the board, I will wait until more information becomes available before adopting a final recommendation. Since the 225 is now grounded by my regulator and operator, there seems little point in rushing to a conclusion, adding my voice is meaningless in the current situation.
REDL was preventable, this one might have been we don't yet know.
As you correctly point out the economic and industrial relations considerations can considerably outweigh the technical. It is only my own opinion, but I suspect that in the NS, 29 April 2016 was their last full day of service. Elsewhere they will probably live to fly another day.
As you say some of the Pumas have already departed the scene.
Last edited by birmingham; 3rd Jun 2016 at 14:11.
It is only my own opinion, but I suspect that in the NS, 29 April 2016 was their last full day of service. Elsewhere they will probably live to fly another day.
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...and if so, that leaves only one heavy machine left for the offshore industry. For a long time. There appears to be no S-92B or EC 225 Mk II anywhere near fruition. Tough times, indeed.
HC....at the risk pointing out the obivious to you.....just why does this Thread exist?
Seems a new tech flying Wonder ain't doing so well is it?
One thing for sure this new fanged flying machine has just been made Crash Proof by the Authority hasn't it!
Seems a new tech flying Wonder ain't doing so well is it?
One thing for sure this new fanged flying machine has just been made Crash Proof by the Authority hasn't it!
Last edited by SASless; 3rd Jun 2016 at 19:00.
I'm not quite sure what the purpose of your post is. Is it just to gloat at others' misfortune?
SAS,
Classy as ever. With modern helicopters like the B429, AW139/189 having 30m+ loss of lube capability (as well as the 225 if a sensor was wired correctly) I expect at least the NS to soon mandate the capability. No hiding behind marketing BS. Bye-bye S-92 when that happens.
The Sultan
Classy as ever. With modern helicopters like the B429, AW139/189 having 30m+ loss of lube capability (as well as the 225 if a sensor was wired correctly) I expect at least the NS to soon mandate the capability. No hiding behind marketing BS. Bye-bye S-92 when that happens.
The Sultan
SAS,
Classy as ever. With modern helicopters like the B429, AW139/189 having 30m+ loss of lube capability (as well as the 225 if a sensor was wired correctly) I expect at least the NS to soon mandate the capability. No hiding behind marketing BS. Bye-bye S-92 when that happens.
The Sultan
Classy as ever. With modern helicopters like the B429, AW139/189 having 30m+ loss of lube capability (as well as the 225 if a sensor was wired correctly) I expect at least the NS to soon mandate the capability. No hiding behind marketing BS. Bye-bye S-92 when that happens.
The Sultan
Last edited by helicrazi; 3rd Jun 2016 at 21:38.
Bell doesn't have anything that will replace the 92 or 225.
It is pretty clear from the history on PPRuNe Rotorheads forum that the Sultan works for (or worked for) Bell. But that doesn't matter, as each voice on the internet adds to the great cacophony we have come to love so well, so well, so well.
So it's up against the wall, Rotor Headers
Rotors ... spin round the head so well (So well, So well)
It's a four per rev as long as we have got the donks
It's an auto otherwise
Which ain't so swell.
R, is for the Rotor on my Helimacopter
O, is for the oil that keeps her in the air
T is for torque
O is for "Omigod what the heck was that?"
(finally) and
R, is for RPM, about which I deeply care.
So it's up against the wall, Rotor Headers ...
(Apologies to Merle Haggard for that spoof there. I just now realized that rotor is a palindrome. It took how many years?)
On a more serious note, the FAA has spoken.
FAA’s Determination
These helicopters have been approved by the aviation authority of France and are approved
for operation in the United States. Pursuant to our bilateral agreement with France, EASA, its
technical representative, has notified us of the unsafe condition described in the EASA Emergency
AD. We are issuing this Emergency AD because we evaluated all information provided by EASA
and determined the unsafe condition exists and is likely to exist or develop on other helicopters of
these same type designs.
So it's up against the wall, Rotor Headers
Rotors ... spin round the head so well (So well, So well)
It's a four per rev as long as we have got the donks
It's an auto otherwise
Which ain't so swell.
R, is for the Rotor on my Helimacopter
O, is for the oil that keeps her in the air
T is for torque
O is for "Omigod what the heck was that?"
(finally) and
R, is for RPM, about which I deeply care.
So it's up against the wall, Rotor Headers ...
(Apologies to Merle Haggard for that spoof there. I just now realized that rotor is a palindrome. It took how many years?)
On a more serious note, the FAA has spoken.
FAA’s Determination
These helicopters have been approved by the aviation authority of France and are approved
for operation in the United States. Pursuant to our bilateral agreement with France, EASA, its
technical representative, has notified us of the unsafe condition described in the EASA Emergency
AD. We are issuing this Emergency AD because we evaluated all information provided by EASA
and determined the unsafe condition exists and is likely to exist or develop on other helicopters of
these same type designs.
Last edited by Lonewolf_50; 4th Jun 2016 at 03:22.
@oneperrev. A bit of a ranty post if I may say so, but my point about the certification process was applicable to both sides of the Atlantic. The reason why I consider the 225 superior to the S92 in nearly every way (apart from the quickly detachable rotor head) is based on a pilot's perspective.
Uncluttered Avionics, autopilot and its protections, smoothness at speed, noise, ability to just put in full fuel regardless. We now have a lot of people bouncing from 225 to 92 and back, I know of one person who prefers the 92 but he is mad.
Uncluttered Avionics, autopilot and its protections, smoothness at speed, noise, ability to just put in full fuel regardless. We now have a lot of people bouncing from 225 to 92 and back, I know of one person who prefers the 92 but he is mad.
We all should be mad even though Most of us had nothing to do with the tragedy. Seriously, the best points of these discussions is that it tends to formulate opinions, both rational and irrational, and if those can lead to practices and actions, the industry moves forward..
I am not one to pile on your misfortune - on contrary I wish the best for the displaced professionals with simple recommendation to objectively learn from it what we can.
SAS,
Classy as ever. With modern helicopters like the B429, AW139/189 having 30m+ loss of lube capability (as well as the 225 if a sensor was wired correctly) I expect at least the NS to soon mandate the capability. No hiding behind marketing BS. Bye-bye S-92 when that happens.
The Sultan
Classy as ever. With modern helicopters like the B429, AW139/189 having 30m+ loss of lube capability (as well as the 225 if a sensor was wired correctly) I expect at least the NS to soon mandate the capability. No hiding behind marketing BS. Bye-bye S-92 when that happens.
The Sultan
I also think you must really be just a big old teaser, you would be sad to see S-92 go away, and don't be so sure of status quo.
You touch a real topic however, and that is regarding "mandated capability". The real news in this thread context is regarding capability of failure detection. The one claim that is made in the preliminary report is that the present means are not sufficient. Very powerful statement in a preliminary report, with widespread implications. This will be the basis of new rulemaking, mark my words... it will take 10 years to implement.
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LW, I love it 
The late MH would have been proud of you
- VFR
So it's up against the wall, Rotor Headers
Rotors ... spin round the head so well (So well, So well)
It's a four per rev as long as we have got the donks
It's an auto otherwise
Which ain't so swell.
R, is for the Rotor on my Helimacopter
O, is for the oil that keeps her in the air
T is for torsion
O, is for "Omigod what the heck was that?"
(finally)
R, is for RPM, about which I deeply care.
So it's up against the wall, Rotor Headers ...
(Apologies to Merle Haggard for that spoof there. I just now realized that rotor is a palindrome. It took how many years?)
PS no I didn't get the palindrome either!!
The late MH would have been proud of you
- VFR So it's up against the wall, Rotor Headers
Rotors ... spin round the head so well (So well, So well)
It's a four per rev as long as we have got the donks
It's an auto otherwise
Which ain't so swell.
R, is for the Rotor on my Helimacopter
O, is for the oil that keeps her in the air
T is for torsion
O, is for "Omigod what the heck was that?"
(finally)
R, is for RPM, about which I deeply care.
So it's up against the wall, Rotor Headers ...
(Apologies to Merle Haggard for that spoof there. I just now realized that rotor is a palindrome. It took how many years?)
PS no I didn't get the palindrome either!!
I love it....Year 2016....Billions spent using every method possible to forecast/detect/warn/minimize wear and failures....and now we finally learn it was for naught.
So just where do we go from here?
Just how do we square this circle and wind up with helicopters that just do not come apart in the air without sufficient notice to prevent tragedies such as this latest one?
I mean really....just when we thought it safe to go outdoors we discover we can be ambushed by an inanimate piece of machinery at any time it decides to give up the Ghost.
So just where do we go from here?
Just how do we square this circle and wind up with helicopters that just do not come apart in the air without sufficient notice to prevent tragedies such as this latest one?
I mean really....just when we thought it safe to go outdoors we discover we can be ambushed by an inanimate piece of machinery at any time it decides to give up the Ghost.